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In the years since the dissolution of the Soviet Union Central Asia has experienced 
wide-reaching and ongoing social change. The structures and values of all social 
strata have been questioned and re-evaluated in a continuing exploration of what it 
means to be part of the post-Soviet space. Within this space, identity formation and 
reformation has been a pre-eminent process for individuals, for groups of all kinds 
and for the newly emerging states and their leaders. 
  
Through the analysis of individual interviews and selected newspaper extracts and 
government policy documents this study explores the ways in which ethnic and state 
identities are being negotiated in Kazakhstan. Using the social identity theory 
framework it investigates the value and content of these identities by examining the 
state ideologies of language and the policies which are their expression as well as the 
discourses of language and identity engaged in by individuals and in the media. 
There is an exploration of common and conflicting themes referred to as aspects of 
these identities, of outgroups deemed relevant for comparison and of the roles of 
Kazakh and Russian in particular, alongside other languages, in relation to these 
identities.  
 
The study focuses on the availability to an individual of multiple possible identities 
of differing levels of inclusiveness. The saliency of a particular identity is 
demonstrated to vary according both to context and to the beliefs and goals of the 
individual concerned. The importance of discourse to processes of identity formation 
and maintenance is also described and the interaction between discourse and social 
context is highlighted.  
  
The ongoing construction of a Kazakhstani identity is described and the importance 
of group norms of hospitality, inclusiveness and interethnic accord observed. The 
sense of learning from other cultures and of mutual enrichment is also demonstrated. 
However, these themes exist in tension with those of Kazakhstan as belonging 
primarily to Kazakhs and of cultural oppression and loss.  
 
The multi-dimensional nature of ethnic identity is highlighted as is the difficulty, 
experienced by some, in maintaining a positive sense of ethnic group identity. 
Perceptions of the importance of language in the construction of ethnic and state 
identity are explored as are the tensions created by the ideological and instrumental 
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1 Introduction and Literature Review 
1.1 Introduction 
In the years since the dissolution of the Soviet Union Central Asia has been part of 
wide-reaching and ongoing social change. The structures and values of all social 
strata have been questioned and re-evaluated in a continuing exploration of what it 
means to be part of the post-Soviet space. Within this space, identity formation and 
reformation has been an important process for individuals, for groups of all kinds and 
for the newly emerging states and their leaders.  
 
This study investigates how ethnic and state level identities are being constructed in 
the independent republic of Kazakhstan. It seeks to establish how valued such 
identities are to individuals in Kazakhstan, what aspects of group belonging they see 
as important and which outgroups are seen as relevant for comparison. It also 
investigates the roles played by the various languages in use in Kazakhstan in these 
identity formation processes.  
  
Moreover, as those in positions of power are rebuilding nations and states and 
defining the identities they wish them to possess and project, ideologies of identity, 
of ethnicity, and of the role of language within these spheres are of critical 
importance to these dominant groups. This study therefore explores the state 
ideologies of language and the policies which are their expression as well as 
investigating discourses of language and identity within the media. 
 
The educational sphere is one in which the linguistic ideologies and identity beliefs 
of government interact with those of groups and individuals in society. It is a prime 
site of identity formation in which language plays a socially prominent role. Pupils 
and students should not be viewed merely as passive recipients of the ideologies 
transmitted to them. The present school and university generation is one clearly 
aware that the values attached to the various languages in use in Kazakhstan are 
changing. Such values are under negotiation and education is the sphere within 
which students orient and position themselves in relation to other groups and 
members of society through the language choices they make and the values they 
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ascribe to individual languages. The present research is therefore focussed on the 
contributions of a sample of students and staff of educational establishments made in 
interviews carried out in Kazakhstan. 
 
1.2 Identity and Language in the Post-Soviet Space  
 
This study is situated within a growing field of work examining issues of identity and 
of language in the post-Soviet space. Smith (1999), for example, provides a helpful 
overview of the newly independent states in the first decade of transition following 
the break-up of the Soviet Union. He discusses the responses of the ethnic Russians 
resident in the borderland states to becoming a minority group within these new 
states. He compares the situation in Central Asia with that in Estonia and Latvia 
arguing that exit has emerged as the most prominent strategy in the former whilst in 
the latter a variety of responses is evident but that most Russians have stayed in the 
newly independent countries and are exploring the identities and ways of living 
available to them within that context.  
 
Other authors in this field have also explored the challenges faced by ethnic Russians 
in the post-Soviet states. Fein (2005) examines identity formation amongst the 
Russians in Estonia as a product of boundary construction as they seek to define 
themselves both in relation to Estonians and to Russians in Russia. She draws on 
evidence based on interviews and on ethnographic observation to argue that an 
Estonian Russian identity is being constructed which views Russians in Russia as a 
negative outgroup. The emerging identity is based on the belief that Estonian 
Russians, whilst distinct from Estonians, have nonetheless assimilated some of the 
national characteristics of Estonians which positively distinguish them from their co-
ethnics in Russia.  
 
Similarly, in her study of the Russian-speaking community in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, 
Flynn (2007b) describes how many of her respondents clearly distinguished 
themselves from local Uzbeks, but also ascribed certain characteristics of this 
nationality, such as hospitality and politeness, to themselves, in such as way as to 
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positively differentiate themselves from Russians in Russia. This tendency is also 
observed amongst some of the Russian participants in the present study (see sections 
4.2.5 and 4.3.1). In her study Flynn also observes the ways in which Tashkent’s 
Russians are rooted in Uzbekistan and relate to it as homeland whilst simultaneously 
fostering a cultural and linguistic identity as Russians which links them to Russia as 
an “external homeland” (2007b: 283) . She thus discusses the value of understanding 
“homeland” as a notion which is not fixed, of recognising that “multiple homelands 
might exist” and “that “homeland” can be understood and have significance at 
different levels (e.g. region, city) and might be very much a state of mind or being 
(e.g. where I was born, were I live, where I am happy)” (2007b: 268). Such an 
approach is helpful in explaining the complex nature of identity formation for 
Russians in the post-Soviet space. 
 
In his study of the Korean and German minorities in Kazakhstan, Diener (2006) also 
stresses the strong sense of connection felt by many of Kazakhstan’s minority group 
members to that territory, whilst recognising the identity formation challenges faced 
by such groups in light of social and political changes since Kazakhstan’s 
independence. He compares and contrasts the histories of each group in terms of 
movement to and experience in Kazakhstan as part of his exploration of these 
communities’ responses to the nation-building policies in the republic since the end 
of the Soviet Union. He finds that a greater proportion of Koreans than Germans 
understand Kazakhstan as “homeland” and that whilst the majority of Koreans are 
therefore willing to embrace an identity as a member of the Kazakhstani state, most 
Germans favour the option of emigration to their historical homeland of Germany.  
 
In contrast to this study which understands ethnic and political factors as paramount 
in minority group members’ decision to emigrate, Radnitz’ (2006) study of 
minorities in Tashkent, Uzbekistan found economic motivations to be the most 
influential factor in determining whether or not individuals sought to emigrate from 
Uzbekistan. This is in accord with Flynn’s findings in the same city (2007b:  275). 
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Whilst the studies discussed above draw primarily on interviews with and 
observations of ‘ordinary’ minority group members, in his investigation of the 
Russians in Kazakhstan, Peyrouse (2008) prioritises the discourses of local 
newspapers and of political and cultural leaders claiming to represent the Russian 
minority. He describes the negative view of Kazakhstan as an independent state and 
of the nation-building policies employed there which is prevalent in these sources. 
However, Peyrouse (2007) describes how Russians in Kazakhstan have become 
increasingly politically disengaged and feel little connection with the organisations 
supposed to represent them due to the negative view of the situation of Russians in 
the newly independent states presented and the fact that such organisations do not 
consider the multiple ways in which ethnic Russians are engaged in defining their 
identity in relation to both their state of residence and to Russia.  
 
In his exploration of identity change in post-Soviet Latvia, Kronenfeld draws 
principally on demographic data. He uses this data to argue that there is a clear link 
between interethnic contact between groups and convergence of ethnic identity, such 
that “Russians who live among Latvians are more likely to identify as inhabitants of 
the Latvian state, to speak Latvian, and to marry Latvians” (2005: 271) than those 
who do not live in such close contact with Latvians. 
 
Kronenfeld thus uses data on patterns of settlement and education for each of the 
ethnic groups under consideration in order to explain processes of identity formation. 
Other authors in the field also consider the physical environment in which people 
live and work and its relationship with beliefs about identity formation and 
maintenance. Liu (2007), for example, considers the cityscape of Osh in Kyrgyzstan 
and explores the different and changing identities associated with the Uzbek 
residential neighbourhoods in comparison with the Soviet-developed regions of the 
city. However, despite strong associations of the former with perceptions of 
traditional Central Asian and Islamic values and of the latter with modern European 
civilisation and orientation (and more recently with Kyrgyz-dominated rule and 
nationalisation), Liu also considers the “hybrid and ambiguous nature” of lived 
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experience and finds that “the correspondence between places and attitudes is never 
one-to-one” (2007: 66).  
 
Similarly, Buchli’s (2007) examination of Kazakhstan’s new capital city, Astana, 
explores the relationships between the built environment and understandings of self 
and of ethnic and national identity. He describes how the development of a new 
capital is related to the development of a new national identity, a city where “people 
are expected to know and recognise themselves and what it means to be Kazakhstani 
and modern” (2007: 42). He asserts that the built forms of the new capital are 
constitutive of notions of social legitimacy and explores the sense of ambivalence 
engendered by the fact that much of the new building work is of poor quality such 
that “where buildings begin to crumble, façades begin to decay and the corrupt 
relations of society can be indexed both literally and figuratively” (2007: 47).  
 
Whilst Buchli’s study explores the built environment, Adams (2004) examines the 
role of Uzbekistan’s cultural elite in promoting the image of state legitimacy and 
social unity rooted in an ethnic Uzbek culture which is put forward by that republic’s 
government as a foundation for a national identity. In Uzbekistan the government 
maintains control over most forms of cultural production and uses these means for 
the communication of its official ideology of the nation. Adams explores the often 
ambivalent role of culture producers in mediating state-society relations and argues 
that these elites both support and resist the nation-building efforts of the state. She 
describes how  
 
“conflicts between state actors in Uzbekistan are not likely to be framed in 
ideological terms but rather as struggles over the allocation of resources and the 
apportioning of credit and blame. To see resistance to the state only in terms of 
democratic opposition or liberalism versus authoritarianism is to overlook the 
mundane modes of resistance within states such as Uzbekistan’s, which take the form 
of assertions of personal or organizational autonomy” (2004: 115).  
 
In his account of the development of national identity in Uzbekistan, Everett-Heath 
(2003) argues that it is the role of Islam in the state that constitutes the biggest 
challenge to the production of a unified identity. He describes how President 
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Karimov has simultaneously “sought to gain credibility by appealing to Islamic 
sentiment while attempting to build a secular state” and may in the process be 
creating a political Islam where no such threat to his authority existed before. As well 
as highlighting religion as a source of division in the country Everett-Heath also cites 
multi-ethnicity and the forces of regionalism and tribalism as possible threats to state 
cohesion and stability – factors he also cites as of significance in neighbouring 
Kazakhstan.  
 
These factors are also cited as relevant to the nation-building project in Kyrgyzstan 
(Lowe 2003). Lowe describes how Kyrgyzstan has engaged in a process, similar to 
that of the other post-Soviet states, of developing the symbols of a new national 
identity and of removing Soviet terms and place names, replacing them with more 
indigenous and nationally oriented alternatives, but argues that such changes “have 
been implemented less zealously than in other former Soviet republics, reflecting 
Kyrgyz ambivalence about the Soviet legacy and realistic acceptance that its 
influence remains strong” (2003: 115). 
 
A comprehensive and helpful overview of linguistic changes such as these is 
provided in Landau and Kellner-Heinkele’s (2001) study of language policies in the 
six Muslim former soviet states. These authors highlight de-Russification and, more 
widely, de-Sovietization as central to language policy and national identity formation 
in all six states (2001: 65). It is argued that since the widespread acquisition of 
Russian by other ethnic groups in the Soviet republics was primarily instrumentally 
motivated, the new elites in these states are attempting to reverse the situation by 
raising the status and use of the titular language in such influential spheres as 
business, education and administration, thereby increasing the instrumental 
motivation for citizens to learn that language. It is also argued that by vigorously 
promoting the titular language, the elites of all six states  
 
“while claiming to profess a real interest in all languages employed within its 
borders, have been perpetuating to a great extent one aspect at least of Soviet 
linguistic policies, viz., the promotion of a policy aimed at the eventual overall 
integration of the minorities into the culture and language of the dominant ethnie” 
(2001: 207).  
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Fierman (2009) also provides a comparison of language policies in post-Soviet 
states, examining the status of Russian and of the titular language in Azerbaijan and 
Kazakhstan prior to and following independence. He argues that, although both 
Azerbaijani and Kazakh declined in use and status in relation to Russian during the 
Soviet era, this process had less impact in Azerbaijan than in Kazakhstan and that 
Azerbaijanis generally had a more positive attitude towards their ethnic language 
than did Kazakhs (2009: 87). He goes on to describe how the relative status of the 
titular languages in each republic was reflected in the language of education with a 
much higher proportion of ethnic Kazakhs than Azerbaijanis studying in Russian 
medium establishments. He goes shows that the proportion of pupils studying in 
Kazakh language education has risen since independence although it still does not 
mach that of Azerbaijan and that a similar picture prevails for titular language use in 
the workplace. Fierman attributes the marked differences in titular language status 
between the two countries to the “inertia” of geographic, historical, political and 
demographic factors present during the Soviet era (2009: 98), and to subsequent 
language policies pursued by the two republics’ governments since independence, 
with the leaders of multi-ethnic Kazakhstan continuing to allow Russian a relatively 
prominent place within the republic in comparison with that allowed to Russian in 
independent Azerbaijan.  
 
The continued prevalence of Russian in Kazakhstan is also highlighted by 
Smagulova (2008). She describes the results of a large-scale self-report survey 
carried out there into language attitudes and use. The survey results reveal that 
knowledge of Russian remains widespread and that Russian “is a dominant language 
of communication across all domains” (2008: 192), although, amongst the younger 
respondents, there is a greater self-reported knowledge and use of Kazakh and less of 
Russian than amongst older participants. It is also argued from the survey data that 
ethnic Kazakhs are actively trying to reverse the language shift which occurred 
during the Soviet era by increasingly choosing Kazakh medium education for their 
children. However, respondents are also shown to be unwilling to entirely replace 
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Russian with Kazakh and it is argued that multilingualism is emerging as the 
dominant ideology in the republic.  
 
It is therefore clear that there is a rich and growing field of study examining issues of 
national identity and of language in the post-Soviet space. The works described 
above are all valuable contributions upon which the present study is able to build. It 
is noticeable, however, that the majority of studies described focus on an exclusive 
comparison between titular groups and ethnic Russians in the post-Soviet states, 
assuming and privileging the dichotomy between the two groups and their languages. 
These studies thus lack an open-minded exploration of whether in fact other groups 
are viewed as relevant for comparison or whether other aspects of identity are 
similarly valued by citizens of the newly independent states. The present study thus 
aims to fill this lacuna by investigating which aspects of ethnic and state level 
belonging are valued and seen as determinative of such identities as well as exploring 
which outgroups are most commonly selected for comparison by group members and 
which dimensions of comparison are seen to be relevant to the individuals concerned.  
 
Similarly, the studies outlined above tend to assume that ethnic identity is highly 
relevant to individuals in all circumstances, whereas the present work does not make 
this assumption, but instead seeks to establish which identities are invoked as 
relevant by the study’s participants under particular circumstances.  
 
A further way in which this research is able build on the existing work described 
above is in its breadth of investigation in studying the discourses of individuals, of 
the state and its representatives and of the media as they relate to ethnic and national 
identity construction and in exploring relationships, links and contrasts between the 
themes of discourse in each of these spheres.   
 
1.3 Ethnic Identity  
The meaning and nature of ethnic identity is often contested. In literature on this 
topic several different approaches are adopted in understanding the nature and 
importance of ethnic identity. One of the most prominent older approaches is that of 
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primordialism; a view which stresses the biological nature of ethnicity. According to 
this approach ethnicity is natural and inescapable, it is a “prior, given and 
powerful…social bond” (Smith 1995: 32). Typically, however, ethnic identity is 
acknowledged to be more than simply genetic information and although descent-
based, is multidimensional and involves both biological and social and cultural 
heritage (Padilla 1999: 115, Edwards 1985: 8).  
 
In contrast to the emphasis placed by primordialists on the entrenched and pre-
determined nature of ethnicity, the instrumentalist approach focuses on ethnic 
identity as one which is situationally determined and transformable at need. It is one 
resource among many upon which an individual may draw according to changing 
circumstances. According to this view the “cultural contents and meanings of ethnic 
identities tend to change with cultures, periods, economic and political 
circumstances, according to the perceptions and attitudes of each member” (Smith 
1995: 31). Ethnicity may vary in saliency for an individual and can exist unnoticed 
alongside other identities (Fishman 1977: 33). 
 
In his important works on the subject, which have influenced the approach taken to 
ethnic identity in the present research, Smith (1991,1995) argues against both of 
these extremes yet draws on elements of both in describing his own historical 
symbolic-cultural approach (1991: 20). He rejects the primacy which primordialism 
accords to ethnic identity and stresses that group identities of many kinds are 
important to individuals, arguing that “ethnic ties like other social bonds are subject 
to economic, social and political forces, and therefore fluctuate and change according 
to circumstances” (1995: 33). However, he also rejects the instrumentalist view’s 
focus on the manipulation of ethnicity and its vision of continuous cultural change 
(1991: 25). Smith stresses the historical rootedness of ethnicity and the importance of 
myths of descent, symbols, historical memories and collective values for an 
individual’s understanding of ethnic group membership (1991: 20, 25). He states the 
need to  
 
“reconstitute the notion of collective cultural identity itself in historical, subjective 
and symbolic terms. Collective cultural identity refers not to a uniformity of elements 
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over generations but to a sense of continuity on the part of successive generations of 
a given cultural unit of population, to shared memories of earlier events and periods 
in the history of that unit and to notions entertained by each generation about the 
collective destiny of that unit and its culture” (1991: 25).  
 
Smith further argues that the actual stability or objective existence of cultural 
attributes which differentiate one population from another is unimportant, because 
once an ethnic group perceives such attributes as significant elements of the group 
identity then they are viewed as objective and become important as ethnic boundary 
markers (1991: 23). This approach to the identity of ethnic groups is revealed to be 
relevant in the discourses relating to it discussed in chapters 5 and 7 of the present 
study. 
 
The contrastive nature of ethnic identity, whereby myths, symbols, memories, 
customs, physical attributes, languages, institutions and religions are significant, in 
so far as they are seen to distinguish one group from another, is important for 
understanding the variability in salience which any one of these markers has for a 
particular ethnic group and the use of such attributes in processes of individual and 
national inclusion and exclusion (Smith 1991: 143, see also for example, Dobson 
2001 for an informative discussion of the situation in Latvia and Triandafyllidous 
1998 for an exploration of the ‘other’ in the context of Greek nationalism). 
 
Although it recognises ethnicity as an important group identity, the present study 
does not assume that ethnic group membership is salient and relevant to individuals 
in all situations. In their study of ethnic and national identity in a Transylvanian 
setting, Brubaker and his colleagues (2006) examine the processes by which ethnic 
group identity is made more or less salient or invisible to individuals and the ways in 
which such identities are lived out within that particular context. 
 
“We do not assume the salience or significance of ethnicity and nationhood; we seek 
rather to discover and specify when, where, and how they become salient or 
significant. Ethnicity is not a thing, not a substance; it is an interpretive prism, a way 
of making sense of the social world. And it is always only one among many such 
interpretive frames. Everyday ethnicity cannot therefore be studied as a self-
subsistent domain. Ethnicized ways of experiencing and interpreting the social world 
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can only be studied alongside a range of alternative, non-ethnicized ways of seeing 
and being” (2006: 15). 
 
Similarly, the present study seeks to discover whether ethnic group identities are in 
fact salient and valued by individuals in the research setting and if so, how they are 
defined and experienced by those individuals. In prioritising the discourse of 
ordinary people in this way the present study can again be compared to that of 
Brubaker and his colleagues. They state that 
 
“Our data—generated by the addressees, not the authors of nationalist politics—were 
drawn from people who ordinarily leave no traces in the public record: they make no 
speeches, issue no statements, write no articles… we sought to grasp ethnicity in 
practice, as it is embodied, enacted and experienced by ordinary Clujeni [residents of 
Cluj, the research setting]” (2006: 360). 
 
1.4 National Identity 
Understandings of ethnicity are closely linked to those of the development of 
national identity and nationalism, which are also seen as being inherently 
multidimensional concepts (Smith 1991: 14, Dawisha and Parrot 1994: 58). For 
Smith national identity is firmly rooted in “pre-modern ethnic symbolism and modes 
of organization” (1995: 7). He asserts that pre-modern ethnic group identities form 
the foundation for modern nations. Nationalist movements draw on elements of the 
historical culture-community (1995: 59) and, asserting the authenticity and purity of 
the group, assign political and territorial significance to the group boundaries.    
 
This symbolic-historic approach can be contrasted with the modernist approach to 
nations and nationalism. The modernist perspective views nations as a product of the 
processes of capitalism, mass communication and bureaucracy which emerged in the 
modern era (Anderson 1991). Modernists place less emphasis on the role of ethnic 
communities in defining the character of modern nations and more emphasis on the 
role of economics and the development of print technology in forming inherently 
limited, sovereign communities, and on the role of political and cultural elites in 
defining those communities. Sarsembayev (1999) provides an account of the 
development of Kazakh nationalism using this framework as expounded by 
Anderson, although Dave (2007b) argues convincingly that the role of the printed 
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word in Kazakhstan was limited due to the relatively small literate elite and low 
levels of literacy amongst the population, which adhered to a culture with strong oral 
traditions.  
 
Moreover, although the importance of economic factors and of developing 
bureaucracies is not denied, Smith in particular (1991, 1995) argues that underlying 
pre-modern, ethnically-based identities continue to exert a strong influence on 
modern nations and on national identity formation. 
 
The present research examines the ways in which a national identity is being 
constructed and presented by the government of Kazakhstan and by selected online 
newspapers. It thus seeks to identify the symbols and identity markers selected and 
reified as defining aspects of a Kazakhstani identity. Importantly, however, the 
present study does not view the discourses of the political elite or of the media in 
isolation but examines continuities and differences between them. It also gives 
considerable attention to the ways in which ordinary individuals understand a 
Kazakhstani national identity, whether such understandings reflect, reinterpret or 
reject the discourses of government and the media and to whether and when such an 
identity is in fact salient for the individuals concerned.  
 
1.5 Language  
A multidimensional view of ethnic and national identities also provides a cogent 
explanation for the variable saliency of language as an identity marker. Language is 
frequently viewed as one of the primary features of a group’s identity. Often it 
clearly demarcates the ingroup from the outgroup and provides a tangible link with 
the group’s past. It may also be perceived as an expression of the group’s unique 
essence (Smith, G. et. al. 1998: 65) and is the primary medium of socialisation of 
individuals within the group. Fishman describes the value placed on language due to 
its role as an expression of group identity as “sanctity by association” (Fishman 
1977: 25). For all these reasons language may become a highly salient and valued 
aspect of identity and yet it exists alongside other strands of identity and as with 
other identity markers its significance may alter in response to changing group needs 
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and circumstances (Safran 1999: 80, and see Chapman, Smith and Foot for a 
discussion of changing attitudes to language and ethnic group membership amongst 
Albanian-Greeks as an example of this). Attitudes concerning language as a 
necessary marker of group belonging are seen to vary both within and between ethnic 
groups in the present study (see chapter 4). 
 
The saliency of language within nationalist movements also varies. A distinction is 
often drawn between civic and ethnic nationalism. Civic nationalism is concerned 
with a “historic territory, legal-political community, legal-political equality of 
members, and common civic culture and ideology”, whilst ethnic nationalism 
focuses on “genealogy and presumed descent ties, popular mobilization, vernacular 
languages, customs and traditions” (Smith 1991: 11-12). However, neither of these 
two strands of nationalism exists in pure or isolated form; any particular instance of 
nationalism will contain elements of each to a greater or lesser extent and the degree 
to which one or another predominates will determine the character of the nation-
building process (Smith 1991: 13, Dawisha and Parrot 1994: 59 and see Juska 1999 
for a comparison of approaches in fourteen of the Soviet successor states). 
 
The present study contributes to an understanding of the role of language in ethnic 
and national identity formation in Kazakhstan by exploring in detail the attitudes and 
beliefs of individuals concerning the Kazakh, Russian, and English languages in 
particular and the importance of each of these languages to group membership.  
 
1.5.1 Language Planning  
Nation-building processes necessarily involve language planning and the formation 
of language in education policies. Investigations into and descriptions of language 
planning generally acknowledge the work of Einar Haugen as their starting point. 
Haugen established a typology based upon a differentiation between problems of 
form and those of function and processes of initiation and implementation. Form is 
used to describe “linguistic structure in all its ramifications” and function “the 
variety of uses to which that structure is put”. Initiation processes of form involve 
“selection of a norm”, whilst the corresponding implementation processes require 
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“codification of form”. For linguistic function initiation is described as “elaboration 
of function” and its implementation as “acceptance by the community” (Haugen 
1966: 17-18).  Later typologies continue to draw similar distinctions between 
planning that relates to language structure and that which relates to context, generally 
referred to as corpus and status planning respectively (Cooper 1989). Rubin and 
Fishman stressed the cyclic nature of language planning processes and added 
evaluation to Haugen’s norm selection, codification, implementation and elaboration 
(Rubin 1971, Fishman 1979, in Dogancay-Aktuna 1997: 15). 
 
In his influential work on the subject Cooper (1989) defined language planning as 
“deliberate efforts to influence the behaviour of others with respect to the acquisition, 
structure, or functional allocation of their language code” (1989: 45). Thus Cooper 
added acquisition planning, referring to activities relating to the teaching and 
learning of language, to the existing typology and, in not restricting his definition of 
language planning to the activities of authorised institutions, widened the scope of 
what was considered to be language planning.  
 
Spolsky (2003, 2004) also utilises a broad and inclusive understanding of language 
planning. He outlines three interrelated components: language practice, language 
ideology, and language management. Language practice “comprises all the 
consensual choices of languages or language forms” whilst language ideology 
includes “the beliefs of the members of the various social groups about language and 
language use… including attitudes to the languages and the items that identify the 
languages and varieties used in the community” and language management is defined 
as “any effort by any individual or institution that holds or claims authority to modify 
the language practice or language ideology of other people” (2003: 554). The benefit 
of an approach such as this, particularly in the context of the present study, is that it 
recognises the importance of the attitudes and language choices of individuals and 




The importance of understanding and influencing language attitudes in order to 
effectively evaluate or implement language policies is widely recognised and it is 
also acknowledged that, in order for language policies to be successful, careful 
attention must be paid to implementation and evaluation processes (Christ 1997: 1, 
Mac Donnacha 2000). In addition, it is important to recognise the importance of the 
specific societal context in which language policies are to be enacted in determining 
the success or otherwise of those policies (Edwards 1994: 174, Schiffman 1996: 5). 
 
A wide range of factors may influence institutional decisions regarding language 
policy. Socio-demographic factors such as the degree of urbanisation and 
modernisation, and relative population balance and distribution of different ethnic 
groups, economic factors including the cost of policy implementation, the status 
accorded to language(s) of wider communication and considerations of economic 
globalisation, political factors such as international relations, relations with former 
colonial powers and the status of minority groups within the society, religious factors 
such as the religious associations of particular languages, and linguistic factors such 
as the degree and spread of bi- or multilingualism and levels of language 
standardisation and modernisation may all affect language policy formation 
(Kirkwood 1989: 5-10). 
 
The educational sphere is of particular importance in language planning. It is a prime 
site for implementation and represents the interface between macro-level policies and 
micro-level behaviour and responses. One of the most critical decisions pertaining to 
language planning in education is that of medium of instruction. The choice of which 
language is to be used in schools may be influenced by historical, cultural, political 
and economic factors and, in turn, has extensive consequences for patterns of 
language use and language structure within the community (see Morrison and Lui, 
2000 for a discussion of the question of medium of instruction in the context of Hong 
Kong). The present study explores beliefs about the importance of language of 
instruction in relation to ethnic group membership (see chapter 6).  
 
 16 
Other important aspects of language in education planning include decisions 
pertaining to personnel recruitment and their initial and ongoing training, production 
and distribution of educational materials including processes of translation and 
language modernisation, standardisation and authorisation, choices of and curriculum 
weighting given to foreign language instruction, the relationship between languages 
in multilingual settings, possible levels and types of bilingual education and teaching 
about language, including evaluations and comparisons of languages (Christ 1997: 
1). As is made clear in subsequent chapters, many of these areas emerge as being of 
concern in the context of education in Kazakhstan.  
 
The present research is of value in furthering understanding of language planning 
and language in education policy in Kazakhstan. It examines the approach taken to 
language in the nation-building processes underway in the republic. Government 
legislation relating to language is described and the identity-forming aspects of such 
measures explored. Importantly though, as well as describing government policy 
concerning language policy, the present study also explores the attitudes of 
individuals in the research site to official language policy, to the use of individual 
languages in various spheres and to the role of language in education. 
 
1.5.2 Language Maintenance and Shift 
Another issue of concern in the Soviet and post-Soviet context is that of language 
maintenance or shift. Factors which influence levels of language maintenance in a 
community include the relative size and geographic location and distribution of 
language-communities, relative levels of fertility and mortality for each group, levels 
of in-migration and out-migration, the percentage of mixed marriages, the duration 
and origin of the contact situation, degree and frequency of contact with speakers of 
the language in other states, degree of cultural difference between language-groups, 
degree of identification and values associated with mother tongue usage, availability 
of education in the group language, and use of language by religious or community 
institutions (Romanov 2000: 65-8, Lewis 1972: 139-40). Economic factors are also 
of great significance as a particular language may be associated with socio-economic 
mobility and it is sometimes argued that economic factors are primary in determining 
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language outcomes as individuals will be willing to alter their patterns of language 
use in order to maximise material gain. Thus, languages associated with 
technological advancement and modernisation may come to be favoured over 
languages associated with ingroup culture and tradition. Political factors and political 
relations between minority and majority groups are also important (Edwards 1985: 
85, 92).  
 
That language shift is of concern to both elites and to individual group members is 
evident in the present study. The widespread shift to Russian and subsequent loss of 
fluency in Kazakh by the Kazakh population during the Soviet era is often described 
in negative terms (see, for example, quotes 5:53, 5:54, 5:55, 7:20 and 7:21). 
 
In related work, Giles and colleagues investigated language maintenance and shift by 
focusing on levels of ethnolinguistic vitality. The vitality of an ethnolinguistic group 
is “that which makes a group likely to behave as a distinctive and active collective 
entity in intergroup situations” (Giles, Bourhis and Taylor 1977: 308). Group vitality 
is itself influenced by status factors, including economic, social, sociohistorical and 
language status, demographic factors, including factors of group distribution and 
group numbers, and institutional support, both formally and informally through use 
of the group language in various spheres of society. However, objective measures of 
vitality may not be the most important factor and a group’s own subjective 
perceptions of status and vitality may have greater influence over levels of language 
maintenance or shift (1977: 309-18).  
 
1.5.3 Language Ideologies 
Much work on language and ideology also deals with intergroup relations and the 
interactions between majority and minority interests. Ideology links social values to 
language (Dijk 1997: 7). Ideologies of language “are not about language alone. 
Rather, they envision and enact ties of language to identity, to aesthetics, to morality 
and to epistemology” (Woolard 1998: 3). Ideologies define the place and value of 
specific languages within society. A useful typology is that formulated by Ruiz, who 
describes how language may be approached as a problem, a right, or a resource 
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(Ruiz 1984 in Taylor 2002: 315). Moreover, different ideologies may exist in tension 
and competition with one another within a society (Woolard 1998: 21, Gal 1998: 
319-20). Shared ideologies mean that group members will generally act alike in 
similar situations and contribute to successful group cohesion and reproduction (Dijk 
1997: 26). An ideology often prevalent during times of nation-building or language 
cultivation is that of linguistic purity. Individual and group discourse may value 
linguistic purity and perceived impurity is described as being a threat to the status 
and well-being of the group. This is evident in the present study (see section 6.4.2). 
The fact that appeals for the well-being of language may serve to obfuscate the real 
issue of group interests is highlighted in Cameron’s work on ideologies of language 
purity (Cameron 1995: 227) and its role in nation-building is discussed by Spolsky 
(2004: 24), whilst Ferguson (2006: 31) and Schiffman (1996: 61-2) provide helpful 
summaries of its relation to language planning processes.  
 
Discussions of ideology often focus on links between ideology and power relations. 
By favouring the use of certain languages over others in institutional and educational 
settings those in authority can control access to resources and reproduce existing 
power relations such that a particular language policy “publicizes, legitimizes, and 
empowers certain groups at the expense of others” (Spitulnik 1998: 166). 
Phillipson’s term linguistic imperialism describes the use of language to achieve and 
maintain political and economic domination and, in particular, the role that English 
plays in maintaining such domination by the West (Phillipson 1997: 205). The socio-
economic value of English plays an important role in the language choices of both 
individuals and institutions. English is often favoured as a medium of instruction, as 
a second language or language of wider communication, on the basis of the 
economic advantages concomitant with fluency in it (see Morrison and Lui 2000: 
475, Ciscel, Hallett and Green 2000: 60, Spitulnik 1998: 175 for examinations of this 
in the contexts of Hong Kong, the former Soviet Union and Zambia respectively).  
 
Bourdieu’s notions of economic, symbolic, social and cultural capital are useful in 
looking at language and power relations. Bourdieu focuses on the symbolic use of 
power and describes how individuals are positioned in the social field according to 
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the amount and type of capital they possess. Economic capital refers to material 
wealth, symbolic capital involves social concepts such as prestige and honour, and 
social capital is constituted through relationships within society, whilst cultural 
capital refers to socially valued types of knowledge usually acquired through 
education and is thus related to linguistic capital, which is achieved through facility 
in the authorised and dominant language. Particular languages or dialects have 
differing values in the linguistic market and the education system reproduces and 
legitimises existing inequalities in linguistic capital (Bourdieu 1991: 62, 230). 
However, institutions and individuals can also act to challenge existing power 
relations. People and groups have agency and may contest the position assigned to 
them by dominant groups by constituting and expressing alternative definitions of 
social values and identities (Chick 2002: 465).     
 
1.5.4 Language and Identity 
Individuals are not tied to a single identity but have many potential identities which 
may be expressed in different contexts (Sebba and Wootton 1998: 277, Grant 1997: 
20, Le Page and Tabouret-Keller 1985: 14). Bi- or multilinguals in particular have 
access to multiple identities through participation in more than one speech 
community. Such individuals may signal which identity is being invoked in a 
particular situation through their choice of language or by code-switching between 
languages. Code-switching may also be employed as a strategy to negotiate identity, 
or in order to maintain neutrality in socially ambiguous situations or between what 
may be considered to be conflicting identities (Romaine 1995: 301, Heller 1988: 92). 
Language use is frequently an important marker of group identity. For groups at all 
levels of society aspects of language use are significant means of establishing and 
consolidating group identity and individuals therefore use language to signal their 
degree of identification with particular groups. Le Page and Tabouret-Keller perceive 
differences in language use between groups as being the “linguistic symptoms” of 
identities (1985: 75). For these authors linguistic behaviour is a “series of acts of 
identity” (1985: 14) and they argue that “it is the relationships between people, as 
symbolised by and inherent in the linguistic systems of each individual, which are 
the key to personal and social identity” (1985: 205). 
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Thus individuals negotiate and express their personal and group identities through 
the language choices they make, and groups in interaction contest and define these 
identities and the relative values of the language varieties associated with them. 
These processes are apparent in contemporary Kazakhstan, where the relative values 
of Kazakh, Russian and English in particular are being negotiated and redefined. The 
outcome of these ongoing processes of ‘refocusing’ of language values (Le Page and 
Tabouret-Keller 1985: 115) is as yet unclear, but will have significant repercussions 
for intergroup relations as well as for individual members of Kazakhstani society.       
 
1.6 The Social Identity Framework 
1.6.1 Social Identity Theory 
The approach to group formation and intergroup relations known as social identity 
theory emerged from investigations into intergroup discrimination. Tajfel and his 
colleagues showed that, under certain conditions, just the perception of being in one 
group as opposed to another was sufficient to cause group behaviour such as 
intergroup competition and discrimination. Moreover, experiments showed that, 
contrary to previous theories, interpersonal similarity or liking is not necessarily a 
sufficient condition for group formation (Turner 1982: 16, 23). Consequently, the 
social group was defined by Tajfel and Turner in cognitive terms as “two or more 
individuals who share a common social identification of themselves or, which is 
nearly the same thing, perceive themselves to be members of the same social 
category” (Turner 1999: 15). Elsewhere Tajfel gives a broader definition of what 
constitutes a group, stating that in addition to the cognitive component there may be 
an evaluative component due to the fact that an individual’s perception of his or her 
membership of a group may carry positive or negative value connotations, and also 
an emotional component, in that individuals may experience and express emotions 
towards the group and towards others as a consequence of their relationship with the 
group (1981: 229). 
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A continuum of identity-perception from the interpersonal to the intergroup extreme 
was posited. It was argued that at the interpersonal end of the scale interactions occur 
in relation to the individual characteristics and personal relationships pertaining 
between those involved, whereas at the intergroup extreme the nature of the 
interaction is entirely determined by their group memberships. As a consequence of 
this it is argued that the nearer a social situation is perceived to be to the 
interpersonal extreme, the more behaviour towards outgroup members will tend to be 
diversified, whereas, the nearer a situation is to the intergroup end of the continuum, 
the more behaviour towards outgroup members will be unified, as they are perceived 
as “homogeneous and undifferentiated members of their social category” (Turner 
1999: 10). 
 
Turner and Tajfel argued that group membership provides individuals with a social 
identity and that, since people were shown to readily identify and define themselves 
in terms of their group membership, the need for positive self-esteem would lead to  
 
“a psychological requirement inherent in social identification that relevant ingroups 
compare favourably with relevant outgroups…a need for positive social identity, 
expressed through a desire to create, maintain or enhance the positively valued 
distinctiveness of ingroups compared to outgroups on relevant dimensions, and 
aroused under conditions when people defined and evaluated themselves in terms of 
their group memberships” (Turner 1999: 8).  
 
The desire for positive distinctiveness may lead to attitudes and behaviour which 
show ingroup bias and discrimination against outgroups even in the absence of any 
objective conflict of interest between groups although other response strategies are 
also available and may be employed alongside or instead of strategies of 
discrimination. Further, it is stressed that the need for positive self-evaluation must 
be considered in the context of a social identity, and not at the level of individual 
self-esteem.     
 
The positive distinctiveness principle also has a bearing on intragroup behaviour 
since it motivates group members to evaluate distinguishing group characteristics 
positively and thus, such characteristics become desirable attributes which are social 
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norms for the group and which group members try to possess and portray. In this 
way social category membership affects attitudes and behaviour in interactions with 
both in- and outgroup representatives (Turner 1982: 35).  
 
The fact that ingroup members compete to enact group norms and so portray 
themselves as more prototypical ingroup members than others has been used to 
explain group polarization effects. Group polarization describes the process whereby  
 
“uniformities in intragroup behaviour result from the members’ opinions becoming 
more extreme in the socially favoured direction rather than from convergence on the 
average of their initial positions… individuals tend to assign the positive aspects of 
the ingroup stereotype to themselves to a greater degree than they assign them to 
fellow ingroup members and also strive to enact them to a greater degree than 
others… individuals compete to enact the same criterial attributes, …they compete to 
be the first amongst equals on those dimensions which describe what they have in 
common as group members” (Turner 1982: 35).  
 
Relatedly, exactly who is included within the definition of the ingroup varies 
according to the specific social context of comparison. It is suggested that minorities 
which form radical or extreme subgroups of the ingroup will tend to be excluded 
from the ingroup in intragroup contexts of comparison but, conversely, will be 
included in situations of comparison with an even more different outgroup. This 
variation in categorization determines the contexts in which minorities may influence 
intra- and intergroup behaviour (Turner 1999: 18). 
 
It is also the case that group members may experience social identity threats. 
Branscombe et al. describe four types of identity threat. 
 
“ 1 ‘Categorization threat’ (being categorized against one’s will) 
 2 ‘Distinctiveness threat’ (group distinctiveness is prevented or undermined) 
 3 ‘Threats to the value of social identity’ (the group’s value is undermined) 
 4 ‘Acceptance threat’ (one’s position within the group is undermined)” 
 (1999: 36). 
 
The authors go on to assert that the nature of a group member’s response to a threat 
will vary according both to the type of threat and the degree of their identification 
with the group. 
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The need for positive social identity interacts with group members’ perceptions of 
the nature and structure of intergroup relations in determining the nature of 
intergroup attitudes and behaviour. Tajfel draws a distinction between strategies of 
social change, and of social mobility. These behavioural strategies are 
conceptualised as lying at each end of a continuum and are determined by structures 
of belief concerning the nature of group boundaries and status. Social change is 
described as “a change in the nature of the relations between large-scale social 
groups” and is associated with the belief that social group boundaries are clearly 
defined and impermeable, that is, the individual cannot leave his current group/s to 
join others. The definition of social mobility is restricted to individual social 
mobility, “the movement of individuals and families…from one social position to 
another… from one social group to another” (Tajfel 1981: 244). This approach is 
associated with the belief that group boundaries are flexible and permeable and that a 
change in group affiliation is possible. Further, it is argued that the basis for group 
stratification may be perceived to be: legitimate and stable, illegitimate and unstable, 
illegitimate but stable, or legitimate but unstable. The third and fourth of these 
situations may often interact, in that a perception of illegitimacy is likely to motivate 
attempts for change and, in time, perceived instability is likely to lead to a decrease 
in the perceived legitimacy of the situation. Thus, beliefs concerning the relative 
permeability of group boundaries and the legitimacy and stability of group status will 
interact to determine whether a strategy of individual social mobility or of collective 
social change will be pursued. Also relevant in this context is the extent to which an 
individual identifies him- or herself with the ingroup. High identifiers are more likely 
to pursue strategies of social change whereas a low identifier may well opt to try and 
leave a group if that group’s status is low or comes to be negatively evaluated.  
 
1.6.2 Self-Categorization Theory 
The degree to which an individual adopts an ideology of social change or social 
mobility is reflected in that individual’s self-conception and behaviour on the 
interpersonal-intergroup continuum. The concomitant distinction between personal 
and social identity which is foundational to social identity theory was also the 
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starting point for the development of the related understanding of group relations 
known as self-categorization theory. This approach focuses on the process whereby 
self-categorization in terms of a social identity leads to an accentuation of perceived 
similarities with ingroup members and differences with outgroup members as a result 
of self-stereotyping and relative depersonalization. Turner argues that  
 
“where social identity becomes relatively more salient than personal identity, people 
see themselves less as differing individual persons and more as the similar, 
prototypical representatives of their ingroup category. There is a depersonalization of 
the self…and it is this process that transforms individual into collective behaviour as 
people perceive and act in terms of a shared, collective conception of self” (Turner 
1999: 11).  
 
As in social identity theory, the self-categorization approach draws on the relative 
salience of personal or social identities in determining levels of personalization or 
depersonalization. However, in the self-categorization framework, personal and 
social identity are conceptualised as being self-concepts at differing levels of 
inclusiveness rather than as points on a continuum. The relative salience of a 
particular level of inclusiveness of self-categorization will determine the degree to 
which behaviour expresses individual or collective motivations.  
 
The relative salience of such a specific level of self-categorization is itself 
determined by an interaction between the accessibility of the self-category according 
to the individual’s willingness to use that particular categorization, and the degree of 
fit between that category and the reality presented. The accessibility of a category is 
influenced by an individual’s past experience and present needs and goals as well as 
by the degree and intensity of identification with the group in question. Furthermore, 
a distinction is made between normative fit, which refers to the fit of the content of a 
category with reality, and comparative fit,  which refers to the fact that group 
members must be perceived to differ more from outgroup members than they do 
from each other (Turner 1999: 12-13). 
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Categorization is highly context-dependent. People perceived as similar in one 
context (e.g. ‘medical personnel’) may be reconceptualised as different in another 
(e.g. ‘doctors’ rather than ‘nurses’).  
 
Self-categorization theory also argues for a contextual, dynamic understanding of 
stereotypes, which vary in nature, meaning and categorical level according to the 
knowledge, experience, aims and values of the perceiver as well as according to the 
particular context and dimensions of comparison in view. It is argued that 
stereotyping is not the result of limited information-processing capabilities but 
reflects the inherently collective, group-defined nature of much of human interaction. 
Turner argues that  
 
“Social categorizations become salient to fit group realities and provide veridical 
contextual representations of people’s group relationships. Stereotypic accentuation 
reflects the rational selectivity of perception in which it is more appropriate to see 
people in some contexts at the level of social category identity than at the level of 
personal identity. It is no more a distortion to see people in terms of their social 
identity than in terms of their personal identity. Both are products of the same 
categorization processes” (Turner 1999: 26).  
 
Moreover, stereotyping is conceptualised as being applied to the self and other 
ingroup members as well as to outgroup members and therefore affects behaviour in 
both intra- and intergroup contexts. 
 
Turner summarises the key concepts of the self-categorization approach as follows. 
 
“first, the level and kind of identity used to represent self and others vary with one’s 
motives, values and expectations, one’s background knowledge and theories, and the 
social context within which comparison takes place; second, the salience of shared 
social identity leads to the depersonalization of self-perception; and third, 
depersonalization produces group behaviour (i.e., collective action and, processes 
regulated by a shared social categorical self)” (Turner 1999: 14). 
 
The social identity and self-categorization approaches’ focus on the importance of 
positively distinct social identities and on the way in which group belonging 
influences behaviour means that they provide a useful framework for the 
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In discussions of ideology and identity reference is frequently made to the concept of 
discourse. In the context of this research discourse is taken to mean the use of 
language as text or talk in communicative acts. Such communicative acts themselves 
are understood to involve actors such as speaker and hearer or writer and reader and 
as taking place in a specific (spatial, temporal and social) setting. These 
communicative acts are influenced and informed by the social setting in which they 
take place and in turn themselves affect those same settings and structures.  
 
This study thus follows Dijk’s definition of discourse as being 
 
“the accomplished or ongoing ‘product’ of the communicative act, namely, its 
written or auditory result as it is made socially available for recipients to interpret. 
‘Discourse’ in that case is the general term that refers to a spoken or a written verbal 
product of a communicative act.” (1998: 194). 
 
It also follows his views expressed elsewhere when he states that  
 
“Language users actively engage in text and talk not only as speakers, writers, 
listeners or readers, but also as members of social categories, groups, professions, 
organizations, communities, societies or cultures… they interact as women and men, 
blacks and whites, old and young, poor and rich, doctors and patients, teachers and 
students, friends and enemies, Chinese and Nigerians, and so on, and mostly in 
complex combinations of these social and cultural roles and identities. And 
conversely, by accomplishing discourse in social situations, language users at the 
same time actively construct and display such roles and identities” (1997: 3).  
 
1.7.1 The Discursive Construction of National Identity  
In its investigation of the development of a Kazakhstani identity in particular, this 
study draws on elements of the work of Wodak et al. (1999). 
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Wodak and her colleagues carried out research into Austrian identity from a Critical 
Discourse Analysis perspective. The authors themselves point out that work 
associated with the Critical Discourse Analysis approach is far from homogeneous 
and so give a clear outline of the approach and of their own position within the field. 
They state that Critical Discourse Analysis is focussed on the study of actual 
communicative texts as they are authentically produced rather than on example texts 
produced by the linguist for examination. Critical Discourse Analysis further 
understands all such texts whether written or spoken as a form of social practice. 
 
“It assumes a dialectal relationship between particular discursive acts and the 
situations, institutions and social structures in which they are embedded: the 
situational, institutional and social contexts shape and affect discourse, and, in turn, 
discourses influence social and political reality. In other words, discourse constitutes 
social practice and is at the same time constituted by it” (1999: 8). 
 
Critical Discourse Analysis is attuned to the way in which discursive practices can be 
used to create, perpetuate and obfuscate relations of unequal power or of domination 
between social actors or groups of such. Rather than attempting to maintain an 
objective stance in its analysis of situations, Critical Discourse Analysis is intended 
to reveal situations of social and political injustice and is “committed to an 
emancipatory, socially critical approach” which aims to “intervene discursively” 
(Wodak et al 1999: 8) in such environments. 
 
Although the present study is not in conscious alignment with these aims of the 
Critical Discourse Analysis paradigm neither is it at all opposed or in contradiction to 
such an approach.  Further, the way in which practitioners of this approach analyse 
discourse in terms of its being situated within and contributing to a social and 
political culture is helpful in the analysis of the present study’s participants’ 
understanding of a Kazakhstani identity within present-day Kazakhstan and in 
treating these views as part of the broader social, cultural and political context.  
 
By using certain elements of Wodak and her colleagues’ framework it is possible to 
investigate the thematic contents of a Kazakhstani identity as it is constructed 
discursively by the participants and to compare this with the contents of the Austrian 
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identity revealed through Wodak’s analysis of small group discussions and 
individual interviews.  
 
Many aspects of Wodak’s approach to the concept of identity are similar in outline to 
those of the social identity and self-categorisation theories already described. Identity 
is seen as something which is not static but which can change through time. 
Moreover, an individual who is a member of diverse social groups has multiple 
possible identities on which to draw and each of these possible identities is made 
more or less salient according to the particular context. 
 
Wodak and her colleagues discuss the nature of national identity in particular, 
drawing on many sources from academic literature on the subject. Amongst other 
authors they integrate Bourdieu’s concept of habitus (see Bourdieu: 1997: 85-7) and 
describe national identity as being “a complex of common or similar beliefs or 
opinions internalised in the course of socialisation…and of common or similar 
emotional attitudes…as well as common or similar behavioural dispositions, 
including inclusive, solidarity-oriented and exclusive, distinguishing dispositions and 
also in many cases linguistic dispositions” (1999: 28). It is thus clear that such a 
definition combining both cognitive and emotional elements and involving self-
distancing from relevant outgroups is in alignment with the social identity approach 
described above and used as a framework for the fieldwork conducted for the present 
study. 
 
Moreover, Wodak writes of her team’s assumption that discursively constructed 
national identities will tend to “emphasise national uniqueness and intra-national 
uniformity but largely ignore intra-national differences” and that in “imagining 
national singularity and homogeneity, members of a national community 
simultaneously construct the distinctions between themselves and other nations, most 
notably when the other nationality is believed to exhibit traits similar to those of 
one’s own national community” (1999: 4). This is clearly an expression of principles 
also articulated in the social identity framework described above relating to the 
desire to maintain positive social identities distinct from relevant outgroups.  
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It is also made clear that the national identities constructed discursively by members 
of a state will tend to draw on both cultural and political dimensions and that a 
strictly maintained dichotomy between civic and ethnic nationalism (Staatsnation 
and Kulturnation are the terms employed by Wodak) does not accurately reflect the 
processes of identification of group members in any given state. This too is in 
accordance with literature reviewed earlier.  
 
These similarities between the approach employed by Wodak and that of advocates 
of social identity theory facilitate their integration in this study. Whilst the whole of 
the research is conducted within the social identity framework the analysis is 
deepened by drawing also on certain aspects of Wodak’s approach. Thus, although 
many aspects of Wodak’s work remain outwith the scope of this study the 
understanding of discourse which lies behind her study as explained above and the 
analysis of key themes relating to national identity have both been utilised in this 
work. 
 
1.8 Research Framework and Questions 
Informed by the understanding of social identity outlined above, the present research 
follows the Self-Categorization perspective in understanding perceptions and 
expressions of identity as being context-dependent. An individual has multiple 
possible identities of varying levels of inclusiveness on which to draw and the 
particular identity made salient will vary according to both background experiences 
and knowledge and to the context in which an interaction takes place. In situations in 
which a group level identity is made salient the individual in question will respond 
behaviourally to the situation in terms of that identity. The desire for positive self-
esteem at the group level will result in individuals seeking to create or maintain a 
sense of positive distinctiveness from outgroups. In intergroup situations group 
members seek to enact and defend the norms and values associated with a valued 
ingroup. This study seeks to investigate the way in which these processes are 
outworked in terms of personal, ethnic and state level identities in Kazakhstan.  
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In the exploration of group belonging the study also draws on the work of Wodak 
outlined above in understanding that themes and ideologies expressed linguistically 
both affect and are affected by the social and political contexts in which they occur. 
Thus the way in which the nature and boundaries of national belonging are 
understood by individuals and groups both affects and is affected by the way in 
which other individuals, groups, institutions and power structures express and relate 
to ideas and beliefs pertaining to that identity. This study thus aims to examine some 
of the themes and ideologies pertaining to ethnic and national identities expressed in 
the interview contributions of individuals and in some media and government output.  
 
The present study thus aims to answer certain research questions. 
 
1. How are ethnic and state level identities being negotiated in independent 
Kazakhstan? 
 
In pursuit of this the following questions are asked 
 
2. How salient and valued are these identities? 
3. How are the content and boundaries of ethnic and state identities understood 
and constituted? 
4. Which outgroups are perceived as being relevant for comparison and on what 
dimensions? 
5. How do individuals understand the roles of specific languages in relation to 
their own and others’ ethnic and state identities and to the identity of 
Kazakhstan as an independent republic? 
6. What beliefs do individuals express about the association of particular 
spheres of use or identities with specific languages? 
 
1.9 Outline of Chapters 
Following this introduction, chapter 2 sets out a broad context for the work as a 
whole by providing a brief historical overview of Kazakhstan whilst Chapter 3 
outlines the methodological approach employed for the fieldwork. 
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Chapter 4 investigates which levels of identity are salient and valued for the 
interviewees in this study and also explores the content of these identities and groups 
and dimensions perceived as relevant for comparison. Chapter 5 also addresses these 
questions, specifically in relation to a Kazakhstani identity and the themes relevant to 
it as it is constructed discursively by the interviewees. 
 
Chapter 6 also relates to the individual interviews as it discusses the participants’ 
language repertoires and their understanding of the roles ascribed to the various 
languages in use in Kazakhstan and their ideas about which languages are associated 
with which domains of use and what identity of speaker . 
 
Chapter 7 explores the construction of a Kazakhstani identity in the context of the 
media by analysing extracts from several online newspapers as they relate to issues 
of language and identity in Kazakhstan. Chapter 8 similarly explores discourses of 
national identity, this time in relation to government legislation and to the responses 
of the MPs and senators interviewed during the fieldwork. 
 
Chapter 9 provides a conclusion to the work. 
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2 Historical Overview 
2.1 Introduction 
As individuals, groups and the governing elite of Kazakhstan explore and negotiate 
possible aspects of identity for the independent republic, appeals and references are 
often made to aspects of the history of the peoples and territory of present-day 
Kazakhstan. The past is used to legitimate and explain present attitudes and policies 
and the selection of particular events and characters from history to be learnt from, 
admired or shunned is an important part of contemporary identity building. Whilst 
the present study recognises that there can be no single uncontested history of a state, 
only multiple competing narratives, it is nonetheless helpful to describe in brief some 
of the most prominent of these narratives. Accordingly, the present chapter provides 
a basic historical overview of the territory in order to set the research as a whole into 
context by describing key social and political aspects of its past and, at least in part, 
the peoples and events now being appealed to as evidence of the legitimacy and 
historical rootedness of the present-day republic. In doing so the chapter draws 
principally on the works of Olcott (1987), Akiner (1995) and Dave (1996), all of 
which inform my study.  
 
2.2 Origins 
Kazakh folk history highlights a single founding ancestor for the people named 
Alash. These legends are important in giving the group the sense of unity that derives 
from a shared origin and an ancient and unbroken link with the territory (Olcott 
1987: 4). However, whilst there have been nomadic tribes present in the area of what 
is now Kazakhstan since the first millennium BC, historians are not unanimous about 
whether or not the group known today as Kazakhs are descended directly from 
groups present at that time at all, or from others moving into the region at a later 
stage. Similarly, whilst some historians assert the presence of a Turkic-speaking 
people in the area in prehistoric times, many believe that such a people did not 
appear in the region until the sixth century AD (Akiner 1995: 9). Akiner also 
highlights the way in which the history of the territory is important for the 
legitimation of present nationalising policies in Kazakhstan. 
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“The desire to establish roots, to construct a national narrative that firmly links the 
modern Kazakhs to the territory of Kazakhstan, has made even the study of pre-
history a highly political issue” (Akiner 1995: 8). 
 
Following his extensive conquests in the thirteenth century the Mongol leader 
Genghiz Khan divided his empire between his sons. In time these areas of rule began 
to disintegrate further into smaller territories and groups which grew and shrank as 
power changed hands and was wielded more or less successfully. By the mid-
fifteenth century a number of tribal groups began to draw together and formed what 
became known as the Kazakh Khanate. This grouping gradually extended the scope 
of its control and presided over a territory which provided the nomads with both the 
grazing necessary to maintain large numbers of herds and access to cities important 
for trade with a settled population (Akiner 1995: 10).  
 
The tribal groupings that made up the Kazakh Khanate were united by their nomadic 
way of life, which differentiated them sharply from other settled populations. The 
importance to a group’s identity formation of differentiating itself from relevant 
outgroups is described in chapter 1 outlining social identity and self-categorization 
theories and its ongoing relevance for individuals in Kazakhstan is explored in 
subsequent chapters. However, the unity created by such a common way of life does 
not necessarily entail an accompanying sense on their part of possessing a single 
ethnic identity. Whilst Olcott states that by the time of the Kazakh Khanate, which 
she defines as a political confederation, the Kazakhs did constitute a people with a 
common language and culture, Dave argues that a “shared economy and cultural and 
linguistic uniformity do not in themselves affirm a sense of national unity or 
identity” (1996: 69). In fact the degree of population movement and uniting and 
disbanding of wider affiliations and groupings mean that terms such as Kazakh did 
not become settled and defined as ethnic markers until the time of Russian influence 
in the region. As such, Dave agrees with the argument that a “sense of ethnic 
identity, dissociated from a nomadic life-style… was forged only as a result of 
Russian colonial expansion and advent of agriculture and industries” (1996: 70). This 
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is in keeping with the concept of identity formation through differentiation from 
relevant outgroups as described by social identity theory and discussed in chapter 1.  
 
2.3 Social Structure 
During the sixteenth century, probably as a result of increasing competition for 
resources and in response to natural geographical divisions in the territory controlled 
which dictated migratory patterns, the Kazakh Khanate divided into three separate 
‘hordes’ with each horde led by a khan drawn from the ruling section of society and 
supposed to be of the line of Genghiz Khan. The hordes each occupied a distinct 
geographical region and were known as the ‘Big Horde’ (Ulu zhus), living 
predominantly in the south-east, the ‘Middle Horde’ (Orta zhus), located in the 
central region and the ‘Little Horde’ (Kishi zhus), which operated in the north-west 
of the territory (Akiner 1995: 13-14). Despite this fragmentation, some degree of 
cohesion remained as the three khans periodically met together and occasionally 
elected a supreme khan who was sometimes able to unify the three hordes for a time. 
However, on the whole the khan of each horde acted in defence of what he saw to be 
his own best interests and freely made ‘external’ alliances with other forces, whether 
or not this brought his horde into conflict with another of the Kazakh hordes. 
 
The foundational unit of the nomadic Kazakh society was the ‘aul’ (sometimes 
transliterated as ‘auyl’) or encampment, which primarily consisted of an extended 
family network or clan. The number of households, each with its own tent, which 
constituted the aul varied considerably. Such encampments each had their own 
elected leader and lived independently during the winter to increase the chances of 
all being able to find suitable grazing for the herds which were their livelihood but 
came together in groups for the migration to summer pastures or in times of war. 
Such groups of encampments thus formed somewhat fluid tribal units, whose 
membership could change as allegiances varied (Akiner 1995: 15).  
 
The aristocracy who ruled these tribes were known as the ‘white bone’ (‘ak suiuk’), 
sultans who claimed to be descended from Genghiz Khan and who elected a khan 
from amongst themselves. As well as the ‘white bone’ there was also the ‘black 
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bone’ (kara suiuk’) aristocracy. These rulers were officially elected, although in 
practice the post was often hereditary and were in turn divided into bii, ‘judges’ and 
batyr, ‘military heroes’. The extent of influence and authority of such figures varied 
a great deal, with some ruling over a small number of clans whilst others were able to 
unite a much larger number under their oversight. These leaders had direct 
jurisdiction over the affairs of these clans and tribes and functioned in an 
intermediary role between them and the white bone sultans and the khans (Olcott 
1987: 13, Akiner 1995: 15-16).  
 
2.4 Culture 
The culture of this society was integrally linked to the nomadic way of life. There 
was no written literature but there was a strong oral tradition of epic tales, songs and 
poems dealing with topics relating to their patterns of migration, their natural 
surroundings and the actions of military heroes. Artistic creativity was expressed 
through decoration of functional items such as spoons and the felt used in the 
construction of the yurts or tents the nomads dwelt in. Family and community 
relationships were very clearly delineated and bound by prescriptions concerning 
hospitality, respect and duty (Olcott 1987: 21, Akiner 1995: 18-19).  
 
The traditional religion of the Kazakhs was animistic in nature and involved the 
veneration of the sky, earth and water as well as of the spirits of the dead. The belief 
that the spirits of dead ancestors were able to protect and help the living meant that 
constructing and respecting grave sites was of great importance. With the gradual 
expansion of Islam in the region from the eighteenth century onwards, these beliefs 
and practices were syncretically added to the new beliefs to a significant extent and 
the inherently transitory nature of the nomads’ lifestyle worked against the 
imposition of the orthodox, mosque-mediated and controlled Islam which was 




2.5 Russian Influence 
From the mid-seventeenth century onwards the Kazakhs came under increasing 
pressure from the aggression of Mongol peoples from the east who made repeated 
raids on Kazakh territory and had taken a significant amount of territory from them 
by 1725. This time is known by Kazakhs as the ‘Great Disaster’, and as well as a 
large loss of life and livestock it resulted in the disruption of trade and alteration of 
migration routes which had an effect on the economic balance of the whole area 
(Akiner 1995: 20).    
 
By the middle of the eighteenth century these Mongol forces were themselves being 
driven out and defeated by the armies of the expanding Chinese empire, who in turn 
came to occupy traditional Kazakh lands. 
 
In response to these threats the Kazakh leaders increasingly turned to Russia for 
protection, although in actual fact the situation was rarely clear-cut and the khans 
frequently sought to gain power over each other through outside influence and often 
attempted to play one potential source of military help off against another in an 
attempt to maintain their own position.  
 
During this period it was becoming clear that Russia was the strongest force in the 
region, with a growing economy and empire. Russia was interested in gaining control 
of the Kazakhs’ territory not so much because of the potential of trade with the 
Kazakhs themselves but because of the important trade routes to the rest of Central 
Asia, Persia and India thereby made available (Olcott 1987: 30). Russian influence in 
the region steadily increased and during the decade following 1731 the khans of each 
of the Kazakh hordes made commitments of allegiance to the Russian crown which 
were honoured to a greater or lesser extent. 
 
By the late eighteenth century the hordes had lost all real independent authority and 
were splintering as they came under increasing foreign control. However, there was 
sporadic resistance to Russian control across the steppe and some periods when the 
Russian forces in the region faced more organised and unified uprisings. Key among 
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these were those led by Sultan Ablai in the eighteenth century and later by his 
grandson Kenisary Qasimov in the 1830s and ‘40s (Olcott 1987: 41, 64).  
 
As the Russians extended their influence into Kazakh lands they established military 
outposts and bases which over time were linked to form a fortified line in the north, 
before securing the lands further south in the nineteenth century. Administrative 
management and control of the steppe lands also increased steadily and consequently 
the region was divided up into a number of administrative units in line with practice 
elsewhere in the empire. However, these divisions failed to take into account the 
migration routes traditionally followed by the various Kazakh tribal groups, thus 
making such movement of peoples more difficult and disrupting the balance of the 
whole social and economic system of Kazakh life through increasing administrative 
intervention and restrictions on access to grazing land. These effects were 
accentuated by the influence of Russian settlers entering the region, particularly in 
the north, who were predominantly farmers and introduced new agricultural practices 
and implements. The northern part of the territory was also becoming increasingly 
developed industrially and thus had much closer social and economic links to Russia 
itself than the southern regions. The increased levels of trade and industry also 
brought about a shift towards a cash rather than a barter-based economy (Akiner 
1995: 23-4).  
 
2.6 Cultural Change 
The social, economic and administrative changes of the nineteenth century, 
accompanied by seizures of land to make way for Russian settlers and a number of 
severe winters had a cumulative effect on the Kazakh way of life such that a truly 
nomadic lifestyle became less and less viable and decreasing herd sizes pushed 
increasing numbers of Kazakhs into poverty (Olcott 1987: 83).  
 
During this time the traditional systems of authority within Kazakh society were 
weakening, with no clear alternatives appearing to take their place. At the same time 
Islam was spreading amongst the Kazakh people and becoming a stronger part of 
society. The Russians had initially encouraged the proselytisation of the Kazakhs by 
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the Muslim Tatars in the hope that it would help bring about their settlement and 
‘civilisation’. However, as this failed to be the case and as religion became an 
increasingly distinct boundary marker between Kazakhs and Slav settlers, the latter 
part of the nineteenth century saw a campaign to convert the Kazakhs to Christianity 
but it met with little success (Olcott 1987: 101-3, Akiner 1995: 28).  
 
Alongside these changes the Russians established a small number of schools initially 
intended primarily for Russian settlers but increasingly admitting Kazakhs and 
contributing to the development of a small secular Kazakh elite equipped to serve in 
the Russian administration, many of whom received further training and education in 
Russia.  
 
The creation of such a literate and educated elite fostered an awareness of a wider 
national level identity. Akiner states that it was Kazakh ‘mobilizers’ – the “cultural 
and political activists – who gave substance to the concept of a national identity that 
transcended horde-tribe boundaries: by delineating a common past, they posited a 
common future” (1995: 29). The gradual increase in literacy and establishment of 
Kazakh as a literary language was also important and, with reference to Anderson’s 
description of the development of nationalism, Akiner goes on to assert that, “the 
introduction of literacy marked a qualitative change in society. It broadened 
horizons, shifting the focus of concern from the auyl to the wider ‘imagined’ 
community of the Kazakh-speaking nation” (1995: 29). 
 
The pressures on Kazakh society increased during the years of the First World War 
and caused rising levels of resentment which became open and violent resistance in 
1916 when Kazakhs were first conscripted to the front. This rebellion was harshly 
put down and punished.  
 
2.7 Early Soviet Rule 
These resentments against the Tsarist authorities meant that there was initially some 
enthusiasm for the 1917 revolution. The Kazakhs supported the Provisional 
Government and a nationalist party, the Alash-Orda, was established. With the 
 40 
overthrow of the Provisional Government an Alash-Orda autonomous government 
was set up which supported the Whites against the Bolsheviks during the civil war 
and lasted until 1919, when most of society had succumbed to Bolshevik rule and a 
growing number were convinced to switch allegiances to support the Bolshevik 
cause (Olcott 1987: 129).  
 
The First World War and the Civil War which followed destroyed the established 
trade system upon which the Kazakhs relied, and with no means of trading livestock 
and a lack of grain available for sale herd sizes dropped dramatically. The situation 
was exacerbated by an extremely hard winter followed by a failed harvest in 1920-
1921. As a result of this period of famine several hundred thousand people emigrated 
from the region and there were around three quarters of a million deaths. Factors 
such as these added to the strain on Kazakh society and made the traditional nomadic 
lifestyle still less viable (Olcott 1987: 158-9). 
 
There was considerable debate amongst the leading Bolsheviks as to how to manage 
questions of nationalities policy and state organisation in the lands over which they 
were seeking to exert and maintain control. By 1918 a form of federation had been 
decided upon as the best compromise between the conflicting views and in response 
to the realisation that the economic resources of all parts of the former Russian 
empire would be important in order for the Soviet project to succeed. However, this 
was presented as being a transitional stage on the road to the coming together and 
eventual merger of nations. Hirsch (2005) describes this process and the challenges 
the Bolsheviks faced in this period. 
 
“The Bolsheviks had set themselves the task of building socialism in a vast 
multiethnic landscape populated by hundreds of different settled and nomadic 
peoples belonging to a multitude of linguistic, confessional (religious), and ethnic 
groups… Before 1917, the Bolsheviks had called for the national self-determination 
of all peoples and had condemned all forms of colonization as exploitative. After 
attaining power, however, they began to express concern that it would not be 
possible for Soviet Russia to survive without the cotton of Turkestan and the oil of 
the Caucasus. In an effort to reconcile their anti-imperialist position with their strong 
desire to hold on to all of the lands of the former Russian Empire, the Bolsheviks 
integrated the national idea into the administrative-territorial structure of the new 
Soviet Union. With the assistance of former imperial ethnographers and local elites, 
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they placed all of the peoples of the former Russian Empire into a definitional grid of 
official nationalities—simultaneously granting these peoples “nationhood” and 
facilitating centralized rule” (Hirsch 2005: 5-6). 
 
Although a first marking-out of the boundaries of Kazakh land was conducted in 
1919 as part of this process, it was not until 1924-5 that the delimitation of 
boundaries in Central Asia was finally completed and the five main territorial units 
of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan were 
delineated following the advice of ethnographers who studied “local cultures, 
religions, kinship structures, byt [way of life], physical type, and languages” (Hirsch 
2005: 163). Whilst the Kazakh territory was predominantly culturally and ethnically 
homogeneous in its make-up some of the other newly designated units were far more 
varied in their composition. Thus the amount of nation-building to be done was 
arguably less for units with a relatively well defined pre-existing sense of group 
identity than for those which were externally defined as a group by the Soviet 
government. Initially Kazakhstan was known as the Kirghiz Autonomous Soviet 
Socialist Republic (following the Imperial practice of referring to the Kazakhs as 
Kirghiz). It was renamed the Kazak ASSR in 1925 and in 1936 the spelling was 
changed to Kazakh to more accurately represent native pronunciation and it was also 
granted full Union republic status. Hirsch describes the importance of these 
processes. 
 
“The national delimitation changed the political and social terrain of Central Asia, 
and led to a realignment of interests and identities. Members of the new dominant 
nationalities… stood to gain access to land, water sources, and other important 
resources from this reorganization of the region and began to redefine their interests 
and concerns in ‘national terms’.” (Hirsch 2005: 165).  
 
The Soviet government’s main aim in the first years of its rule was to establish its 
authority in all areas of Kazakh society. Some traditional Kazakh customs, including 
those relating to blood revenge and marriage of minors, were deemed to be harmful 
to society and were prohibited by law. However, education was seen as the primary 
means of transforming Kazakh society. Accordingly, a campaign for mass literacy 
was launched and lectures were given in many districts to teach people about the 
nature and aims of the Communist Party. The focus at this stage was on education 
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through the mother tongue as the best means of promoting the ideologies of the 
revolution and fostering a sense of loyalty to it. In the early years efforts were also 
made to develop standardized languages with their own scripts for the Central Asian 
peoples. The Kazakh language was written in the Arabic script at this time. Some 
medical, veterinary and agricultural aid and advice was also given as part of this 
drive. However, overall these policies met with relatively little success and the 
authority structure and culture of Kazakh society remained little changed during 
these early years. The government’s economic policies adopted during this period to 
increase levels of agricultural and industrial production also largely failed in their 
aims (Olcott 1987: 170-172). 
 
The Bolsheviks had very little understanding of or sympathy for the nomadic way of 
life and accompanying culture with its oral-based literature and folklore. They saw 
themselves as bringing culture and civilisation to the peoples of Central Asia as a 
whole and particularly those such as the Kazakhs and Kyrgyz with a nomadic 
lifestyle and lack of written history. This formed part of their nationalities policy and 
what Hirsch refers to as “state-sponsored evolutionism” (2005: 7).  This policy was 
based on the belief that it was possible to speed the development of populations 
through the stages on the Marxist timeline of historical development at an 
accelerated rate and thus facilitate their progress towards the socialist future. Hirsch 
describes the outcomes of this policy further. 
 
“Characterizing “backwardness” as the result of sociohistorical circumstances and 
not of innate racial or biological traits, Soviet leaders maintained that all peoples 
could “evolve” and thrive in new Soviet conditions. The party-state devoted 
significant resources to furthering the population’s ethnohistorical evolution, 
establishing official national territories, cultures, languages, and histories” (Hirsch 
2005: 9).  
 
Hirsch goes on to point out, however, that whilst some clans and tribes were thus 
selected and helped to develop into nations, the languages, cultures and identities of 
other such groups were wiped out as they were ‘helped’ to ‘evolve’, i.e. be 
assimilated into, those of the new nationalities that had been selected (2005: 9-10). 
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As stated above, the early language policies of the regime supported the development 
of the national languages and the use of the Arabic script. However, this policy was 
changed when it was deemed necessary to limit the influence of the Islamic clergy in 
the region and accordingly a Latin script was developed for the Central Asian 
languages. The Latin alphabet was argued to be linked neither to the Russian colonial 
past nor to the Islamic world and was thus suitable for the new republics and their 
emerging Soviet identities and by the 1930s many of the region’s languages had 
switched to the use of Latin script. The introduction of this script served to sever 
Kazakhs from their existing literary past and promoted a new literacy influenced 
primarily by Bolshevik ideology (Dave 1996: 96-7). 
 
A more violent disassociation from the past was achieved through several waves of 
repression and terror. The first of these, in 1928, resulted in mass arrests, largely of 
the intellectual and political elite of the republic. The second, in 1937, also affected 
members of the intelligentsia. There was a third wave in 1949-50. These repressions 
served to eliminate all opposition and intimidate the population into compliance with 
and allegiance (at least externally) to the Soviet regime. 
 
2.8 Collectivisation 
A fundamental change in society was also aimed at through the policy of the 
collectivisation of agriculture and final sedentarisation of the Kazakhs which began 
in the late 1920s. The first stage of this campaign involved further integration of 
Kazakhstan into the planned Soviet economy and a drive to persuade Kazakhs to join 
cooperatives. Following this, in 1928, as part of a Union-wide campaign a policy of 
complete collectivisation was initiated. This involved the forced appropriation of 
livestock aimed at equal distribution of wealth alongside forcing the population to 
join large-scale collectivised farms. Impossible targets of production were set despite 
an extreme lack of supplies and the fact that many areas were simply not suitable for 
farming due to being located in arid or semi-arid desert regions.  
 
The program resulted in limited armed resistance and massive loss of human and 
animal life due to a combination of starvation, illness and the punishment which 
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followed the failure of the campaign. It is estimated that about one and three quarter 
million Kazakhs (approximately 40% of the population) perished during this period, 
whilst several hundred thousand fled abroad or moved to neighbouring Soviet 
republics. About 80% of the pre-collectivisation number of livestock was also lost 
(Olcott 1987: 184-5, Akiner 1995: 44-5).  
 
Despite its massive failure economically, the campaign for collectivisation in 
Kazakhstan did achieve the final eradication of the nomadic way of life and to a 
significant extent the culture that accompanied it. Once no longer employed as an 
active part of life, the skills and traditions that made up Kazakh culture were easily 
forgotten or reduced to dead symbols of a former way of life, belittled as backward 
and representative of a lack of culture in the new social order.  
 
During the 1920s and on into the 1930s the Soviet government also carried out an 
all-union campaign against religion. In Kazakhstan this involved closing down 
mosques and religious schools and confiscating Islamic literature. Legislation was 
passed restricting the rights of clergy of all faiths and in the 1930s the campaigns for 
collectivisation and against religion merged such that Muslims were arrested and 
executed alongside class enemies and those resisting collectivisation. The pressure 
on religion was lifted somewhat during the years of the Second World War, however. 
The general Kazakh population continued to identify themselves as Muslim despite 
little active knowledge of Islam as a faith although certain rituals and ceremonies 
were an integral part of important life events; the practices of circumcision and 
aspects of Kazakh funerals for example, and these, by and large, were preserved 
(Akiner 1995: 46-8).  
 
The drive for ideological conformity also had implications for nationalities and 
language policy. Whereas in the early years diversity and the ‘flowering’ of many 
languages were encouraged, by the 1930s there was a focus on standardization and 
consolidation of socialist ideals throughout the union. Thus, only a decade after the 
introduction of the Latin alphabet in Central Asia there was a new wave of script 
reform, this time establishing the Cyrillic script. Similarly, traditional sources of 
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borrowing for the development of modern and technical vocabulary were rejected in 
favour of Russian. Also in the late 1930s there was an increase in the dominance and 
prevalence of the Russian language and culture throughout the union, both of which 
were compulsory aspects of study in schools throughout the country. The number of 
Russian medium schools grew steadily from this time (Dave 1996: 110-11). 
 
This increase was at least in part a result of the rise in Russian migration to the Union 
republics in response to the attempted programme of rapid industrialisation 
implemented as part of the first five year plan for the economic development of the 
Soviet Union. Due to their higher levels of education than most of the indigenous 
population, ethnic Russians came to predominate in positions of leadership and more 
prestigious employment (Kolstoe 1995: 82). Kolstoe also describes how the schools, 
newspapers and other cultural facilities provided for the incoming Russians set them 
apart from other migrant groups. Such minority groups thus had to choose between 
Russian language schools for their children and education in the medium of the 
language of the titular population. The advantages associated with the knowledge of 
Russian meant that Russian language education was overwhelmingly chosen and “in 
that way they underwent a process of linguistic Russification, and thus contributed to 
a further strengthening of the Russian cultural imprint upon the non-Russian cities” 
(Kolstoe 1995: 83).  
 
2.9 Korenizatsiia 
Korenizatsiia is the name of the Soviet policy of indigenisation of the administrative 
elite throughout the various republics. It was initiated in 1921 with the aim of 
increasing the number of natives within the party and in administrative, educational 
and cultural institutions of the relevant republic in order to co-opt them into the 
regime and consolidate the success of the revolution (Kolstoe 1995: 73-4). Initially at 
least, the aim was also to promote the use of the national language within these 
institutions. The Stalinist purges of the 1930s directed against nationalists severely 
undermined these goals, yet despite this the general policy of indigenous 
representation within the administration of the republics remained. Dave asserts that 
the policy of korenizatsiia was important in that it “institutionalised the principle of 
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indigenous primacy and naturalized the belief that every nation must possess a 
primary, secondary and higher educational structure in its native language” (1996: 
131). These beliefs now play an important role in the post-Soviet nation-building 
context as “the nationalists and language mobilizers in the post-Soviet nations have 
subsequently presented these institutionalised understandings of nations – based on a 
harmony between the ethnic group and its language – as legitimate goals that should 
constitute the state agenda”(1996: 131). 
 
2.10 1941-1986 
The experiences of the Second World War, known as The Great Patriotic War 
throughout the Soviet Union, helped to consolidate a Soviet identity in Kazakhstan 
and throughout the Union. Not only did Kazakh soldiers fight alongside those from 
other republics of the Union but civilians too were involved in the war effort as they 
were required to keep agricultural and industrial production going and accept young 
evacuees and relocated workers and industries transposed from the western front to 
the comparative safety of Kazakhstan. The war years also saw greater promotion of 
the Russian language and of the Russian people as ‘the elder brother’ and ‘leading 
nation’ amongst the peoples of the USSR (Smith, G. 1990: 7).  
 
In the post-war, post-Stalin era, the Virgin Lands campaign of Nikita Khrushchev 
had a major impact in Kazakhstan. The aim of this campaign was to cultivate the vast 
areas of grassland of the northern steppes of Kazakhstan and southern Siberia in 
order to achieve a massive increase in agricultural productivity. The campaign was 
formally launched in 1954 and by the following year the area of land being cultivated 
had been more than doubled. Large numbers of state farms were organised to plant 
cereal crops on these lands and there was a drive to introduce more modern 
techniques into agriculture and livestock breeding. However, the funding for the 
project was insufficient and poorly directed and supplies of material and technical 
help often failed. As a result of the much-publicised campaign large numbers of 
Slavic immigrants arrived in the region to work the new farms although on arrival 
they often found conditions much harder than they had been led to expect. This 
large-scale influx affected the demography of Kazakhstan such that by 1959 ethnic 
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Kazakhs represented just 30% of the population, whereas the proportion of Russians 
rose to 42.4% (Kolstoe 1995: 244).  
 
Agricultural production did increase dramatically, and the early harvests particularly 
were celebrated as a great achievement. However, in subsequent years targets 
frequently failed to be met, as bad weather conditions combined with the soil 
degradation and erosion, which were to prove the principal legacy of the campaign, 
began to take their toll (Akiner 1995: 49-50).  
 
As well as changes in agriculture there was rapid urban and industrial growth during 
this period. The flow of Russian-speaking immigrants to Kazakhstan coming to the 
growing cities and to work on the farms as part of the Virgin Lands campaign was a 
major factor favouring the ongoing spread and dominance of the Russian language. 
The education system in Kazakhstan (as in the other republics) became steadily more 
Russified during this period and under Khrushchev the Russian language was given 
increasing prominence over other languages of the Union as it was presented as 
necessary for communication between peoples, for the development of science and 
technology and in order to provide access to the riches of Soviet culture (Dave 1996: 
117). In terms of nationality policy this was also presented as promoting the unity of 
the nations of the USSR, an aim which Khruschev described as being more 
achievable in the short- term than the still-acknowledged long-term goal of the 
merger of nations (Smith, G. 1990: 8). Kolstoe describes the way in which the 
Russification of the cities in particular gained increasing momentum and significance 
in the Union republics. 
 
“The Russianisation of Soviet cities outside the RSFSR acquired a self-propelling 
character. As more and more Russians moved in, the indigenous rural population in 
the republics increasingly perceived the cities in their own homeland as ‘alien’ to 
them. To them, moving to the capital of their own republic demanded almost as 
much cultural adaptation as moving to another republic. To the new Russian arrivals, 
on the other hand, the degree of cultural adaptation required in order to settle into 
these cities became increasingly small. Non-Russians living in these cities or moving 




Towards the end of 1964 Khrushchev was replaced by Leonid Brezhnev as head of 
the Soviet Union. The modernisation of agriculture and increases in production of 
cereal crops, milk and meat were priorities under this regime too, which once again 
met with only partial success, although the modernisation of farming techniques did 
help increase levels of production. The Brezhnev regime was, however, more 
pragmatic than its predecessor and the production targets set for the national 
republics were more realistic. Smith describes how, in return for meeting these 
targets and for “maintaining ethno-territorial stability”, “Moscow was prepared to 
allow republic elites both greater flexibility in native appointments to local positions 
and some de facto administrative leeway” (Smith, G. 1990: 9). However, where local 
leaders were perceived as having gone too far in promoting republic interests over 
those of the centre they were removed from their posts.  
 
Brezhnev also further promoted the idea of the emerging new community of the 
‘Soviet people’ which had first been articulated by Khruschev. The development of 
this new community was seen as evidence of the progress made by the Soviet state in 
fulfilling its policies of the flourishing and coming together of nationalities. 
However, whilst the eventual goal of the coming together of all peoples was retained, 
Brezhnev was also prepared to acknowledge that problems still remained and that 
such integration could not be forced (Smith, G. 1990: 9-10).  The leading role played 
in the Union by the Russian people was also highlighted in his speeches and the 
Russian language was further promoted both functionally and symbolically as the 
language of the Union.  
 
Earlier in his career Brezhnev had spent time in Kazakhstan and after his departure 
he maintained contact with personnel of that time and promoted those he favoured 
and knew he could work with. These included D. A. Kunaev, who was given the post 
of first secretary of the Kazakh Communist Party, a role he continued in until 1986. 
In his turn Kunaev was able to promote fellow Kazakhs to positions of influence 
within the republic.  
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Towards the end of the Brezhnev era the regime grew increasingly concerned by the 
high levels of indigenisation of cadre appointments in the republics. The concern that 
korenizatsiia policies had gone too far was further articulated by Brezhnev’s 
successor, Yuri Andropov. In reference to nationalities policy, Andropov also 
restated the Soviet government’s commitment to the eventual coming together of 
nations despite the acknowledgement that national differences would remain for a 
long time to come (Smith, G. 1990: 11). 
 
2.11 The Soviet Legacy 
The Soviet era brought massive changes to Kazakhstan. The huge loss of life 
associated with the sedentarisation and collectivisation campaigns and with Stalin’s 
purges combined with the large number of settlers who arrived in the region, 
particularly during the Virgin Lands campaign, left the Kazakhs a minority in their 
titular republic for many years. Kazakhstan became, moreover, the most multi-ethnic 
of the 15 Soviet republics. Table 2.1 below shows the ethnic composition of 
Kazakhstan according to data from the 1989 census taken prior to independence. The 
ethnic composition of Kazakhstan in 1999 is also shown for comparison.  
 








Kazakh  40.1% 53.4% 
Russian 37.4% 29.9% 
Ukrainian 5.4% 3.7% 
Belorussian 1.1% 0.8% 
German 5.8% 2.4% 
Tatar 2.0% 1.7% 
Uzbek 2.0% 2.5% 
Korean 0.6% 0.7% 
Others 5.6% 4.9% 
Census data is taken from Dave 2004: 5. 
 
The destruction of the traditional Kazakh way of life and the modernisation, 
urbanisation and industrialisation of the republic, accompanied by the introduction of 
prescribed methods of education and Russian language, culture and arts all similarly 
contributed to the transformation of Kazakhstan and the Kazakh people.  
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The Russian language came to be seen as the language of modernity, of culture and 
of social mobility within the republic, and Dave stresses that Kazakhs learnt Russian 
not just for instrumental gain, “but for its progressive appeal as well” (1996: 138). 
This attitude is observable in the present research too (see for example chapter 6, 
quote 6:109 and following comments). Kazakh became a language of low prestige 
and provided limited prospects whereas Russian language education was of a higher 
quality and knowledge of Russian facilitated entry into higher education institutions 
and better careers for Kazakhs. Consequently, many Kazakh parents strove to bring 
up their children as Russian speakers. This meant that Kazakhs displayed high levels 
of bilingualism and the majority of non-Kazakh, non-Russian residents of the 
republic learnt Russian whilst the vast majority of Russians in Kazakhstan remained 
monolingual.  
 
Despite these factors the Kazakhs retained a strong sense of identity as a people. This 
was displayed, for example, in the fact that 98% of Kazakhs in the census of 1970 
listed Kazakh as their mother tongue, although it is very unlikely that anything like 
this number were at all fluent in the language, whilst just 40% claimed fluency in 
Russian, a figure also at odds with linguistic practice described as pertaining at the 
time (Akiner 1995: 52). It is reasonable to assume that these statements then 
represented a sense of identification with the ethnic group more than a true reflection 
of language repertoires.  
 
The Kazakhs also maintained some ethnic group distinctions in the areas of food and 
traditional celebrations and rites of passage as well as in family relationships and 
respect given to elders in society. From the 1970s on there was a growing awareness 
of ethnic identity and a rediscovery of cultural symbols of that identity such as the 
yurt and traditional decorative designs, and this trend continued into the 1980s. 
 
2.12 The Breakdown of the Soviet Union 
Despite the increased freedoms of the time and willingness to reform, Gorbachev, 
who became Soviet leader in 1985, did not significantly reappraise the Soviet 
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Union’s nationalities policy. He was, though, concerned by the system of patronage 
which had become entrenched in Central Asia generally and specifically in 
Kazakhstan under Kunaev. Consequently, in December 1986 Kunaev was removed 
from his post. That he was replaced by an ethnic Russian who was moreover 
completely unfamiliar with the republic represented a departure from the practices 
established over several decades and proved to be deeply unpopular. 
 
A demonstration was held in Almaty on December 17 in protest at the appointment. 
The details of what happened at the demonstration are unclear; however, it is known 
that tanks were sent in, several people were killed and others arrested for taking part. 
Whilst the demonstration was not itself anti-Russian, Akiner argues that the Kazakh 
community felt unsupported by Russians at the time of the demonstration and that 
the resultant sense of 
 
“exclusion, rejection and betrayal was the starting point for a fundamental 
reappraisal of the ‘great friendship’: the consequences of this shift were not 
immediately apparent but eventually it led to a distinct divergence between the 
political interests of the two groups. In the case of the Kazakhs, this merged with the 
growing awareness of ethnic identity, providing the impetus for the emergence of a 
nationalistic trend in public opinion” (1995: 56). 
 
Although the immediate aftermath of the 1986 demonstration resulted in a more 
stringent imposition of ideological control in the republic it also represented the first 
of a growing number of displays of discontent throughout the Soviet Union. Despite 
this, Gorbachev failed to carry out a far-reaching reappraisal of nationalities policy 
and instead dealt with each new manifestation of unrest as it appeared and events 
thus gathered a momentum of their own. By 1989, when Nursultan Nazarbaev was 
appointed as First Party Secretary in Kazakhstan, the process of change was well 
underway. However, despite the growing sense of ethnic awareness described above, 
no coherent movement for independence had emerged in Kazakhstan by December 
1991 when the Soviet Union collapsed and independence came to the republic. 
Kazakhstan’s dependence on the Union both structurally and economically meant 
that the disintegration of the Soviet Union was, in many ways, threatening to the 
viability of the republic and the well-being of its citizens and consequently 
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Nazarbaev was one of the last to remain faithful to Gorbachev and his proposals for 
maintaining the USSR in some form or other (Svanberg 1996: 318). 
 
Akiner states that  
 
“The collapse of the Soviet Union destroyed the entire context – cultural, economic, 
political and ideological – within which the modern Kazakh identity had been 
formed. Suddenly all the assumptions that had been taken for granted, from the 
conventional value judgements on Kazakh culture to the legitimacy of the Kazakh 
republic (which was, after all a Soviet creation), were called into question” (1995: 
62). 
 
2.13 Nation-building and Language Policies since Independence 
As president of the independent Republic of Kazakhstan, since 1991 Nazarbaev has 
sought to legitimate and consolidate both his own position as national leader and that 
of the state itself. He has presented himself as being committed to political and 
economic reform but on his own terms and at the pace he deems most conducive to 
the stability and prosperity of the country1. As well as the question of the legitimacy 
of Kazakhstan as a state, the nature of the republic’s history as outlined above means 
that Nazarbaev and other government representatives have had to deal with many 
challenges in forging a coherent identity for the independent republic due to its huge 
geographical scope, multi-ethnic population and significant differences between 
urban and rural culture and standards of living. Many of these challenges and 
tensions are apparent in the discourses explored in subsequent chapters. 
 
Nazarbaev has sought to portray Kazakhstan as a bridge between Europe and Asia 
and has fostered links with the United States and Western Europe as well as Russia 
and also with China. Due to the weak and heavily trade-dependent nature of 
Kazakhstan’s economy when it gained independence, Nazarbaev has sought the aid 
of international experts and investment in the country from both the West and the Far 
                                                 
1 Dave argues that this “fixation” with stability is in fact a hindrance to democratic reform and civic involvement. 
She states that “democracy emerges out of societal contestation and debate over identity issues, rather than as a 
consequence of the ‘stability’ manufactured by the regime, which also rests on a continual effort to co-opt the 
civil society and opposition” (2007b: 170). 
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East in order to help with the processes of privatisation and of transition to a strong 
market economy (Svanberg 1996: 328). The president thus hopes to establish 
Kazakhstan as a recognised member of the global community with a modern and 
internationalist outlook.   
 
Alongside these processes, however, Nazarbaev has also sought to construct a 
national identity for Kazakhstan which, without unduly alienating the large 
proportion of Russian and other minority nationalities resident in (and in many cases 
economically necessary to) the republic, is nonetheless built around the titular ethnic 
group and aspects of their culture. Such nationalising policies are common to a 
greater or lesser extent to all the post-Soviet borderland regimes. 
 
In an overview of the nation-building projects undertaken by leaders in the post-
Soviet states Smith (1999) highlights the importance to all of the processes of de-
Sovietisation, of boundary marking and differentiation between the titular nationality 
and other ethnic groups and of developing and standardising an acceptable national 
culture for the new polity (1999: 76-7).  
 
As in Kazakhstan, this national culture is invariably based upon that of the titular 
ethnic group. These processes involve the re-evaluation of history in order to 
establish a “pre-Soviet legitimacy for the… state and its existing territorial 
boundaries” (Akiner 1995: 62) and the incorporation of symbols and mythologies 
associated with the titular group’s history and culture into the republic’s national 
identity. However, it is the establishment of the titular language as that of the state 
which is perceived as the most important part of the process by many of the new 
states’ governing elites.  
 
In her assessment of language change in the post-Soviet states Pavlenko (2008) 
identifies “derussification and shift in the direction of titular languages” as “key 
goals of post-Soviet language policy and planning” (2008: 8). She argues, however, 
that the presence of large numbers of monolingual Russian speakers, the 
Russification of many members of the titular ethnic group, the existence of 
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multiethnic populations used to relying on Russian as a lingua franca and the 
functional limitations of some of the titular languages complicate and inhibit the 
successful implementation of such policies in all the post-Soviet states investigated 
(2008: 9).  
 
All of these factors are relevant and significant in Kazakhstan. Thus, whilst the 
central aim of state language policy has been to elevate the status of Kazakh in 
relation to that of Russian and to reverse the Russifying effects of Soviet language 
policy, the complicating factors listed above have had to be taken into account in the 
formulation and implementation of the policies developed around this aim.  
 
Fierman (1998) highlights several areas of conflict and debate surrounding language 
policy in Kazakhstan. For instance, even the name of the main law was contested, 
with Kazakh nationalists arguing for reference to only a single state language, whilst 
those concerned with establishing a more civic oriented state wanted the title of the 
legislation to refer to languages in the plural. Fierman maintains that “the ambiguous 
“solution” to this problem is typical of the way that Kazakhstan’s political processes 
have maintained social peace at the cost of ambiguity” (1998: 178) in that the 
Russian version of the law is clearly named as a ‘Law on Languages’ whilst the 
Kazakh title manages to remain ambiguous as to whether one or more languages are 
referred to.  
 
A related issue of contention is that of whether or not Russian should be granted the 
status of being a ‘state’ or ‘official’ language alongside Kazakh. The constitution 
adopted in 1995 recognises Kazakh as the sole state language. However, concession 
has also been made to the proponents of a recognised status for Russian by declaring 
that “In state institutions and local administrative bodies the Russian language shall 
officially be used on equal grounds with the Kazakh language” (Article 7.2). Once 
again the legislation is formulated somewhat ambiguously in order to defuse conflict 
by allowing for varying interpretations as to what “officially used” actually means 
(Fierman 1998: 179-180).  
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There have also been many debates over the question of whether there should be 
language requirements associated with official government posts or even with more 
general employment. At present only the post of president and those of chairperson 
to the two houses of parliament carry the stipulation of proficiency in the Kazakh 
language, although frequent calls are made for this to be extended to other roles. In 
these debates, both those advocating Kazakh language requirements and those 
opposed to them invoke the notion of linguistic and human rights in defence of their 
arguments. However, Smagulova (2008) suggests that the failure of nationalists to 
pass legislation imposing stricter language requirements is likely to be largely due to 
the fact that few members of government are actually fluent Kazakh speakers 
themselves (2008: 177).  
 
Lack of fluency in Kazakh amongst government officials and the population more 
generally also affects the implementation of the government requirement to transfer 
all official paperwork to Kazakh by 2010. This law relates both to state organisations 
and private businesses and stipulates that as well as submitting official documents in 
both Kazakh and Russian, organisations must match the language of inquiry in their 
written response to a client (Smagulova 2008: 177-8).  
 
In order to further establish the importance of Kazakh in the state building enterprise 
2007 was proclaimed to be the year of the Kazakh language. The state budget for 
language planning was increased and campaigns undertaken to increase the quantity 
and quality of Kazakh language paperwork generated in state organisations 
(Smagulova 2008: 178).  
 
The fact that education at all levels is widely available in both Russian and Kazakh 
and that the curriculum in each language stream is, to a significant degree, reciprocal, 
with Kazakh language students required to learn Russian and vice versa, is a 
significant stabilising factor in Kazakhstan. The education system is also heavily 
relied upon in promulgating the ideologies of Kazakh statehood including the 
validity of Kazakhstan as a state and legitimacy of Kazakh as an adequate state 
language (Smagulova 2005: 6-7).  
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In order to further consolidate the role of Kazakh as a state language, increasing 
attention has been paid to corpus planning. The State Terminological Commission 
was established to develop Kazakh into a language capable of being used for all 
functions of state and society. A division of opinion exists, though, between those 
who believe that Kazakh should maintain the ‘international’ vocabulary it already 
possesses (principally relating to terms for modern technology and governance and 
drawn from Russian) and those who argue that equivalents must be found or created 
based on Kazakh language roots (Landau and Kellner-Heinkele 2001: 160).  
 
Other changes made in line with policies of nationalisation and de-Russification 
relate to changes in geographic and territorial names either by changes in 
orthography to better represent Kazakh pronunciation or by a complete renaming. 
Included in this process are the names of many streets and bus stops in Kazakhstan’s 
cities. 
 
Dave (2007) states that the governing elite of Kazakhstan has “enacted a language 
legislation that sought to appease all strata of the society without compromising on 
the normative status of Kazakh” (2007: 166). One factor aimed at ensuring ethnic 
harmony and stability in Kazakhstan is the official support for multilingualism. In 
2007 a government project was launched promoting societal trilingualism in Kazakh, 
Russian and English (the same languages are also promoted in Nazarbaev’s 
Kazakhstan 2030 vision). The government has promised increased finance and 
resources to promote teaching of and in each of these languages although it is clear 
that Kazakh is to remain the principal language of the three (Smagulova 2008: 183).  
 
The constitution guarantees the protection of all languages in use in Kazakhstan and 
prohibits discrimination on the basis of language. Additionally, some provision is 
made for education in minority languages where a significant number of minority 
group members live in a compact area. School instruction is thus available in 
Ukrainian, Uyghur, Uzbek, Meskheti Turkish, Korean, German, Dungan and Polish 
(Landau and Kellner-Heinkele 2001: 181). However, on the whole the state regards 
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the promotion and teaching of minority group languages as being the responsibility 
of the groups themselves via the system of Sunday schools and national-cultural 
centres (Fierman 1998: 180).  
 
It is noteworthy that language policy formation in Kazakhstan remains firmly 
centralised. The governing elite regard any potential devolution of issues of language 
to the regional level as a threat to the unity and cohesion of the state and of its 
identity. Nazarbaev has attempted to promote the Kazakh language as a unifying 
symbol of state relevant to all of Kazakhstan’s citizens regardless of ethnic 
background and such a project would be severely undermined were individual 
regions able to downgrade the status of Kazakh in favour of Russian or another 
language (Fierman 1998: 184).  
 
In a comparison of language policy and implementation in independent Kazakhstan 
and Kyrgyzstan, Dave (2004) highlights the fact that both of these republics were 
highly Russified with large percentages of Russian and other European nationalities 
in their populations.  Dave describes how, in Kazakhstan, the elites have presented a 
unified image, using language as a tool of indigenization and have managed to 
maintain a balance between regional and sectarian claims. She also asserts that in 
Kazakhstan “the cultural and linguistic barrier between Russified and rural Kazakhs 
has not acquired a political dimension” (2004: 128) and that Nazarbaev has been able 
to declare that the language issue has been ‘solved’ because it is no longer debated at 
policy-making level but has been moved down to a bureaucratic level (2004: 134). 
Success in policy implementation has been reduced to changing the language of 
official business and documentation to Kazakh (2004: 153) although relatively little 
language shift has occurred amongst the population. She contrasts this situation with 
that in Kyrgyzstan where “intraelite struggle, which coincides with existing regional 
and clan divisions has made the language issue more contested” (2004: 136). She 
further states that the linguistic divide between urban and rural members of the titular 
group is sharper and more politicized in Kyrgyzstan than in Kazakhstan (2004: 136-
7). She describes how the divided Kyrgyz elites have had less success in imposing 
and implementing their language laws than their more unified Kazakh counterparts 
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arguing that “the more divided the elites are on core issues of national interest and 
identity, the greater is the ambiguity in the law and in the proliferation of contending 
claims” (2004: 150).  
 
By this account the governing elites of independent Kazakhstan are achieving a 
measure of success in their nation-building and identity-forming projects despite the 
many challenges faced in this process. Interestingly, whilst, as outlined above, such 
projects focus on de-Russification and de-Sovietization, it was the Soviet period 
itself which defined Kazakhstan as a republic within its present borders and fostered 
an awareness of nationhood on the part of the Kazakh people by differentiating them 
from other similar groups in Central Asia.  Soviet ethnographers were also 
responsible for the selection and reification of many of the aspects of Kazakh culture 
now being used in defining the identity of independent Kazakhstan. Adams (1999) 
argues that the Soviet elites successfully institutionalised understandings of nations 
and cultures such that present day structures and expressions of nationhood and 
national identity are based on these Soviet formulations. The Soviet 
institutionalisation of culture also established the norms of using culture for the 
promotion and expression of state ideologies and of the state’s role in defining and 
developing national culture which are evident in the nation-building projects of 
Central Asia’s present-day governing elites. In the context of Uzbekistan she states 
that 
 
“An institutional explanation tells us not just how the Soviets repressed or passively 
tolerated aspects of ethnic identity, but how the state actively institutionalized the 
existence of multiple nations and nationalities… The Soviet version of Uzbek culture 
is accepted today because, prior to the Soviet period, there was no unified Uzbek 
culture: it was Soviet institutions that were responsible for defining and developing 
that culture in the first place” (Adams 1999: 356-7). 
 
In defining the borders of the Central Asian states and designating each as the 
homeland of particular groups the Soviet elite established the territorial principal 
now used to justify cultural and linguistic nationalising policies in these states. 
Kazakhstan has been defined as the home of the Kazakhs such that they are 
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3.1 Interviews in Research 
In my exploration of language and identities in present day Kazakhstan I decided to 
use semi-structured individual interviews. The use of interviews is widespread in 
work which aims to gain insight into subjective beliefs and attitudes towards a 
research issue. Interviews are valuable for providing both structure and flexibility in 
that the researcher can determine the overall direction of the interview but can also 
respond to the interlocutor. The conversational nature of an interview can thus be 
utilised to draw responses from participants and to encourage them to follow up or 
elaborate on particularly interesting or relevant comments. Other advantages of 
interviewing include the fact that when they are conducted in a relaxed and friendly 
atmosphere the participant is likely to feel able to express attitudes and opinions and 
to elaborate points of view more fully than is possible through the written medium of 
a questionnaire. The researcher is also able to demonstrate that she is interested in 
participants’ personal ideas and to show readiness to hear those ideas in a way which 
is not possible through less personal or immediate research methods.  
 
However, the context of an interview itself, albeit an informal one, must be seen as a 
specific social context which will in turn have a bearing on the participants. 
Interviewees are engaging with a particular interlocutor in a particular context and 
will therefore respond to these factors. The personal characteristics of the interviewer 
(and translator) may influence participants’ responses. Perceptions of the 
conversational audience as in- or outgroup representatives may affect the way in 
which interviewees express themselves and seek to portray their own group 
membership. Participants may ascribe certain norms to communication with such an 
audience and thus modify responses to accommodate or reject those norms as 
personal and group motivation directs.  
 
This does not nullify the interview as a means of investigating beliefs and attitudes 
towards identity; all research methods take place within a specific context, but that 
context must be acknowledged and its implications recognised. Commenting on the 
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fact that survey questionnaires constitute a specific communicative context to which 
participants respond, Ellemers, Barreto and Spears write that 
 
“…it would seem that participants’ ratings of degree of group identification may in 
themselves constitute strategic statements of the right to claim membership in social 
groups to a given audience. This view does not imply that when engaging in such 
responses participants are not expressing a ‘true’ feeling of identification with a 
group. By contrast, it stresses the fact that ‘true’ social identities are not immutable 
cognitive structures, but that they are contextualized statements about how one wants 
to be positioned in the social system and how one wishes to relate to others.”  
(1999: 137, italics mine) 
 
In his extensive research into the Russian-speaking populations of Estonia, Latvia, 
Ukraine and Kazakhstan since the break up of the Soviet Union, David Laitin and his 
team made use of interviews with ordinary people in each country (Laitin 1998). By 
this means Laitin was able to gain understanding of individual and community 
responses to the identity crises posed by the end of the Soviet Union and the 
changing linguistic landscapes of the nations involved. The words of individuals 
actually experiencing these changes make the work more vital and convincing.  
 
Similarly, Wodak and her co-authors used both group and individual interviews in 
their research into national identity construction in Austria (Wodak et al. 1999). In 
group interviews information can be drawn from a large number of participants quite 
quickly and economically. Such group discussions may also bear a closer 
resemblance to natural conversation and therefore draw out more genuine responses 
from the participants. However, one or two particularly confident or vocal members 
of the group may dominate the discussion such that other members feel unable to 
express their own ideas or may modify their ideas to align themselves with the 
dominant members or majority of the group. The more public setting of the interview 
may also inhibit participants’ free expression of attitudes and beliefs, particularly 
regarding sensitive or controversial topics. The group environment also makes it 
harder for the interviewer to ask particular participants for additional or more 
detailed information. In practical terms group interviews also pose greater challenges 
for recording and transcribing the dialogue as simple recording equipment is not able 
to pick up sound from all angles and distinguishing individual voices during 
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playback can be very difficult. It was reasons such as these that led Rajah-Carrim 
(2005) to modify her approach and conduct only individual interviews during her 
research into Mauritian Creole and also influenced the decision to follow the same 
methodology in the present study. 
 
I decided to focus my interviews on students of secondary schools and universities 
and also to interview some members of staff at these institutions. As described in the 
introduction (1.1), educational establishments are sites of interaction between the 
ideologies of government and of individuals in relation to language and group 
identities. Also, the language beliefs formed and choices made by the present 
generation of students will influence the linguistic culture of Kazakhstan in future 
years. For these reasons schools and universities constitute an important research 
environment and I decided to conduct the majority of interviews within this context.  
3.2 Formulating a Research Schedule1 
Having therefore decided that individual interviews were the most appropriate and 
accessible means of conducting my research I began the process of formulating an 
interview schedule that would enable me to explore the relevant issues as thoroughly 
as possible within a practical time-frame for a single interviewee. As I did so I strove 
to achieve a suitable balance between depth and breadth of content and to keep the 
interview sufficiently concise that length would not be a deterrent or prohibiting 
factor and such that I would be able to conduct a reasonable number of interviews 
during my time in Kazakhstan. I also endeavoured to compose an interview that 
would be accessible to all participants whilst allowing me to explore the relevant 
issues from a social identity perspective.  
 
One of the main points of the self-categorisation framework is that individuals 
categorise themselves at different levels of inclusiveness from the individual level to 
broader levels of group identity which themselves may form a subgroup of a yet 
more inclusive group identity and may also contain more restricted subgroups within 
                                                 
1 See Appendix A for a copy of the interview questions. 
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themselves. Individuals possess multiple possible self-categorisations and the 
saliency of any given identity is strongly influenced by the immediate context of 
interaction. 
 
As a result, it was important that the interview made group identities salient and I 
sought to achieve this without overly restricting responses by asking questions 
pertaining to national and ethnic identity at the start of the interview. This approach 
assumes that these particular group identities are relevant to respondents in 
Kazakhstan but I felt that this was justified given that my previous research in the 
area (carried out as part of MA and MSc studies) showed that individuals are willing 
to categorise themselves in this way and usually respond readily to questions 
pertaining to these distinctions. 
 
Another factor prominent in the literature is that degree of identification with a group 
is highly variable and also plays an important role in determining attitudes and 
behaviour towards both in- and outgroup members. In order to gain information 
regarding strength of commitment to national and ethnic identities I included 
questions about the independence of Kazakhstan as a republic and questions 
concerning self- and other categorisation in national and ethnic terms. 
 
Also important to categorisation is the defining content of a particular identity. In 
order to investigate this area of group identity norms, questions relating to what 
makes an individual a member of a particular ethnic group and to the importance of 
language to this identity were included. There are also questions to ascertain the 
dimensions of comparison used in relation to different ethnic and national groups. 
 
Drawing on the results of previous research it was expected that language would be 
perceived as an important aspect of group identity and therefore questions relating to 
Russian, Kazakh and English were included. I sought to ascertain the values attached 
to different languages by asking about their suitability in various spheres. The role of 
language in identity formation was investigated through questions regarding 
perceptions of speakers of each of the various languages.  
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In order to gain further insight into patterns of language use and self-categorisation I 
included questions on individual use of and beliefs about Russian, Kazakh and 
English. 
  
As well as distinctiveness between groups the existence of positive and negative 
aspects of a group identity is also relevant. Therefore questions relating to such 
perceptions of aspects of ethnic and national identity were included. 
 
I aimed to obtain some information about perceptions of group status and the 
stability and legitimacy of the existing structure through questions relating to the 
relative importance of languages in employment and education and to the notion of 
official language/s in Kazakhstan.  
 
Once I had completed a research schedule which I thought suitable for use during the 
fieldwork I was able to do a pilot interview with a Kazakh friend studying in Britain. 
This was valuable in enabling me to familiarise myself with the interview process 
and, to a limited extent, to check that the questions themselves were comprehensible 
and suitable for my purpose. I was also able to practise using the recording 
equipment in an interview context.  
 
3.3 Fieldwork Preparation 
Throughout the time during which I was formulating the research schedule I was also 
engaged in practical preparations for my time in Kazakhstan. I arranged to spend just 
over eight weeks in the country from mid-January to mid-March 2005, and decided 
to confine the majority of my research to students and staff of schools and 
universities in the city of Shymkent in South Kazakhstan Oblast. I was aware that as 
I was able only to undertake research of this duration the breadth of my 
investigations would be limited. Any large-scale investigation into the views of all 
segments of the population or all regions of the country was well beyond the possible 
scope of my research. I therefore decided to concentrate on the city of Shymkent, in 
which I had previously worked, as this would enable me to utilise existing local 
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knowledge and contacts to maximise what was achievable during a relatively short 
period of fieldwork. I make no claims that any findings can be generalised to other 
regions; indeed, many participants articulated a belief in the differing character of 
residents of other regions, or other segments of the population.  
 
However in order to expand my understanding of the same issues from the 
perspective of those involved in the government of Kazakhstan I also planned to visit 
the capital city, Astana, to speak to Members of Parliament and Senators working 
there. I therefore began the process of organising a visit to Astana by means of the 
help of a British national living in Kazakhstan. 
 
Also during this time I asked other contacts living in Shymkent to find a suitable 
translator with whom I could work in the schools and universities of Shymkent. I 
wanted to give interview participants the opportunity to express themselves in either 
Russian or Kazakh and whilst I speak Russian sufficiently well to conduct the 
interviews, regrettably I do not know Kazakh. It is acknowledged that this is a 
possible weakness of the research; however, I felt that, for the purposes of my 
research using the social identity perspective, the content of participants’ replies was 
the most relevant factor and that this would be available for analysis even through 
the medium of translation. In light of my inability to use Kazakh I decided to conduct 
all interviews by means of a translator in order to keep conditions from one interview 
to another as similar as possible. In practice, however, my translator was not 
available on every occasion and I was therefore required to conduct some interviews 
(those with Russian medium of education students) alone, without the presence of a 
translator. Moreover, after some weeks the original translator began to be so 
infrequently available that I decided to begin working with someone else. A further 
factor to be taken into consideration is that many of the participants either chose or 
were encouraged by their teachers to practise their English in the interview context 
and were thus expressing themselves through the medium of a foreign language. 
Although I tried to discourage this and urged participants to speak in the language in 
which they felt most comfortable as a I was a guest in the institutions and was 
dependent on the good will of the staff and students involved I did not feel I could 
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press this issue. Again, whilst the use of English affects the fluency of participants’ 
responses, I did not feel that it had an overly detrimental effect on the suitability of 
their responses for analysis. 
 
Time was often limited during interviews and for this reason, when a translator was 
present although I asked all questions through him or her, when the replies were in 
Russian they were not translated into English and I simply continued with the next 
question unless I required clarification of a particular word or expression. Sometimes 
participants code-switched quite extensively during their contributions, using a 
combination of both Russian and Kazakh, and this tended to mean that the translation 
was less thorough than otherwise as the translator lost track of which segments of 
speech I had and had not understood. 
 
3.4 The Fieldwork Site: Shymkent 
The city of Shymkent was founded as a staging post on the Silk Road and was the 
site of a frontier fort in the nineteenth century but has been entirely rebuilt since the 
Second World War. Shymkent is an important industrial centre and the site of a large 
oil refinery. It is the regional capital and Kazakhstan’s third largest city with a 
population of approximately 545,400 in 2009.2  Situated in the south of the country, 
the majority of Shymkent’s population are ethnic Kazakhs but there is also a 
significant Uzbek minority (Shymkent lies relatively close to the Uzbek capital, 
Tashkent) as well as Russians and other minority groups. For the South Kazakhstan 
region as a whole, Kazakhs make up approximately 55% of the population and 
Russians 15%.3 




Figure 3.1: Map of Kazakhstan 
 
Map Source: http://www.virtualsources.com/Countries/Asia%20Countries/Kazakhstan.htm 
 
3.4.1 The Translators 
The first translator with whom I worked was a male ethnic Kazakh in his mid-
twenties. A former medical student, he had become disillusioned with the system of 
internship, which he believed to be corrupt, and had left to set up his own business 
teaching English. Bakhit is fluent in English, Kazakh and Russian and seemed to 
converse equally willingly and easily in either Russian or Kazakh with friends and 
colleagues. He seemed to be competent as a translator. At the start of my fieldwork 
he was freely available to work with me and proved very helpful in making contact 
both with institutions and with individual students. However, his business concerns 
seemed to become an increasing priority for him and on occasion he asked a 
colleague to work in his place.  
 
This second translator was also a male ethnic Kazakh of the same age and equally 
fluent in Russian and Kazakh although he seemed to prefer Kazakh in social 
dialogue. Irkan was less competent in English and I consequently had less confidence 
in the complete accuracy of his translation from Kazakh.  
 
Because of my concerns about the availability of Bakhit and the competence of his 
colleague I sought to find a new translator with whom I could work more freely. I 
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was put in contact with a final year student of a local Language Academy with whom 
I had had some contact on a previous visit to Shymkent. Dinara is in her early 
twenties and is fluent in Russian, Kazakh, Uzbek, Tatar and English. Ethnically she 
is half Tatar, half Uzbek and uses all the listed languages (except English) in the 
home depending on with which member of the family she is speaking. She proved to 
be very professional in her approach and I had full confidence in her translating 
skills. She was also able to negotiate access to the Language Academy in order for 
me to conduct interviews there.  
 
3.4.2 The Institutions 
The Language Academy is a private university which focuses on the teaching of 
English but also gives students some instruction in either French or German in the 
latter years of study. It has a good reputation for quality and employs native English 
speakers for some of its teaching.  
 
Another private university into which I was able to gain access is Miras University. 
Miras is a particularly successful private university which in recent years has 
expanded to occupy extensive second premises. It teaches a wide range of subjects 
and has both Russian and Kazakh medium of instruction groups. The Director of the 
university is well connected and innovative. He is introducing English as the medium 
of instruction for technological subjects and is keen to develop the skills and training 
of his staff. The university generally has a good reputation for the quality of teaching 
and standard of education received.  
 
The Kazakh-Turkish University in Shymkent is funded with money from Turkey. It 
is a large university and popular in particular with ethnically Kazakh students. I was 
unsuccessful in my attempts to gain access to the university itself and was not 
allowed to conduct interviews in the university. However, Irkan had personal contact 
with a number of current students. He was therefore able to arrange for me to meet 
with and interview these students in their own time in his classroom. He also 
introduced me to two teachers whom I was then able to interview. 
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The South Kazakhstan State University is, as its name suggests, state-funded. It is a 
relatively large university but does not enjoy a particularly good reputation for the 
quality of education received there. I made no attempt to interview inside the 
university as Bakhit and his colleague made arrangements with individual students to 
come to his classrooms to be interviewed. Through another local contact I was also 
able to conduct an interview with an English teacher from the university (at the 
private institution where she herself was learning English).  
 
The first school I visited is a private school not far from the centre of the city. Salem 
school is quite small and benefits from native speaker English teaching and small 
class sizes. I interviewed 12 students aged 15 and 16 at this school and three 
members of teaching staff including the school’s Director.  
 
Bakhit arranged my visit to a second school where his mother works as a teacher. 
Situated on the outskirts of the city, school number 37 is a Kazakh-Uzbek school 
with both these languages used as a medium of instruction. At this school I spoke 
with the Director and interviewed several members of staff. Unfortunately there was 
a fault with the recording equipment on this occasion and only part of the 
conversation with the Director and one teacher interview has been preserved.  
 
I intended to return to this school to interview students and was invited to do so. 
However on one occasion my translator was prevented from accompanying me at the 
last minute and before a second scheduled visit had taken place there was a violent 
incident at the school. Apparently students from one ethnic group attacked a teacher 
of the other nationality and in return same-nationality students acted in defence of the 
teacher. A gun was used and several students and the member of staff were 
hospitalised though no-one was seriously wounded. Although the incident was 
apparently reported on the local television news I could not find any further, more 
detailed or substantiated information. It meant though, that it was deemed 
inappropriate for me to return to the school at that time.  
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3.4.3 The Interviews 
In order to gain as balanced and broad a perspective as was feasible it was my aim to 
interview at least ten students from each of the institutions I visited and, with the 
exception of the Kazakh-Uzbek school, I was able to do so. In total I successfully 
recorded interviews with 65 students (including one recent graduate) and 17 teachers 
yielding approximately 51 hours of dialogue.4 
 
The role of the interviewer (and translator) as an in- or out-group member in relation 
to the interviewee was discussed briefly above (section 3.1). In my experience, as I 
carried out the interviews in Shymkent, I was at times aware of the fact that my 
gender as a female was perhaps an issue for some of the participants. I particularly 
felt that Kazakh males perceived the gender difference between us as an inhibiting 
factor preventing them expressing themselves as freely as they might otherwise have 
done. I also felt that there was a perception of greater cultural difference between 
myself and respondents whose primary language was Kazakh than between myself 
and those most comfortable speaking Russian and that this too had an affect on the 
way in which participants expressed themselves within the interview context. Whilst 
it is worth bearing such factors in mind it is also to be understood that the above is a 
description of my perceptions of the situation only. As well as being impossible to 
quantify, such factors are also impossible to eliminate and form the backdrop to any 
such investigations carried out by a Westerner within a Central Asian research 
setting such as Shymkent where participants have relatively little contact with 
Westerners or experience of the type of research being undertaken.  
 
The intended trip to Astana proved to be quite difficult to arrange and it was not until 
the final week of my stay in Kazakhstan that I was able to finalise arrangements 
sufficiently and travel to the capital. I was able to gain admittance to the senate and 
parliament buildings through the help of Senator Kuanishbek Kulbaevich Bultaev, 
one of the Senators for the South Kazakhstan Oblast at that time. Senator Bultaev 
                                                 
4 A CD containing the full transcripts of all the interviews carried out is attached to this thesis for examination 
purposes.  It cannot, however, be placed in the public domain due to the assurances of confidentiality given to the 
interviewees when the recordings were made. 
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introduced me to a number of his colleagues who were willing and able to be 
interviewed. I modified my basic research schedule from that used in the educational 
setting in order that the questions be more appropriate to the role and knowledge of 
the participants5. There was also on occasion an increased time pressure on the 
duration of these interviews and the participants were sometimes interrupted by 
visitors or telephone calls. However, I was able to have interesting and valuable 
conversations with 7 senators and 2 MPs resulting in approximately 4 hours of 
recording. The senators interviewed included Kazakhs, a Russian, a Tatar and an 
ethnic German. There was no translator with me on this trip and all conversations 
took place in Russian.  
 
The equipment used to record the interviews consisted of a Sharp MT80 minidisk 
recorder and a Sony ECM 909A microphone. Both of these were small and therefore 
proved very convenient for carrying around easily and setting up quickly during the 
time of the fieldwork. Their small size also had the advantage of being less obtrusive 
and potentially intimidating to participants. I also often reassured interviewees that 
the recording was being done solely for my own research purposes as well as 
describing to them the basic purpose and outline of the research. This was often 
necessary in order to reassure participants who were nervous about being 
interviewed. I therefore explained that they were not being judged on their responses 
and that I saw my role as being there to learn from and about them rather than as 
being in a position of authority over them.  
 
In practice I had to modify the interview schedule to the available time and to 
individual participants’ level of interest and engagement with the topics. Time 
constraints meant that in the vast majority of interviews I excluded the questions 
relating to differences in speech between participants and their parents and children 
as well as the last section of questions relating to personal experience at the 
particular institution.  Most of the interviews lasted about 30 minutes although some 
lasted considerably longer than this. Interviews were generally carried out in an 
                                                 
5 See Appendix A for a copy of these interview questions also. 
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office or classroom of the institution. I was usually given a desk to work at and often 
tried to sit at ninety degrees to the interviewee to lesson the appearance of 
interrogation and to try and create a more conversational atmosphere. As explained 
above some interviews were conducted in the classrooms in which Bakhit and his 
colleague conducted their English teaching business. The interviews with Senators 
and MPs took place in the interviewees’ offices.  
 
In addition to the interviews I was also able to do some observation in the private 
school in Shymkent. I spent a day observing classes attended by the students I had 
interviewed and followed all or part of the group to their lessons for that day. I 
observed lessons in chemistry, history (including a computer presentation in 




4 Personal, Ethnic and State Level Identities: Individual 
Interviews 
4.1 Introduction 
It is clear from the discussion of the social identity and self-categorization 
frameworks in chapter one that multiple possible identities are available to people 
and that various identities and levels of identity may be related to more or less 
strongly by a given individual, or, more specifically, by a given individual in a 
particular social context. Therefore, within the context of the research interview, it 
was my aim to elicit an indication of which levels of identity were salient to the 
students and teachers of Shymkent. In accordance with the focus of the present 
research I was principally watching for an orientation by my interviewees to 
personal, ethnic and national levels of identity. However, these identities were not 
viewed as being clearly defined in either content or level of inclusiveness and were 
taken as broad categories only. Certain interview questions were therefore asked with 
the aim of revealing participants’ beliefs about the defining content and boundaries 
of such identities as well as identifying the outgroups deemed relevant for 
comparison. 
 
4.2 Levels of Identity 
4.2.1 ‘How would you describe the people of Kazakhstan?’ 
Following the preliminary explanation of the interview and introductions of the 
participants the first question included was, ‘How would you describe the people of 
Kazakhstan?” 
 
One purpose of this question was to increase the salience of group identity at the 
ethnic and national level at an early stage of the interview. Whilst not wishing to 
restrict or pre-empt responses I did want to bring these identities to the fore in order 
that the interviewee would be more likely to interpret and respond to the interview 
primarily in terms of social rather than individual identities.  
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The question was phrased quite openly, deliberately using the general word ‘people’ 
rather than ‘population’ or ‘nation’ (this was retained in translation) so as to leave 
room for participants to interpret it and answer according to their own natural focus 
in terms of salient level of identity. Accordingly, a variety of answers were elicited. 
Some interviewees focused on a republic-level state identity, interpreting the ‘people 
of Kazakhstan’ as all those living in Kazakhstan. Some, moreover, made explicit 
reference to the multi-ethnic and inclusive identity of the state. Others were more 
oriented to an exclusive ethnic understanding of identity where ethnic Kazakhs were 
understood to be the ‘people of Kazakhstan’. Still others ascribed greater importance 
to individual level identities, stressing that each person is different or denying the 
validity of a generalisation describing all the people of Kazakhstan together.  
 
Some participants oriented to more than one level of identity and in such cases each 
reference was included and categorised for analysis. In some instances participants’ 
answers made no clear or distinguishable reference to any of these levels of identity 
and were therefore categorised as ‘non-specific’. In certain cases there was some 
difficulty in deciding whether a particular answer should be categorised as orienting 
to a Kazakh ethnic level identity or to a general Kazakhstani state level identity. This 
complication arose principally when participants described the people of Kazakhstan 
in terms of certain stereotypical character traits. These traits, the foremost of which is 
hospitality, are usually understood as being attributes of the Kazakhs as an ethnic 
group. However, there is also an understanding that other ethnic groups resident in 
Kazakhstan have taken on these attributes and in response to certain other questions 
this process is described explicitly. In some answers specific reference was made to 
the Kazakhs as an ethnic group alongside the characteristics described; in these 
instances answers were categorised as being ‘ethnic, explicit’. In those instances 
where characteristics commonly attributed to Kazakhs were listed with no explicit 
reference to a particular ethnic group the answer was categorised as ‘ethnic, 




Table 4.1: Orientation of Respondents’ Answers to the Question ‘How would you 
describe the people of Kazakhstan?’ 
Answer No. of Responses % of Respondents Mentioning 
Personal 10 13 
Ethnic, explicit 15 19 
Ethnic, implicit 28 35 
State  14 18 
Non-specific 15 19 
NB: Some respondents offered more than one response 
Total number of respondents = 80 
 
Personal Identity 
It is described above how the first question was intended to raise the salience of 
social rather than personal identities by virtue of the fact that it invites a 
generalisation at the group level. It is therefore perhaps surprising that as many as 
13% of the respondents focused on personal identity. To do so despite the phrasing 
of the question suggests that for such participants personal identity is highly salient.  
 
Some began by making a generalisation adhering to the common stereotype of 
hospitality but then as they considered their response further qualified this with a 
recognition that in their actual experience individual level identities and 
characteristics are more salient.  
 
4:1 “By their qualities?… First of all they’re hospitable, then what else? You meet 
different types of people, those who are open to conversation, those who are closed 
to conversation, at once, then there are people who are calm towards all people, 
caring people.”1 2  
 
In contrast, a teacher from the Kazakh Turkish University simply orients to an 
individual level identity straight away. 
 
4:3 “People of Kazakhstan very different, they may be tolerant, well educated, kind-
hearted, good-natured, they may be rude, ignorant people, they’re different.”  
 
                                                 
1 See Appendix B for information on style and referencing of quotes 
2 See also quote 4:2 in Appendix C. Where † appears in this and subsequent chapters, supplementary quote(s) are 
to be found in this appendix.  
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Almost half of those giving responses in this category are Russian, which may 
indicate a stronger tendency for non-Kazakhs to focus on a personal rather than 
social level identity. However, the fact that only 10 respondents gave answers in this 
category means that it is too small a number from which to draw meaningful 
conclusions in terms of ethnic group membership.  
 
Ethnic Identity, Explicit 
Despite president Nazarbaev’s frequently repeated rhetoric stressing the inclusive, 
multi-ethnic nature of Kazakhstan, there are those for whom ethnic identity is highly 
important and who see Kazakhstan as belonging principally and primarily to the 
titular group. This ideology is apparent amongst those who gave descriptions of the 
‘people of Kazakhstan’ in exclusively Kazakh ethnic terms. Many Kazakhs feel 
empowered as the titular group to express a greater sense of ownership and 
belonging to Kazakhstan than other groups. They see themselves as the genuine and 
true people of Kazakhstan in contrast to other nationalities, who may be welcomed 
and accepted to a significant degree, as Kazakh hospitality dictates, but are not 
rooted in the territory to the same extent. Two thirds of the interviewees who gave 
answers in this category are Kazakhs themselves. However, this figure is only 
marginally greater than the Kazakh proportion of participants overall and it is 
perhaps surprising that it is not higher, as it might be expected that a greater 
proportion of ethnic Kazakhs would show such an orientation than members of other 
ethnic groups. Of the remaining 5 participants 2 are Russian and 3 are members of 
minority ethnic groups. 
 
One of the Russian participants is very clear in describing her view of the ‘people of 
Kazakhstan’ in ethnic terms. 
 
4:4 “Kazakhs live in Kazakhstan, it’s their country”  
 
The other Russian participant who gave an answer in this category also excludes her 
own ethnic group from the scope of the ‘people of Kazakhstan’, saying that she 
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thinks that (4:5) “such eastern nationalities are beautiful people,” thereby clearly 
marking the Kazakh people out as different to herself.  
 
One of the members of a minority ethnic group, a Tatar man who teaches translation 
studies, also immediately oriented his answer to the Kazakhs as an ethnic group 
separate from his own and from Russians. 
 
4:6 “In character, this people is very kind, very kind, open and there is a very 
interesting, good, useful and interesting point about the Kazakhs, they want to know 
a lot…”  
 
As would be expected the Kazakhs who gave answers oriented to an explicitly 
Kazakh understanding of the ‘people of Kazakhstan’ used phrases marking their own 
inclusion in this group.  
 
4:7 “In general our Kazakhs…”  
 
4:8 “…in the time of the Soviet Union we lost our culture, traditions and language” † 
 
One Kazakh participant further underlines the exclusive nature of this ethnic 
orientation to identity by focusing on a characteristic that, by and large non-Kazakhs 
do not share: language. (4:10) “Kazakh people speak the Kazakh language.”  
 
His principal orientation is thus a highly focused and exclusive ethnic one and it is 
clear that for the other participants also giving answers in this category an ethnic 
level of identity is highly salient. For them the ‘people of Kazakhstan’ are ethnically 
identified and characterised.  
 
Ethnic Identity, Implicit 
In contrast to the description of the people of Kazakhstan as speaking Kazakh, which 
rules out most members of other ethnic groups, many respondents described the 
people of Kazakhstan in terms of attributes and characteristics which may be shared 
by other groups. However, where members of other ethnic groups manifest such 
traits it is usually said that this is because they have learned and adopted them from 
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their Kazakh neighbours. Therefore, although it is likely that most of the respondents 
who gave answers in this category were basically orientating to an ethnic Kazakh 
level of identity, and indeed this is often the impression given, such an orientation is 
implicit only, as no explicit reference is made to an ethnic group and it is possible 
that they are meaning to include other ethnic groups resident in Kazakhstan within 
the scope of their description.  
 
This is the category with the highest level of responses (mentioned by 35% of 
interviewees), and once again a breakdown of responses according to ethnic group 
correlates quite closely with the number of respondents representing each ethnic 
group overall; for example, in this category 25% of respondents are Russian 
compared to 22% of all interviewees.  
 
Answers which almost certainly refer to an exclusive ethnic level of identity include 
that of Salem school student 1, a Kazakh female who describes the ‘people of 
Kazakhstan’ as (4:11) “nomads” who “steal their bride.” These are characteristics 
which are unlikely ever to be attributed to Russians. 
 
Similar implications are made by the Kazakh Turkish University student who states 
that the people of Kazakhstan are (4:12) “…always glad to meet somebody from 
other countries” and similarly by the Salem school student who says that they are 
(4:13) “hospitable” and “…don’t throw anyone out.”  
 
It seems then that for many interviewees giving answers in this category an ethnic 
level of identity is most salient. If the two categories representing answers at this 
level are taken together to form one category pointing to an ethnic group level 
orientation, then that category represents 53% of all responses given. 
 
State Identity  
It has been described above that whilst the trait of hospitality is usually attributed to 
Kazakhs it can be seen as a representative characteristic for all residents of 
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Kazakhstan. Some of those for whom a national, state level of identity seems to be 
most salient make explicit reference to this. 
 
4:14 “There are some things which are present in all people of Kazakhstan. I would 
say main traditions, like hospitality and um, openness... Friendly, I would say they 
are friendly.”  
 
One of the students of Salem school makes her focus on a state identity clear by 
making an explicit comparison at this level. 
 
4:15 “People who live in Kazakhstan, I’ve just been to Russia and can compare, all 
the same in the relationship between them, their hospitality, they are a lot warmer 
towards people and more sociable.”  
 
A number of participants for whom a state level of identity was salient in this context 
made their orientation apparent by an explicit description of the multi-ethnic nature 
of Kazakhstan. Such respondents seem highly focused on the inclusive nature of such 
an identity and find in this a positive social identity. This is true for members of all 
ethnic groups. 
 
4:16 “People of Kazakhstan uh, in our Kazakhstan there are many different 
nationality and er, I am very glad that…it’s good, in my opinion, all people it’s good 
I think.”†  
 
One Kyrgyz student from the Kazakh Turkish University shows the inclusive nature 
of his understanding of ‘the people of Kazakhstan’ despite the fact that he himself is 
not of the titular ethnic group by his use of the pronoun ‘we’ and also makes it clear 
that for him this is a highly positive social identity. 
 
4:18 “Very pleased with people of Kazakhstan. We are kind, we are hospitable.”  
 
Summary 
We have seen through participants’ responses to the first question of the interview 
that whilst for some interviewees personal identity in terms of individual 
characteristics and behaviour remained salient, many manifest an orientation towards 
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a social identity at ethnic or state level. Of those for whom this was true three 
quarters gave responses showing that for them an ethnic level of identity was most 
salient and of those focusing on a state identity many made reference to the ethnic 
make up of the republic. It is therefore clear that for those participating in this 
research social identity in terms of ethnic group membership is highly salient and 
significant. 
 
4.2.2 ‘How would you describe yourself?’ 
Whilst the first question pushed the focus towards a group level identity, a 
subsequent question briefly oriented participants to their personal identity. The 
question, ‘how would you describe yourself?’,  was phrased so as to be open to 
interpretation by the participants as to whether they answered in terms of identifying 
information such as age or place of residence, in terms of a personal character 
description or in some other way. The responses given to this question can also be 
used to ascertain which levels of identity are salient for participants. Accordingly, 
answers were categorised as to whether respondents described themselves in purely 
personal, individual terms, according to ethnic group membership or according to a 
state level identification with the Republic of Kazakhstan. Once again where 
respondents gave a description showing identification at more than one level both 
were included. The results are summarised in Table 4.2 below. 
 
Table 4.2: Orientation of Respondents’ Answers to the Question ‘How would you 
describe yourself?’ 
Answer No. of Responses % of Respondents Mentioning 
Personal 57 80 
Ethnic 15 21 
State 20 28 
NB: Some respondents offered more than one response 
Number of respondents = 71 
 
Personal Identity  
The fact that a high proportion of participants made reference to a personal level of 
identity is expected for a question such as this. However, of more interest is the fact 
that despite the obvious bias of the question, of the 57 responses which contained a 
personal level self description, only 40 of these related solely to personal identity 
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whilst the remaining 17 also made reference to a collective identity at ethnic or state 
level. Thus, overall 44% of the respondents oriented towards an ethnic or state group 
level identity in their answer and 56% were oriented exclusively to a personal level 
self-description. Categorising references to other collective identities such as gender, 
occupation or student status was outwith the scope of this analysis. It can also be 
noted that the distribution according to ethnic group of participants giving a personal 
level identification closely matches the overall proportion of respondents from each 
ethnic group.  
 
Ethnic Identity  
This is not true of the distribution of respondents for whom ethnic group membership 
is salient in this context. Of the 15 responses in this category 13 are given by 
Kazakhs and just 2 by Russians. A possible interpretation of this may be that for 
Kazakhs in Kazakhstan ethnic group membership is a less problematically positive 
self identity than for members of other ethnic groups. It is widely acknowledged that 
the dissolution of the Soviet Union has posed numerous identity challenges for 
Russians living in the Central Asian republics (see Laitin 1998 for a helpful 
examination of the challenges facing the Russian speaking populations of several 
post-Soviet countries in this context), whereas for the titular nationality 
independence has meant the affirmation of their ethnic group and a marked increase 
in its status. Thus Kazakhs are keen to self identify as members of this high-status 
group. For the two Russians who describe themselves in ethnic terms this is done in 
such a way as to highlight the challenges and ambiguities of their status. For one, a 
student at Miras University, this is because of his lack of clear ethnic group 
membership and the challenge this poses to self-description and self-definition. 
 
4:19 “According to my nationality, my father is um, Russian and half of Ukraine. My 
mother is Tatar. So I’m like um, double national mixed yes.”  
 
The other Russian participant who gives an ethnic self-description in this context 
seems to do so in a way which highlights her minority status as she juxtaposes her 




For the Kazakh participants displaying ethnic level identity orientation in this 
context, their ethnic group membership is much less ambiguous; it is explicitly 
positive and valued as the following examples show. 
 
4:21 “I am a Kazakh girl and I am a patriot of my country.”  
 
4:22 “I am Kazakh, it’s a proud.”  
 
For these participants then, ethnic group membership is an important social identity. 
The fact that only 21% of respondents answering this question oriented to an ethnic 
identity whereas 28% showed a focus towards a state level identity is perhaps 
surprising in comparison to the responses to the first interview question where there 
was considerably more focus on ethnic level identity than on state identity. Upon 
further comparison of the responses to each of these questions it also becomes clear 
that the overlap between those mentioning an ethnic identity as salient in the context 
of question 1 and those doing so in response to the later question is quite small (5 
participants) and the overlap between the two questions of those orienting to a state 
identity is even smaller with just three interviewees making a reference to a state 
level identity in both answers. This fact highlights the important role played by 
context in terms of salient levels of identity. A certain group membership may be 
made more or less salient by context and the effect of context will be different for 
each person according to his or her own set of beliefs about those identities and past 
experiences relating to them. Hence a student for whom ethnic identity is highly 
salient within the context of thinking about Kazakhstan may not view the same 
identity as salient in the later context of thinking about themselves. In that context it 
may be that a level of identity relating to their role as a citizen of Kazakhstan seems 
more relevant.  
 
State Identity  
The challenges posed to non-Kazakhs by the end of the Soviet Union and the 
establishment of the independent Republic of Kazakhstan have been highlighted 
above. They are also brought to the fore by certain participants for whom a state 
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level of identity was salient in reference to a self-description. One Russian student in 
particular expresses the loss of a sense of belonging that a secure national level 
identity engenders, a perception made worse by the linguistic insecurity due to the 
decline in the status of Russian in the new republic which she describes as the ‘loss’ 
of her native language. 
 
4:23 “…of course I’m not a patriot of my country.” … “Because as they say, we 
don’t have a native language. Your native language is the one your mother taught, if 
I’d been born in England, my native language would be English, although it’s 
Russian so the same, if, well I’d happily live in Russia, and all that like USSR, 
national homeland.”  
 
It seems that this participant is searching for a positive group level identity but is 
struggling because the value of the group membership attributes of Russian ethnicity 
and language which were formerly highly valued and secure are now under 
negotiation and no longer provide a strong positive social identity. This is 
highlighted by the comparisons with the Soviet past for Russians and also with 
England where the white majority is similarly secure in its ethnic and linguistic 
status. The loss of status of the Russian language at the republic level is expressed as 
the loss of a native language, that is, for this participant its value has been so reduced 
that it can no longer contribute to a positive social identity and thus, for her it is as if 
it were no longer there: “we don’t have a native language”.  
 
It is clear from this discussion that the various group memberships which are 
important social identities do not exist in isolation. For the participant discussed 
above, ethnic and state identity are closely linked and insecurity in the area of one is 
tightly bound to the negative status of the other.  
 
Another Russian student at the same university also makes reference to the political 
changes and end of the USSR in relation to her own identity. For this student 
however, the changes are less threatening and are interpreted far more positively. She 
seems to focus on the newly acquired identity as a citizen of Kazakhstan rather than 




4:24 “…I am a citizen of Shymkent, of Kazakhstan. Er, I was born in Soviet Union 
now I live in Kazakhstan so it’s very interesting…I want to study, I want to master 
languages, I want to achieve something in my life, I want to travel…” 
 
In contrast to the sense of change and identity negotiation that the above quoted 
participants expressed, for other interviewees a state level identity was secure and 
straightforward. Indeed, for a number of respondents it was the only self description 
they gave. 
 
4:25 “I’m Kazakhstani.”  
 
4:26 “I am patriot of my state.”† 
 
For these participants then, the social identity ‘citizen of Kazakhstan’ is secure and 
positive and, judging from the fact that it was the main or only aspect of their self-
description, it is a salient and valued one; an important aspect of the self.  
 
For some participants though, it seems that a variety of levels of identity are equally 
salient and value-laden and are equally valid aspects of the self. They are not willing 
to categorise themselves in terms of a single level of identity but draw attention to 
the overlapping and multi-tiered nature of their perception of self-identity. 
 
4:30 “I’m Alikhan, I’m a student, I’m a person of Kazakhstan, I’m a Kazakh…”  
 
4:31 “Dana, Kazakh, study at this school, citizen of Kazakhstan…” 
 
Summary 
It is therefore again apparent that each person has their own set of personal and social 
identities which may be identified with more or less strongly, be secure and positive 
or be insecure and problematic. The social context of the interview and the particular 
question, “How would you describe yourself?” makes certain of these identities 




4.2.3 ‘What is the most important aspect of Kazakhstan’s independence?’ 
Another question used to explore which levels of identity were salient and value-
laden for participants was that asking what, in their opinion, was the most important 
aspect of independence. The answers people gave were categorised according to 
whether the respondent most valued aspects of independence which related to them 
personally, those which related to Kazakhs as a nationality or those which related to 
Kazakhstan as a republic inclusive of all ethnic groups. The relative distribution of 
responses into these categories can be seen in Table 4.3 below. 
 
Table 4.3: Orientation of Respondents’ Answers to the Question ‘What is the most 
important aspect of Kazakhstan’s independence?’ 
Answer No. of Responses 
Personal 16 (20%) 
Ethnic Kazakh 22 (27%) 
State 43 (53%) 
NB: Some respondents offered more than one response 
Number of respondents = 75  
% figure relates to responses as opposed to respondents 
 
Whilst the relatively high level of responses orienting towards the benefits of 
independence at the state level is unsurprising given the wording of the question it is 
of interest to note that nearly half of the responses made were focused on the benefits 
enjoyed at the personal or ethnic level, once more underlining the multi-tiered 
experience of identity for these respondents. 
 
State Identity  
Many of those who focused on state level benefits spoke of independence or freedom 
itself as the main benefit and many spoke too of the economic progress made by 
Kazakhstan in the years since independence, both of which factors were valued and 
therefore contributed to the positive nature of the state level identity made salient in 
this context. 
 
4:32 “Most of all I’m glad because it’s improving, the crisis is past and now we’re in 
the time of the upturn zone… it is sovereign, first of all we are improving our 
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economy ourselves, using our own resources… now Kazakhstan must decide 
everything in only its own strength.”  
 
4:33 “Even though I’m not a Kazakh, Kazakhstan means a lot to me… 
[independence means] more pride in Kazakhstan… because now it is an independent 
country.”  
 
Both of these students have been able to find a positive social identity in their status 
as citizens of independent Kazakhstan. These comments stand in marked contrast to 
those discussed earlier (quote 4:23), in which the loss of status of Russian meant that 
Kazakhstan’s independence was seen as a threat to that individual’s social identity at 
the state level. In fact both quote 4:23 and 4:32 were said by the same student. It 
would appear then, that whilst the loss of status of Russian is negatively perceived by 
this student, she has been able to draw on different group characteristics, in this case 
economic success, to maintain a positive state level identity in some ways, despite 
the threat she feels from the fact that Russian is not the state language. Different 
individuals bring different experiences and cognitive approaches to the task of 
understanding and expressing their own role as a member of the various groups and 
levels of society and events that for some are threatening and negatively perceived 
for others bring new opportunities for positive identity constructs.  
 
Ethnic Kazakh Identity  
The distribution of responses within the ‘state’ category according to the ethnic 
group membership of participants is broadly in accord with the overall balance of 
participants in these terms. However, unsurprisingly this is not true of those for 
whom the most important aspect of independence is expressed as being benefits to 
Kazakhs as an ethnic group. Of the 22 responses given in this category 19 are made 
by ethnic Kazakhs, with just one from a Russian and two from ethnic minority group 
members (a Tatar and a Kyrgyz).  
 
For Kazakhs, independence has meant an increase in the status and value accorded to 
their ethnic group membership. For many citizens, being Kazakh and participating in 
the culture, traditions and language associated with that group membership is no 
longer problematic in terms of maintaining a positive social identity. For these 
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people independence has brought security and legitimacy to a positive experience of 
an ethnic level identity. Many participants responded by expressing appreciation of 
this new legitimacy and status. 
 
4:34 “Independence is freedom - of language, culture and religion which was 
forbidden during the Soviet Union.”  
 
4:35 “It took a long period to get our independence and now I’m proud of that, that 
I’m Kazakh, that I live in Kazakhstan, that I am part of this country.” 
 
4:36 “The first that the Kazakh language is …state language yeah, and our history is 
more, how to say? People know about history more than they, in the post-Soviet, the 
post-Soviet time.”† 
 
The themes of history granting legitimacy and status to the group (discussed further 
in chapter 7) and the fact that independence facilitates a more positive experience of 
Kazakh ethnicity also come across in the response given by one of the senior 
teachers at Miras University. 
 
4:38 “The independence? Um, uh, the independence for our country gives much 
because of the mentality of our nation. Much historical documents says about, 
nowadays are being opened um revealed maybe and they are, they are saying much 
about our history, um maybe the independence gave our nation mmm raising of their 
mentality maybe as a nation, the proud um, it helped um to know the roots of this 
nation.”  
 
The fact of Kazakhstan and the Kazakhs enjoying increased status and legitimacy 
since independence comes across in many of the answers. Interestingly, the one 
Russian participant to give a response in this category identifies herself with the 
Kazakh language, describing it as ‘our’ language, and finds a sense of positive 
identity in what she perceives to be the greater freedom and recognition it now 
enjoys. 
 
4:39 “The main thing in our independence is that our language is developing, the 




This student has chosen to embrace what is typically seen as an element of ethnic 
Kazakh identity, the language, as part of her own identity as a member of this 
emerging nation. In this way, by defining herself as part of the group which claims 
this language as a defining feature, she is able to enjoy the benefits of the enhanced 
status of Kazakh. 
 
Personal Identity  
Another way in which participants have utilised the changes since independence in 
positive identity formation is through an appreciation of the possible benefits to them 
as an individual. Personal freedoms including the freedom of choice in study, new 
opportunities in work, business and travel and new freedom of religion are all often 
mentioned in this context. 
 
4:40 “Freedom in religion and freedom in travelling to other countries, freedom on 
starting business and in politics as well, I would say it’s more freedom.”†  
  
For these people the changes since independence have enabled them to feel a greater 
sense of control in determining their own personal and social identities. They can 
choose religious and occupational group membership and can find a positive sense of 
self through a feeling of freedom and agency in their personal lives. The threat of 
categorization against their will has receded (see section 1.6.1 on identity threats) 
and these new identities are valued because they are self-chosen and formed with no 
sense of external imposition.  
 
The ethnic distribution of participants giving responses in this category shows a 
greater proportion of Russians than for the group as a whole: 31% in this category, 
22% overall. It may be that it is easier for ethnic Russians to perceive the benefits of 
independence in terms of personal identity choices rather than in relation to social 
identity categories. At the ethnic level independence has certainly meant more 
benefits and increased status to Kazakhs, which may be a cause for a sense of 
identity threat to some ethnic Russians. Similarly the loss of the Soviet Union as 
homeland has already been cited as a possible source of anomie and confusion for 
ethnic Russians living in Kazakhstan. These factors may cause such people to seek to 
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consolidate personal level identities and look for new positive aspects of self-identity 
by means of the same changes which have threatened certain of their highly valued 
social identities. Whilst any conclusions drawn from the ethnic balance of responses 
to this question must be very tentative as the sample is so small as to make statistical 
inferences questionable, it is certainly true that the transformation of Kazakhstan 
from Soviet to independent republic has necessarily meant similar identity 
transformations and redefinition for its citizens at many levels.  
 
Summary 
The wide variety of responses to the question, ‘What is the most important aspect of 
independence?’ further underlines the fact that individual experience, understanding 
and beliefs have a significant influence on the salience of any particular level of 
identity within a specific context. For some, the context of thinking about 
independence and the changes it has brought highlights a newly secure ethnic 
identity, or new and renegotiated state level belonging, whilst for others individual 
level self-identities are brought to the fore and explored. Independence has meant 
changes and challenges for everyone at all levels of self-perception and it is these 
challenges that are prompting the exploration and negotiation of the meaning and 
value of personal, ethnic and state identities in Kazakhstan revealed above.  
 
4.2.4 State Identity: ‘Would you ever describe yourself as Kazakhstani?’ 
Participants Responding, ‘No’ 
We have seen above that many Kazakhs interpret the changes since independence in 
terms of benefits to their ethnic group identity. However, it has been part of 
government rhetoric since 1991 to promote a sense of inclusion and ethnic harmony 
in Kazakhstan as an independent republic. There is an effort to promulgate the 
ideology of a united republic, multi-ethnic but nonetheless cohesive (see chapters 7 
and 8 for further discussion of government discourse). Consequently it was of 
interest within the interview context to explore the level of development of a sense of 
state identity for people as ‘Kazakhstanis’. The question put to participants was: 
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‘Would you ever describe yourself as Kazakhstani?’ The distribution of responses is 
shown in table 4.4 below. 
 
Table 4.4: Responses to the Question ‘Would you ever describe yourself as 
Kazakhstani?’ 
Answer No. of Respondents 
No 8 (11%) 
Yes 28 (40%) 
Yes, abroad etc 34 (49%) 
Number of respondents = 70 
 
It was telling in itself that many respondents did not immediately understand the 
question and it often had to be repeated and explained before they felt able to 
formulate a reply. One respondent was very clear that an identity in this sense had 
not developed and even denied that a term for such an identity existed. 
 
4:43 “No, like if you compare with America, everybody in America is American 
yeah? It doesn’t matter what nationality he is, but in Kazakhstan for example I am 
Russian, I am a citizen of Kazakhstan, I am not a Kazakhstani, like it’s…We don’t 
have such a word Kazakhstana, like Kazakh it’s nationality, like Russian, Turk, 
Turkish and others. So everybody in foreign countries think that Kazakhstana is, no, 
is a citizen of Kazakhstan but no we have Kazakh, Russian and etc. nationalities.”  
 
In contrast a teacher at the same university, also a Russian, described how such an 
identity had developed through the close association of nationalities in Kazakhstan. 
This teacher described the intermingling of nationalities and merging of traditions as 
being strong enough to forge a new identity that goes beyond civic unity, that of an 
‘ethnic Kazakhstani’.  
 
4:44 “Well, I can say that I understand people in Kazakhstan you know, our country 
is have a lot of nationalities and they have some, they have much in common and so I 
can understand them, my husband, as he is Uzbek I understand his way of life, the 
traditions and um I like some of them, their traditions and we celebrate holidays, 
yeah, Kazakh, Uzbek, and so on Korean. Well and it makes ethnic Kazakhstani.”  
 
However, this identity was not one that she herself actively embraced; when 
questioned further as to whether she ever had or would describe herself as 
‘Kazakhstani’, she replied ‘no’ to both, explaining that she would describe herself 
saying: (4:45) “I am Russian but I am from Kazakhstan.”  
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Thus it seems that whilst a Kazakhstani identity is developing, this teacher does not 
feel comfortable in claiming it for herself, describing Kazakhstan just as being where 
she is from, suggesting that perhaps for her the label ‘Kazakhstani’ is not perceived 
to be a positive social identity whereas an ethnic self-identification is more valued. 
This was true for others of the participants as well. 
 
4:46 “I am Russian from Kazakhstan.”  
 
4:47 “But actually I say, ‘I’m Kazakh, I’m from Kazakhstan etc.’”  
 
Of the responses in the ‘no’ category a high proportion, 6 out of the 8, are made by 
ethnic Russians, which may suggest that ethnic Russians find identification with an 
independent Kazakhstan at this state level threatening, or at least are more likely to 
do so than the titular population. This may be due to their loss of status in 
comparison with Kazakhs since the end of the USSR and consolidation of 
Kazakhstan as an independent state. However, it is too small a sample to draw any 
strong conclusions of this type.   
 
Participants Responding ‘Yes’ 
For the students and teachers who answered ‘yes,’ the ideology of Kazakhstan as an 
all inclusive, multi-ethnic state in which the culture and traditions of all groups are 
accepted is salient and valued. They show a willingness to self-identify with this 
definition of state level belonging. 
 
4:48 “Yes, I am part of the Kazakhstani society and er, our society is multinational 
and er, the national character as tolerance helps us to live in this community, 
multinational community, and I am very proud that our nation er, this multinational 
state is stable and er different people can understand each other and can live in peace 
with each other. It’s a great achievement for our state and for our government, for 
our society. And this proudness I feel when I see different sport, I mean so um, 
competition, sport competition yeah, we feel when our team we listening our team, 
the team of Kazakhstani and er, the banner of Kazakhstan raising so we feel very 
proud that we are Kazakhstani.” 
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4:49 “Yes, I am a patriot of my country and when some people ask me why I don’t 
go to Russia, I think that it’s not my country, I was born here and this is my country 
and this tradition is also mine.”† 
 
Each of these participants clearly derives a valued social identity from being a part of 
the Republic of Kazakhstan. The multi-ethnic nature of the state is interpreted as a 
defining asset and strength whilst mutual understanding and tolerance are reified as 
characteristics of the group. These respondents, representing different ethnic groups, 
derive a sense of worth and pride from this identity such that they feel positive 
emotions as a result of perceived group status and achievements, as described in 
chapter one in relation to the social identity and self-categorisation theories.  
 
Participants Responding ‘Yes, when abroad, etc.’ 
Almost half of the responses to this question were that the participants would only 
use the self-description ‘Kazakhstani’ when abroad or in some other international 
context. For these participants it seems that the ingroup identity ‘Kazakhstani’ is 
made salient by the context in which this identity is seen to contrast to that of other 
state level groups (see section 5.2 for further discussion of this). The examples of 
such contexts usually cited were school or university academic competitions, 
conferences and sporting events. 
 
4:51 “Of course yes, …In different situations, in different, maybe yes in, in the sports 
contests.”  
 
4:52 “At a conference or maybe in a foreign country.”  
 
4:53 “Yes, when I lived in Russia for two years I said I was Kazakhstani.”†  
 
This would seem to suggest that international social contexts such as these cause the 
state level identity to assume greater salience for these participants in a way which 
does not occur during everyday, intra-group interactions, where lower level ethnic or 
other identities have greater salience. Within Kazakhstan, contrasts and comparisons 
between ethnic groups are relevant to questions of everyday belonging and 
behaviour. However, in the international context people come to perceive that the 
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differences between themselves and other Kazakhstanis, even those of other ethnic 
groups, may well be less than the differences between themselves and citizens of 
other states along valued social and cultural dimensions such as, for example, the 
attribute of hospitality mentioned by so many participants as an important attribute of 
the group (self-categorization theory’s comparative and normative fit as described in 
chapter 1). This realisation is manifest in the account of a Kazakh student of her time 
abroad. 
 
4:57 “Yes, because uh, you know I was in England and only when I visited, only 
when I left my country I felt myself as a Kazakhstani really. I found out that, found 
out that I am patriotic person… OK, first of all I liked there very much… but then I, I 
began missing my parents and also my friends, my town and the whole country.”  
 
A Russian student also realised the importance of such republic-wide cultural values 
to her identity when abroad and says that, on a visit to Russia she felt different and 
described herself as Kazakhstani despite the fact of ethnic affinity with the majority 
population in Russia. 
 
4:58 “Well yes, to be honest, I went to Russia last year and in reality it feels awful 
that you’re actually from Kazakhstan and not from Russia, people are completely 
different, completely… And there in Russia they’re less hospitable, that’s visible 
straight away, they’re more independent…”  
 
A Tatar student at Miras finds the common life of traditions and celebrations marked 
in Kazakhstan most salient in summarising Kazakhstani identity. 
 
4:59 “Usually if I’m communicating with foreigners and they most often, very often 
ask me to describe life in Kazakhstan of Kazakhstani people. To be honest I often 
describe the traditions because if I live in this country I also mark some 
celebrations.”  
 
These interviewees have become aware of valued ingroup characteristics which 
make them distinctive from outgroup members of other state level groups. They 
experience pride in the ingroup markers and are ready to defend them against 
outgroup threats and derogation. The ingroup identity may also be of sufficient 
importance as a self-identity that in the international context it supersedes other 
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identities and the ingroup member is highly aware of her role as a group 
representative. These points are illustrated by the responses of a Kazakh and of a 
Uyghur student. The Kazakh student responds that she describes herself as 
Kazakhstani 
 
4:60 “Talking with other nationalities, defending Kazakhstan if it is belittled.”  
 
The Uyghur student says that, when abroad, she would not describe herself as 
Uyghur 
 
4:61 “…‘Cos it’s not the first thing’… ‘if I go abroad, I show not my nation and not 
my culture, but I show my Kazakhstan… For example, if I left, left my school and I 
go to a new school, I represent my old school and the same thing with countries ‘cos 
they look at me and they’ll say, if I will cheat and if I will be bad or I will be 
criminalistic something they’ll say, ‘huh, everybody in Kazakhstan are bad.’”  
 
Summary 
The interview responses discussed above illustrate that whilst a Kazakhstani, state 
level identity may not be salient during most everyday interactions, in which ethnic 
or other smaller group identities are more prominent and involved in determining 
attitudinal and behavioural responses, the higher level identity is none the less an 
important and valued self-category for many in certain social contexts. Within the 
context of international comparison these citizens of Kazakhstan experience 
interactions in terms of their group membership as a Kazakhstani and respond in 
terms of that identity, seeking to promote positive group distinctiveness and status. In 
these contexts a Kazakhstani social identity is relevant to and valued by group 
members. There are others for whom that group identity is relevant and salient in 
other contexts as well and these participants expressed a willingness to self-identify 
as Kazakhstani in many or all situations. It may be that for such people the state-level 
identity with its group norms of hospitality and friendliness and sense of inclusion in 
traditions and celebrations provides a more secure and positive social identity than 
other possible group memberships and they are therefore ready to invoke the state 
identity in more circumstances. For a minority, though, a Kazakhstani identity is 
either implicitly or explicitly rejected. For these participants other group 
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memberships are more salient and valued in all social contexts such that state level 
group membership is not deemed to be a relevant or acknowledged self-category.  
 
4.2.5 State Identity: ‘Are people from Kazakhstan different than people from other 
countries?’ 
A later question also aimed to explore the relevance and importance of a state level 
identity to the students and teachers in Shymkent. This question made the context of 
international comparison explicit, asking: ‘Are people from Kazakhstan different 
than people from other countries?’ It was thus intended that participants compare 
citizens of Kazakhstan with those of other states and give an opinion as to whether or 
not there was any sense of a cohesive Kazakhstani identity uniting its people and 
distinguishing them from those belonging to other states. As can be seen from Table 
4.5 below a large majority of participants did recognise this kind of group unity. 
However, it is also clear that a number of respondents rejected the relevance of this 
level of group cohesion and oriented instead to ethnic or individual level identities.  
 
Table 4.5: Responses to the Question ‘Are people from Kazakhstan different than 
people from other countries?’ 
Answer No. of Responses 
Yes, there is something uniting them 54 (75%) 
No, ethnic groups differ 2 (3%) 
Understand question as relating to Kazakhs 12 (17%) 
No, people are individuals 1 (1%) 
No 3 (4%) 
Number of respondents = 72  
 
It was shown above that many participants consider the traits of hospitality, 
friendliness and inclusion to be defining characteristics for Kazakhstanis and that 
participation in marking certain celebrations and traditions was also deemed to be an 
important aspect of group membership. These same aspects were often mentioned as 
examples of factors differentiating Kazakhstan from other countries. 
 
4:62“I think that I told you that our quality is hospitality, it really unites all 
nationalities, all ethnics, ‘cos I was in Russia uh, last year and there Russian people 
they are not so hospitable, they are not so open, ‘cos our people open-hearted. So 
even our, I compared our Russian, Russian people and in people of Russia so they 
are different, they are different.”  
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4:63 “Probably the fact that all nations, we all live in Kazakhstan, we are no longer 
marked by ethnic nationality but by our state, that we are all Kazakhstanis and as I 
said all the traditions and national celebrations are marked by any nationalities.”†  
 
The importance of these points is stressed by the latter two respondents through the 
way in which they draw attention to the fact that they have mentioned these traits 
before; (4:62) “I think I told you that…”, (4:63) “…as I said…”. The centrality of 
these traits to a Kazakhstani identity is highlighted by the fact they are mentioned by 
so many participants and are mentioned more than once by individual interviewees.  
 
When questioned as to which celebrations were marked by all ethnic groups in this 
way, respondents generally referred to the two popular New Year festivals (Kazakh 
New Year, Nauriz, is celebrated in March), although one interviewee did also 
mention some republic oriented occasions. 
 
4:67 “Yes, they are different because we have a, every country has their own 
traditions and we can divide them by their traditions.” 
“New Year (Nauriz), and uh, and uh, Constitution day, Constitution day, Republic 
day, Independence Day I mean.”† 
 
Whilst the interviewees quoted above focus on outward traditions and the defining 
characteristic of hospitality, other participants felt some kind of Kazakhstani 
mentality or perspective, perhaps born out of common fate, to be the factor uniting 
all citizens and defining the group (see chapter 5 for more on this). 
 
4:69 “Well I think that yes, every country has its own mentality, its own 
understanding of life, each one has that, its own point of view.” 
 
4:70 “Um, we are a sort of, in the middle of Europe and Asia, not just geographically 
but in our mentality now. It’s like, and actually it’s one of the things our government 
is seeking. It’s a sort of mentality of someone who is Asian but European at the same 
time. So I think this makes us different to other people. Yeah, we are kind of, we 
have this ancient kind of traditions of Asia, Asian, you know people, but at same 
time our present and future are more into Europe, you know, I mean, West, Western 




It is clear that a large number of participants are ready to self-categorise at the state 
level of inclusiveness and are able to identify, enact and defend group norms and 
stereotypes in order to protect the group status from outgroup derogation and 
preserve a positive sense of group distinctiveness at this level. Table 4.5 shows 
though, that for a quarter of interviewees this was not the case, and that for 20% of 
respondents an ethnic level identity was more salient and valid in this context. Thus a 
significant number of participants interpreted the question as relating only to ethnic 
Kazakhs, in a manner reminiscent of similar responses to the first question of the 
interview (‘How would you describe the people of Kazakhstan?’) whilst two 
participants stated that there was no difference between the people of Kazakhstan 
and other countries because the differences existed at the ethnic level. For one such 
interviewee, a teacher at the Kazakh Turkish University, the group characteristic of a 
defining mentality is perceived as existing at the ethnic rather than the state level. 
 
4:72 “Hmm, they are different, they have their own mentality, for example, I have 
my own opinions, Russian people have their own, Uzbek also.”  
 
One of the teachers at the Language Academy, a Tatar, understood the question as 
relating solely to the Kazakhs of the country and persisted in this understanding 
despite several attempts to rephrase the question to make the intended state level of 
comparison clear. 
 
4:73 “Are people from Kazakhstan different than people from other countries?” 
“The Kazakh people at one point were very different from other nations because they 
were nomads, nomads…” 
“Is there something that unites all the different population of Kazakhstan?”  
“Two ideas unite it. The first idea is that of freedom, independence, that unites. And 
the second idea is linguistic, linguistic. Kazakhs want to preserve their language…” 
“What unites the nations, the ethnic groups in Kazakhstan?”  
“Well at present it seems to me that two main things unite the Kazakhs…”  
 
For this participant then, ethnic identity is clearly uppermost and he seems to have no 
concept of a state category separate from the idea of a Kazakh nation state. He 
repeatedly orients to an ethnic Kazakh group category despite the explicit references 
made to the heterogeneity of Kazakhstan’s population in subsequent re-phrasings of 
the question. This illustrates how the overwhelming salience of one category means 
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For each of the categories discussed above which contain a sufficient number of 
responses to make analysis possible, the distribution of responses by ethnic group 
quite closely matches that of the overall distribution of participants by ethnic group. 
 
For three quarters of the interviewees responding to the question, ‘Are people from 
Kazakhstan different than people from other countries’ a strong sense of state level 
categorisation with related group level norms and responses was evident. These 
participants readily self-categorised as members of the group ‘citizen of Kazakhstan’ 
and responded according to that categorisation. For the remaining 25% of 
participants this was not a salient social identity and they responded by arguing that 
the differences between members of the potential ingroup (the state) were no smaller 
than those between in- and outgroup members so that the group category was not a 
valid one. For most of these participants it was only possible and relevant to 
stereotype at the level of ethnic identity. 
 
4.2.6 Levels of Identity: Summary 
The interview questions discussed above explored the importance and relevance of 
certain social identities operating at different levels of inclusiveness for the students 
and teachers participating in the research. The importance of context is made 
apparent by the fact that a given interviewee may relate and respond to one question 
in terms of an individual level identity because that is the identity level most salient 
to her in that context, but to another question at the state level for the same reason. 
Identity is not static or fixed, it is highly dependent on the social context, which thus 
plays a pivotal role in determining the attitudes and behaviour displayed by an 
individual in interaction with others. If the context highlights personal level identity 
for that participant then it is in terms of individual attributes and actions that she will 
respond, whereas if a more inclusive group level membership is made salient she will 
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respond and interact according to the relevant norms for that group. That such group 
memberships are frequently relevant and self-defining is clear from the number of 
responses given in terms of ethnic and state identities. Members of ethnic groups 
experience emotions such as pride, pleasure or insecurity as a consequence of their 
identity as group members and can also be seen to promote and enact valued group 
norms and to defend both the status and legitimacy of the group when they are 
perceived to be under threat. Many participants are willing to self-identify as 
Kazakhstanis and are able to describe important character traits and behaviours 
which function as group norms for this social identity. However, most often day to 
day interactions do not make the international social context necessary to invoke this 
identity sufficiently salient, and interactions are thus more likely to occur in terms of 
a social identity at a lower level of inclusiveness such as ethnicity.  
 
It has been demonstrated that according to context personal, ethnic and state level 
identities are relevant and value-laden for the research participants. Some defining 
attributes of these identities have been mentioned and explored to a certain extent. 
However, various questions included in the interview were intended to probe the 
content and definition of these identities further.  
 
4.3 Content of Identities 
4.3.1 State Identity 
‘How would you describe the people of Kazakhstan?’ 
The issues associated with the analysis of answers to this question were discussed in 
section 4.2.1. As Table 4.1 (page 77) displays, many participants responded to this 
question in terms of a personal level identity or ethnic group membership. 
Interviewees who gave responses in these categories are excluded from the table 
below which only pertains to those interviewees who gave answers indicating a 
response in terms of a state level identity. There were 14 such participants and their 
responses are summarised in Table 4.6 below. In this table only attributes mentioned 
by more than one participant are included. 
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Table 4.6: ‘How would you describe the people of Kazakhstan?’: Attributes Cited by 
Participants Orienting to a State Level Identity. 
Answer No. of Respondents 
Hospitable 6 
Friendly, helpful 6 
Open, welcoming 4 




Depends on ethnic group 2 
All other responses 7 
NB: Some respondents offered more than one response 
Number of respondents = 14  
 
It is noticeable from this table that several of the attributes ascribed to the people of 
Kazakhstan; hospitality, friendliness, openness and being polite are those primarily 
associated with ethnic Kazakhs. This becomes apparent when Table 4.6 above is 
compared with Table 4.7 below, showing the responses given by the 15 participants 
orienting to an explicitly ethnic Kazakh understanding and description of the people 
of Kazakhstan (once again only those descriptions mentioned by more than one 
interviewee have been included). 
 
Table 4.7: ‘How would you describe the people of Kazakhstan?’: Attributes Cited by 
Participants Orienting to an Ethnic Kazakh Level Identity. 
Answer No. of Respondents 
Hospitable 10 
Friendly, helpful 4 




Proud to be Kazakh 2 
All other responses 7 
NB: Some respondents offered more than one response 
Number of respondents = 15 
 
As discussed above, the usual explanation for this overlap is that these characteristics 
have spread from the autochthonous population and have been embraced and taken 
on by the many other peoples also living within the territory of Kazakhstan. Thus, 
some of the most important group norms for Kazakhs are also the most commonly 
mentioned attributes of the population of Kazakhstan as a whole by those for whom a 
state identity is salient. 
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4:74 “The population of Kazakhstan, I can describe that they are, more… polite, 
…hospitable and open.”†  
 
 ‘Are People from Kazakhstan different than people from other countries?’ 
As well as showing a strong correlation between the group norms associated with 
Kazakh identity and those associated with a Kazakhstani identity the responses given 
to the first question of the interview reveal a distinct set of characteristics repeatedly 
used to define citizens of Kazakhstan. In order to further ascertain what level of 
agreement exists between participants as to these characteristics we can compare the 
results in table 4.6 with those of table 4.8 below. This table shows the categories of 
responses given to the question, ‘Are people from Kazakhstan different than people 
from other countries?’ Only the responses given by those seen to be answering in 
terms of a state level identity (see table 4.5 above) are included here and only 
descriptions used by more than 1 participant are listed. 
 
Table 4.8: ‘Are people from Kazakhstan different than people from other countries?’: 
Responses from Participants Orienting to the State Level. 
Answer No. of Respondents 
Traditions, customs 20 
Culture, way of life 12 
Helpful, kind, friendly, sociable 12 
Language, communication 11 
Hospitable 9 
Mentality 7 





Peaceful relations between people  3 
Priorities/aims 2 
Appearance  2 
Behaviour 2 
Economic development 2 
All other responses 3 
NB: Some respondents offered more than one response 
Number of respondents = 54 
 
It is noticeable that this question elicited a broader range of characteristics defining 
Kazakhstan’s population than the earlier question (see table 4.6). Although the 
attributes of ‘hospitality’ and of ‘friendliness’ or ‘helpfulness’ feature here they are 
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not mentioned as often in this context as ‘traditions’ or ‘customs’ and ‘culture’ or 
‘way of life’ 
 
A possible explanation for the greater range of responses in answer to the later 
question and the frequency with which traditions and culture were mentioned as 
distinguishing features is that whilst hospitality and friendliness are seen as 
descriptive of the people of Kazakhstan (question 1), these attributes do not 
necessarily distinguish Kazakhstanis from members of other states to the extent that 
certain traditions and aspects of the way of life in Kazakhstan are perceived as doing. 
Although Kazakhstanis may be described as being more hospitable and friendly than 
their Russian and Central Asian neighbours these are attributes that are also relevant 
and valued in the neighbouring republics. The proximity and sense of common 
history with Uzbekistan make it particularly salient for comparison in this context. It 
may be that due to their historical and cultural similarities the Central Asian states 
compete for positive social identity in these terms and that these similarities may 
threaten distinctiveness so that other distinguishing features such as particular 
traditions and aspects of culture are reified as defining characteristics of a 
Kazakhstani identity. The sense of competition between Kazakhstan and its 
neighbours in terms of the values of hospitality and friendliness are illustrated by 
many responses to this question. Some examples are given below. 
 
4:76 “Kazakhstanis are more polite, more kind than Uzbeks… Our Kazakhstan is I 
think very friendly people…”  
 
4:77 “…I was in Russia er, last year and there Russian people they are not so 
hospitable, they are not so open ‘cos our people open-hearted.”†  
 
It is probable then that whilst the group norms of hospitality, openness and 
friendliness are valued as such, the fact that they are also relevant features of other 
states means that they are not felt to be secure as characteristics which distinguish the 
Kazakhstani ingroup from potentially similar outgroup members of neighbouring 
states. Thus participants such as those quoted above stress the greater friendliness 
and hospitality of the ingroup and many also mention traditions and culture as being 
aspects that distinguish the people of Kazakhstan from those of other states 
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completely and not just comparatively. Whilst few participants added further 
comment as to what these distinguishing features or traditions were, it is evident that 
some participants mean to indicate the very multicultural nature of Kazakhstan 
whereby the customs and traditions of many ethnic groups exist side by side and are 
accepted by all. This variety could itself then distinguish Kazakhstan from its more 
mono-ethnic and mono-cultural neighbours. 
 
4:79 “There is probably no other country which is so multinational. Here people are 
used to living together somehow…probably in this is the difference…”  
 
4:80 “…here when the person came from Russia or from China, Korea it doesn’t 
matter. I have group mates and absolutely all of them were not Kazakh and they were 
Azerbaijan, Uzbek, um Ukrainian and many nationalities, I have never thought of 
their nationality, it’s even interesting to know his traditions, for example, to know 
how they for example, celebrate the wedding party or something like this.”† 
 
From these responses it would appear that tolerance and peaceful inter-ethnic 
relations are norms for the group identity ‘Kazakhstani’. Citizens of the republic find 
a positive and distinct social identity in their citizenship defined by these attributes. 
Although the multi-ethnic nature of Kazakhstan makes it hard to find many attributes 
or features of culture that all ethnic groups share, and many of those that all groups 
do have in common are also relevant as characteristics of certain outgroups, the fact 
of Kazakhstan’s multi-ethnicity acts in itself as a defining characteristic of the group.  
 
The fact that it is challenging to identify many traditions or cultural traits definitive 
of Kazakhstani identity is also borne out by the relatively high number of participants 
mentioning the fact that citizens of Kazakhstan had adherence to the republic’s laws 
as a common trait. This defines the ingroup in administrative, civil terms such that 
innate similarities between group members are not assumed. Participants for whom 
the differences between ethnic groups are salient may orient to this as a group 
definition which enables them to preserve an acceptably distinctive and cohesive 
social identity at the state level despite these manifest differences.  
 
4:83 “Yes, people who live in Kazakhstan they follow the laws of Kazakhstan.”†  
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It may be that a similar perspective is taken by those participants who mentioned 
language as a factor uniting Kazakhstanis in contrast to other nations. It cannot be 
convincingly argued that the Russian language is a uniting factor as, although it does 
serve as the principle language of communication for many ethnic groups and as the 
language of inter-ethnic communication, there are an increasing number of Kazakhs 
who do not speak it. Moreover, the use of Russian as a lingua franca would not 
clearly distinguish Kazakhstan from neighbouring countries. What participants must 
mean then is that all Kazakhstanis have a common state language, Kazakh. There are 
still a large number of citizens who are unable to speak Kazakh or unable to do so 
with any degree of fluency in formal registers (see chapter 6 for the interviewees’ 
language repertoires), however, it is true that Kazakhstanis are united in being 
subject to the law on languages which names Kazakh as the state language. Although 
some citizens may find this threatening (see for example quote 4:23) it is a 
distinctive and defining factor of identity at the state level.  
 
Whilst this argument applies for those participants indicating language as a uniting 
factor it is possible that references to ‘communication’ or ‘way of speaking’ may 
more properly be categorised with references to ‘friendliness’ or ‘politeness’ as it 
seems to be communicative norms that some participants at least have in mind in this 
context. 
 
4:85 “In behaviour, in the way of speaking yes. Here we are, I think we are more 
polite.” 
 
4:86 “Yes. I don’t know how to explain but there is a difference, in the 
communication between them.” 
 
Summary 
Participants’ answers to the question ‘Are people from Kazakhstan different than 
people from other countries?’ reveal a range of defining characteristics for a 
Kazakhstani social identity. Some of these are valued group norms but there is a 
sense of competition to enact them not only within the ingroup but between the 
ingroup and certain relevant outgroups, namely Russia and the neighbouring states of 
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Central Asia. For this reason other characteristics may be seen as more securely 
distinctive, particularly those civil and administrative aspects which necessarily 
relate only to citizens of Kazakhstan as a group.  
 
‘What makes you proud to be Kazakhstani?’ 
Another interview question which explores the content of a Kazakhstani identity is, 
‘What makes you proud to be Kazakhstani?’ This question clearly directs 
participants to consider the positive aspects of their state level identity. Replies were 
wide ranging but a variety of responses were mentioned with some frequency. Table 
4.9 below shows those features which were mentioned by more than 1 participant. 
 
Table 4.9: Responses to the Question ‘What makes you proud to be Kazakhstani?’ 
Answer No. of Respondents 
Development, economy, status 23 
Independence, democracy 17 
Kazakhstan, land, homeland 15 
Size of territory 10 
Multi-ethnic, inter-ethnic relations 9 
President, government 9 
Resources 7 
Landscape, nature, climate 6 
People  4 
Hospitality of people 3 
Ancestors/history 2 
Language 2 
Not proud/nothing 2 
All other responses 8 
NB: Some respondents offered more than one response 
Number of respondents = 66 
 
It is noticeable that this question seems to elicit a different set of responses in terms 
of the positive content of a Kazakhstani identity. Also, a notable feature of responses 
to this question is a strong orientation to factors relating to a civil identity rather than 
an ethnic one. Most of the categories in table 4.9 relate explicitly to Kazakhstan as a 
political or geographical entity rather than human characteristics or attributes. Of the 
categories that do relate to the citizens themselves, one ‘the people’ is somewhat all-
encompassing and ill defined and another ‘multi-ethnicity’ or ‘inter-ethnic relations’ 
relates to the discussion above of the challenge of finding attributes that both unite 
and define Kazakhstanis.  
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The most frequently cited source of pride for Kazakhstanis relates to the progress 
Kazakhstan has made economically and developmentally since independence (on this 
theme see also sections 5.5 and 7.5). Moreover, the ethnic distribution of participants 
giving responses in this category closely matches the overall ethnic distribution of 
interviewees. All citizens of Kazakhstan, regardless of ethnic background 
experienced the same economic hardships in the aftermath of the Soviet Union’s 
dissolution. All groups too have had to work for economic survival at a personal as 
well as at a republic level. This seems to have resulted in a strong sense of shared 
experience and common fate. Kazakhstan has developed and strengthened 
significantly in economic terms, particularly in relation to several of its Central Asian 
neighbours. Because of this fact Kazakhstanis can positively differentiate themselves 
from citizens of the other republics by referring to Kazakhstan’s economic status and 
prospects. 
 
4:87 “I am glad that my country, in comparison with all the Asian countries is more 
advanced in economic development and culture and that makes me proud.”  
 
4:88 “In the period of the Soviet Union the Kazakhstan was at the very low level 
among the Soviet countries but at the present time, yes, naturally it’s a developing 
country but the economical level is higher than the other post-Soviet countries.”† 
 
Good economic development is perceived by a relatively large number of 
participants as being a positive aspect of Kazakhstani identity. It is one which is 
valued by and affects all ethnic groups, all too can feel a sense of involvement in this 
aspect of their social identity as they participate in the labour market and experience 
the benefits of the republic’s improving economic climate. The question of ethnic 
discrimination in employment is beyond the scope of this study but whether or not 
this is a factor, a better economic climate than pertained immediately following 
independence is beneficial to all.  
 
The fact that Kazakhstan is now independent is also something that involves and 
affects all ethnic groups. However, not all ethnic groups have experienced the 
changes in Kazakhstan as a result of independence in the same way. The sense of 
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confusion and insecurity experienced by many ethnic Russians has been discussed 
above. It is not surprising then that whilst the proportion of responses in this category 
given by Kazakhs closely matches the proportion of Kazakhs overall, the proportion 
of responses in this category given by Russians is very low; just one Russian 
interviewee gave an answer in this category (6%), whereas Russian participants 
represent 22% of interviewees overall. Of the participants from other ethnic groups 
giving answers in this category 4 of the 5 are Uzbek (100% of the Uzbek 
participants) whilst the other is Ukrainian. It seems then that independence is most 
positively experienced as a characteristic of social identity by the autochthonous 
Central Asian peoples. 
 
4:91 “…I’m proud of my nation, in general, that it exists.”  
 
4:92 “…I have my own country, my own land, I have a president who watches and 
rules our country… we have freedom, I can do everything what I want.”  
 
Similarly, only one ethnic Russian expressed pride in the president or government of 
Kazakhstan with most of the responses in this category (7 of 9) coming from 
Kazakhs.  
 
4:93 “…we have a very good and very clever president. We are waiting from future 
very good things.”  
 
In contrast, pride in the land of Kazakhstan, in Kazakhstan as a homeland (as distinct 
from Kazakhstan as a political republic), seems to be something experienced by 
similar proportions of representatives of all ethnic groups. Whilst Russians may find 
the fact of a sovereign and politically independent Kazakhstan problematic they are 
still able to relate to it as a land in which they can take pride or as their homeland. 
 
4:94“I live here, I should like, it’s my country and… I can’t live here without being 
proud of it.”  
 
Taking pride in Kazakhstan in this way unites Russians with members of other ethnic 




4:95 “Just because I live here…”  
 
4:96 “Because um, because I live in Kazakhstan, I’m, I’m very gl, glad and um, ‘East 
or West, home is best’. Like the place where you was born is the most.” 
 
4:97 “That I live in this country, it’s my native land.”  
 
Similarly, pride in the natural beauty of Kazakhstan, its landscape and climate are 
also mentioned by both Russians and Kazakhs. 
 
Pride in Kazakhstan as a homeland is something which clearly defines in- from 
outgroup members, whilst it is not ethnically distinctive, by definition it marks out 
those who identify with Kazakhstan and find a social identity as a person rooted in 
that place. As was discussed above, such an identity can be positive and secure in 
relation to outgroups because it does not relate to characteristics shared by people of 
other countries. The same cannot necessarily be said of taking pride in Kazakhstan 
for the wealth of its natural resources. However, although other states possess natural 
resources, Kazakhstanis may feel that the outcome of any comparison of wealth of 
these resources made with the republic’s Central Asian neighbours would be 
favourable for Kazakhstan and that therefore this is a secure and valued aspect of a 
Kazakhstani identity.  
 
This comparative dimension is also relevant in relation to those participants 
describing the size of Kazakhstan as a source of pride. It is interesting that of the 10 
responses in this category 9 are given by Kazakhs and just one by a Russian. It may 
therefore be the case that for ethnic Russians, comparisons with the Russian 
Federation are relevant and hence any comparison on this dimension would not be a 
positive one for Kazakhstan. However, for Kazakhs, comparison with other Central 
Asian republics is more salient, in which context a comparison of territory size 




From the responses to this question it can be seen that whilst Kazakhstani citizens’ 
conceptions of the most important and positive aspects of their state identity vary, 
broad patterns of agreement do emerge. In particular many citizens find a positive 
social identity through the physical and political presence of the republic and through 
its achievements and resources in comparison with relevant outgroups.  
 
‘What makes you ashamed to be Kazakhstani?’ 
As discussed above, Kazakhstanis find a variety of sources for positive ingroup 
identity. That this state level identity is primarily positively defined and experienced 
is revealed by the responses to the question, ‘What makes you ashamed to be 
Kazakhstani?’ A substantial majority of interviewees answering this question (47 out 
of 64, or 73%) said that ‘nothing’ made them ashamed of their state identity. Only 
three sources of shame were mentioned by more then one participant, these were: 
corruption and injustice (5 mentions), the poor health and education systems (3 
mentions) and the existence of racial discrimination (2 mentions). Each of these can 
be seen as threatening to a positive state level identity in that they are opposite to the 
explicitly valued group norms of good government, state progress and prosperity and 
inter-ethnic harmony revealed in many answers to the previous question. They cause 
shame for these participants not merely because they are negative characteristics but 
because they call into question the validity of established group norms and hence 
challenge a securely positive state level group identity. 
 
Summary 
The comments made by interviewees in response to the questions discussed above 
reveal that although Kazakhstan is still young as an independent republic and the 
parameters and norms of group belonging are still to some extent under negotiation 
there is a significant degree of focus upon a set of positive and distinctive group 
norms. The characteristics of hospitality, friendliness and openness are valued and 
ingroup members compare themselves favourably with outgroups along these 
dimensions. Kazakhstan is also seen to be at a comparative advantage over its 
neighbours in terms of economic development and possession of natural resources, 
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so these too are sources of self-esteem. In contrast, other features, such as certain 
traditions and customs and the multicultural nature of Kazakhstan are frequently 
cited as distinctive and defining aspects of the state identity not shared by other 
states. Overall there is a definite sense of agreement as to the positive value and 
defining characteristics of Kazakhstani identity today.  
 
4.3.2 Ethnic Identity 
‘What makes you Kazakh/ Russian …?’ 
As well as investigating the content of a state level Kazakhstani identity, it was also 
an aim of the interview to explore the nature of ethnic level identity for the 
participants. The question, ‘What makes you Kazakh/ Russian…?’ explicitly probed 
interviewees’ understanding of the definition of their own ethnicity. Many 
participants gave answers which included several defining features so the number of 
responses and the number of categories of responses to this question is high. Table 
4.10 below, shows categories mentioned by 1 or more participant. 
 
Table 4.10: Responses to the Question ‘What makes you Kazakh/Russian…?’ 
Answer No. of Respondents 
Parents, grandparents 37 
Language 36 
Customs, traditions 23 
Culture, behaviour 20 
Land, live in Kazakhstan  12 
Blood, birth 11 
Character, mentality 10 
Religion 9 
Appearance 9 





All other responses 4 
NB: Some respondents offered more than one response 
Number of respondents = 81 
 
It is clear from this table that many of the interviewees view ethnicity as being 
something innate and largely primordial, passed down by birth through the 
generations. This is true of participants from all ethnic groups; the distribution of 
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participants making responses in the ‘parents, grandparents’ and ‘blood, birth’ 
categories according to ethnic self-identification broadly matches the overall 
distribution of interviewees in these terms. 
 
4:98 “My father, mother, all of them Kazakh, it makes me Kazakh and all the 
abilities of Kazakhs are in my blood.”  
 
4:99 “My dad is Russian, my mum is Russian, my grandmother…” 
 
4:100 “Just the title of my nationality.”  
- “Where does that title come from?”  
“…From my parents, from my grandparents who came here.” †  
 
This last quote from a Ukrainian student illustrates the primacy of parentage for 
many interviewees in terms of deciding ethnic group membership. For this student 
her status as Ukrainian is a title determined by her parents and grandparents so that 
group membership remains valid despite her own distance from or lack of all other 
markers of group belonging.   
 
A similarly unidimensional approach to ethnicity is expressed by a Kazakh pupil. 
 
4:102 “Just that my parents are Kazakhs.”  
 
A phenotypical conception of ethnicity is also expressed by those participants who 
asserted that their appearance was part of what made them Russian or Kazakh. Skin 
colour and eyes are both mentioned repeatedly in this context which reveals that it is 
a Central Asian versus European ethnic contrast that is most salient. 
 
4:103 “My customs, my language, the colour of my skin, my eyes.”  
 
4:104 “Probably first of all the colour of my skin…”† 
 
In contrast, other participants make a distinction between ethnic identity as a label, as 
it might be in a passport, and ethnic identity as something experienced and lived out. 
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4:106 “Well I am Uyghur but… I know nothing about my culture, well I can’t say I 
know nothing about my culture, I know what um, as you know Uyghur people don’t 
have their own country they live in Chinese, in China, but I live in Kazakhstan for 12 
years I think and I really feel myself Kazakh.”  
 
4:107 “I live in Kazakhstan and, uh my, my parents are Kazakh. 
- “But a Russian person could live in Kazakhstan and that wouldn’t make them 
Kazakh would it?”  
“…they’re not Kazakhs but they’re counted as Kazakhs because they live in 
Kazakhstan and because they live in Kazakhstan… and our Russians say they went 
there to Russia and there they said that Russians who live in Kazakhstan are 
considered to be Kazakhs.” 
 
4:108 “I am Uzbek, but actually I am a mixture of Uzbek and Tatar, but according to 
the passport I am Uzbek… Because sometime um, it’s like OK patrilineal yeah, yes, 
my grandfathers are Uzbek and my grandmothers are Tatar, both of them, yep, so 50, 
50 I would say…to be honest too, till the age 10 probably I didn’t know any Uzbek 
but I was still Uzbek, maybe traditions…”  
 
For these participants ethnicity as a meaningful group membership is something tied 
up with socialisation processes and context rather than being biologically 
determined, hence the difference between “our” Russians and those in Russia as 
perceived by the student quoted above (4:107). According to these interviewees 
descent is important and determines the ethnic label ascribed to an individual but at 
the same time, experientially that person may value a different group membership or 
even multiple group memberships.  
 
The student quoted above rejects language as a necessary feature for ethnic 
belonging stating that she was Uzbek because of following traditions despite not 
knowing the language. For many of the interviewees though, language was cited as a 
defining feature of their ethnic identity. However, whilst similar proportions of 
Russians and Kazakhs mentioned language in this context only 2 members of other 
ethnic groups did so (5% of responses). Many members of ethnic minorities in 
Kazakhstan do not speak their titular language, functioning instead in Russian or 
Kazakh. It is likely then that for most members of these groups, language is not 
considered to be a necessary or defining feature of group belonging whereas for 
Kazakhs and Russians whose group languages enjoy wider use and status, language 
is more salient as a group characteristic. A relatively large number of Russians 
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mentioned language as being part of what made them Russian which may be because 
the vast majority of Russians in urban areas speak only that language. It is perhaps 
more surprising that so many Kazakhs also mentioned language as a defining feature 
despite the fact that there are still relatively large numbers of Kazakhs who do not 
speak the language fluently. However, all of those Kazakhs mentioning language in 
answer to this question also describe themselves as Kazakh speakers.  
 
4:109 “Because I speak Kazakh language…”† 
 
For one of the teachers interviewed, knowledge of Kazakh was something her 
parents considered to be a vital part of her ethnic identity despite the need for a good 
knowledge of Russian for instrumental purposes. The value attributed to Kazakh in 
this way is something she herself accepts and considers to be an important part of 
group belonging. 
 
4:112 “I don’t know. Probably the language. Because earlier for us it was important 
to know the Russian language and I was born in a Kazakh family, my parents are 
Kazakh and the importance of the language was that all my older brothers and sisters 
studied in a Kazakh school but in order to have an education Russian played an 
important role and I was the first in the family to go to a Russian class and on the 
whole I grew up in a, well I had a Russian-language upbringing but my dad always 
said to me, ‘At home you must always speak Kazakh, but there you can speak 
Russian, so that you will always know your native language.’ but nonetheless I am 
very ashamed that I don’t know my language very deeply because I’m used to 
putting my thoughts and everything in the Russian language… but I’m very thankful 
that circumstances have turned out such that I now teach Kazakh and I’m glad that I 
know my language.” 
 
Although this teacher, and indeed many of the participants who mentioned language 
in their answer to this question, place a high value on language as a part of their 
ethnicity it is not the sole determinant of this identity and operates in conjunction 
with other group characteristics and norms. This is apparent in the answers given by 
the Russians quoted below. 
 
4:113 “What makes me Russian? First language, appearance, my yes, my behaviour 
maybe, and my traditions, my way of speaking yeah… maybe my way of thinking.”  
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4:114 “I’m Russian because I was born of Russian people, Russian because I… 
confess Russian culture… and love the Russian language, I love to write poetry and 
prose in the Russian language.”  
 
Alongside language these participants mention culture or behaviour as an important 
aspect of their social identity. As indicated above slightly higher proportions of 
Russian and Kazakh interviewees than are represented in the interview sample 
overall mentioned language as a defining feature of ethnicity. Similarly, the 
distribution of respondents speaking about culture or behaviour shows a slight bias in 
representation of Kazakhs and Russians but no representation at all of other ethnic 
groups. The explanation for this pattern is likely to be the same as for language; 
many members of ethnic minorities in Kazakhstan, particularly those of groups not 
native to Central Asia, are assimilated linguistically and behaviourally/culturally to 
the Russian language and culture. Similarly Central Asian minority group members 
often assimilate Kazakh language and culture. Thus only Russians and Kazakhs feel 
that their culture or behaviour are diagnostic for ethnic group membership. 
 
4:115 “My religion, my culture, my customs, like upbringing. Because actually, even 
we have different, a lot of nationalities, maybe you’ve noticed and Kazakh families, 
like upbringing is different than Russian the little bit.”  
 
4:116 “My country I think first of all yeah and in uh, in my family we, my parents 
keep the rules of our culture.”†  
 
From the foregoing discussion it is clear that family plays a very important role in 
establishing the nature and understanding of ethnic social identity. For many 
participants biological descent is the main factor in determining their ethnicity, but 
more than that it is the atmosphere and conduct of the home and the language and 
social or behavioural values established as norms by the parents that determine their 
children’s experience of ethnic group belonging. Thus, alongside culture and 
behaviour, many participants mention that following customs and traditions is an 
important feature of group membership. Interestingly, in contrast to ‘culture’ or 
‘behaviour’, customs and traditions are also seen as ethnically diagnostic by 
members of Kazakhstan’s minorities. This may be an indication that despite the loss 
of language and most aspects of culture minority group members do still recognise or 
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adhere to certain visible group traditions or customs. For minority group members, in 
the absence of other ethnic markers, following group traditions is the only or main 
group attribute they mention. 
 
4:118 “I know my traditions, the traditions of the Uzbek people.”  
 
4:119 “Some family traditions and honestly speaking I don’t know my native 
language… traditions on the whole, celebrations.” 
 
For Russians and Kazakhs though, customs and traditions are more likely to be listed 
alongside other factors. 
 
4:120 “I speak Russian, I’m um, I keep some Russian traditions and uh I’m a… 
Christian.” 
 
4:121 “Traditions, culture, language. Mainly traditions.”† 
 
However, for older Kazakhs, brought up and educated during the Soviet Union in a 
largely Russian linguistic and cultural setting, the traditions and atmosphere of the 
home were particularly important in establishing a distinct sense of identity much as 
they are today for members of minority groups. 
 
4:123 “It’s not language! ‘Cos I don’t speak much Kazakh, actually I don’t speak at 
all, almost at all. Um, it’s the, it’s the traditions, the way I’ve been brought up in my 
family, it uh, yeah, it’s mainly to do with the traditions and family life. Yeah, 
actually family is one of the things I can say about Kazakhs, they all value family.” 
 
A number of participants express a belief that ethnic group membership is marked by 
particular character traits or a particular mentality. Some of the characteristics 
mentioned in answer to previous questions as descriptive of an ethnic group are here 
referred to as being diagnostic or constitutive of that group membership. The 
qualities of openness and tolerance are mentioned in particular in relation to Kazakhs 
whereas the Russian participants largely cite their way of thinking or mentality as 
being distinct from that of other groups. 
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4:124 “For me, Russian, mmm. I was born in Russia and some um, the culture, the, 
my language, the way of thinking yes, it’s Russian. It’s different from my, the way of 
thinking of my husband [an Uzbek] yeah.”  
 
4:125 “…features, properties of Kazakh. Open-hearted, ability to absorb positive 
things that come from abroad.”  
 
One Kazakh participant, a teacher, explains that in her opinion the common history 
of Russians and Kazakhs in Kazakhstan during the Soviet Union led to a significant 
degree of merging of Russian and Kazakh mentality and culture but that certain 
characteristics nevertheless remain as group markers. 
 
4: 127 “You see I am, I was born in the Soviet Union you see and uh, for me uh, I’m 
bred on the mixture of Kazakh and Russian mentality so I do not feel that I am true 
Kazakh meaning maybe um, I mean I feel that uh, for me Russian people as well as 
Kazakh people similar, for me. I do not divide them because we have common, much 
common or general between two nations, between two mentality and the, we much 
learnt about them during the Soviet Union, we have a common culture. For this 
reason I am, I am not really Kazakh I feel um, but I am proud that um, some uh, 
features of my character truly Kazakh. That is the tolerance maybe, tolerance, um 
then sincerity maybe uh, and… respect for older people. That is the national 
character, the national feature and I’m proud that they are seed in me, inside me, in 
my children um, for these features I am proud that I am Kazakh people.”  
 
Here again is the combined importance of innate characteristics and of family; 
despite being brought up in a Russified Soviet culture this teacher is proud that she 
has retained qualities she sees as specifically Kazakh and also that she has been able 
to pass them on to her children. The importance to Kazakhs of continuity and of links 
with the past seen here emerge again both below and in the following section. They 
are also evident in the discussion of national identity in relation to extracts from the 
media in chapter 7 and are discussed further there.  
 
It was mentioned above in the context of skin colour and eyes that these differences 
in physical appearance are most salient in distinguishing Central Asian groups from 
Europeans. The same can be said of religion as a marker of group identity. Several 
Kazakh and Russian participants suggested that being Muslim and Christian 
respectively was part of what made them Kazakh or Russian. Interestingly, no 
minority group members referred to religion in this context and so it may be that 
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whilst for Kazakhs and Russians distinguishing themselves in relation to each other 
is most important, minority groups are concerned to distinguish themselves from all 
other groups and that therefore religious adherence is not a suitably distinctive group 
norm.  
 
That different markers of ethnicity are considered salient by different groups is also 
apparent in the fact that only ethnic Kazakhs said that the land itself or living in 
Kazakhstan was part of what made them who they were. This is a manifestation of a 
feeling of national ownership and belonging by some Kazakhs in relation to the land. 
The present day Republic of Kazakhstan is given legitimacy by references to it being 
the ancient and historic territory of the Kazakh people. Whereas most other ethnic 
groups present in the republic can be argued, in some sense, to have an alternative 
homeland this is not the case for Kazakhs who are known as the ‘root’ population. 
For this reason some Kazakhs see the land itself and their residency there in the 
present as a link with previous generations and an expression of ethnic continuity 
valid as a marker of group belonging.  
 
Summary 
It is clear from the above discussion that for most participants, ethnic belonging is 
multidimensional, with biological, social, linguistic and even political factors playing 
important roles in individuals’ experience and understanding of the nature of their 
ethnic group membership and how that group membership is defined. It was noted in 
the context of participants citing aspects of physical appearance or religion as group 
features that these only really operated to distinguish Central Asian groups from 
European ones, and in this context in practice, Kazakhs from Russians. It was also 
apparent that different ethnic groups consider different factors as important in 
determining their own ethnicity.  
 
‘What makes you proud to be Kazakh?’ 
In order to further explore participants’ experience of their ethnic group membership 
the question ‘What makes you proud to be Kazakh, Russian …?’ was included in the 
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interview. Answers to this question reveal the dimensions on which participants 
enjoy a positive social identity; they highlight the norms and characteristics of the 
group which are most valued by its members. Table 4.11 below shows the responses 
given by Kazakh interviewees (categories mentioned by 1 or more participant are 
included). 
 
Table 4.11: Responses to the Question ‘What makes you proud to be Kazakh?’ 
Answer No. of Respondents 
People, their character 14 
Customs, tradition, culture  13 
Kazakhstan  13 
Language  11 
The land, its size/resources 10 
Ancestors 9 
Parents, relatives 7 
Kazakhstan’s independence 7 
History 5 
Religion 3 
Kazakhstan developing 3 
Peace 2 
Power/influence of Kazakhstan 2 
All other responses 3 
NB: Some respondents offered more than one response 
Number of respondents = 46 
 
Participants show a strong orientation towards social and linguistic characteristics in 
particular as well as towards the land, the family and a sense of continuity through 
knowledge of their ancestors. The defining group norms of hospitality, tolerance and 
openness are also a source of pride for many Kazakhs. 
 
4:128 “That I have such a people - good, that accept other nations to its country.”  
 
4: 129 “…I uh glad that I am a Kazakh because Kazakh people hospitable, friendly 
and they have a very good tradition.”  
 
It is evident then, that the characteristics mentioned so often as being descriptive of 
the Kazakh people are a source of positive self-identity, giving value to the 
individual’s experience of their group membership. Kazakhs see these qualities as 
descriptive of the ethnic group and thus can identify with the group by both 
esteeming these qualities and claiming that the ingroup enacts them to a greater 
extent than other groups.  
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Aspects of family and social life seen as being definitively Kazakh are valued in the 
same way. Thus participants feel pride in the Kazakh language as a feature of group 
belonging and in diverse markers of culture and tradition and required attitudes and 
behaviour. 
 
4:130 “I was born in, in Kazakhstan and I am Kazakh, it, it proud me and I, I never 
shamed that I am a Kazakh girl, For example, um to… respect the elderly, never to 
raise your voice to an elder person, not to your mother or your father, many things 
like that. I respect these things, these traditions these.” 
 
4:131 “The language is very rich and traditions, customs, traditions, I am proud of 
these.”  
 
4:132 “I’m proud because Kazakh they try to respect and to OK to let their traditions 
stay, this is the main why I proud of this.” †  
 
This last quote gives a sense of pride in the continuity and maintenance of cultural 
norms despite the threat to them from Soviet Russifying culture over so many years. 
Valuing continuity is also evident in the way Kazakhs express pride in the survival of 
their language despite the dominance of Russian and, as discussed earlier in the 
legitimising of Kazakh nationalism through reference to Kazakhs’ uninterrupted 
residency in the territory (these themes are also pervasive in the media extracts 
analysed in chapter 7). A further expression of this same value is seen in the way in 
which Kazakhs place a high value on family connections and respect and revere their 
ancestors. 
 
4:134  “I’m proud that I’m Kazakh and was born here and my grandfather and great-
grandfather were born here in Kazakhstan, I think that every person is proud of his 
country.”  
 
4:135 “I’m very glad, I’m proud of that I am Kazakh… I know I read a lot of about 
my history. I know that all our this uh, this ancient people, for example our Kazakh 
people they fought um becau, um, about our land. They want that, they uh, wanted 
uh to leave for their… future people, many land. And they fought because of us I 
think and uh I am proud of that I am Kazakh and that I live and I born as a Kazakh 
person, and I like it.”  
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4:136  “That I’m Kazakh. The people, the land, Kazakhstan, my parents, my 
ancestors.” 
 
Several of the participants including the teacher quoted above (4:135) perceive 
Kazakhstan’s independence as the final realisation of a long struggle originally 
engaged in by their ancestors for control of their own territory. This theme also 
emerges in the media extracts analysed in chapter 7 and is discussed further there. 
Thus, pride in Kazakhstan and in its independence can also be linked to the value 
placed upon continuity, upon cultural survival and on the perception of belonging to 
the land in a more meaningful way than other groups now resident in the republic.† 
 
Summary 
It is clear from the contributions of the Kazakh staff and students who were 
interviewed that they are able to identify and feel pride in defining group norms and 
experience a secure and positive social identity at ethnic group level through 
adhering to and valuing these group features. The theme of continuity is of particular 
importance; Kazakhs value the continued survival of their language, traditions and 
cultural values despite great social and political changes over time (a theme which 
emerges more explicitly in the media extracts discussed in chapter 7), they also place 
great importance upon the perception of their own rootedness and uninterrupted 
belonging within the borders of Kazakhstan. Therefore Kazakh ethnicity is marked 
and expressed in numerous ways through values and attitudes available to all 
Kazakhs regardless of the degree to which they themselves adhere to and experience 
Kazakh culture and language in their day to day lives.  
 
‘What makes you proud to be Russian?’ 
It is clear from the above that most Kazakhs enjoy a secure and positive ethnic 
identity. In order to assess whether this was also true for Russian participants the 
same question was asked. Table 4.12 below shows the results (categories mentioned 
by 1 or more participant are listed). 
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Table 4.12: Responses to the Question ‘What makes you proud to be Russian?’ 
Answer No. of Respondents 
Nothing 5 
Language  4 
Russia is large country  3 
History 3 
Character 3 
All other responses 7 
NB: Some respondents offered more than one response 
Number of respondents = 16  
 
The category here with the highest number of responses is that indicating that 
nothing makes the participant proud of his or her ethnicity. This suggests that ethnic 
identity is less securely positive for Russians in Kazakhstan than it is for Kazakhs. 
Over a quarter (5 out of 18) of the Russian participants felt this way compared to less 
than two percent of Kazakh participants (1 out of 51). The end of the Soviet Union 
and the sudden increase in status of Kazakh ethnicity combined with policies of 
Kazakhification since independence mean that Russians have had to re-evaluate the 
meaning of their ethnic identity and find new dimensions of comparison through 
which to achieve a secure and distinctive identity. It seems that this process is still 
ongoing and that many Russians are as yet insecure in their ethnic identity, unable to 
identify positive dimensions of that group membership. Of those who do express 
pride in some aspect of their identity several qualify their statement by asserting that 
all nationalities can take pride in their identity and that they are not claiming any 
inherent superiority. 
 
4:140 “Russian, it sounds so proud! But to be honest any nationality can be proud, a 
Kazakh is also proud to be Kazakh. First of all the Russian language is very rich…”† 
 
As can be seen in table 4.12, and in the quote above, language is the most mentioned 
source of ethnic pride. Russians understand their language to be an important aspect 
of their ethnic identity similarly to Kazakhs but whereas Kazakhs take pride in the 
survival and recent resurgence of their language, Russians feel positively about the 
world-wide status of Russian and about its cultural and literary richness. In this way 
a positive aspect of identity is maintained despite the loss of overall status of Russian 
in contemporary Kazakhstan. 
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4:142 “I am proud that this language is very widespread not only in Kazakhstan but 
also in other countries…”  
 
Just as Russians take pride in their language due to its status and history on a broad 
scale rather than just within Kazakhstan today, so too they find positive dimensions 
to their ethnic identity in the history of their people group, an area which clearly 
cannot be threatened by present insecurities. Russians’ lack of status as a group in the 
Republic of Kazakhstan perhaps also motivates them to look for positive aspects of 
group identity through their connections with Russia itself and the status and history 
of that state and of their co-ethnics there. 
 
4:143 “Maybe to, like knowing that Russia, Russia is a great country, has great 
history and …I am part of its history.”  
 
4:144 “The history of Russian. Russian people always were brave I think. They 
always were, were courageous and um kind and helpful…”† 
 
This last quote also illustrates another area in which Russians find a positive sense of 
identity - the national character. It was discussed above that many Russian 
participants felt that their ethnic group was distinguished by certain traits or a certain 
mentality. These distinctive features are themselves interpreted positively and 
become a source of pride as markers of group belonging.   
 
Summary 
For Russians living in Kazakhstan, exemplified by these participants, feeling pride in 
their ethnicity seems to be more complicated than for Kazakhs. Russians are less 
willing to express unqualified pride in this social identity and are less clear as to 
whether the dimensions of that identity are defined in reference to Kazakhstan, to the 
Russian Federation or both. Their ethnic group has declined in status in Kazakhstan 
which motivates orientation to co-ethnics in Russia and yet there is a sense of 
distance from the Russian Federation born out of residence in Central Asia and 
engagement with its people and culture. Overall it seems that Russian ethnic identity 
within Kazakhstan is still in transition as members of the group negotiate the 
orientation and focus of its identity.  
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‘What makes you proud to be Uzbek, Korean…?’ 
The same question concerning pride in the ethnic group was put to representatives of 
Kazakhstan’s minorities.  Table 4.13 shows those aspects of identity mentioned by 
more than one participant. 
 
Table 4.13: Responses to the Question ‘What makes you proud to be Uzbek, 
Korean…?’ 
Answer No. of Respondents 
Traditions  4 
Minority  2 
Nothing  3 
All other responses 6 
NB: Some respondents offered more than one response 
Number of respondents = 11 
 
The numbers involved are obviously too small to draw clear conclusions concerning 
these interviewees. However, as for Russian participants, a relatively high proportion 
reported that nothing made them proud of their ethnicity. Many minority group 
members, particularly those of non-Central Asian origin do not speak their ethnic 
language, hence language is unlikely to be perceived as an important source of in-
group pride. The groups themselves do not enjoy particularly high status and neither 
do many of them have links with what might be seen as high status historical 
homelands as ethnic Russians do. Thus, for many minority group members it is their 
distinctiveness itself which becomes a source of positive self-identity; the surviving 
traditions and customs which mark them out as different from other groups and their 
very status as minorities are esteemed. The social identity framework argues that 
group distinctiveness is important for maintaining a positive social identity, hence 
belonging to a group clearly identifiable as a minority, for being, therefore, unusual 
can be a source of positive identity, of pride. This is portrayed in the responses of 
some members of minority groups who were interviewed. 
 
4:146 “We don’t have a lot of Koreans in Kazakhstan.”  
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4:147 “Maybe it’s stupid but sometimes I think that Uyghur people are now in very 
small amount so it’s a little bit different like, for example, you can see Kazakh 
everywhere, you can see Russian everywhere, but Uyghur are counted people.”† 
 
In this way minorities are able to enjoy a positive social identity as a result of rather 
than despite their numerical inferiority.  
 
‘What makes you ashamed to be Kazakh, Russian, Uzbek…?’ 
That on the whole members of all Kazakhstan’s ethnic groups experience a relatively 
secure positive ethnic identity is shown by the high percentage of each group stating 
that nothing made them ashamed of their ethnicity (or at least being unwilling to 
admit any sources of shame to an outgroup member): 71% of Kazakhs, 73% of 
Russians and 86% of minority group members. Participants who did mention things 
which made them feel ashamed of their group largely cited negative behaviour and 
attitudes in other group members which they felt reflected badly on the group as a 
whole; racism was mentioned by both Kazakh and Russian participants in this 
context and dishonesty was cited by a minority group member.  
 
Interestingly, several Kazakh participants described the loss of their language and 
culture as a source of shame, probably because such loss is in contravention of the 
valued group norms of continuity and cultural survival mentioned so often as part of 
Kazakh identity (see chapter 7 for more on this theme). 
 
Summary 
The discussions above show how the various ethnic groups who share life in 
Kazakhstan have developed or are developing strategies for establishing and 
maintaining positive and distinctive ethnic identities. As suggested in literature of the 
social identity framework discussed in chapter 1, group members are constrained by 
reality in their efforts at identity construction, hence Russians are re-evaluating their 
group level experience of identity in light of the changes to that group’s status and 
likewise minority group members do not frequently cite language or culture as being 
principal components of their ethnicity. Participants of all groups refer to a wide 
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range of factors as being part of their group identity showing that the experience of 
ethnicity is multi-faceted and may be re-defined according to context. Respondents 
described ethnicity both as an official label and as a vital part of an individual’s 
social existence with the traditions and values of the family and home playing a 
major role in defining the parameters of that identity.   
 
4.3.3 The Importance of Language 
As discussed above, many interviewees, particularly Russians and Kazakhs, 
mentioned language as an important aspect of their ethnicity; as part of what made 
them a member of that group or as an aspect of that identity in which they felt pride 
(section 4.3.2). In order to further explore the role of languages within individuals’ 
experiences and understanding of ethnic belonging specific questions about language 
were asked.  
 
‘How important is the Kazakh language to being Kazakh?’ 
Representatives of all ethnic groups were asked, ‘How important is the Kazakh 
language to being Kazakh?’ However, in order to focus on Kazakhs’ own 
understanding of their group identity, table 4.14 below, only shows the distribution 
of answers given by Kazakh participants. 
 
Table 4.14: Responses to the Question ‘How important is the Kazakh language to 
being Kazakh?’ (Kazakh Respondents) 
Answer No. of Respondents % of Respondents Mentioning 
Important, should speak it 17 40 
Part of identity, culture  16 37 
State language  10 23 
Native language  7 16 
To get a job, for documents 5 12 
Russian is also important  5 12 
Individuals have different opinions 2 5 
NB: Some respondents offered more than one response 
Number of respondents = 43 
 
As might be expected a high proportion of the respondents expressed the view that 
Kazakh was of significant intrinsic importance to their ethnic identity, either simply 
underlining its importance and the need to know it or describing it as part of the 
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Kazakh identity itself. The Kazakh language has survived alongside the people and 
the two go together. For these participants, speaking Kazakh is an important mark of 
loyalty to and respect for their ethnic identity and not to do so leaves that identity 
incomplete, thus an important part of identity maintenance is language use and 
promotion. 
 
4:149 “I think it’s the first and foremost thing for being Kazakh.” 
 
4:150 “To be a Kazakh you must know Kazakh language, it’s the first criteria to be a 
Kazakh and know the traditions, customs and so on.” 
 
4:151 “I think it’s very important to know and to speak Kazakh because uh, it’s the 
first thing that shows your nationality and also your um, patriotism and your respect 
to your nationality, to your language, to your culture.”†  
 
These comments show how highly many Kazakhs value the language as a marker of 
group identity. A number of the interviewees cited above describe language as being 
the ‘first’ indication of group belonging and all express the belief that the experience 
of group membership is not complete without knowledge of the language. A number 
of other participants similarly note the strong link between language and group by 
describing the language as important because it is the Kazakhs’ native language. This 
link between a member of the group and the language is thus seen as something 
almost biological; the language is viewed as a birthright, and belongs to members of 
the group. 
 
4:154 “It’s the own language of Kazakh and he must speak in Kazakh language if he 
is Kazakh, he must know his mother language.”† 
 
It is clear from this selection of responses that a high proportion of Kazakhs 
understand the Kazakh language as being an important, if not necessary, constituent 
of ethnic Kazakh identity, a vital aspect of the group which must therefore be 
esteemed and strengthened so as to increase its importance in the wider sphere of 
inter-group activity.  
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A number of other participants stress the importance of the language but also focus 
on its role at the state level; it is to be seen not just as the language of Kazakhs but of 
all citizens of Kazakhstan. In some cases this seems to represent a Kazakh 
nationalising view in which aspects of ethnic Kazakh identity are promoted to 
dominance. 
 
4:156 “It’s very important because our president um, uh, makes every office, every 
institution accept his um worker uh, to know his national language, I mean not his 
national, that he must know Kazakh language.”† 
 
For other participants though, it seems to represent identification with a higher level 
of inclusiveness which sees the Kazakh language as belonging to a developing 
Kazakhstani identity in which all groups are included. 
 
4:158 “It’s the main language in Kazakhstan so I think it’s important for everyone.” 
  
4:159 “It must be our first language. You see now Kazakhstan has two language, 
Russian and Kazakh… maybe it’s very good when we know Russian because for 
example, I know that most other countries know only one language… and it’s plus I 
think for us.” 
 
The preceding quote highlights another view which several participants expressed. 
That is that the Russian language is also important and has a place in their lives 
which should not be denied or belittled. The Russian language has long been 
important in Kazakhstan and has shaped the country and its people. Also, languages 
such as Russian and English are seen to have value in helping Kazakhs communicate 
in wider spheres. A teacher from Miras University expresses this view in some detail. 
 
4:160 “I said you that Kazakh language itself is very deep and beautiful language and 
it has its own sound and its own music which influence as an energy influence on the 
mentality greatly, I feel for myself so. So native language greatly influence on the 
mentality. Ah, for this reason I think the development of native language in our 
country is very important, to become as a nation. But er, it doesn’t mean that we 
should forget the Russian language because Russian language opens the door into the 
world for communicating with the outer world. And not saying English. English, it is 
a global language er, it helps us to communicate with the world, with all the world. 
For this reason it’s actual for us to survive in this world, to know 3 languages.”  
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This teacher values languages both for the personal and cultural and the instrumental 
values associated with them. A similar focus on the instrumental worth of language 
is seen in the responses of those who said that Kazakh was important because many 
documents are now distributed in Kazakh and because, as mentioned by the student 
quoted above (4:156), the language is increasingly required for jobs in offices and 
institutions. This view is also expressed by the teacher cited below. 
 
4:161 “It’s important only in documentary, for example, if you communicate, I can 
communicate in Russian and in Kazakh, frankly speaking I don’t speak Kazakh, I 
just understand, but I cannot answer and in university there is a rule, all documents 
are in Kazakh language… and you have to fill it in Kazakh language and only this 
and I don’t think that’s really good because for example those people who do not 
speak Kazakh and write even Kazakh at all, it’s very difficult.”  
 
Summary  
From looking at interviewees’ responses to the question, ‘How important is the 
Kazakh language to being Kazakh?’ it has become apparent that for a majority of 
Kazakhs their ethnic language is intimately involved in their sense of what their 
ethnicity means and as such is highly valued as a mark of group belonging. However, 
a number of participants take a more pragmatic view of language and see the value of 
languages more in instrumental terms, or place a greater emphasis on languages as 
part of a more inclusive state level of identity.  
 
4.20 ‘How important is the Russian language to being Russian?’ 
A similar spectrum of answers was elicited from Russians in response to the same 
question concerning their ethnic language. Table 4.15 below summarises the results 
and shows categories of response mentioned by more than one participant. 
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Table 4.15: Responses to the Question ‘How important is the Russian language to 
being Russian?’ (Russian Respondents)  
Answer No. of Respondents % of Respondents Mentioning 
Important  9 60 
Part of identity, culture  4 27 
Language of communication 4 27 
Native language  3 20 
All other responses 3 20 
NB: Some respondents offered more than one response 
Number of respondents = 15  
 
As with the Kazakh participants a relatively high number of Russians simply asserted 
that the language was indeed important to being Russian. Others went further, 
making clear that it was an integral part of their identity and culture. 
 
4:162 “Of course the language is important. The Russian language is first of all, well 
you think in this language, that says something already.” 
 
4:163 “It’s their native language, it’s important for their culture. If a person is 
Russian he must know Russian, it’s important for him so.” †  
 
This quote also expresses the view that the language is an important part of being 
Russian because it is the native language of the group. Altogether the number of 
participants expressing the views described above, in which the language is seen as 
an integral part of the ethnic group identity, constitute 80% of the Russian 
participants answering this question.  
 
As in the case of the Kazakhs, a small number of respondents perceived the 
importance of Russian in more instrumental terms describing it as being important 
because it functions as their main language of communication. 
 
4:165 “Well obviously it’s a way of speaking, talking, for many Russians it’s very 
complicated to adopt the Kazakh language or some kind of other one, but if you have 
the desire, in principle it’s possible to learn to speak in any language…”† 
 
It is therefore apparent that Russians hold very similar views to Kazakhs in terms of 
the importance of the ethnic language to the group and its identity. In order to assess 
whether this was also the case for minority group members the same question was 
put to them. 
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4.21 ‘How important is the Uzbek, Korean… language to being Uzbek, Korean…?’ 
Unfortunately the number of minority group representatives who answered this 
question is very small so no clear conclusions can be drawn. However, table 4.16 
below shows the results that were obtained. 
 
Table 4.16: Responses to the Question ‘How important is the Uzbek, Korean… 
language to being Uzbek, Korean…?’ (Minority Group Respondents) 
Answer No. of Respondents % of Respondents Mentioning 
Native language  2 40 
Must know it 2 40 
Important  1 20 
Don’t know 1 20 
Doesn’t matter 1 20 
NB: Some respondents offered more than one response 
Number of respondents = 5  
 
Although the numbers are very small it does appear that a similar pattern obtains as 
for the other ethnic groups discussed with the majority describing the language as 
important and a necessary part of the group’s identity and a minority disagreeing.  
 
4.22 ‘Can you still be Kazakh if you don’t speak the language?’ 
The above discussion made clear that members of all ethnic groups consider the 
language associated with their group to be an important part of their identity. In order 
to test and explore this view further, participants were asked whether it was possible 
to still call yourself by the ethnic group name if you didn’t speak the language. Table 
4.17 below shows how Kazakh interviewees responded to this question concerning 
their own group. 
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Table 4.17: Responses to the Question ‘Can you still be Kazakh if you don’t speak the 
language?’ (Kazakh Respondents) 
Answer No. of 
Respondents 
% of Respondents 
Mentioning 
Yes (no further comments given) 10 21 
Yes, ethnicity decided by birth 9 19 
Yes, traditions, patriotism more 
important  5 10 
Yes, but is shameful, not true 
Kazakh  9 19 
No 15 31 
Number of respondents = 48 
 
These results show that half of the Kazakh respondents believe that you can call 
yourself Kazakh even if you don’t know the language whilst half believe that you 
either cannot do so or that you are in some sense not a true Kazakh without the 
language.  
 
The biological understanding of ethnic identity was made apparent in answers to 
questions previously discussed and is expressed again here by those who said that 
blood or birth made you Kazakh regardless of linguistic competence. 
 
4:167 “Yes… Because even if I don’t speak in Kazakh I’m still a Kazakh because I 
was born Kazakh, it’s not important what language I speak.”  
 
4:168 “…I don’t blame them because they were born and they were brought up in, in 
different time than ours. Yeah, I can say that they are Kazakh. Probably if the person 
don’t know his or her language um but they, they are, they are inside I would say, 
their inner world is uh, shows their nationality.”† 
 
For this respondent ethnicity is something internal, revealed by a particular mentality 
or world-view. Similarly, for other respondents as well as biological connections, 
adherence to the forms and norms of ethnic tradition and a respect for and love of the 
identity are more important in determining group belonging than language 
knowledge. 
 
4:170 “Yes… maybe I can because for example, our famous people, our statesmen 
they cannot speak Kazakh well but I think they are also Kazakh, they must have 
family, patriotism.”  
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4:171 “Yes of course because also they think that in the heart, traditions, the heart 
they all the time use our bread, you know, baursak [Kazakh bread], and our eatings, 
besh parmak [the Kazakh national dish], they know… but now it doesn’t matter 
speak or she or he in Kazakh or in Russian but she feels that.”† 
 
This respondent highlights the multidimensional nature of ethnic identity in which a 
whole range of group markers are important and from which individuals can select in 
order to demonstrate their group membership and loyalty. One of the teachers at 
Miras also describes the many different facets of ethnic experience each of which has 
its place and importance. 
 
4:173 “I think it depends on education, it depends on environment, your friends, it 
depends on your family ‘cos some people I know that they don’t speak Kazakh, some 
people live out of our country in foreign countries but they respect all our holidays, 
all our traditions and customs and they are trying, I think they, they more they are 
real Kazakh than we ‘cos sometimes we don’t celebrate some holidays because we 
think it’s not important for us. So but in when you live out of your country you are 
missing so you’re trying to keep to save all these traditions and customs. 
- “So you think respect for the culture is a more important thing than speaking the 
language?”  
- Not only but it means, I mean when I say culture I include their art, our language, 
our customs and holidays. All things which shows that we are real Kazakh cos er 
when you will come, when you will come in Nauriz, in March 22nd of March we will 
celebrate our Kazakh New Year’s Day, so you can see there, you can see there our 
yurta, it’s a round house so with our, so with our national ornaments, with our 
folklore, so they sing our national songs, so it shows that you are real Kazakh, these 
things, we have our clothes, our language.”  
 
The students and teachers discussed above seem to be discursively constructing an 
understanding of ethnicity which is determined biologically and experienced through 
the links of family and cultural practice, through celebrations, food and clothing. 
Language is frequently stressed as important but it is one aspect among many and 
does not ultimately have a privileged status in determining group membership. For 
the other half of the Kazakh participants though, language does have this status, or 
something close to it. Some participants expressed the essentialising view that not 




4:174 “…this person should know his own language… if this person doesn’t know 
Kazakh language it’s shame on him, it’s very big importance of our Kazakh people.”  
 
4:175 “If you don’t know Kazakh but you are Kazakh you are only gene Kazakh but 
if you want to be a real Kazakh you must know Kazakh.”† 
 
These views echo those expressed earlier in response to the question ‘What makes 
you Kazakh, Russian…?’ where participants made a distinction between ethnicity as 
a label as it might be recorded in a passport and ethnicity as an experience of group 
belonging expressed in family values, traditions and customs. For other participants 
language is put alongside or even above biological descent in determining ethnicity 
and therefore without the language you are not part of the group. The student quoted 
below for example, expresses a Romantic philosophy of language and nation. 
 
4:178 “You can’t be Kazakh if you don’t speak the language - because the language 
is the main part of being the Kazakh, the part of the nation, because language is very 
important for every nation. If your parents are Kazakh but you don’t speak the 
language you are not Kazakh, you are between Kazakh and Russian.”  
 
4:179 “If I don’t know Kazakh how can I say that I am Kazakh?… For me parents 
are not so important because if I don’t know Kazakh, I can’t accept myself as a 
Kazakh.”† 
 
Thus, a relatively high proportion of Kazakhs see language as being at least partially 
determinative of ethnicity. The language is part of the identity and without the 
language the identity is incomplete. In order to compare this situation with the beliefs 
of Russians about the importance of Russian in ethnic group belonging the same 
question was put to them. 
 
4.23 ‘Can you still be Russian if you don’t speak the language?’ 




Table 4.18: Responses to the Question ‘Can you still be Russian if you don’t speak the 
language?’ (Russian Respondents) 
Answer No. of 
Respondents 
% of Respondents 
Mentioning 
Yes (no further comments given) 6 40 
Yes, ethnicity decided by birth 2 13.3 
Yes, traditions, patriotism more 
important  2 13.3 
No 5 33.3 
Number of respondents = 15 
 
Although the number of participants is smaller, this table shows that the proportion 
of Russian interviewees who state that you can still call yourself a group member 
despite not knowing the language is higher than that of Kazakh interviewees. Despite 
the fact that in Kazakhstan the vast majority of ethnic Russians speak only Russian 
most participants believe that ethnicity is determined other than by language. 
However, a similar range of views is expressed by Russian participants. Thus, the 
idea that ethnicity is decided by birth and that it is largely culturally expressed is 
apparent among Russians as it is among Kazakhs. 
 
4:181 “Yes, you can. Some, I have relatives who moved to Germany and now they 
don’t talk Russian at all, just German, but all the same they’re Russian.” 
 
4:182 “No, he doesn’t have to speak Russian, from other, maybe by his deeds, his 
address, sometimes following certain traditions, there are things like that.”† 
 
This teacher describes the ethnic experience similarly to the Kazakh teacher quoted 
above (4:173) in that ethnicity consists of a variety of social and cultural forms and 
practices such that language is not in itself essential to define group membership. 
However, as amongst Kazakhs, others see social processes as more important than 
biological descent and language as vital in defining the parameters of the group. 
 
4:184 “Probably not. You know, I have an acquaintance, his mum is Lithuanian, his 
dad is Tatar but he says, ‘I’m a purely Russian person’, it sounds quite mixed but 
really his way of thinking, he was brought up and has always lived in a Russian 
environment. He lived in Russia for a long time and he thinks only in Russian, he 
acts like a Russian and therefore he is Russian.”† 
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It is clear then that the Russian interviewees agree that socialisation and cultural 
practice are strongly implicated in ethnic identity and belonging but disagree as to 
the importance of language within the matrix of group norms.  
 
4.24 ‘Can you still be Uzbek, Korean… if you don’t speak the language?’ 
Members of ethnic minorities were also asked this question in order to explore their 
understanding of the importance of language amongst other group norms. Table 4.19 
below shows the results. 
 
Table 4.19: Responses to the Question ‘Can you still be Uzbek, Korean… if you don’t 
know the language?’ (Minority Group Respondents) 
Answer No. of Respondents % of Respondents Mentioning 
Yes 5 72 
Yes, traditions more important  1 14 
No 1 14 
Number of respondents = 7 
 
Once again the number of minority group respondents is very small. However, we 
can see that here too the majority agree that group membership is determined other 
than by language with one participant mentioning adherence to traditions as more 
important than knowledge of the language. Thus, it seems that the respondents are 
quite pragmatic about their identity and do not necessarily continue to prioritise a 
mark of that identity which most group members have lost. As with the Kazakh and 
Russian groups though, a minority does privilege language with determinative status.  
 
The Importance of Language: Summary 
From the foregoing it is clear that language occupies a privileged position in its role 
as a group norm for all ethnic groups. It is often cited as one of the main markers of 
ethnic belonging, an important part of the social identity of the group and for some it 
supersedes biological descent in being ethnically determinative.  
 
4.4 Levels and Content of Identities: Summary 
The social identity framework highlights the validity of many self-definitions and 
identities existing at differing levels of inclusiveness and made more or less salient 
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according to individual beliefs and experiences and to context. These points were 
well illustrated by the responses of interviewees to questions concerning levels of 
identity. Participants readily self-identified at personal, ethnic and state levels but 
each of these identities was brought out to a different extent for various respondents 
by differently phrased and focused questions. Their own attitudes and life 
experiences were also expressed and could be seen to play a part in determining the 
degree of identification with each level of identity and hence its relative salience in 
the context of the interview questions. 
 
It is clear that a state level identity is emerging in Kazakhstan marked out by the 
characteristic group norms of hospitality, friendliness and openness and the social 
practices of republic-wide celebrations and traditions. It is esteemed for the progress 
made by the state in developmental and economic terms and Kazakhstan is seen to 
compare favourably with its Central Asian neighbours in these terms and also in 
terms of territory size and wealth of resources. As well as the states of Central Asia, 
and in particular, Uzbekistan, the Russian Federation also emerged as being regarded 
as relevant for comparison for many participants. 
 
Ethnic identity is experienced by the participants as a highly valued 
multidimensional level of identity with different ethnic groups placing greater or 
lesser emphasis on various dimensions of that identity as important and membership 
defining. For Kazakhs and Russians there is often a focus on group markers that 
differentiate Central Asians from Europeans, such as skin colour or religion. 
However, minority group members tended to point out their distinctiveness from all 
other groups in Kazakhstan. 
 
Language is extremely important as an element of ethnic identity for all groups and 
is valued as such. However, in response to social realities such that sometimes 
would-be group members do not speak the ethnic language many participants 
ultimately define group membership as possible without knowledge of the language. 
For some though, language is integral to the ethnic identity to such an extent that 
without knowledge of the language true group belonging is deemed to be impossible.  
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5 National Identity: Individual Interviews 
5.1 The Discursive Construction of National Identity 
Having established that state and ethnic levels of identity are salient and value laden 
ones for the participants in this study and having explored relevant aspects of the 
content of both of these it is instructive to make a further examination of the 
development of a state level, Kazakhstani national identity. In order to compare the 
participants’ feeling of and beliefs about a Kazakhstani identity it is useful to draw 
upon ideas from the work done by Wodak et al (1999) discussing Austrian national 
identity (see chapter 1 for an introduction to this work). 
 
In their research Wodak and her colleagues collected and analysed a selection of sets 
of data. These were political speeches, newspaper articles, posters and brochures, 
individual interviews and focus group discussions. One of the principal dimensions 
of analysis of these data sets was that of thematic content. Drawing on a review of 
relevant literature and on a pilot analysis of their own data five major thematic 
content areas were identified.  
 
The first of these is the linguistic construction of a homo nationalis (a homo 
Austriacus in the case of their study of Austrian national identity). This thematic 
heading covers references to a national mentality, character or national behavioural 
dispositions as well as emotional attachment to the state, descriptions of national 
identity being ‘activated’, for example when visiting a foreign country, and 
references to aspects of origin such as place of birth, of residence or of socialisation.  
 
The second content area identified is that of a common political past. This includes 
references to myths of origin and founding, mythical figures, political successes and 
times of prosperity and stability or of defeat and crisis.  
 
The linguistic construction of a common culture is also identified as an important 
topic. This heading includes the fields of language, religion and the arts as well as 
science and technology and aspects of everyday culture such as sport, clothing, 
habits, food and drink. 
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The fourth content area highlighted is that of the linguistic construction of a common 
political present and future. This includes ideas about citizenship, political 
achievements or problems, political aims for the future and political virtues. 
 
The final topic heading identified is the linguistic construction of a ‘national body’. 
This covers the conception of a national territory and landscapes and the use made of 
those landscapes.   
 
In order to further examine the nature and development of a Kazakhstani national 
identity these same topic headings have been applied to relevant parts of the 
interview data from Shymkent. The questions dealing most clearly with aspects of a 
possible Kazakhstani identity are outlined below. 
 
The first question of the interview, ‘How would you describe the people of 
Kazakhstan?’ was oriented to by a number of participants in terms of a state level 
Kazakhstani identity (see the discussion at the start of the preceding chapter for 
further detail). The answers given by these participants were therefore analysed using 
the thematic content headings listed above. Also analysed in this way were answers 
pertaining to a state identity in response to the questions ‘Are you glad that 
Kazakhstan is now independent?’ and ‘What is the most important aspect of this?’, 
‘How would you describe yourself?’, ‘Would you ever describe yourself as 
Kazakhstani?’, ‘Are people from Kazakhstan different than people from other 
countries?’, ‘What makes you proud to be a Kazakhstani?’, ‘What makes you 
ashamed?’ and finally responses to the question ‘Do you ever compare Kazakhstan 
with other countries, if so which ones and how?’ were also analysed. Where answers 
to certain other questions related to these themes they have also sometimes been 
referred to or quoted.  
 
5.2 The Discursive Construction of a Homo Nationalis  
As noted above, this aspect of the content of national identity deals with what makes 
a person a member of a national community and how membership is experienced and 
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made evident. In the case of Austrian national identity many participants made 
reference to the importance of an emotional attachment and sense of commitment to 
the nation. This belief was also evident in quite a number of the responses under 
review in the present study. In describing the importance of the independence of 
Kazakhstan participants frequently use words such as ‘pleased’ and ‘proud’  when 
discussing being part of the national ingroup and stressing ownership of and 
participation in this identity.  
 
5:1 “We have our capital, our country and our Tenge [the national currency] and we 
have what in the Kazakhstan is all ours and I am proud.”  
 
5:2 “It took a long time to get our independence and now I’m proud of that, that I’m 
Kazakh, that I live in Kazakhstan, that I am part of this country.”† 
 
Alongside the sense of pride and enjoyment of independence there is often an 
expression of hope for the future. 
 
5:4 “I live here, I should like, it’s my country and… I can’t live here without being 
proud of it, so I know, it’s just the beginning and we have a lot of difficulties like, 
like our systems are not formed and everything is not formed but I hope in future, in 
good future for my children, for my, myself.”  
  
5:5 “I am proud because our country, that’s the very country that’s up developed 
very quickly, ‘cos in comparison with other, like Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Uzbekistan we really higher…thanks to this we can open new factories, new schools, 
new colleges, we can provide new orphanages and so on.”† 
 
As well as the hope that Kazakhstan will continue to gain in stature as a state and 
have a secure and prosperous future the desire to participate in and be part of the 
ongoing development of the state of which they are proud is also a strong theme, 
particularly in participants’ responses to the request to describe themselves. For 
example, one Russian Salem student describes herself as (5:7) “Something small in 
the big country and maybe needed in the future.” Similarly a student of the Kazakh 
Turkish University says, (5:8) “I think I will be a useful man for my country” and a 
student of the South Kazakhstan State University says that, (5:9) “In future I want to, 
part in developing our country of our Kazakhstan.”  
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The themes of pride and enjoyment of the national identity and of a sense of 
ownership and participation were also evident in answers to other questions. This is 
shown particularly clearly in the response of an ethnically Russian teacher at the 
Language Academy. 
 
5:10 “I am a patriot of my country and when some people ask me why I don’t go to 
Russia, I think that it’s not my country, I was born here and this is my country and 
this tradition is also mine.”  
 
Similarly an ethnically Uzbek student expresses his identification with and loyalty to 
the state. 
 
5:11 “I was born here, I must respect the Kazakh state. I will work here and join the 
Kazakh army and I will protect my people.”  
 
Other students too root their identity firmly into that of the state. 
 
5:12 “I was born here, and the history and life of Kazakhstan is also my life and I can 
be proud of it, that I am Kazakhstani and was born in Kazakhstan.”† 
 
The sense of identification with the state identity is also revealed by the way in 
which many participants use the pronouns ‘we’, ‘us’ and ‘our’ to mark their 
inclusion within and emotional involvement with the Kazakhstani ingroup. This is 
exemplified by several of the participants quoted above and was particularly frequent 
in responses to the question asking about the most important aspect of independence.  
 
5:14 “we have our own state and don’t depend on anyone. We can found our own 
way, our own laws”† 
 
Closely linked to the theme of involvement, pride and emotional attachment to 
Kazakhstan is the theme that being born in the state creates a sense of attachment and 
loyalty, and the concept of a special bond with the homeland is noticeable in several 
participants’ responses.  Language Academy teacher 1 (ethnically Russian), South 
Kazakhstan University student 7 (an Uzbek) and Kazakh Turkish University student 
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7 (a Kazakh) quoted above (5:10, 5:11, 5:12) all root their identification with the 
state in the fact that it is their place of birth and therefore has a claim on their loyalty 
and emotions whatever their ethnicity. Several other participants express similar 
views. 
 
5:17 “I was born here so it doesn’t matter what my nationality [i.e. ethnicity] is but I 
am still a Kazakhstani.”  
 
5:18 “I’m glad that I am Kazakhstani and that I was born here.”† 
 
For some respondents it is not just the fact of being born in a place that is important 
but that it is also where they live and have been socialised. Residency creates the 
bond with the state, similarity with other ingroup members and difference from 
outgroup members. 
 
5:21 “Kazakhstanis are different [than people from other countries] that they live in 
here and they, they have own abilities… Every Kazakhstani, Kazakhstani, whether 
he’s Russian or Kazakh or Tatar or Uzbek… all of them are united as one, in one 
Kazakhstan.”  
 
5:22 “[People from Kazakhstan] are different [than people from other countries]. 
They, maybe they are different in bringing, yes upbringing and how, how we were 
brought up.”† 
 
For these participants and others like them there is a Kazakhstani group identity that 
includes members of all ethnic groups. Members of the state are united and defined 
by being born and socialised in Kazakhstan which they believe results in natural 
pride and emotional attachment to the state as well as in a distinct ingroup identity 
setting them apart from members of other states.  
 
Whilst some respondents give the impression that such an identity is naturally salient 
at all times, many describe experiences that made them particularly aware of their 
emotional bond with Kazakhstan and allegiance to a state level group membership. 
Wodak and her colleagues describe this as the ‘activation’ of national identity (1999: 
31) and for participants in both the study of Austrian national identity and in the 
present investigation this is often linked to being in a foreign country or to returning 
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‘home’ from abroad (see section 4.2.4). An ethnically Korean student of Salem 
school states for example, that she described herself as ‘Kazakhstani’ when she lived 
in Russia for two years,1 whilst a teacher at school 37 says that he described himself 
in that way when he visited the Ukraine.2 A student of the Language Academy 
describes this process particularly clearly. 
 
5:26 “I was in England and only when I visited, only when I left my country I felt 
myself as a Kazakhstani really. I find out that, find out that I am a patriotic person… 
I began missing my parents and also my friends, my town and the whole country.”  
 
For many respondents though, it is not just being in a foreign country that activates 
their Kazakhstani identity but simply interacting with representatives of other 
countries. A student of the Kazakh Turkish University says that she describes herself 
as ‘Kazakhstani’, (5:27) “When I meet people from different countries” and a student 
at South Kazakhstan State University says that he described himself that way, (5:28) 
“when I met some foreign students.” A student at Salem school says that she 
describes herself as ‘Kazakhstani’ when, (5:29) “talking with other nationalities, 
defending Kazakhstan if it is belittled.” This shows both the activation of the national 
identity in contact with outgroup members and the need to maintain and defend a 
positive ingroup identity within that context. This theme is also evident in several 
other responses. For example a student of the Kazakh Turkish University says that 
she described herself as ‘Kazakhstani’ when abroad and because Kazakhstan (5:30) 
“is not famous” she was “compelled to describe the very big territory and the things 
and traditions and culture and language that belong to Kazakhstan.” 
 
For some, the interaction with members of the outgroup does not need to be face to 
face to activate a sense of national identity. Salem student 9 says that a ‘Kazakhstani’ 
identity becomes salient when he communicates on the internet.3  
 
                                                 
1 (Ss8Kof, [02, 03: 2.00-2.30], R)  See Appendix B for information on referencing of quotes 
2 (37t2Km, [13, 01: 4.30-5.00], K) 
3 (Ss9Rm, [02, 06: 2.40-3.00], R) 
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A more particular international context in which a Kazakhstani national identity is 
‘activated’ for several of the respondents is that of watching or participating in sport.  
 
5:31 “And this proudness I feel when I see different sport… sport competition yeah, 
we feel when we listening our team, the team of Kazakhstani and er, the banner of 
Kazakhstan raising so we feel very proud that we are Kazakhstani.”† 
 
Some respondents describe being surprised at the strength of their own feeling for 
Kazakhstan when watching sporting events. For example, an ethnically Russian 
student of Miras University seems to find her allegiance towards Kazakhstan 
unexpected. 
 
5:33 “well yes I am a Kazakhstani… let’s say when it’s the Olympic Games, I for 
some reason support Kazakhstan and not Russia, is like that even being in Russia 
when I saw the Olympic games I still supported Kazakhstan although I wouldn’t 
consider myself a patriot.” 
 
This response illustrates the way in which latent ingroup affiliations can become 
salient in particular social contexts when in other (probably intragroup) contexts the 
same identity had been far less salient and hence the student involved was surprised 
when the previously ‘dormant’ national identity was activated and the emotional 
responses inherent in identification with the group became evident.  
 
The responses quoted above exemplify the way in which identification of the self 
with the nation is such that the good reputation and success, or lack of reputation and 
failure of the state prompts emotional and behavioural responses from individuals 
who perceive themselves to be members of that state. The wider reputation of the 
state or the success of a representative team or individual in the case of sport is 
appropriated and experienced positively by other ingroup members as legitimately 
contributing to their own sense of a positive self identity.  
 
Also contributing to a secure and distinctive national identity is the concept of intra-
national sameness and international difference. (The process of accentuating 
perceived similarities amongst ingroup members and differences from outgroup 
members is described in the self-categorization framework, see section 1.6.2). It is to 
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the desire to preserve a sense of intra-national uniformity that Wodak attributes the 
conception, common amongst the participants in her study, of distinctive Austrian 
characteristics and mentality, which she refers to as the discursive construction of a 
‘Homo Austriacus’.  Wodak and colleagues describe these concepts of typically 
Austrian behaviour, mentality and national character as being “of great importance” 
in the participants’ discourse (Wodak et al. 1999: 193) and elsewhere state that 
 
“Such statements about supposedly typical Austrian qualities and behaviour promote 
an assimilative presupposition of sameness or similarity within an ingroup. At the 
same time, such statements also encourage a singularising emphasis on national 
uniqueness, which, for its part, may be linked to the dissimilative presupposition, in 
other words to an emphasis on differences between one’s own and other groups, 
which in turn are themselves assumed to be also internally homogeneous groups.” 
(1999: 116-117).  
 
Thus, as well as constructing a national character, the positive traits of this character 
and mentality are compared and contrasted to the less desirable characteristics of 
relevant national outgroups; typically the Germans and Swiss in the Austrian study 
and usually Russians and Uzbeks or other Central Asians in the present research.  
 
This is exemplified in the comments made by a student of Salem school quoted 
above and repeated below. 
 
5:34 “People who live in Kazakhstan, I’ve just been in Russia and can compare, all 
the same in the relationship between them, their hospitality, they are a lot warmer 
towards people and more sociable.” 
 
As well as showing participants’ tendency to compare national characteristics with 
relevant others this quote is also an example of the principle aspect of a supposed 
Kazakhstani character – that of hospitality. This quality alongside those of openness 
and friendliness emerge as the characteristics of a ‘typical’ Kazakhstani and are 
referred to by a large number of participants, both students and teachers.  
 
5:35 “Kazakhstanis are more polite, more kind than Uzbeks.”  
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5:36 “They [the people of Kazakhstan] are more hospitable and friendly than Russian 
citizens.”  
 
5:37 “There are some things which are present in all people of Kazakhstan. I would 
say main traditions, like hospitality and um, openness… Friendly, I would say they 
are friendly.”†  
 
The fact that the trait of hospitality is valued as being characteristically Kazakhstani 
and part of a national identity is exemplified by the emotional reaction evident in the 
response of one participant when told that members of another national group share 
this character trait. 
 
5:39 “Um, my sister is in Korea now and when she comes here, um sometimes I ask 
you to tell me something about Korea, but when she tells me something good and I 
feel that she um uh, she changes her mind about Kazakhstan and I shout her, ‘you 
mustn’t tell so, because Kazakhstan is best!’ For example when she uh, uh that there 
people are very good and hos, hospitable I say that you shouldn’t tell so because our 
person are very hospitable and that’s all.” 
 
This student feels that her sister is betraying the national ingroup by praising Koreans 
so highly and attributing to them the character trait which, she believes, ‘belongs’ to 
Kazakhstanis. Many respondents indicate their belief in this national character which 
has evolved over time as the many ethnic groups resident in Kazakhstan have lived 
together.   
 
5:40 “Because of long living in Kazakh that is the assimilation of nations takes place. 
And not assimilation but even um, change in culture maybe, in mentality, yeah, intra, 
intra-influence maybe yeah, intra-influence of cultures and there the assimilation of 
cultures takes place.”  
 
5:41 “[the people of Kazakhstan] have different mentality, they have their own type 
of living… I think that we [ethnic minorities] have some difference with Kazakh 
people, Kazakh people but nevertheless, we are, we like we live like one nationality, 
and we have the same mentality, way of thinking.”  
 
The idea of a national Kazakhstani character which separates the ethnic minorities of 
Kazakhstan from their co-ethnics in their titular republic is frequently reinforced by 
responses (in particular to the questions asking whether ethnic groups are internally 
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homogeneous) stating that Kazakhstanis are not recognised by their co-ethnics in 
these republics. 
 
5:42 “They usually say that those who go to Russia from Kazakhstan aren’t 
recognised by their own people, the Russians there. It’s the same everywhere, for 
example, Kazakhstan’s Uzbeks aren’t recognised there, Uzbekistan’s Uzbeks don’t 
recognise them.”   
 
5:43 “If a Russian goes to Russia he can easily be recognised that he comes from 
Kazakhstan, by the speech, by the behaviour, the traditions.”† 
 
In the previous chapter it was suggested that whilst these characteristics were seen as 
normative for Kazakhstanis their value as distinctive group attributes setting 
Kazakhstanis apart from relevant Central Asian outgroups where such attributes were 
also valued, was limited. Thus as well as describing the national ingroup as 
possessing these qualities to a greater extent than for example, the neighbouring 
Uzbeks, Kazakhstanis also highlight other aspects of the national culture which, in 
their opinion, set them apart more clearly from other Central Asian states and from 
Russia. Kazakhstan is more multi-ethnic than any of the other Central Asian 
countries and also enjoys relatively good relations between ethnic groups. Thus, 
tolerance, good communication between ethnic groups and peacefulness are put 
forward by many participants as being part of a Kazakhstani mentality and 
Kazakhstani behavioural disposition. These traits therefore, positively distinguish 
‘Homo Kazakhstanus’ from his neighbours.  
 
5:45 “our society is multinational and er, that is, the national character as tolerance 
helps us to live in this community, multinational community, and I’m very proud that 
our nation er, multinational state is stable and er, different people can understand 
each other and can live in peace with each other” 
 
5:46 “There are a lot of nationalities but they are all I think common, like very polite 
um very friendly, I think so. They don, they don’t show any um, like, discrimination 
towards other nationalities. So, we are very friendly, I said there are a lot of 
nationalities so it’s very good and we are maybe one country from former Soviet 
Union which remains without war, very friendly.”† 
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This last quote serves to highlight that it is indeed the countries of the former Soviet 
Union which constitute the outgroups perceived to be relevant for comparison and 
competition. 
 
Through the preceding discussion it has been demonstrated that many of the 
elements of the discursive construction of a national identity described by Wodak 
and her team in the discussion groups and interviews they carried out in Austria and 
which they gathered under the thematic heading of the concept of a ‘homo 
nationalis’ are also present in the responses of participants in the present study. It 
should be pointed out that there is no unanimous consensus from the Shymkent 
participants, on the contrary different interviewees offer varied viewpoints on the 
elements of national identity in question and there are even individuals who, within 
the course of the interview, make conflicting comments as to the extent of the 
existence of a common Kazakhstani identity and its constituent elements. However, 
the fact that numerous participants’ responses do converge in many respects in 
relation to this topic, and that certain ideas, (such as the concept of emotional 
attachment and loyalty to the state arising from birth and socialisation there), words 
and phrases (as for example, ‘pleased’, ‘proud’ and the inclusion of self using the 
pronouns ‘we’, ‘us’ and ‘our’) recur in multiple interviews demonstrates that the 
students and staff of this study are indeed part of a common social context in which 
the existence and nature of a common Kazakhstani identity are being negotiated 
discursively.   
 
5.3 The Discursive Construction of a Common Political Past 
In introducing a discussion of participants in the Austrian study’s comments relating 
to the theme of the discursive construction of a common political past, Wodak states 
that 
 
“Historical or mythicised recollections which are stored in the collective memory of 
social groups are of particular importance for the construction of national identity” 
(Wodak et al.1999: 157). 
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Where Shymkent interview participants have oriented towards historical themes their 
comments are reviewed here in relation to the areas of thematic content Wodak and 
her team found relevant. As well as references to myths of origin these included 
reference to mythical figures, political successes, times of prosperity or stability and 
of defeat or crisis.  
 
One important event in recent history about which the participants in the Shymkent 
study were asked is that of Kazakhstan becoming an independent republic at the time 
of the dissolution of the Soviet Union. This is viewed by many of the respondents as 
a major achievement and as a very positive event. Participants frequently describe 
their ‘pride’ that Kazakhstan is now an independent state and say that they value 
highly the freedoms that independence has brought as well as the very status of 
independence itself. 
 
A student of Salem school says that she feels (5:48) “more pride in Kazakhstan, 
because now it is an independent country.” One of the teachers at the same school 
believes that the best aspect of independence is the new level of freedom. 
 
5:49 “freedom in religion and freedom in travelling to other countries, freedom on 
starting business and in politics as well, I would say it’s more freedom. I think it’s 
good for Kazakhstan to be independent.” 
 
A student at the Kazakh Turkish University says that the best thing about 
independence is that, (5:50) “it’s a separate country and doesn’t depend on anyone” 
and similar beliefs are expressed by many other participants. 
 
In contrast, the majority of participants view the period of Soviet rule negatively and 
use words such as ‘oppression’, ‘colonisation’ or a ‘yoke’ and  speak of it as a time 
of ‘loss’ and crisis for Kazakh culture and language. 
 
5:51 “when… [Kazakhstan] was united with Russia for a long time it, from some 
sides of course it was bad, the government was a yoke, people were exiles and people 
couldn’t live as they wanted.”  
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5:52 “the state, the Soviet state was totalitarian here, there, of course you can’t justify 
that kind of oppression that happened, that’s completely unjustified.” 
 
5:53 “During the Soviet Union it was a time when there was a danger Kazakhs could 
lose their religion, cultural traditions, even language… Kazakh people were 
colonised and directed by Russians during the Soviet Union.”† 
 
Moreover, independence is portrayed as being the result of a long struggle in which 
previous generations of the autochthonous population had engaged (see chapter 7 for 
further discussion of this theme).  
 
5:56 “It was our grandfathers’ aims to be independent and we are now independent, 
we are not colony of other republic or Russian federation.” 
 
5:57 “Because we have been colonised about 70 years and our ancestors just dreamt 
about independence and now we got the independence, had it for about 10 years.” 
 
Whilst many of these comments focus on the negative aspects of Soviet rule there is 
a concurrent discourse in which the Russian people who have settled in Kazakhstan 
have, along with other minority groups, become assimilated to local Central Asian 
culture and traditions and as such genuinely belong in the territory and now to the 
newly independent state.  Several comments were quoted in the previous section in 
which participants expressed the belief that Russians in Kazakhstan are different than 
those in Russia and do not comfortably ‘belong’ in Russia as they do in Central Asia. 
The director of Salem school discusses this point in some detail. 
 
5:58 “this is very clear to me, that Russian people who live in Kazakhstan are 
different to Russian people who live in um, I would say actually Russian people who 
live in Central Asia, like Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, they are different to 
Russian people who live in Russia. Because they become like us, like Asian people 
in their traditions and when they, I’ve heard from many of my friends who went to 
visit relatives in Russia there, they felt quite strange there… some [Kazakhstani 
Russians who had emigrated to Russia] came back because they couldn’t adapt to 
their culture. Some of them are still living there but I think they are getting into small 
communities of Russians who were in Kazakhstan or Tajikistan and actually they 
come from different Central Asian countries but they kind of can find, you know, 
similar things, I’ve heard about marriages between their families.”  
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Thus, this teacher, and many other participants, believe that Russians who have been 
resident in Central Asia for a prolonged period have become a part of that 
community, increasingly separate and distinct from Russians living in Russia. 
Common experience has generated a new and binding identity that distinguishes 
them as members of the Central Asian, and in this case Kazakhstani, ingroup and 
means that Russians outwith Central Asia are actually a foreign outgroup to them.  
 
Also, whilst much of the discourse concerning Russification is negative and 
highlights the forced imposition of Russian language and culture there is also a 
secondary discourse in which some Russian influence is seen positively and in which 
the two ethnic groups are seen to mutually influence each other creating a new mixed 
culture. One of the teachers at Miras University says that she feels that she is an 
example of this inter-cultural influence. 
 
5:59 “You see I am, I was born in the Soviet Union you see and uh, for me uh, I’m 
bred on the mixture of Kazak and Russian mentality so…for me Russian people as 
well as Kazakh people similar, for me. I do not divide them because we have 
common, much common or general between two nations, between two mentality… 
we have a common culture.”  
 
Another teacher at Miras exaggerates her own mixed ethnic background to highlight 
the way in which the variety of ethnic and cultural influences in Kazakhstan results 
in a new Kazakhstani identity. 
 
5:60 “Our Russians are all by parts, I’m partly German from my grandmother, partly 
Russian from my parents, partly Chinese from my husband, partly English from 
Masha [her English speaking granddaughter], really, I’m truly a Kazakhstani, I’m 
like that, Kazakhstan has always been a very hospitable state, old people used to be 
against mixed marriages and say Kazaks should marry only Kazakhs but not any 
more.” 
 
In terms of recent history and in particular Kazakhstan as an independent republic 
there is clearly a discourse of ethnic and cultural inclusion in the national identity. 
However, with regard to more ancient history many of the participants describe 
Kazakhstan as the territory of the Kazakhs specifically and as belonging to them (see 
chapters 7 and 8 for further references to this theme). Although there are no 
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comments which clearly relate to the origin or foundation of Kazakhstan, references 
are made to Kazakh ancestors belonging there and Kazakhs are often described as the 
‘root’ population. This theme, alongside that of the character trait of hospitality 
discussed earlier, results in a discourse which, although largely contradictory to that 
of forced Russian colonial expansion and oppression, nevertheless runs alongside it 
and portrays the hospitable Kazakhs as willingly accepting and welcoming Russians 
and other minorities into their territory. For example a student at Salem school says 
that, as a Kazakh, she is proud (5:61) “that I have such a people, good, that accepts 
other nations to its country.” Other respondents also participate in this discourse. 
 
5:62 “Kazakhs live in Kazakhstan, it’s their country, I think the Kazakhs are a very 
hospitable people, they accepted the Russians… [they] really respect those who’ve 
come to their country.”† 
 
Thus, the Soviet period is portrayed as a time of defeat and crisis which threatened 
the viability of the Kazakh language and culture. However, the highly valued 
character trait of hospitality which has now become an ingroup marker for all 
Kazakhstanis is also utilised to create an alternative, more positive discourse in 
which the Kazakhs show their hospitality by welcoming in many other nationalities 
to share ‘their’ territory with them (see the comments on the introduction to the 
Constitution in chapter 8). Moreover, the fact that many nationalities have resided 
together for so long in Kazakhstan is part of a theme of stability, successful learning 
from each other and cultural interchange.  
 
Wodak also includes mythical figures as an important theme in her study’s 
participants’ construction of a common political past. In contrast, the participants in 
the present study did not orient to this theme in their comments relating to history. 
One respondent however did mention a mythical figure from history and in doing so 
provides a telling example of the very cultural mixing mentioned above. This 
participant, a student of the South Kazakhstan State University, says that he is proud 
to be Kazakh because (5:64) “we have a lot of Bogatyrs.” The Bogatyri are a 
collection of legendary heroes from Russian folk epics. This student is thereby 
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appropriating a Slavic folk hero to describe the heroic nature of the Kazakh people 
and gives no indication that this might be perceived as incongruous.   
 
5.4 The Discursive Construction of a Common Culture 
The third thematic content area identified by Wodak and her team is that of a 
common culture. This pertains to aspects of everyday culture such as sport, food and 
drink, and dress as well as to science and technology, the arts, including such areas 
as music, literature, painting and theatre, and also encompasses responses relating to 
ideas about language and religion.   
 
This thematic area overlaps to a degree with that of the linguistic construction of a 
homo nationalis in that a proposed national mentality and national characteristics or 
behavioural predispositions are closely linked to a cultural conception of nationality.  
 
Wodak and her co-authors state that 
 
“The interview and the focus group data indicate that intermingling politically based 
and culturally based lines of argumentation seems to be the ‘norm’ in everyday 
discourse of national identification. Even where interviewees emphasised citizenship 
as a criterion for national membership and identity (which, by the way, did not occur 
very often), most of them pointed to linguistically, culturally and ethnically defined 
elements of Austrian self-perception at a later point in the interview.” (1999: 150-
151). 
 
The responses that make up the Shymkent interview data also show a more frequent 
orientation to culturally defined elements of national identity than to civic ones. 
However, Austria is far less ethnically heterogeneous than Kazakhstan and far closer 
to being a prototypical mono-ethnic nation state. It is likely that this fact has a strong 
influence on the willingness of the participants in Wodak’s study to define Austrian 
national identity in ethnic, cultural or linguistic terms. In contrast, a number of the 
Shymkent interviewees deny that there is any cohesive Kazakhstani cultural identity 
and insist instead that the cultural differences between ethnic groups are of greater 
significance than any similarities between them and than any possible differences 
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between Kazakhstanis and members of other states. For example, a teacher at the 
Kazakh Turkish University expresses this view. 
 
5:65 “They [the ethnic groups] are different, they have their own mentality, for 
example, I have my own opinions, Russian people have their own, Uzbek also.” 
 
Therefore, two competing discourses are evident in the Shymkent data. One of these 
constructs an ethnically divided heterogeneous society with only civil elements of a 
national identity in common whilst the other constructs an ethnically diverse and yet 
cohesive, culturally defined Kazakhstani identity.  
 
A teacher at the Language Academy, a Tatar by ethnicity, describes principal aspects 
of the benefits of independence as being cultural. 
 
5:66 “For us, the intelligentsia, for the young, of course, the spiritual, spiritual, 
cultural aspects are important… we have gained the opportunity for the development 
of the national language, the national culture and independent development.” 
 
Many of the participants who affirm a Kazakhstani cultural identity do not specify 
very clearly what such a culture involves. In fact, in a number of responses 
interviewees simply list ‘culture and traditions’ as being unifying factors in a 
Kazakhstani identity without seeming to be able easily to elaborate on what this 
means. Having ‘traditions and customs’ such as friendliness, sociability and 
hospitality in common is often mentioned as is the joint celebration of certain 
festivities, the Russian and Kazakh New Years (marked in January and March 
respectively), for example. These aspects of a national identity, discussed in the 
previous chapter, are mentioned by a large number of the Shymkent interviewees in 
the linguistic construction of a common cultural identity.  
 
Sport and support for a Kazakhstani sportsman or woman or for the national team is 
also cited as a unifying factor. Participants of all ethnicities describe feeling national 
pride and becoming emotionally involved when watching international sporting 




Overall, the participants describe a multi-ethnic community in which such aspects of 
everyday culture as food and drink, music, habits of dress and ways of marking life 
events such as birthdays, funerals or weddings are seen as differing according to 
ethnic group but that groups recognise, accept and sometimes participate in the 
cultural practices of other ethnic traditions. Therefore, although the participants 
cannot describe many aspects of everyday culture which unite all parts of 
Kazakhstani society there is a common belief in such an identity. A response from a 
university teacher quoted in the previous chapter and repeated below articulates this 
view. 
 
5:67 “[if] the person came from Russia or from China, Korea it doesn’t matter. I have 
group mates and absolutely all of them they were not Kazakh and they were 
Azerbaijan, Uzbek, um Ukrainian and many nationalities, I have never thought of 
their nationality it’s even interesting to know his traditions for example, to know how 
they for example, celebrate the wedding party or something like this” 
 
Other respondents express similar opinions. 
 
5:68 “Every Kazakhstani, Kazakhstani, whether he’s Russian or Kazakh or Tatar or 
Uzbek, they have their own traditions, and each one has their own traditions, the 
Uzbeks, the Tatars, the Russians and all of them are united as one, in one 
Kazakhstan.” 
 
5:69 “all nations, we all live in Kazakhstan, we are no longer marked by ethnic 
nationality but by our state, that we are all Kazakhstanis and as I said all the 
traditions and national celebrations are marked by any nationalities.”† 
 
Also contained within this thematic heading is the inclusion of language within a 
conception of a common culture. This is a topic in which the multi-ethnic nature of 
Kazakhstan is once again relevant and significant. Ideas concerning language and the 
roles of, in particular, the Russian and Kazakh languages are important in the 
construction of a Kazakhstani identity. Again there are competing discourses evident 
in the Shymkent data. Some participants stress the importance of Kazakh to the 
exclusion of other languages in constructing an independent Kazakhstani culture. 
Other participants however, as in the case of everyday culture discussed above, 
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recognise the diversity of native languages in use in Kazakhstan, although some 
highlight the symbolic importance of Kazakh as the official state language of 
independent Kazakhstan. This last point is illustrated by the comments of an 
ethnically Russian student, who studies in the Russian group and spoke Russian 
during the interview. She said that 
 
5:73 “The main thing in our independence is that our language is developing, the 
Kazakh language is developing, it is starting to, receive attention from other 
countries.” 
 
The same student goes on to say that  
 
5:74 “it seems to me that when someone is proud of Kazakhstan… I think he must 
first of all learn the Kazakh language, because he lives in Kazakhstan he should learn 
Kazakh.” 
 
The fact that the student in question does not act on this belief herself by speaking or 
studying in Kazakh illustrates the fact that for many the status and respect which it is 
believed should be accorded to the Kazakh language is largely symbolic. 
 
The priority due to Kazakh is also referred to by others. 
 
5:75 “Kazakh [should be the official language because] in the country of Kazakhstan 
the Kazakhs are the root population.” 
 
5:76 “Of course for me it’s better to speak in Russian but as I, as I understand it 
should be first Kazakh then Russian language, we should know Kazakh, it should be 
[the official state language].”† 
 
However, some participants believe that there should be parity between Russian and 
Kazakh at an official level as both are necessary for ease of communication with 
members of the Kazakhstani community. 
 
5:78 “we live in one country ‘cos my neighbours are Kazakh or Russian it but I have 
to work with different people, with people of different ages, sexes and languages so 
that’s why I should know more languages than one Kazakh language.” 
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5:79 “there must be, must be two um, two languages yes, Kazakh and Russian 
because um, there are two nationalities prevailing in our, in our country.” 
 
From the foregoing discussion it is evident that the concept of a common 
Kazakhstani culture is contested. Some participants in the study believe that there is 
a coherent and cohesive cultural group identity uniting the different ethnicities of the 
state or that one is developing. Within this group identity though there seems to be a 
recognition of continuing differences between ethnic groups in some aspects of 
cultural practice. The unifying factor then highlighted is a culture of tolerance and of 
learning about and learning from each other. However, there are a number of 
participants who express the opinion that the cultural differences between ethnic 
groups preclude any sense of a broader common identity other than a legal and civic 
one. Although present in the responses relating to the linguistic construction of a 
common national character and a common political past these competing discourses 
emerge particularly clearly when discussing everyday culture and language in 
present day Kazakhstan.  
 
5.5 The Discursive Construction of a Common Political Present and Future 
The fourth thematic content area identified as salient by Wodak and her colleagues 
was that of a common political present and future. Under this heading they included 
ideas relating to citizenship, to political achievements and virtues, and to defeats and 
crises as well as to political aims for the future.  
 
As discussed in the previous section, although many participants relate principally to 
a culturally defined national identity, this may be expressed alongside references to 
more civic aspects of the state identity and some participants deny any relevant 
cultural identity associated with membership of the state, believing that only civic 
aspects of identity exist at that level. As part of these discourses participants do 
orient to a common political present and future.  
 
Although cultural aspects of identity are most salient for many participants, it seems 
that in certain contexts at least, the boundary marking function of official citizenship 
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is highly salient with regards to membership of the Kazakhstani ingroup. This is 
highlighted by the response of one of the teachers in the Shymkent study. Ethnically 
Russian, she describes how culturally she feels at home in Kazakhstan and recounts 
how, during a visit to Russia she felt, and was identified by others as an outsider 
because she spoke Kazakh and spoke Russian with a non Russian accent as well as 
exhibiting Central Asian characteristics and ideas. Despite all this she describes 
herself as ‘a foreigner’ in Kazakhstan because she has yet to receive a passport.  
 
5:80 “I’m still a citizen of Russia and haven’t yet received a passport, I’m not a 
citizen of Kazakhstan, when I get one, then I probably will [call myself 
Kazakhstani], I’m still a foreigner.” 
 
Another participant shows by his response that for him citizenship and more emotive 
elements of national identity are integrally linked.  
 
5:81 “I was born here so it doesn’t matter what my nationality is but I’m still a 
Kazakhstani, a citizen of Kazakhstan because I love this country and I was born 
here.” 
 
As discussed above, some participants highlight the celebration of certain holidays as 
a unifying factor for the people of Kazakhstan. One respondent mentions Nauriz 
(Kazakh/ Persian New Year celebrated March 22nd), Constitution Day (August 30th), 
Republic Day (October 25th) and Independence Day (December 16th) in this context.4 
In addition to these celebrations, New Year (1st January), International Women’s Day 
(March 8th),  Kazakhstan Nations Unity Day (1st May) and Victory Day (May 9th) are 
also public holidays. This selection shows a clear emphasis on inclusive celebrations 
primarily oriented to celebrating the republic’s independence and nation-building 
efforts with only International Women’s Day and Victory Day oriented to the Soviet 
period of Kazakhstan’s history. The celebration of Nauriz was banned during Soviet 
times and having been revived since independence is now presented as an ethnically 
inclusive occasion with city sponsored celebrations giving a stage for performances 
of dances and display of clothing associated with the various ethnic groups 
represented in Kazakhstan. The designation of the existing May Day holiday as 
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Kazakhstan Nations Unity Day shows a similar determination on the part of the 
government to portray Kazakhstan as an ethnically inclusive and harmonious state. 
Thus, on these occasions the government encourages a perception of the expression 
of ethnic identity as being largely a matter of interesting national costumes, dances 
and songs rather than anything which might affect the life and governance of the 
state more meaningfully. 
 
The discourse of ethnic peace and inclusion is reflected in the responses of the 
interview participants where the achievement and preservation of inter-ethnic 
harmony is portrayed as one of the main political virtues of the state. A number of 
participants expressed pride in the fact that Kazakhstan had made the transition from 
being a part of the Soviet Union to being an independent republic without violence 
and has on the whole continued to maintain good relations between the different 
ethnic groups that make up the population and between itself and other states. 
 
5:82 “[I am proud of] our country, our unity, unity of nations of all, the friendship 
with other countries, that we don’t have war.” 
 
5:83 “[I am proud that] our reforms are peaceful, and that the many nationalities live 
peacefully.”†  
 
A number of participants also cite the introduction of democracy as a political 
achievement and virtue. Many talk about the new freedoms they enjoy as a result of 
independence and value these highly as positive aspects of their newly defined state 
identity. 
 
5:86 “I think that all people are happy, we have a democratic republic, I’m happy 
because I live in Kazakhstan.” 
 
5:87 “we have freedom of speech, freedom of everything, a person can live as he 
likes, the freedom of Kazakhstan [is the most important aspect of independence]” 
 
                                                                                                                                          
4 (SKs12Km, [10, 11: 6.50-7.10], E) 
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A number of participants talk about the virtues and achievements of the president as 
an aspect of state belonging that they value highly and which contributes to a 
positive and secure group identity in comparisons with other state leaders. Nazarbaev 
is closely associated with the transformation of Kazakhstan from Soviet state to 
independent republic and is credited with Kazakhstan’s higher economic 
achievement than its Central Asian neighbours (see chapter 7 for more on this 
theme).  
 
5:88 “I am proud of our president, OK, because he make, makes lots of things for 
people and even he, he gives… freedom for uh, people… to create their own 
business, yeah, yeah and um comparing with Uzbekistan our economy and our, how 
to say, our position is more, is better than theirs.” 
 
5:89 “We have a wonderful president and I consider that the future of Kazakhstanis 
is bright… I was very pleased… when we received independence. We don’t have a 
dictatorship like above us to dictate, we have a single man who is truly in agreement 
with the country – it’s the president who decides all questions.” 
 
This last quote is interesting in that it illustrates the popularity of the president and of 
a strong leader for the country with many of the population in that the interviewee 
sees no contradiction between his belief that Kazakhstan does not have a dictatorship 
and his assertion that Nazarbaev “decides all questions”. 
 
The relative economic prosperity of Kazakhstan in comparison with its Central Asian 
neighbours is the most commonly mentioned achievement about which participants 
are proud. The fact that Kazakhstan has come through the state of crisis which 
followed the dissolution of the USSR and has, in recent years, seen significant social 
and economic improvements is obviously of tangible benefit to its citizens. The fact 
that Kazakhstan is rich in natural resources which are now being utilised by 
Kazakhstan itself for its own benefit and that much of the population now enjoy a 
higher standard of living than many inhabitants of neighbouring states is often 




5:92 “After the collapse of the Soviet Union you can notice the big territory and due 
to the reforms made by the government we are ahead of other post-Soviet countries.” 
 
5:93 “Most of all I’m glad because [Kazakhstan] is improving, the crisis is past and 
now we’re in the time of the upturn zone. You can say most of all I’m pleased…that 
it is sovereign, first of all we are improving our economy ourselves, using our own 
resources…When it was Russia, together with the USSR it was like all resources 
were in common, they stood in for each other but now Kazakhstan must decide 
everything in only its own strength.” 
 
5:94 “Yes, er, the economics is progressing and er, we er, years by, year by year we 
got good results and it makes every Kazakh people, Kazakhstan people happy.”† 
 
Many participants also express hope for the future and state that the main objective 
for Kazakhstan is continued economic development accompanied by social and 
cultural development, particularly in the sphere of education. A number of 
respondents express their pride in the progress Kazakhstan has made in the relatively 
short time since gaining independence and their hope that this rapid development 
will continue for their own and future generations’ benefit.  
 
Wodak also includes discursive orientation to the concepts of current and future 
political problems and to crises and danger within this thematic area of national 
identity. In relation to this a number of the Shymkent participants refer to the 
problem of corruption prevalent in Kazakhstan. It is described as a source of shame 
which threatens their positive self identity. Other sources of dissatisfaction for the 
Shymkent participants include the lack of development and improvements in quality 
in the spheres of health and education, areas of society which some feel do not 
compare well with those of other countries.  
 
5:98 “Yes, some problems [make me ashamed], like education system, medical 
system, all these systems should be changed and they will be changed in some time 
so it’s, it’s difficult time for us now.”† 
  
Overall then, many of the participants in the present study talk positively about the 
political and economic achievements of Kazakhstan and of its president in the years 
since independence. Despite ongoing problems of corruption and the slow 
development of basic aspects of society there is often a sense of optimism that things 
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will continue to improve and that given continued economic stability and inter-ethnic 
harmony areas of society such as education and medical care will be developed and 
will, in time, compare favourably with those of other countries.  
 
5:102 “What you see on the television on the news, that some countries are better 
developed than us but we will reach that point in a certain time, we’ll reach it…we 
just need time.” 
 
5.6 The Discursive Construction of a ‘National Body’ 
The fifth thematic area distinguished by Wodak and her colleagues in relation to 
Austrian national identity was that of the discursive construction of a ‘national body’. 
This heading relates to discussions of the national territory, the landscape and the 
transformation of that landscape by the national community.  
 
A number of the participants in the Shymkent study referred to the territory 
belonging to Kazakhstan. For many the large size of Kazakhstan was a source of 
pride, although for a few, orienting to a comparison with the Russian Federation, the 
size of the territory was not seen as being a source of positive ingroup identification. 
Participants talking about the territory also often went on to discuss the richness of 
Kazakhstan in oil and other natural resources as a further source of pride and both of 
these aspects were often further valued as Kazakhstan’s ‘own’ now that the state is 
independent.  
 
5:103 “I’m proud that, in Kazakhstan there is oil, different metals, diamonds and that 
we’ve become a competitive country. I’m proud that our Kazakhstan produces a lot 
of raw materials for example and I’m proud that it produces these, oil products.” 
 
5:104 “Well Kazakhstan is a great country, it is a large territory equipped with useful 
raw materials and it seems to me we have a good president…it’s a good country, I 
like it, it’s very beautiful here.”† 
 
This last quote is an example of how some participants also expressed pride in the 
beauty of the physical landscape. It was noted above, in the discussion of a national 
character, that emotional attachment to the state is often perceived to be important. A 
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number of the Shymkent participants express such an emotional attachment in 
connection with an appreciation of the natural beauty of Kazakhstan.  
 
5:109 “[I am proud of] our nature, so my hobby is taking picture of nature, I have a 
lot of pictures of nature so I like our nature and I like travelling so I was in different 
places but every time when even, even I am out of Kazakhstan I sort of think it is 
interesting but when I come back, when I come back to my er, country and see other 
places so every time I am discovering new things new places… so that’s why I 
proud.” 
 
As discussed in the section dealing with a national character, for a number of 
participants there is an emotional link with Kazakhstan because of it being ‘home’ 
and several express the opinion that, as their homeland Kazakhstan has a natural and 
unquestioned claim on their loyalty and emotions.  
 
5:110 “I’m happy because I live in Kazakhstan because it’s my beloved home, my 
homeland.” 
 
5:111 “I was born here and the, the history and life of Kazakhstan is also my life and 
I can be proud of it, that I am Kazakhstani and was born in Kazakhstan and in such a 
city as Shymkent in Kazakhstan, I can be proud of it all, the climate, the territory, the 
nature.”† 
 
For some participants the bond between the land and the people is so important that 
they believe characteristics of the land and the landscape have shaped those of the 
people living there so that their identity is integrated with the land itself. This is 
particularly the case with ethnic Kazakhs who often express a sense of being rooted 
in the territory and frequently focus on the fact that many generations of their 
ancestors have lived there giving them a special connection with that geographic 
space (the theme of continuity was touched on in the previous chapter and that of the 
land shaping the character of the people is discussed further in chapter 7).  
 
5:114 “In general our Kazakhs, you can say, if you look at the steppe, it’s so vast and 
boundless and the Kazakh spirit is also expansive like that, hospitable, open.”  
 
5:115 “Um, we are sort of in the middle of Europe and Asia, not just geographically 
but in our mentality now. It’s like, and actually it’s one of the things our government 
is seeking. It’s a sort of mentality of someone who is Asian but European at the same 
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time. So I think this makes us different to other people. Yeah, we are kind of, we 
have this ancient kind of traditions of Asia, Asian you know, people, but at same 
time our present and future are more into Europe, you know, I mean, West, Western 
culture. So it’s a funny mixture, mixture of Asian and Western culture. Like in 
family at home, we are Kazakhs, but in business, in our office you know we are quite 
Western.” 
 
Although overall there is a focus on intra-national sameness and international 
difference there is also some acknowledgement of differences within Kazakhstan. 
Many participants commented on the differences between people in the north, who 
are generally more Russified, and those in the south who follow more traditional 
Kazakh lifestyles and are more Central Asian in their characters. These character 
differences too are sometimes linked to geography as the following response from a 
teacher at Miras University shows. 
 
5:116 “It depends on in what part of Kazakhstan you live, ‘cos in north they are 
colder even in their behaviour and in their sayings er in thinking so everything is a 
bit colder in north Kazakhstan. So in south they are warmer, I don’t know, maybe it’s 
from our geographical position.” 
 
Similar opinions are expressed by other participants. For example, an ethnically 
Tatar teacher at the Language Academy expresses the belief that southern Kazakhs 
are more adaptable and get on well with members of all ethnic groups whereas those 
from the north are harsher and less mutable either becoming completely Russified or 
remaining traditionally Kazakh, with no compromise between the two. 
 
5:117 “The large territory means that there’s a psychological differential amongst 
Kazakhs. Let’s say the best Kazakhs are the southern ones, they are very 
approachable, they adapt themselves well, they economic, political and cultural life 
in southern Kazakhstan, let’s say, from Zhambul, from Almaty, they are very, very 
approachable, very mobile, dynamic. As regards other Kazakhs, let’s say northern, 
western and eastern Kazakhs, they have already left the flock, they are more harsh, if 
they’ve already become Russified then they’re Russified, if they’ve remained 
Kazakhs, then they’ve remained Kazakhs. But our Kazakhs are more free, more 
mobile… The local Kazakhs also live very well with Uzbeks and also very well with 
Russians.” 
 
The theme of those in the south (where Shymkent is situated) being warmer, more 
hospitable, friendlier and more open than those in the north (and sometimes than 
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those from the former capital, Almaty) is one which occurs often in the participants’ 
discussions of possible intra-national differences and suggests the relevance of a 
regional level identity for some of the participants.  
 
5:118 “if we talk about Almaty there are people there they are, more formal, they try 
to keep the distance between each other but here it’s absolutely different.” 
 
5:119 “I think Kazakhs in south are different from Kazakhs in north. Here they are 
more like, they pay attention more at, at the culture at tradition, more traditional 
maybe yes like in south it’s the middle of Asia and all traditions are preserved, yeah 
preserved, but in the north of Kazakhstan they more like Russian because it’s border 
with Russia and yeah they work like Russian and they don’t speak Kazakh.” 
 
5:120 “In south Kazakhstan they are more polite and friendly than in north 
Kazakhstan.” 
 
In general the participants in the present study made very few references to cities in 
Kazakhstan or to architecture and the transformation of physical space. The few 
comments there were relating to these themes were those expressing pride in the 
development and construction of the new capital city of Astana (relocated from 
Almaty in 1996) and in its buildings.  
 
From the foregoing discussion it is clear that conceptions of the national body do 
play a part in discourses relating to the national identity of Kazakhstanis. Participants 
express pride in the land, its beauty and its rich resources. Some also describe a 
special bond with the land as home and there are suggestions that over time the 
geographical location and characteristics of Kazakhstan have influenced the people 
living there such that their characters reflect their place of origin. In these ways the 
respondents in the Shymkent study construct a national identity with strong 
connections to their ideas about the physical nature of the state. 
 
5.7 National Identity: Summary 
Wodak and her colleagues highlighted five thematic content areas which they 
believed to be salient in the discursive construction of an Austrian national identity. 
These were the discursive construction of a homo nationalis, of a common political 
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past, a common culture, a common political present and future and of a national 
body. The above discussion has demonstrated that discourses relating to all these 
themes are present in the interview data from Shymkent. However, although each of 
these themes is present the participants do not speak unanimously about them. The 
past experiences and differing understandings of each individual as well as differing 
exposure to and filtering of existing discourses about the topic influence the way in 
which they relate to concepts of their own national identity and their linguistic 
construction of such an identity. Thus, competing and conflicting discourses are 
evident in the interview data and it is clear that for the students and staff represented 
in this study the nature of a Kazakhstani national identity is still very much under 
negotiation.  
 
There are definite similarities between the responses given in the study of Austrian 
identity and those given in the present research. However, as Wodak rightly points 
out, the particular history of a people and state play a pivotal role in determining 
which particular events and themes will be taken up and integrated into discourses of 
national identity for that people. Thus, the fact that Kazakhstan is a newly 
independent state with a recent colonial history and an ethnically heterogeneous 
population means that discourses of national identity there differ from those of the 
Austrian participants in Wodak’s study.  
 
Despite the contested nature of a Kazakhstani identity just described, there is a 
significant measure of agreement on the part of the participants in identifying and 
articulating key aspects of their emerging group identity. There was a high level of 
convergence on group norms such as hospitality and ethnic unity, pride in the land 
and in the state’s economic and political achievements. Many also showed a 
willingness to defend the group and its values as a result of a strong emotional 
attachment to the group. There was also agreement regarding relevant outgroups as 
participants consistently described how group attributes such as Kazakhstanis’ 
hospitality, ethnic diversity and inclusiveness and economic progress were greater 
than those of their Central Asian neighbours and of Russia. 
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6 Language Roles: Individual Interviews 
6.1 Introduction 
Having explored the participants’ understanding of a Kazakhstani identity it is 
worthwhile examining further the respondents’ understanding of the roles played by 
different languages in use in Kazakhstan. This chapter explores the ways in which 
members of the Kazakhstani community perceive the use of these languages as 
contributing to the different state and ethnic identities constructed through the 
various discourses discussed in the preceding section and the association of particular 
languages with specific identities and spheres of use.  
 
6.2 Language Repertoires 
First of all it is helpful to gain an overview of the language repertoires of the 
participants1. Figure 6.1 below shows the interviewees’ responses when asked ‘What 
languages can you speak?’  
 

































































Fluent 58 77 40 13 9 5 4 2 1 1 1 0 0 0 
Some 15 1 24 5 5 9 6 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
Total 73 78 64 18 14 14 10 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 
                                                 
1 For information on changes in Shymkent residents’ repertoires since 2000 see Appendix D. 
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From this chart it is clear that whilst Kazakh and Russian predominate as would be 
expected, a large number of the participants claim to be able to speak English. It 
should be noted however, that this figure is higher than is naturally representative of 
a general student population because when requesting access to students in the 
universities I was frequently directed to interview English language students 
principally because staff wished these students to practise their language skills in the 
interview context. Despite this, the table can be read as an indication that many 
languages are heard and used in Kazakhstan and that within this context English is a 
highly popular foreign language choice.  
 
Also relevant to building up a picture of the language competencies of the 
participants is the degree of bi- and multilingualism. Of the 79 students and staff 
asked “What languages can you speak?”, only three claimed competence in just one 
language (Russian). Also of note is the fact that all except one of the participants 
who claimed to speak Kazakh also claimed to speak Russian and that one claimed to 
speak “a little Russian”. This is a reflection of the fact that the ethnic Kazakhs in the 
study are almost all bilingual in the two languages with just one Kazakh participant 
claiming not to speak Russian competently and one claiming not to speak Kazakh 
fluently. In contrast, just one of the Russian participants claims to be bilingual in 
Russian and Kazakh although a much larger number claim some knowledge of 
Kazakh. The representatives of minority groups all claim some knowledge of Kazakh 
and all claim to speak Russian. Table 6.1 below shows the percentages of each group 
who claim some knowledge of or fluency in these languages. 
 
Table 6.1: Responses to the Question ‘What languages can you speak?’: Percentages 
Speaking Russian/Kazakh by Ethnic Group 
Language Ethnic Group Fluent Kazakh Some Kazakh Fluent Russian Some Russian 
Kazakhs 98% 2% 98% 2% 
Russians 6% 56% 100% 0% 
Minority groups 58% 42% 100% 0% 
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6.3 Language of Instruction 
Students in Shymkent are, on the whole, able to choose whether to receive their 
schooling through the medium of Russian or of Kazakh (and occasionally of Uzbek 
or another minority language). The same choice applies for further education. 
Despite the fact that a much higher percentage of ethnic Russians now claim some 
knowledge of Kazakh than in previous years, none of the Russian participants in the 
present study chose Kazakh as the medium of instruction for either their school or 
university education. Approximately two thirds of the Kazakhs in the study who 
were asked about their language of schooling studied in a Kazakh medium 
environment with the remaining third learning through Russian. At university level 
however, less than 45% of the Kazakhs questioned studied through Kazakh whilst 
the rest were in Russian language classes. A large majority of the participants from 
minority ethnic groups received both their school and university education in Russian 
medium classes.  
 








Kazakh 29 19 0 0 1 2
Russian 14 24 11 12 7 8
School Uni School Uni School Uni
Kazakhs Russians Minority Group Members
 
 
6.3.1 Reasons for Choice of Language of Instruction 
The participants were also asked why they chose the medium of education they did. 
Although many respondents answered that their parents or grandparents had made 
the decision on their behalf they generally went on to articulate the reasons for their 
family’s choice. Nearly a third of the ethnic Kazakhs who answered this question 
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said that they (or their family) chose a Kazakh medium of instruction because of 
their nationality, i.e. because they are Kazakh. One student at the Kazakh Turkish 
University said that she chose a Kazakh education because she’s a (6:1) “patriot” and 
another says his decision was because he (6:2) “was born as a Kazakh.” A student at 
another university says that it is (6:3) “because my father speak in Kazakh and my 
mother speak in Kazakh, I Kazakh and I speak in Kazakh.” A few Kazakh students 
express the belief that it is a Kazakh’s duty to know his or her ethnic language well 
and that therefore all Kazakhs should go to Kazakh medium of instruction classes. A 
student at the Language Academy articulates this view. (6:4) “Any Kazakh must 
complete a Kazakh school and receive a Kazakh education.” Some Kazakhs seem to 
fear the cultural consequences of studying in Russian and worry that they will 
become Russified and lose their native Kazakh culture. Another student at the 
Language Academy explains this. 
 
6:5 “we have a stereotype that if you go to a Russian school, it means that’s it, you’ll 
forget everything, your traditions and all that and my parents didn’t want that.”† 
 
However, pragmatism also plays a role, as although he went to a Kazakh language 
school, the Language Academy student quoted above (6:4) received his university 
education through the medium of Russian as the Language Academy did not at that 
time have a Kazakh medium stream.  
 
The sense of duty towards the native language expressed above may be why some 
participants seemed defensive of the choice of Russian as a medium of instruction. A 
student at the Language Academy for example, having described how her parents 
made the decision for her to study in a Russian language class because of their own 
limitations in Russian due to their rural background, goes on to say (6:7) “and 
anyway, even if I studied in Russian group, at home I spoke Kazakh and still speak” 
thereby highlighting the fact that despite studying in Russian she has not lost her 
native language and is still very much part of the Kazakh speaking community.  
 
A smaller proportion of the Russian participants (just over 20%) said that they chose 
a Russian medium of instruction education because of their ethnicity. A more 
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commonly cited reason for Russian respondents and for minority group members 
was that they didn’t know Kazakh or didn’t know it well enough to cope with it as a 
medium of instruction. A number of Kazakhs also described lack of knowledge of 
Kazakh as a reason to reject it as a medium of instruction whilst a similar number 
rejected Russian language classes because they didn’t know that language well 
enough. An ethnically Kazakh teacher at Salem school described her experience 
growing up. 
 
6:8 “Well uh, it wasn’t actually my choice, it was the situation I was in, uh, I didn’t 
have grandparents, my parents worked both, so I had to be in a kindergarten, the 
kindergarten was only in Russian at that time, so then school of course Russian 
school because I wasn’t able to speak, I didn’t understand any Kazakh actually. And 
after school of course it’s in Russian because I, I just didn’t know any Kazakh at all.” 
 
In the present day however, Kazakh medium education is more readily available. For 
many Russian and minority group participants though the fact that the home 
language is Russian and that they do not know Kazakh rules out the possibility of 
learning in Kazakh medium classes. A Tatar student says that he went to a Russian 
language school and university 
 
6:9 “because I don’t speak Kazakh and studying in that language would have been 
very difficult.” 
 
A Russian student expresses a similar attitude, (6:10) “I had no choice, I wouldn’t 
understand in Kazakh.” However, despite stating that she ‘had no choice’ because of 
her lack of knowledge of Kazakh she has just finished describing how her younger 
sister had to learn in a Kazakh language class as there was no Russian form for her 
age group in the school she attended and how it was good that her sister was now 
fluent in both Russian and Kazakh. Several Russian speaking participants show a 
similar attitude to this, believing that studying in Kazakh is desirable and good for 
inter-ethnic communication and relations but that it is too difficult for them to do 
themselves.  
 
The conflict between what is educationally easier for the student because of their 
existing language competence and what might be desired ideologically to show 
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group loyalty which was evident in the discussion of the views of the Language 
Academy students above (6:4. 6:5) is again clear in the discussion with one of the 
newly qualified teachers who participated in the study. This respondent studied in the 
Russian group at both school and university. 
 
6:11 “I tried to study in Kazakh group but it was very difficult for me to learn terms, 
different, for example, such subjects as physics, chemistry, it was difficult for me.” 
“Do your parents normally speak Russian with you then?”  
“Before they used Russian language, then Kazakh.”  
“What made them change?”  
“Because my grandparents, they said that we shouldn’t forget about our traditions 
and customs and our language and they said that it’s wrong to use only Russian 
language because they, he said, ‘you are Kazakhs, and that’s why you should use 
your own language’.” 
 
A number of ethnic Kazakhs though, expressed a different attitude. They said that 
they chose Russian medium of instruction classes because they already spoke 
Kazakh well and wished to extend their competence in Russian because of its value 
as a language of inter-ethnic and wider communication. One student who went to a 
Kazakh language school and then changed to a Russian language group at university 
said that this was because (6:12) “now a lot of people in Kazakhstan speak Russian.” 
Similarly, a student at Miras University says, (6:13) “I know Kazakh well enough so 
I just wanted to maybe advance my Russian.” In contrast, a student at the Kazakh 
Turkish University made the reverse decision stating that his parents wanted him to 
go to a Kazakh school because (6:14) “I speak Russian freely, they wanted me to be 
able to speak Kazakh as well.”  
 
The desire to improve one’s life chances through making wise educational choices is 
expressed by a number of students who say that their choice of Russian as the 
language of instruction was driven by the perception that Russian language classes 
are still generally better resourced and of a higher educational standard than most 
Kazakh language classes.  
 
6:15 “I went to a Russian kindergarten and there was a good gymnasium which was 
in Russian and my parents said I’d get a better education.” 
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6:16 “I wanted to go to a Kazakh school but my parents said, ‘no, go to a Russian 
one, the Kazakh group won’t give such a good education.’”† 
 
This last quote again raises the question of actual support for Kazakh education. It is 
sometimes argued that Kazakh schools were forcibly closed during Soviet years in a 
move to repress the Kazakh language. However this quote supports the argument 
made by Dave that the closure of Kazakh schools was also driven by the desire on 
the part of many Kazakhs to receive a Russian language education to aid their 
chances of upward social mobility (1996: 161-162). These conflicting views of the 
Soviet past are further considered in chapter 7 in relation to the linguistic 
construction of a common political past. 
 
Finally, a number of participants said that they had basically not had a choice 
because their school or the university they wished to attend had not offered the other 
language as a medium of instruction.  
 
6:19 “if there had been a Kazakh group, I wanted to join the Kazakh group but there 
isn’t one here so I went to the Russian group.” 
 
6:20 “When I went school, in our village there are only Kazakh school yeah, and 
there everybody go, in Kazakh.”†  
 
This overview of participants’ discussions of the reasons behind their choice of 
medium of instruction shows the ongoing influence of ideology on choices where 
individuals feel a sense of obligation to learn through their ethnic language and 
thereby stay within their own culture and promote the value of the language and 
culture. These individuals equate the ethnic language with their ethnic identity. Often 
in tension with this though, is the inevitable influence of the desire to maximise life 
chances by choosing the ‘right’ institution or the language of instruction associated 
with better quality resources and teaching. For each participant in this multilingual 
educational setting there are choices to be made and these individuals’ membership 
of and commitment to the ethnic and state level groups discussed in the preceding 
chapters can be understood as the starting point for each person as he or she 
expresses the relative value placed on such identities through the language choices 
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made. As noted above these issues are explored further in chapter 7 in relation to the 
media extracts analysed.  
 
6.4 Language and Context: Kazakh and Russian  
As almost all the participants claimed to speak more than one language and usually 
spoke both Russian and Kazakh at least a little, they were also asked ‘When do you 
use Kazakh?’ The question was phrased openly in this way in order to leave 
participants free to describe the contexts they themselves associated with the use of 
Kazakh without specific domains being suggested to them.  
 
Table 6.2: Responses to the Question ‘When do you use Kazakh?’ 





All the time 5 1 1 
Always use both 5 0 2 
At home 33 0 0 
With Kazakh speakers 13 0 0 
At school / university / work 3 2 2 
In the street 1 0 0 
Depends on the person 26 1 4 
Depends on the topic 1 0 0 
To people who don’t understand Russian 1 1 2 
Occasionally to practise 1 4 3 
Never 1 1 1 
Total number of respondents 49 10 10 
NB: Some respondents offered more than one response 
 
A relatively small proportion of the Kazakh participants (just 10%) claimed to use 
Kazakh ‘all the time’ or almost all the time as their sole language of communication 
under normal circumstances and sometimes at least, this practice is ideologically 
motivated, linked with ideas about the linguistic markers of the state identity and 
appropriateness for the context.  
 
6:22 “Most of them I speak in Kazakh, if I meet a Russian I try to talk with him in 
Kazakh because he lives in Kazakhstan and needs to know this language and speak 
in it.” 
 
6:23 “If I am in Shymkent I always use Kazakh language… because everybody here 
speaks Kazakh and they know Kazakh language.” 
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For most of these participants though, whilst Kazakh is their principal language of 
communication and first choice for any interaction they are willing to accommodate 
to non-Kazakh speakers where necessary by switching to Russian, indeed the 
respondent quoted above says that he will do so when required. The practice of 
language accommodation towards even a single Russian speaker is often noted and 
described as further evidence of the Kazakh people’s welcoming and inclusive 
national character (as discussed in chapters 4 and 5) and touched on by Dave in her 
discussion of language shift in Kazakhstan (1996: 145-6).  
 
A much larger proportion of the Kazakh participants described the home as being the 
main or one of the main environments in which they used Kazakh with nearly 70% 
of those responding to this question mentioning the home or family. One pupil at 
Salem school said that he used Russian (6:24) “at school, in lessons” but Kazakh “at 
home.” Another echoes this by saying she speaks (6:25) “Russian at school, Kazakh 
at home.” The fact that the interview was carried out in the school environment 
would then be a reason why both these participants used Russian in the interview 
context. A student of the Kazakh Turkish University describes how in many contexts 
her language use varies but at home she speaks (6:26) “just Kazakh.” In these and 
many other descriptions of language use it seems that Kazakh and Russian are 
largely associated with differing contexts.  
 
6:27 “I use Russian in Academy, in the Academy with friends and sometimes in the 
street but at home I use Kazakh” 
 
6:28 “I speak Kazakh with my parents, with my friends, but in the university I speak 
Russian with my group-mates.” 
 
6:29 “Um, for example, at university actually I always use both of them because 
some friends, some my friends they… are Kazakh but actually no matter who they 
are Kazakh or Russian I speak, with some of them I speak Russian with some of 
them I speak Kazakh but if I am in my family circle of course I speak Kazakh.”† 
 
This participant seems to realise as she is speaking that whilst the home context is 
always associated with Kazakh, at university her language is determined according to 
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her interlocutor and the self-correction “but actually no matter who they are Kazakh 
or Russian…” seems to indicate that this is not purely decided along ethnic lines.  
 
Quite a few other participants also express the opinion that their language choice 
depends on the identity of their interlocutor. More than half of the Kazakhs and a 
similar proportion of minority group interviewees and a fifth of the Russians 
responding to this question stated that this was the case. The fact that less Russians 
choose their language in order to accommodate to their conversational partner is 
probably primarily a result of the fact that less Russians than members of other 
ethnic groups are confidently bilingual. Thus, despite the rise in the number of 
Russians reporting some ability to speak Kazakh it is still the case that an ethnic 
Kazakh is more likely to switch to Russian for a Russian speaker’s benefit than vice 
versa.  
 
A number of the respondents state that they primarily choose which language to 
speak according to the ethnicity of their interlocutor. 
 
6:33 “It depends. I try to Uzbek with, when I am with my relatives. I try to speak 
Russian, OK, it depends with such kind of people I communicate, he is Russian, I 
speak in Russian, if he is Kazakh I try to speak Kazakh or if he is Tatar, I try to speak 
Tatar, yeah.” 
 
6:34 “With Kazakhs in Kazakh, with Russians in Russian.”† 
 
For others, whilst ethnicity might be the starting point they acknowledge that they 
also evaluate and take into account the abilities and needs of their conversational 
partner. 
 
6:37 “If a person can speak Kazakh then I speak Kazakh, if he can’t or it’s hard for 
him then I don’t try to force him to speak Kazakh.” 
 




These comments indicate that participants’ choice of language is jointly determined 
according to their own and their interlocutor’s competencies and needs as well as 
according to context, with home and university or school being the two main 
contexts mentioned as being associated with a particular language.  
 
A number of Russian and minority group respondents mentioned that they generally 
only used Kazakh when spoken to in that language or in situations such as when on 
the bus or when shopping or even just in order to practise their language skills. 
 
6:42 “[I use] Kazakh sometimes to practise with friends, Russian all the time.” 
 
6:43 “[I use Kazakh] in shops sometimes or on the bus even if it’s only a few 
words.” 
 
6:44 “[I use Kazakh] for example when old Kazakh people ask me something in 
Kazakh.” 
 
This perhaps shows a desire on the part of these participants to recognise the changed 
status of Kazakh in Kazakhstan since independence and to show respect to users of 
that language although the growing value of Kazakh functionally may also play a 
part. This increasing need to use Kazakh is also mentioned in response to these 
questions and perhaps suggests a change in accommodation norms as Russians are 
increasingly willing or expected to accommodate to Kazakh speakers rather than the 
reverse as discussed above. A student at Miras University, when asked if he ever 
uses the little Kazakh he knows, replied 
 
6:45 “Yes, mainly in the bazaar, you need to understand the basic things. In the 
university too, what people are talking about.” 
 
Similarly, one of the teachers at Salem school describes her reason for making an 




6:46 “I was brought up Russian-speaking… my husband also on the whole lived in 
Russia, here now you need to speak Kazakh so at home we’re trying to speak Kazakh 
so that our children also speak Kazakh.” 
 
This is a clear reversal of her parents’ generation’s efforts to ensure their children 
spoke Russian, but carried out with the same aim of improving their children’s life-
chances and is thus an indication of the alteration occurring in the balance of 
linguistic capital associated with the Russian and Kazakh languages. Earlier in the 
interview this same teacher had stated that 
 
6:47 “…earlier for us it was important to know the Russian language and I was born 
in a Kazakh family… in order to have an education Russian played an important role 
and I was the first in the family to go to a Russian class and on the whole I grew up 
in a, well I had a Russian-language upbringing.” 
 
A teacher at the Language Academy also stresses the growing instrumental 
advantage of knowing Kazakh. 
 
6:48 “[I use Kazakh] for my job. I use three language here because I call and I phone 
some, if someone called me in different language and I must spoke with them in their 
language.” 
 
However, the fact that this can be problematic for Kazakhs as well as for members of 
other ethnic groups is illustrated by the comments of the one Kazakh respondent to 
say that she uses Kazakh only rarely, who states that she uses Russian even when 
addressed in Kazakh due to her embarrassment at her lack of competence in Kazakh. 
 
6:49 “Sometimes when someones ask ‘what time is it?’ I can answer, I can reply [in 
Kazakh], usually… when someone speak to me in Kazakh, usually not to be ashamed 
I answer in Russian.” 
 
This sense of shame at her own lack of proficiency in the Kazakh language reflects 
the importance revealed in chapter 4 which many Kazakhs place on knowledge of the 
ingroup language. This interviewee fears being criticised by other group members for 
making mistakes in Kazakh and so prefers an identity based on a portrayal of herself 
as a proficient Russian-speaker. The fear of Kazakh ingroup criticism as a barrier to 
use of Kazakh is discussed further in section 6.12.5. 
 181 
 
In contrast to the salience of the situation and of the interlocutor’s identity in 
determining language choice, just one of the forty-nine Kazakhs responding to these 
questions and none of the Russians or minority group members stated that their 
choice of language depended on the topic being discussed. 
 
6.4.1 Code-Switching 
Rather than defining their language choice by context or interlocutor a number of 
Kazakh and minority group participants (five out of the forty-nine Kazakhs and two 
of the ten minority group representatives who answered these questions) stated that 
they always used both languages.  
 
6:50 “In my life I use both Russian and Kazakh languages… With every people, with 
my family, my colleagues and with my friends.” 
 
6:51 “I have no thoughts when I use… just Russian or just Kazakh. Whole day, 
twenty-four hours I use bilingualism, yeah.”† 
 
The latter respondent in particular describes his own bilingualism as being so 
ingrained that he himself is not consciously aware of which language is being used. 
Other participants also emphasise the ingrained and integrated nature of their fluency 
in both languages such that they are aware that they regularly code-switch during 
spontaneous speech.  
 
6:53 “Everywhere I use Kazakh and Russian, in lesson I try to use Kazakh but the 
Russian words like eshchë, i, [more, and] are mixed.” 
 
6:54 “We are usually mix these two languages.” 
 
When asked directly about whether or not they ever mixed Russian and Kazakh in 
their speech a large majority of Kazakhs (forty-six out of the forty-nine answering 
the question) as well as a number of the minority group representatives and some 
Russians stated that they did. As many as eight of the Kazakhs said that they 
‘always’ mixed languages in conversation.  
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6:55 “Yes, always, even I think the whole family they mixed… I think um, for 
example, I mix languages because it’s really very easy to express my thoughts in 
Russian but sometimes you cannot remember the word in Russian, you remember 
only in Kazakh.” 
 
6:56 “Yes… All the time. It sounds funny. You mix them when you don’t know 
something, when you have lots of thoughts in your head and when you want to say 
something quickly and it comes out in a mixture.”† 
 
The latter two respondents attribute their code-switching to the fact that they are 
bilingual and that sometimes a word or phrase is more quickly retrieved in one 
language than in the other. This is also the reason given by the ethnically Tatar 
teacher at the Language Academy who says that he sometimes mixes languages. 
 
6:58 “Yes it happens, that kind of macaroni language happens sometimes. Because 
when you know a lot of languages yes… and the first words that come are the most 
convenient, the most beautiful in various languages yes? It’s when you know a lot 
that’s why we sometimes speak in two or three languages.” 
 
Similarly, one of the interviewees who said that he mixed languages ‘often’, stated 
that this was because, (6:59) “I’m used to the languages.” And others also attribute 
the mixing of languages to their fluency in both Kazakh and Russian. 
 
Some participants focused on the fact that being frequently in a Russian speaking 
environment has influenced their speech.  
 
6:60 “Every time. Because in our country a lot of Russian people.” 
 
6:61 “Every day, every minute… Because I first studied at, went to Russian school, 
then I went to Kazakh school and I’m half Russian, half Kazakh, I’ve got half 
Russian and half Kazakh education.” 
 
One of the teachers who said that he ‘often’ mixes languages also mentioned the 
effect of living in a Russian speaking environment and stated that this had had a 
detrimental effect on his command of Kazakh. 
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6:62 “Often, often. Because you know, I grew up in the Russian sphere, I had very 
many Russian friends, friends of Russian nationality, and then I worked in a Russian 
school, until, um, I worked in a Russian school for fifteen years, communication with 
Russians also means a lot, so for me I don’t have enough Kazakh, so sometimes it 
happens that we’re talking and, and elementary words, like I can even often lose 
prefixes or sometimes conjunctions in conversational speech.” 
 
A large majority of the Kazakhs who responded to this question either said explicitly 
that they ‘sometimes’ mixed languages or simply answered affirmatively that yes, 
they did mix languages. Some of these participants also attribute it to a lack of 
facility in or exposure to one or another language. As in the case of other participants 
above, this is sometimes attributed to the language of education being the stronger of 
the speaker’s two languages. However, mixing is also commonly ascribed to 
temporary recall problems for a word or phrase in a particular language with no 
suggestion of an overall lack of ability in that language. 
 
6:63 “Yes, sometimes it happens. When I was doing my practical in a school, I was 
teaching in Russian and there were many words I couldn’t explain to the children – I 
went to a Kazakh school, I couldn’t translate for them from Russian to Kazakh.” 
 
6:64 “So, when… I was not married I every time I thought in Russian and speak in 
Russian even when I was addressed in Kazakh language I answered in Russian… But 
after marrying, the relatives of my husband they required me to speak in Kazakh 
language and so step by step I learned Kazakh language again. And nowadays I mix 
them.” 
 
As well as showing how this participant moved from a predominantly Russian-
speaking identity to a Kazakh-speaking one this quote reveals something of the 
nature of the Kazakh group identity and the importance of the social ties and 
traditional patriarchal attitudes which inform many of the group norms. 
 
6:65 “Sometimes it turns out like that. When you can’t find the word I want, when 
you can’t express something, words just come out in both Russian and Kazakh.”† 
 
An ethnically Russian teacher also ascribes her code-switching to problems of 
memory and lack of practise in using Kazakh. 
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6:70 “Sometimes it happens. In a difficult situation when, now I don’t speak Kazakh 
often and I’ve started to forget some words and so I say those words in Russian, I 
used to know it better, now I’ve forgotten it a bit.” 
 
A Russian student also says that he mixes languages due to his limited competence in 
Kazakh. 
 
6:71 “When I speak Kazakh I don’t have enough kinds of words to express my 
thoughts and then I change to Russian.” 
 
The idea of trying to find a ‘suitable’ or ‘appropriate’ word is also often mentioned. 
This suggests that in trying to express a particular idea or discuss a certain topic 
accurately one language is occasionally viewed by the speaker as more appropriate 
(or is more often associated with that idea or topic) than the other.   
 
6:72 “Sometimes, when I can’t find the appropriate word I use Russian.” 
 
6:73 “When I can’t find suitable words.”† 
 
This explanation is also given by a Kyrgyz student. 
 
6:75 “When I can’t find a suitable word to express my mind.” 
 
It is clear from the responses discussed above that code-switching between Russian 
and Kazakh is recognised as being a common occurrence in the speech of many of 
the participants whether this is attributed to fluency in both languages or to lack of 
competence or confidence in one of the languages. In fact, just eight of the sixty-four 
interviewees who responded to this question stated that they never mixed languages.  
 
6.4.2 Beliefs about Code-Switching 
Following the discussion of whether or not interviewees mixed languages in their 
speech they were asked whether they thought such mixing was good or bad or didn’t 
matter. Of the fifty-five participants who answered this question a considerable 
number (23) stated that they didn’t think code-switching mattered.  
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6:76 “It doesn’t matter.” 
 
6:77 “I think er, I’m like neutral to this.”† 
 
Some students stress that comprehension between speaker and listener is the priority 
and that mixing languages doesn’t hinder, and in some circumstances can aid this 
and is therefore acceptable.  
 
6:79 “It doesn’t matter, it’s nothing, the main, it’s understand.” 
 
Talking of the fact that his teacher mixes languages during their lessons one students 
states that 
 
6:80 “He tries not to mix them, but mixes them… It doesn’t matter because it’s 
easier for us to understand.” 
 
When asked why the teacher ‘tried not to’ mix languages the student answered that it 
was 
 
6:81 “Because they teach us in Russian so it should be in Russian but there are some 
of us who know Kazakh so it’s to explain to them.” 
 
This comment would seem to suggest that whilst language mixing may be seen as 
generally acceptable in some circumstances it is less so in others; the medium of 
instruction is Russian and so ‘it should be in Russian’ and the teacher ‘tries not to 
mix’. Other students who stated that they didn’t think code-switching mattered also 
qualified this belief. One student argued that whilst mixing languages was currently 
acceptable it would not be so in the future. 
 
6:82 “Now it doesn’t matter but in the future I think it will have to be taken in an 
important way… separate languages, Kazakh in Kazakh.” 
 
This would seem to show that rather than genuinely believing that mixing languages 
does not matter the student sees it as being a problem to be addressed and taken 
seriously in the future. Such an attitude possibly reveals a belief in the ongoing 
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Kazakhification of the country with the Kazakh language growing in status and 
dominance and needing to be kept separate from Russian to achieve this. 
 
Another participant, a teacher, who says that her whole family mixes languages and 
that she herself thinks that (6:83) “it doesn’t matter” also describes her 
grandmother’s reaction to the family’s language mixing as being less tolerant.  
 
6:84 “My grandmother, she always says, ‘oh you should speak only whether Kazakh 
or whether Russian but only one language, don’t mix!’” 
 
The idea that languages should be kept separate is frequently expressed by many of 
the large number of participants responding to this question (thirty-one out of fifty-
five) who said that code-switching was bad. Some of these could not articulate 
further why they thought that languages should be kept separate in this way but were 
sure in their belief that this was so despite their own acknowledged habit of mixing. 
 
6:85 “If you speak Russian you should speak Russian, not Kazakh too.” 
 
6:86 “Yes, I hate it when I do it… ‘Cos I think if, if you speak Russian you’ve got 
speak Russian, if you speak Kazakh, you speak Kazakh.” 
 
For many of the participants the purity of the language is at stake and the perception 
is that mixing one language with another pollutes that language. There are 
similarities here with the discourse of language purity observed by Rajah-Carrim 
(2005), many of whose interviewees expressed the belief that the influence of other 
languages threatened the purity of ‘true’ Mauritian Creole. 
 
6:87 “No, chistota, [purity], I think the clearance [cleanness] of the language is 
important.” 
 
6:88 “[It is] bad, if you’re speaking Russian you should speak cleanly in Russian, if 
Kazakh, Kazakh. Otherwise it ends up neither here nor there.” 
 
6:89 “[it is] bad. It’s good to speak two languages, only purely in two; purely in one 
and purely in the other and not to mix them.”† 
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The discourse of purity engaged in here with repeated use of words such as ‘clean’ 
and ‘pure’ to describe ideal language use is also observable in the responses below. 
As well as the idea that mixing languages pollutes, these interviewees express the 
view that it spoils or damages the language in some way and this is linked by some to 
the well-being and standing of Kazakhstan itself in comparison with other countries. 
Ryazanova-Clarke (2006) describes this theme as being evident in the state and 
media discourse in Russia in relation to the use of Russian as the state language and 
Søvik (2007) reports on the same phenomenon in the Ukraine. The importance of the 
belief in the link between language and national identity is thus once again 
highlighted.  
 
6:91 “[It is] bad for Kazakhstan, the language must be clean.” 
 
6:92 “It’s bad I think. It will break our language. To make bad, spoil.” 
 
6:93 “[It is] bad. For example in Russia, Russian people speak in Russian… Uzbek 
people speak in Uzbek language, they don’t mix with another language and we must 
too don’t mix with another language.”† 
 
This last quote also reveals the importance to participants of comparisons with the 
outgroups consistently revealed to be relevant in the interviewees’ discourse. This 
student believes that members of other linguistic groups maintain the distinctness and 
purity of their group languages and that therefore his own ingroup must do the same 
in order to compare favourably with them.  
 
Some participants express the view that it is a matter of self-respect and respect for 
the language (and by extension the ethnic group) to speak the language purely. There 
is also the suggestion that not speaking the language ‘properly’ may cause it to be 
forgotten. 
 
6:95 “Of course it’s bad… Why? Because every I think, self-respecting person 
should speak his own language excellently, beautifully, comprehensibly and purely.” 
 
6:96 “[It is] bad because while you mixing language you forget your own language.” 
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6:97 “[It is] bad because by mixing the words it can be thought you don’t speak the 
native language.” 
 
6:98 “Oh, I think that it’s not good. I think we should respect the language and to say 
uh, pure Kazakh… the best way for us will be to have good Kazakh and good 
…Russian and not mixing them… For myself I feel that the respect to language 
requires not to mix them.”  
 
6:99 “But we try of course, to speak properly because my wife is a teacher and as a 
responsibility of friends or teachers or workers… of course we try to speak purely.”†  
 
Quote 6:99 suggests that certain people such as teachers are regarded as having a 
particular responsibility to promote the purity of the language. Similarly quote 6:97 
reveals a sense of pressure exerted from other members of the ingroup both to speak 
the language and speak it in an approved manner. ‘Proper’ use of the group language 
is thus regarded as a marker of group loyalty and as necessary to maintain the status 
of both the language and the ethnic group in comparison with relevant outgroups. 
Maintaining a positive and distinct group identity is important and linguistic 
distinctiveness is regarded as part of this process. Quote 6:98 suggests that respect 
for the language implies maintaining its purity and distinctiveness from the influence 
of other languages, a discourse also described as being prevalent in both Russia 
(Ryazanova-Clarke 2006) and Mauritius (Rajah-Carrim 2005) as noted above.  
 
It is clear from the contributions quoted above that despite their own language 
practices many of the interview participants view code-switching negatively. Ideas of 
respect for one’s native language and of the importance of maintaining language 
purity are widespread. In contrast, very few participants said that they thought 
mixing languages was a good thing. In fact only five participants expressed a 
favourable view of code-switching, and of these, several qualified this view by 
saying that they thought its effects were both good and bad. One of these, a teacher, 
states that she thinks code-switching can be helpful as an aid to comprehension for 
those who may not be confident in a particular language. The fact that she highlights 
this as a positive effect of code-switching but also thinks that it should not become a 
habit suggests that she views it as something to be used consciously and not as a part 
of usual or unconscious linguistic practice. 
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6:101 “Sometimes it’s good, sometimes bad. It’s good to translate so they 
understand, it’s bad when it becomes a habit.” 
 
One of the other teachers interviewed who also expressed a mixed attitude to the 
practice (his belief in its negative effects were quoted above as quote 6:93) also 
focuses on the way in which code-switching can help understanding and include 
people from different language backgrounds. 
 
6:102 “It has bad and good sides. Bad – for Kazakhstan, the language must be clean. 
Good when you have relationship with other nationalities these languages help you 
just to express your mind and explain what you want to say.” 
 
This quote expresses the tension between the two aspects of Kazakhstan’s identity so 
often mentioned by participants; that of Kazakhstan as first and foremost the land of 
the Kazakh people and that of a country and population who are hospitable and 
inclusive. 
 
The other positive aspect of code-switching to be mentioned by participants was that 
it helped creative expression, particularly in the context of humour. A teacher at the 
Language Academy who was quoted above in the context of reasons for code-
switching (6:58) and of teachers’ responsibility towards the language (6:99) 
highlights the way in which it enables those fluent in more than one language to 
express themselves more fully than if they used only one language. 
 
6:103 “when you know a lot of languages… and the first words that come are the 
most convenient, the most beautiful in various languages yes?… we play around with 
the languages, we joke.” 
 
Similarly, one of the students at the Language Academy focuses on humour and on 
understanding the multi-ethnic nature of the population and culture of Kazakhstan in 
which many languages are heard.  
 
6:104 “Sometimes it’s very good because we have a lot of jokes in mixture language 
and it’s better to understand sometimes the culture, the people the population.”  
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From the foregoing discussion it is apparent that whilst code-switching is largely 
perceived negatively as a phenomenon that pollutes and spoils language or shows a 
lack of respect towards one’s native language it is also recognised as a common 
occurrence in many people’s speech and as a means of creative expression for the 
large number of the population who are to some extent bilingual (see Romaine 1995: 
292 for more on attitudes to code-switching). Because of this it is unlikely that the 
majority of speakers will ever eliminate the practice from their speech, particularly in 
informal contexts.  
 
6.5 Beliefs Regarding Choice of Language of Instruction 
A further question to explore attitudes towards language choices in present day 
Kazakhstan asked participants whether the language of instruction at school or 
university chosen by a student (or their family) affects what other people think of 
that student and if so how.  
 
Nearly two thirds of the interviewees who answered this question said that they did 
not think the choice of medium of instruction affected people’s opinion of a student. 
Such participants tended to stress that it was simply a matter of personal choice and 
that students would naturally choose to study through the language in which they 
were most fluent and as such the choice would not affect what people thought. 
 
6:105 “No, it just depends on the wishes of the student, the person himself.” 
 
6:106 “No, it’s his own choice, whichever is more comfortable for him to study in.”† 
 
One of the teachers at Miras University expresses the view that whilst it is a matter 
of personal choice which group to choose there is a widespread view that Russian 
schools provide a higher quality education and that this influences people in their 
choice (a theme also discussed in chapter 8). However, there is also a frequent desire 
for children to study in their ethnic group’s language such that for Kazakhs there is 
often a degree of tension as to which medium of instruction to choose. 
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6:108 “No, I don’t think so, I think just their own opinion of what group to choose… 
I don’t know why but even Kazakh people think that it will be better to send their 
children to Russian schools. I think maybe some, some of them want their children to 
know Kazakh that’s why they want their children to study in Kazakh school. But 
when they think about knowledge they try to send their children in Russian school… 
Students in Russian groups are better, their knowledge is better and in Kazakh 
groups they are not so good as a rule.” 
 
Another of the teachers at Miras describes how many Kazakh students who go to 
school in the city are influenced by the amount of Russian spoken and encountered in 
such an urban setting and culture and become used to using that language and 
therefore often choose to study through Russian at university. 
 
6:109 “No, I think they decide for, for themselves in what group to go. It depends 
upon what school they finished, if Kazakh and then they from a village, they go to 
Kazakh group. But mostly ah, I um, see the tendency that the um, person who 
finished city school, they may go to study in Russian group. Because in schools they 
speak Russian, even in Kazakh school – city school. Maybe that is the influence of 
TV., er, everyday surrounding in the city, they go in bus maybe, their neighbours, 
they go everywhere, even in shopping, on TV., on theatre, they go, they listen the 
Russian language and they communicate between each other in Russian even in 
Kazakh school. So that is the feel from my son, he finished Kazakh school but he go 
to Russian group at the university.” 
 
The tendency for Russian to predominate in the city means that this language and 
even a Russian accent are often considered as an index of urban identity. During 
fieldwork I was told on more than one occasion of Kazakh students who came to the 
city from a village and then deliberately chose to speak Kazakh with a Russian 
accent in order to portray an urban identity.  
 
Thus, although a large number of the participants believe that the choice of language 
of instruction is basically a personal or parental one and will not affect what people 
think of a student there is a recognition from some of these that beliefs about the 
importance of the ethnic group’s language to the individual and of the value of a high 




Just over a third of the participants responding to this question said that they did 
believe that the choice of a medium of instruction affected what people thought of a 
student. Some of these participants also describe the pressure felt by some, as 
Kazakhs, to learn (or have their children learn) through the medium of their ethnic 
group language. This is expressed by several participants as being an important part 
of group loyalty, a marker of solidarity and, as with ideas about speaking the 
language ‘purely’, of respect for this marker of group belonging. The discourse of 
group loyalty emerges particularly clearly in this context with participants describing 
those who study through a medium other than the group language as being seen as 
‘abandoning’ or ‘leaving’ the group (6:110) and as ‘traitors’ (6:11) who don’t respect 
the language (6:12). This discourse thus highlights the importance of language as a 
boundary marker for groups, with an individual’s linguistic behaviour being seen as 
indicative of his or her membership or non-membership of the group.  
 
6:110 “Society yes [does judge a student according to his medium of instruction]. 
Well, for example I’ve met the situation and now it happens sometimes that for 
example if a child of Kazakh nationality studies in a Russian school they say that 
he’s abandoned, now he’ll only follow Russian, Russian language and traditions, 
he’s left us and it shouldn’t be like that, he shouldn’t forget it all, he should swap to a 
Kazakh school. His speech, he can’t even talk to us in Kazakh, he says everything in 
Russian or in a mix with Russian. And among Russians you meet it, for example, if a 
Russian is friends with Kazakhs and talks to them in Kazakh… they say ‘he’s 
Russian, why is he speaking Kazakh with them, let him speak his own language’ or 
something like that. Or if he takes an interest in their culture for example, from that 
perspective I’ve also heard Russians talk like that.” 
 
6:111“Yes. People might think bad things, question why he went to the other school, 
is a traitor.” 
 
6:112 “Yes. There can be rumours, like, ‘why does he go to another school? Why 
doesn’t he respect his language?’… the Russians also can make fun of this child, 
‘why did he come to a Russian school?’ like this.” 
 
The belief that it is a matter of group loyalty for students to learn through the ethnic 
group language seems often to be associated with the older generation. Several 
participants mentioned the fact that it was their grandparents or other relatives who 
exerted pressure in this way. 
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6:113 “My grandfather was against [me] studying in the Russian group.” 
 
6:114 “For example, my grandmother, for example she, she um, when I went to 
school she didn’t allow me to go to a Russian school.” 
 
6:115 “OK, from the first till the fifth class, oi, classes, I was in Russian group, then I 
was, I entered… Uzbek [group]… It’s because of my parents’ choice. Uh, they, they 
did it because of my relatives, they always said… ‘Oh your children are Uzbek, they 
don’t Uzb, they don’t know Uzbek’, or something like this, that’s why they had to do 
it. University – here now, this was my own choice [to study in a Russian group]… 
because I see the difference between of level of education in Uzbek groups and in 
Russian groups.” 
 
As well as feeling the pressure of group loyalty, for some the belief that Kazakh will 
be the principal language of Kazakhstan in the future is also an influential factor. 
However, the perception described above, that the best quality education is largely 
associated with Russian medium schools, is in tension with such a motivation 
towards Kazakh language education. Thus, instrumental motivations for language 
choices in education are evident in both those choosing to learn through Kazakh and 
those who choose to study through Russian. Similarly integrative motivations of 
group loyalty may by some be perceived to be in harmony with instrumental choices 
geared to maximising an individual’s life chances and by others to be in conflict with 
such a choice. In Bourdieu’s terms (1991: 230) the degree of capital associated with 
the principal two languages of Kazakhstan is under negotiation as individuals make 
important life choices based on their beliefs concerning which language will 
maximise their chances to succeed in education and consequently in employment as 
well as on the links between language and group identity.  
 
6:116 “Yes, uh, I have the, I’ve heard many parents saying they would like the 
children to be educated in Kazakh because of the future, but they realise the Kazakh 
schools are not giving the same quality of teaching as Russian schools… That’s still 
true, that’s why they make choice and they give child to a Russian school but they 
make sure that at home they speak only Kazakh. And many of our pupils of our 
school in the same situation.” 
 
As well as speaking of the tension described above, which exists between favouring 
Kazakh medium education for ideological reasons and the perception that Kazakh 
schools are not as good quality as Russian ones, a teacher at the Language Academy 
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expresses the opinion that whilst the parents may wish their children to study through 
Kazakh, many children, once exposed to a Russian speaking culture and 
environment, do not themselves want this, possibly because of the link between the 
Russian language and a modern, urban identity discussed above and between Russian 
and a wider popular culture as portrayed through Russian medium television in 
particular. 
 
6:117 “…every Kazakh wants to preserve the language. They are imposing Kazakh 
schooling on children. But the consequences of this are bad. Children don’t want to 
go there. If they’ve played and been brought up a little, in a Russian speaking 
environment, gone to kindergarten or watched television, then children don’t want to 
go. And to repeat, even if they do want to go, Kazakh schools, still at the present 
time, don’t teach the genuine culture, the genuine language, genuine knowledge. 
Kazakh schools don’t give genuine qualifications, Kazakh, at the moment. Now, 
talking objectively yes? Objectively. It’s not slandering, it’s being objective… the 
best teachers, best lecturers are not those who finished Kazakh school, the Kazakh 
department, the faculty of Kazakh language, but those who, Kazakhs who finished 
the Russian faculty, the Russian department.” 
 
A teacher at Salem school also describes the pressure for Kazakh children to be sent 
to Kazakh schools but goes on to explain her own reasons for not sending her 
children to such a school. 
 
6:118 “There is such an opinion, let’s say right now, many people are saying that 
children must learn in Kazakh schools because we’re Kazakhs etcetera, but my 
children study in a Russian school because the Russian school has three languages, 
Russian, Kazakh and English, they teach them all almost the same number of hours, 
therefore the children have the chance to know three languages. I didn’t have that 
opportunity. In Kazakh schools the Russian is almost disappearing and the children 
won’t know Russian at all and a knowledge of languages – the more languages you 
know it seems to me, the better.” 
 
A number of other interviewees also highlight the fact that knowing more than one 
language is a useful and respected skill and therefore affects the choice of school and 
of medium of instruction for an individual. Some thus choose to study through the 
medium of a language other than their home language in order to become fluent in 
that second language and thus gain both symbolic and cultural capital thereby 
increasing their employment prospects.  
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6:119 “Yes, probably. [You get] respect if you know a language.” 
 
6:120 “I think so, if I know many languages, I will receive some kind of privilege or 
respect somewhere.” 
 
It is clear from the above discussion that a significant number of the interviewees 
acknowledge a range of influences and pressures surrounding the choice of a 
medium of instruction for students. These participants express the belief that such 
choices are observed and judged by both in- and outgroup members and the 
individual and his or her family appraised accordingly.  
 
6.5.1 Possible Effects of Language of Instruction on a Student’s Character 
In order to further explore the influences and ideas surrounding the choice of a 
medium of instruction at school and university level the interviewees were asked 
whether the choice of joining one or another group had an effect on the student’s 
character as a result of learning in that linguistic and cultural environment. 
 
Around one third of the participants who responded to this question said that they 
didn’t think that the language of instruction influenced a student’s character whereas 
two thirds believed that it did. Ethnic group membership does not seem to affect the 
way interviewees answered this question as roughly one third of Kazakhs who 
responded answered negatively and two thirds affirmatively and this is similarly true 
of the Russians and minority group members answering this question. However, of 
those Kazakhs who said that the medium of instruction did not affect a student’s 
character a much higher proportion (around half) had themselves studied in Russian 
than in Kazakh (less than forty percent), with the remainder having studied in both 
language environments at one time or another. Amongst Kazakhs who did believe 
that the medium of instruction affected character the situation is reversed with just a 
quarter having themselves studied in Russian and nearly half in Kazakh with a 
significant number again having experienced both as a medium of instruction. The 
numbers and proportional differences are not sufficient to draw strong conclusions. 
However the tendency for Kazakhs who had studied in a Russian language 
environment to be more likely to state that linguistic environment of study did not 
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affect character than those who had studied through their ethnic group language may 
be a reflection of the greater need of those students to defend themselves and the 
language choices made in light of the pressures described above to learn through the 
ingroup language. 
 
Those participants who said that the language of school or university did have an 
effect on a student’s character were asked to describe in what way this was so. They 
explained that learning in a Kazakh language school would provide inculcation in the 
Kazakh character and communicative norms including deference for elders and 
respect for traditional social structures and authority patterns, and that the same was 
true of Russian language schools for Russian character, culture and norms.  
 
6:121 “Of course it affects it… I was brought up in school [in a Russian language 
class] during Soviet times to speak directly and plainly, and that’s all, black is black 
and white is white, and for us, for Kazakhs in general in their character, the national 
character is such that you should speak so that it is not offensive… they don’t speak 
straight out and it’s even pleasing to hear.” 
 
Other participants also mention this difference and a pattern emerges in the 
participants’ discourse whereby Kazakh culture is associated with being shy and 
indirect and Russian culture with openness, freedom and independence. 
 
6:122 “…children who went to Russian school they are more, they are not so shy, 
they can say something against you… they can produce their thoughts when Kazakh 
children… in Kazakh school I don’t know why, usually it’s maybe it’s our tradition, 
if you are Kazakh you should be a bit shy especially girls.” 
 
6:123 “In Russian group they are more independent than Kazakh, feel independent. 
They feel free… they can express everything.” 
 
6:124 “Yes. Yes, I think language influences into our culture of life, style of life and 
uh, understanding of life… For example, um, Russians, mm speak their parents as 
‘you’ or uh, but we um Kazakh people speak um, er, people elder than we, we speak 
polite.” 




6:125 “I think yes… it probably affects everything, character and l. Maybe, um in 
generally Kazakh people con, considered to be um… shy but uh and when you 
communicate with Russian people you maybe um, become open, I don’t know both 
in character and in everything.”† 
 
Similarly, a teacher at Salem school states that learning in the language of another 
ethnic group shows an openness towards that group’s character and culture. 
 
6:127 “Yes, it affects it. For example, if a person of Russian nationality starts to 
speak Kazakh he starts to get closer to them, he is ready to get closer to them, to their 
traditions, how they relate to this or that event, he starts to take a closer interest in 
their problems, he gets closer… It happens like that.” 
 
This is echoed by other participants. 
 
6:128 “Yes. ‘Cos for me, language uh, language is tied to a culture. So if you learn 
language you learn the culture, and does affect you.” 
 
6:129 “It affects it of course, it definitely affects it. Why do Kazakhs not want to 
send their children to Russian schools, Russian higher education, education 
institutions? Because their character might change, might alter, their character might 
take on a different complexion, a different direction and they want to preserve the 
original Kazakh character.” 
 
6:130 “You can be Russianised, get the culture, behaviour from society when you 
study.”† 
 
This discourse of the importance of maintaining cultural norms echoes the discourse 
of language purity discussed above and is also voiced by other interviewees. 
 
6:134 “Yes, you can become Russified, Kazakhified – take on the culture and 
behaviour, the mentality of the group.”† 
 
One participant highlighted the fact that taking on the culture of a different ethnic 
group can cause tensions within the family and be perceived as a rejection of the 
ingroup culture. 
 
6:136 “Yes, he can become Russified, can take something from Russian people. It’s 
bad because there can be conflict between the child and parent because for example 
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she is a Kazakh and her boy goes to the Russian school and he takes something from 
his Russian friends, from the society that’s around and it can influence his 
characteristic and that he can estimate that his nationality, his people, are wild or 
something. At home he can talk in Russian but the mother can talk in Kazakh and 
there can be misunderstandings between them.” 
 
Others also mention the perceived negative aspects of such cultural assimilation. 
 
6:137 “It can affect the character of the child. I think that in Russian schools, in 
Russian schools the childs are, become rough[er] than Kazakhs, hooligans.” 
 
6:138 “Yes. Because Russian people are not kind as Kazakh people.” 
 
In contrast, others highlight positive characteristics which can be passed on. 
 
6:139 “Yes. I constantly get used to their way of life, how they talk, how they study. 
They say Russians are broadminded, so I probably am too!” 
 
6:140 “Yes. If a person study in Russian school he or she behave as Russian people 
and they think as a Russian… They think very well of business and they can do it 
very well.” 
 
Thus, the majority of the participants expressed the belief that the language in which 
a student studied had an effect on his or her character. It is generally believed by 
these interviewees that a student will absorb the culture and communicative norms of 
the ethnic group associated with the language of instruction and this may, in some 
instances, be viewed negatively by or cause tension with other members of the ethnic 
ingroup. The tension between the desire to maintain cultural and linguistic purity and 
a recognition of the potential benefits of learning through another group’s language 
is further evidence of the tension so often observed between an identity based on 
promotion of Kazakh group norms and language and one based on an image of 
hospitality, inclusiveness and openness to the new.  
 
6.6 Language and Employment 
Another source of influence on the choices people make regarding languages in 
which they wish to be or to become competent, which was mentioned briefly above, 
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is the desire to find well-paid employment after their education. In order to explore 
the interviewees’ ideas and beliefs about this topic they were asked what language or 
languages were required in order to get a good job in contemporary Kazakhstan.  
 
Figure 6.3: Responses to the Question ‘What language(s) do you need if you want to 





































































The multilingual nature of Kazakhstani society is revealed by the fact that very few 
participants named just one language as being important in order to secure a good 
job. For example, of the 61 participants who mentioned Kazakh as being important in 
this context just 4 listed only that language and similarly, of the 47 participants 
mentioning Russian, just 1 referred only to that language, whilst only 8 of the 63 
participants who said they believed English was important singled out that language. 
In fact more than half of the participants who responded to this question said that 
they thought all three languages were important for obtaining desirable employment. 
A belief in the necessity of all three languages for Kazakhstan’s ongoing 
development is also encountered in the media discourse analysed in chapter 7 and is 
prominent in extracts of speeches given by Nazarbaev discussed in that chapter.  
 
6:142 “First of all Kazakh, then Russian, English… Kazakh, speaks for itself, this is 
Kazakhstan …many people use Russian and English is becoming one of the 
languages you need to know.” 
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6:143 “I think Kazakh but in most high-paid firms or factories they need English and 
Russian also.” 
 
6:144 “Definitely Russian, Kazakh and English, now you need them almost 
everywhere. English is mainly for computing but also for translation and for with 
foreign firms and all that, it’s needed and obviously Kazakh it’s like the people’s 
language and many documents are in Kazakh… really they’re all important, all 
important.”† 
 
These comments reveal the belief, held by many of the interviewees, that desirable, 
highly paid jobs in Kazakhstan require knowledge of both Russian and Kazakh and 
also, increasingly, of English.  
 
One of the participants quoted above mentions that English is particularly useful in 
the sphere of computing. The fact that computing skills themselves are increasingly 
associated with well regarded employment is suggested by the fact that, alongside the 
languages they considered to be important, a number of interviewees answering this 
question listed computing skills as necessary in order to get a good job. This may 
also be a reflection of one aspect of the president’s much publicised 2030 campaign 
in which he states that by that date all citizens should know Kazakh, Russian, 
English and computing, including the latter as a ‘language’ necessary for the 
country’s ongoing development. See chapter 8 for further discussion of this 
document.  
 
6:147 “Nowadays people must know English, Kazakh and Russian and computer.” 
 
6:148 “Er, it’s obligatory or mandatory you should know English and you should 
have computer skills… so if you know more languages you have more chance to get 
good job with high salary.”† 
 
The latter two quotes are further evidence of the growing prevalence of English as a 
requirement for high status employment. The need for English is particularly felt in 
industries influenced by or necessitating contact with representatives of multinational 
companies as a result of foreign investment and development in Kazakhstan. This 
association in itself contributes to the prestige and status of such a job. The 
perception that competence in English is becoming more widespread as a skill 
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demanded by prestigious employers is also shown in the fact that a greater number of 
participants cited English than Russian or even Kazakh as a requirement for getting a 
good job with 63 interviewees mentioning English in this context compared to 47 for 
Russian and 61 for Kazakh. Clearly English is far from becoming a lingua franca in 
Kazakhstan with Russian and Kazakh in far more widespread use in the workplace as 
in other spheres of life, yet the fact that so many participants stated that competence 
in English was a requirement for prestigious employment does indicate the growing 
cultural capital associated with that language.  
 
6:150 “Kazakh and English… Kazakh because you’re finding a job in Kazakhstan 
but English gives you a privilege when you’re finding a job, they will take you.” 
 
6:151 “Knowing English I think, it’s very prestigious… yes, if they see the English 
on your c.v. it will be very effective.”† 
 
From the responses discussed above it seems that many participants increasingly 
view English as the most important language of wider communication at the expense 
of the status of Russian within the country. Participants acknowledge that Russian is 
still in widespread use throughout Kazakhstan but when discussing the demands of 
prestigious employers as in the present context many describe English as having a 
higher status than Russian. In fact, where respondents mentioned two languages as 
being needed to secure a good job, the combination most frequently mentioned was 
that of Kazakh and English. This is argued to be due to the increasing level of 
Kazakhification perceived to be occurring and to the fact that English is recognised 
as a world language such that these two languages are currently seen to both be 
increasing in status at the expense of the former language of both status and wider 
communication, Russian. 
 
6:153 “Kazakh and English… Because Kazakh is the national language and English 
is a world language.” 
 
6:154 “Now, on the whole all documentation is going over to Kazakh, so you 
definitely need to know Kazakh, that’s definite, and English as well.” 
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There is some indication though that one reason for the importance attached to 
knowing Kazakh in order to get a good job is that there is still a relative lack of well-
qualified Kazakh speakers able to meet both the demands of the job itself and of the 
government’s Kazakh language documentation requirements described above. The 
student quoted above (6:154) goes on to state that (6:155) “Russian will always be at 
the bottom because everyone knows it”, which indicates that Russian is still very 
much needed for everyday communication but that its very prevalence means that it 
is not viewed as being as prestigious in terms of job requirements as fluency in 
English or even Kazakh is. A student at Miras University expresses a similar view 
with regard to Kazakh, that it is not so much necessary for workplace communication 
as for meeting stipulations regarding documentation. 
 
6:156 “Russian and Kazakh are necessary and English, English not always but you 
need Russian and Kazakh… Now if it’s a good job it’s work in government or 
somewhere like that and the state language is Kazakh, it’s important and many 
documents, all the documents are in Kazakh so you need to know it.” 
 
Other students also spoke of the ongoing importance of Russian and quote 6:157 
below echoes president Nazarbaev’s goals for language learning in the country as 
expressed in his ‘Kazakhstan 2030’ campaign (see chapter 8).  
 
6:157 “Nowadays people must know English, Kazakh and Russian and computer… I 
think Russian language because when we connected with Russia, it’s very impor, 
important uh, language in uh thirteen countries and Russian language more 
developed than for example Kazakh, Uzbek, Turk and because of I think it’s more, 
most important when you need job.” 
 
6:158 “Mostly they say that Kazakh language is… more in demand and but anyway 
when um, when you are working Russian language is more important still.” 
 
One of the teachers at the Language Academy also expresses the opinion that the 
reality of the employment situation doesn’t necessarily mach up to the government’s 
aims or to the published requirements for a particular job. 
 
6:159 “Now Russian [is the most important language for getting a good job]. At the 
moment Kazakh doesn’t have that kind of prestige. Whether you know Kazakh or 
not they’ll take you if you’re a specialist… They demand it but it isn’t extracted. In 
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what sense? Because now they take, take people on a local basis not a state one. If 
you don’t know Kazakh but if you’re related to me, will they take you? If you don’t 
know Kazakh but you have a lot of experience, will they take you? If you don’t know 
Kazakh but I recommend you, will they take you? They’ll take you. That is, that 
necessity isn’t there. It isn’t there yet.” 
 
When asked to choose just one language which they regarded to be most important 
for getting a good job at that time a number of students said that they thought 
Russian was still most important simply because it was still the language in most 
widespread use amongst the population.  
 
6:160 “Russian… Because the majority are Russian [speakers] although Kazakh is of 
course developing.” 
 
6:161 “I think Russian the most because everything is in Russian now.”† 
 
However, despite the fact that Russian is clearly still in widespread use in 
Kazakhstan, when asked to state which single language was most important for good 
employment fewer participants mentioned Russian than chose English in this context 
and the majority of respondents stated that Kazakh was the single most important 
language for getting a good job.  
 
Figure 6.4: Responses to the Question ‘Which single language is the most important 


























Once again this is largely attributed to the government’s legislative efforts on behalf 
of Kazakh and to the increasing Kazakhification of society which some perceive to 
be taking place. 
 
6:163 “Kazakh. In this country they are saying that soon Kazakh will be 
everywhere.” 
 
6:164 “Kazakh… Because business papers, documents are always in Kazakh.” 
 
6:165 “Now our government, our government prepare, prefer that the Kazakh 
language must be the main.”† 
 
6.7 Perceptions of the Relative Future Importance of Kazakh, Russian and 
English  
A large number of the participants believe that the policy of Kazakhification will 
continue and that Kazakh will be the most important language in Kazakhstan in the 
future. Interviewees were asked what they thought the relative importance of 
Kazakh, Russian and English would be within Kazakhstan in the future. Of the 62 
interviewees who responded to this question two thirds (41) said that they thought 
Kazakh would be the most important language whilst 10 respondents thought that 
Kazakh and Russian would be equally important. A number expressed the belief that 
English would become the most important language or that all three languages would 
be of equal importance but just one student thought that Russian would in future be 
the most important language in Kazakhstan.  
 
Similarly, belief in the future importance of English in Kazakhstan and the cultural 
capital associated with that language is revealed by the fact that of the 60 participants 
who responded to the question ‘Is there a language or languages you wish you knew 
better?’ 49 said that they wished to improve their English. Many explained that this 
was because of the demand for English in employment and because of its status as a 
world language or because of its use in computing and technology.  
 
6:169 “English is the most widespread language in the world, there are people 
everywhere who speak it, you can relate to people everywhere in English.” 
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6:170 “English… Because English is a widespread language and an international 
language.” 
 
6:171 “English as it’s all connected with computers and Kazakh because I live in 
Kazakhstan.”† 
 
Despite the acknowledged growth in importance of the Kazakh language in the 
country just 11 participants said that they would like to improve their knowledge of 
Kazakh. However, when asked about their language repertoire 58 of the 81 
interviewees claimed to be able to speak Kazakh and so would not think 
improvement in this language necessary. Those who did state a desire to improve 
their knowledge of Kazakh tended to explain this as a result of the increasing 
instrumental need for and status of the language and its association with the identity 
of Kazakhstan as a state. 
 
6:173 “Kazakh… Because I live in Kazakhstan, I like this language, it’s a beautiful 
language and I want to know it and to be better able to fully communicate with 
people.” 
 
6:174 “Kazakh… Well ‘cos I, I want to live in Kazakhstan… now you’ve got to 
know Kazakh, especially with me being a head of school and more and more papers 
come in Kazakh and I can’t really understand, or I go to the meetings and it’s all in 
Kazakh and I can’t really follow all that’s going on… It’s uh, to do with education 
you know our department of education, they try to do everything in Kazakh now… I 
think it’s our regional department who are quite eager on Kazakh.” 
 
The fact that almost one hundred percent of the interviewees claimed competence in 
Russian means that it is not surprising that just 4 people stated a desire to improve 
their knowledge of that language. 
 
6.8 Spheres of Language Use 
6.8.1 Business 
In order to further explore the participants’ ideas about the roles of these languages 
in contemporary Kazakhstan they were asked whether any one language was better 
than others in certain spheres of use. The first context asked about was that of 
business. Again a number of participants insisted that no single language was more 
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important in this context such that Kazakh, Russian and English were all useful for 
business. Similarly a small number of interviewees stated that a combination of two 
languages was needed (with Russian and English being the most frequently 
mentioned pair). Of those who did select one language as being better suited than 
others for the business sphere equal numbers cited Russian as being most appropriate 
as mentioned English (19 participants each), with just five interviewees saying they 
believed the Kazakh language was best for doing business. Of those who advocated 
that English was best for business the majority stated that this was because of its 
international status and due to the need to communicate with foreign countries and 
companies.  
 



































































6:175 “Now, as far as I know the international language for business is English, 
English, so for commercial affairs English is the most important.” 
 
6:176 “English is probably better than others for business. Because now it’s 
fashionable to… take different investments, investors from different countries and 
they are usually American and even if he’s German then he tries to speak English 
and it will be easier for them in this common language.” 
 
6:177 “English. It’s international and only Kazakhstan knows the Kazakh language 
and all states know English.” 
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It is likely that it is due to an acknowledgement as above of the limited scope of 
Kazakh that relatively few participants described it as being the best language for 
business. However, those students who did state this or who thought that Kazakh was 
needed alongside another language or languages usually explained that this was 
because Kazakh holds the status of being the official language of Kazakhstan and is 
thus important in the sphere of business and will continue to be so into the future.  
 
6:178 “I think Kazakh and English. Kazakh because it’s a nationality language and 
English because it is an international language.”† 
 
A similar recognition of the different roles played in Kazakhstan by the languages 
under discussion is expressed by another Language Academy student answering this 
question. 
 
6:180 “I think they are all suitable but English in that it’s connected with computers 
and Kazakh because it’s the state language so it must be used and Russian because 
almost everyone knows it. I think they are all important languages.” 
 
The argument used above that Russian is needed in the sphere of business because it 
is the most widely spoken language in the republic is the most common reason given 
for their choice by those who mentioned this language, although the fact that many 
existing documents and agreements are in Russian was also mentioned by a number 
of participants. 
 
6:181 “I think Russian is better for business now. Because in Kazakhstan people in 
business are mostly speaking Russian.” 
 
6:182 “Russian. A lot of documentation is in Russian, it’s more understandable than 
others, it’s rich. Because not all the people speak English but most speak Russian.”† 
 
As well as discussing the factors already described the student quoted above, himself 
a Kazakh speaker, states his belief that Russian is best for business because it is 
‘more understandable’ and is ‘rich’. This is probably a reference, made by other 
participants too, to the fact that Russian has a more established and developed 




An acknowledgement of the importance of a developed vocabulary for a particular 
context was also a feature of participants’ responses when questioned about the best 
language for use in the sphere of science. Once again more participants considered 
Russian to be the most suitable language for this domain than Kazakh. Of those who 
answered that one single language was better than others 20 opted for Russian 
compared with 10 who chose Kazakh whilst 8 participants thought that both Russian 
and Kazakh were equally suitable.  
 



































































One of the most frequently cited reasons given for saying that Russian was a good 
language to use in the scientific context was the fact that Russian terminology in this 
sphere is well established. 
 
6:184 “For science, um, er, they say that Russian books are um more understandable 
now to stu, er, for students. I think that the words of science termins 
[terms/terminology] is not er, developed in Kazakh.”† 
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Another reason frequently given for the perceived greater suitability of Russian in 
this context was that many more scientific publications are available and have a 
wider distribution in the Russian language than in Kazakh.  
 
6:186 “Because a lot of the publications are in Russian and they come from Russia.” 
 
6:187 “Russian, because scientific books are published in Russian.” 
 
Amongst the responses indicating that Kazakh is best for use in the scientific context 
reasons given include that Kazakh is the language of the future for Kazakhstan and 
so needs to be used and that it is right to use the language of the titular population in 
this sphere. Also mentioned is the belief that Kazakh does now possess a developed 
vocabulary for use in the scientific domain. However, these explanations are given 
by just one or two participants each and do not therefore represent a general 
consensus amongst the interviewees. See chapter 8 for more on the development of 
modern vocabulary and terminology in Kazakh.  
 
6.8.3 Law 
Participants were also asked which language they thought was best for use in the 
context of the law. In contrast with the sphere of science Kazakh was more 
frequently chosen than either Russian alone or the combination of Russian and 
Kazakh together. Of the 59 responses to this question 31 were for Kazakh alone 
compared to 14 for Russian and Kazakh together and 12 for Russian alone. Ethnic 
Kazakhs were most likely to choose Kazakh alone: nearly 60% of the Kazakhs 
answering this question opted for their ethnic language whilst about 20% chose 
Russian and 20% a combination of both languages. Perhaps surprisingly Kazakh 
alone was also the most commonly given answer amongst ethnic Russians and 
minority group members as well although a smaller proportion of these groups than 
of ethnic Kazakhs chose that language (45% and 50% respectively).  
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Kazakhs 0 8 0 0 22 8 1 
Russians 1 2 0 1 4 2 1 
Others 1 2 0 0 5 2 0 
Total 2 12 0 1 31 12 2 
 
By far the most frequently given explanation for considering Kazakh to be the best 
language for use in the sphere of law was that it is the official state language of 
Kazakhstan and it is therefore fitting that legal matters be conducted and decided in 
that language. Participants invoke notions of ‘respect’ for the state language and 
make comparisons with relevant outgroups in relation to whom it is important to 
compare favourably in order to maintain a positive state level identity. The mention 
of Russia in particular may indicate a desire to have laws in Kazakh in order to create 
difference and distance between modern Kazakhstan and Soviet and Imperial times 
and highlight Kazakhstan’s independent status. 
 
6:188 “Kazakh, because the state language is Kazakh and for the future we must 
respect it in society, use it in law.” 
 
6:189 “…every documents will be in Kazakh I hope” 
“Why do you want them all to be in Kazakh?” 
“’Cos we are Kazakhstan… maybe it will increase our patriotic feelings.” 
 
6:190 “Kazakh, because it’s Kazakhstan. In other countries legal matters are in their 
language and it’s the same for us.” 
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6:191 “Kazakh. All laws have gone across to Kazakh – we live in Kazakhstan and 
not somewhere in Russia.”† 
 
From the responses shown above it is clear that many of the participants feel that 
Kazakh should be the main language of law in Kazakhstan for ideological rather than 
instrumental reasons. Whereas in considering the spheres of business and science a 
large number of interviewees spoke about the practical advantages of using Russian, 
in this context the close association of the legal sphere with the status of the republic 
itself seems to influence the participants’ responses such that the status of Kazakh as 
the state language is considered to be a more influential factor than whether or not it 
is widely understood or has a developed legal terminology. The fact that participants 
point to the example of other countries as a model for the language of the titular 
population being the language of legal and legislative affairs is evidence of this 
influence. Similarly the Uyghur student quoted above who suggests that conducting 
legal affairs solely in the medium of Kazakh will increase people’s feelings of 
patriotism and the comments urging that the state language should be respected also 
seem to be pointing to the potential nation-building role of the language above its 
function as a means of general communication. 
 
Those interviewees who argued that Russian should be used alongside Kazakh 
tended to point to the fact that Russian is also currently recognised as an official 
language within the republic and that the Russian-speaking population needs to have 
access to legislation and legal documents in a language they understand. 
 
6.8.4 Literature  
In contrast to the legal sphere discussed above, when asked which language was the 
best for literature the most commonly given answer was that a person’s native (or 
most fluent) language was best for the enjoyment of literature and that therefore no 
one language was inherently more suited than another in this sphere.  
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6:194 “For me Russian, but for Kazakhs probably Kazakh.” 
 
6:195 “If it’s a Russian school then Russian of course. It depends on your 
education.” 
 
6:196 “For each nationality, its own language.”† 
 
However, as with the topic of law, some students do make reference to the 
importance to a country of having a body of literature in its state language. 
 
6:199 “For literature it’s better for each country to use its own language because it 
needs to be left for coming generations so that it remains in the future.” 
 
6:200 “All countries have their own language yes? And the literature must be in that 
native language.”† 
 
However, whilst the belief that literature was best in a person’s most fluent language 
was the most commonly expressed opinion, this was only marginally the case as just 
two fewer participants stated that Russian was the best language for literature. 
Moreover, a greater number of participants expressed the belief that Russian was best 
in this context than chose Kazakh.  
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Those interviewees who stated that they thought Russian was best suited for 
literature often explained that this was because of the rich and expressive nature of 
that language.  
 
6:202 “Russian, because it’s rich.” 
 
6:203 “For literature, for literature I think the most clearly expressive, the most 
fulfilling language is Russian.” 
 
6:204 “For literature, Russian is better because it has more words like that the 
vocabulary is bigger, and for literature you can express your thoughts more 
beautifully.”† 
 
The fact that more works of literature have been written in or translated into Russian 
was also mentioned by some participants and one student asserted that Kazakhstan 
still lacks an independent literary tradition and so looks to Russia in this area. 
 
6:206 “Russian. On the whole all literature is translated into Russian.” 
 
6:207 “Russian. Because Kazakhstan still isn’t fully independent…especially in 
literature it’s more dependent on Russia, Russia has the most famous writers and 
Kazakhstan uses this literature.”† 
 
Nineteen of the participants who answered this question said that they believed 
Russian was the best language for literature compared to just thirteen who said that 
Kazakh was most suited. Of those who stated that Kazakh was best for literature the 
most popular reasons given were that it is a rich, expressive language and, more 
ideologically, because it is the official language of Kazakhstan and thus is best suited 
for the literature of Kazakhstan. 
 
6:209 “Kazakh, because I read Kazakh literature and find it rich, it sounds good.” 
 
6:210 “Kazakh, for example in Kazakh you find… descriptive words. I mean to 
describe something is easier in Kazakh, we have more words.” 
 
6:211 “Kazakh. If it’s Kazakhstan, then Kazakh.”† 
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6.8.5 Poetry  
The fact that Kazakhs have a history of oral culture focussed on poetry rather than 
written prose means that it is worth considering poetry as a sphere of use distinct 
from that of literature which, as treated above, was understood by participants as 
relating primarily to prose novels. When participants were asked which language was 
best for poetry again the most popular answer was that a person’s native language 
was best (21 out of 55 answering the question) whilst 10 named both Russian and 
Kazakh as being equally good for poetry. However, of those interviewees who did 
name a particular language, 14 chose Kazakh as opposed to just 8 who chose 
Russian. Some of those who chose Kazakh stated that they did so because it was 
right that the language of poetry in Kazakhstan be Kazakh. 
 



















































































6:213 “It also needs to be Kazakh.” 
 
Stating that poetry ‘needs’ to be associated with the Kazakh language in Kazakhstan 
shows that for this participant the most important issue is the status of Kazakh rather 
than a consideration of whether Kazakh is more or less suited to expressing poetry in 
subjective terms. However, a number of participants do argue that Kazakh is by 
nature particularly suited to poetry and is more expressive than other languages. 
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6:214 “I prefer Kazakh, for me it’s better for poetry. Because Kazakh better 
describes nature and beauty.” 
 
6:215 “Kazakh too probably. People who read poetry prefer Kazakh to Russian.” 
 
6:216 “For poetry I think Kazakh. There are many beautiful words in Kazakh.” 
 
Of those who said they believed Russian was better for poetry some argued that this 
was the more naturally expressive language. However, for others it seemed to be as 
much an issue of language competence and comprehension as of aesthetics which 
influenced their choice. 
 
6:217 “Probably Russian as well for poetry. It’s a very rich language… the words 
change easily.” 
 
6:218 “Russian, I think…. For me those literary words in Kazakh are hard. I don’t 
understand.” 
 
6:219 “Russian, because I think uh, Russian, I think that Russian language more 
effective and more easy understand.” 
 
6:220 “Russian, the sounds are easier, it has rhythm, Kazakh poetry won’t have 
rhythm.”† 
 
The fact that more participants stated that Kazakh was the best language for poetry 
whereas when discussing literature considerably more chose Russian than Kazakh 
may be attributable to the oral history of Kazakh such that whereas there is no 
established canon of classic novels in Kazakh there is a long-standing history of 
poetic expression and recitation associated with the Kazakh language and culture.  
 
6.8.6 Philosophy 
The next context about which participants were asked was that of philosophy. The 
most frequently given answer to this question was that Russian was best (19 
participants), followed by the response that it depended on the individual and their 
own language repertoire (15) and then that Kazakh was best suited to this sphere 
(12), with 10 participants stating that Kazakh and Russian were equally suited to 
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discussing philosophy. Interestingly, a greater number of Kazakh participants stated 
that they thought Russian was better for philosophy than thought Kazakh was best 
(13 and 10 respectively).  
 



















































































Of those who said that Russian was best for philosophy reasons given included that 
philosophy was more comprehensible in Russian and that Russian was intrinsically 
better suited with a more developed vocabulary in this sphere and more relevant 
publications available in Russian.  
 
6:222 “In Kazakh it’s hard to explain something scientific, Russian is more used.” 
 
6:223 “Russian. Because a lot of publications and editions of foreign writers and 
philosophers are translated into Russian.” 
 
6:224 “Russian, is more understandable, has more terminology.”† 
 
Of those who stated that Kazakh was the best language for philosophy, again, the 
principal reason given is the ideological one that it is necessary for all spheres of 
communication in Kazakhstan to be associated with the Kazakh language.  
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6:226 “Philosophy in any one country should be in that language and in another 
country, in their language. [In Kazakhstan], Kazakh.” 
 
6:227 “I think for our country to develop, then Kazakh… for Kazakhstanis it would 
be better if everything were in Kazakh.” 
 
It is ironic that the student quoted above chose to state her belief in the importance of 
Kazakh using the Russian language. This, as well as the frequently expressed belief 
that Russian is more comprehensible than Kazakh, is perhaps symptomatic of a gap 
between what is believed ideologically and the competence and everyday language 
practices of many of Kazakhstan’s urban citizens for whom Russian still has a high 
instrumental value being used and encountered frequently in everyday life. 
 
6.8.7 Jokes 
Following the discussion of philosophy, interviewees were asked which language 
they thought was best suited for telling jokes. In this sphere nearly twice as many 
participants thought Russian was best than thought Kazakh was best (21 compared to 
11), with 15 participants arguing that it depended on the individual’s language 
competencies. Of those interviewees who said they believed Russian was better for 
telling jokes the most frequently given reason was simply that Russian was 
intrinsically more suited in this sphere than Kazakh although the richness of the 
language was also given as an explanation by some, as was the greater influence of 
and exposure to Russian humour on the television. 
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6:228 “Russian. Even Kazakhs… joke more in Russian… On television it’s more in 
Russian.” 
 
6:229 “Russian, because it’s better, more suitable.” 
 
6:230 “Russian, because of its richness it has a lot of appropriate words.” 
 
6:231 “Russian because we watch TV and they use Russian, for that reason it sounds 
good that the joke is in Russian.” 
 
6:232 “In Russian. Because in Kazakh it sounds very strange, not, uh, not so 
funny.”† 
 
Of those who advocated that Kazakh is better than Russian no single explanation for 
this emerges as being given more frequently than others. A few participants stated 
that they think Kazakh jokes are funnier than Russian ones or that Kazakh is simply 
better while others said that they understand Kazakh better. 
 
6:235 “Kazakh, I laugh at Kazakh jokes more often than at Russian ones.” 
 
6:236 “Kazakh, I think that I understand Kazakh jokes better than others…Not 
because of I Kazakh and I think it’s Kazakh language is better.”† 
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Thus both competence and value judgements relating to language play a part in ideas 
about language and humour as does the fact that a great deal of popular television is 
still in Russian. As discussed above in the discussion of medium of instruction this 
contributes to the perception that use of Russian indexes a modern and urban 
identity. 
 
6.8.8 Spheres of Language Use: Summary 
In the discussions relating to the language deemed most suitable in the spheres 
explored above Russian was the most frequently cited single language in five of the 
seven contexts. Kazakh was the more popular choice for use in law and in poetry. 
Overall, the reasons given by participants for their choices reveal a pattern such that 
Kazakh is most frequently chosen for its role as the state language of Kazakhstan 
deserving of prestige and status whereas Russian is most often mentioned for its 
widespread use and comprehension and for its developed and established vocabulary 
available for use in all spheres. Thus, whilst Kazakh is growing in both use in a 
greater number of spheres and in status, Russian is still widely used and appreciated 
by a majority of those interviewed and probably too of the wider population. 
 
6.9 Language Use in Education 
6.9.1 Language of Instruction 
Interviewees’ views on language use in education were further investigated. They 
were asked what language or languages they thought schools should use as the 
medium of instruction in Kazakhstan and also what other language or languages 
should be taught. When asked the first of these questions the majority of respondents 
stated that they thought that both Russian and Kazakh should continue to be on offer, 
with individual institutions or classes within a particular school or university 
choosing to teach in one or the other of these languages. As many as 52 of the 71 
interviewees answering this question expressed this opinion. This view was thus 
clearly dominant and the next most frequently expressed answer, that Kazakh should 
be the only language of instruction, was given by just 7 participants whilst 5 
participants stated that all schools should teach through both Russian and Kazakh.  
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Figure 6.12: Responses to the Question ‘What language(s) do you think schools 
should use to teach?’ 

















































































One of the most frequently given reasons for the opinion that there should be a 
choice of medium of instruction for Kazakhstani citizens is that there should be 
freedom of choice and that such choice is fitting for a free, independent and 
democratic country. 
 
6:238 “[It’s an] independent country and there should be respect for every person, 
personal choice.” 
 
6:239 “I think there must be choice… because if we build democratic and 
humanitarian society er, there always must be choice.”† 
 
Another reason given is that people should be given the opportunity to study through 
the medium of their native, that is ethnic, language. 
 
6:241 “Both, and not only Russian and Kazakh, there are schools for example 
teaching Uzbek language, Uzbek schools. I think every person must learn their own 
native language.” 
 
It is argued that all ethnic groups should be offered the opportunity to study in their 
ethnic language in order to preserve harmonious group relations in Kazakhstan. Thus 
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the belief in tolerance and in harmony between ethnic groups is once more presented 
as playing an important and valued part in the construction of a state level identity. 
 
6:242 “Both, there should be a choice. Because different ethnic groups live in 
Kazakhstan, so there are not just Russian but also Uzbek, Uighur, Arab schools in 
Kazakhstan, so if you cancelled one there would be disrespect to this nationality, to 
this people, and there might be misunderstandings among the society.” 
 
6:243 “You can’t tell people, ‘You must study in this language’. Kazakhstan is a 
multi-ethnic country so we need to preserve the traditions and languages of all 
peoples.” 
 
As well as the need for students to be able to study in their ethnic language, one 
student in particular also highlights the instrumental value of Russian and the 
importance of not losing that language. 
 
6:244 “I think it’s right [that there is a choice] because Russian language is for 
Russian people and Kazakh language is for Kazakh people, I think it’s good there is 
a choice. For example if we have only Kazakh schools we will forget about Russian 
language… We must keep our language and Russian language… We mustn’t forget 
Russian language …first of all we must know Kazakh language and second Russian 
because Russian is our international language.” 
 
When asked about whether code-switching was to be avoided or not, amongst those 
who had reservations about the acceptability of the practice, one participant 
expressed the opinion that whilst it was presently acceptable, in the future it would 
not be and the purity of languages would be insisted on. A similar, transitional view 
is expressed in the present context by several students who believe that there should 
be a choice of medium of instruction for the present and near future but that beyond 
this Kazakh should be the sole language of education. 
 
6:245 “For now it’s right [that there is a choice] but in the future it must change and 
there must be only Kazakh groups”  
“When in the future?” 
“Maybe in five or ten years.” 
 
6:246 “It’s OK now but in the future it must be only Kazakh schools – when 90% of 
Kazakhs speak Kazakh.” 
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This view is another example of the tension often encountered between ideological 
beliefs about the importance of raising the status and spread of Kazakh in 
Kazakhstan and belief in or acceptance of the instrumental value of maintaining the 
use of Russian in the republic. This friction between what might be thought to be 
desirable and what is practical is also revealed in the response to this question of one 
of the Miras University students, who seems to realise the conflicts within her own 
point of view. 
 
6:247 “It’s good that we choose ourselves, because when you force a person to do 
something he doesn’t, although we need to do everything in Kazakh so that everyone 
will know it.” 
 
The tension between an ideology of Kazakhification and one of tolerance of and 
protection for expressions of ethnic group diversity in Kazakhstan is also evident in 
government discourse and is discussed further in chapter 8.  
 
For those who said that all schools should use Kazakh the reason given was generally 
ideological. 
 
6:248 “Kazakh. Because it’s Kazakhstan.” 
 
From the participants’ responses to this question (as to a number of the questions 
discussed above dealing with the best language for various domains of use) it is clear 
that the majority of the interviewees see a continuing role for Russian within 
Kazakhstan. This is linked to the instrumental values of that language and to the 
popular conception of Kazakhstan as a harmonious multi-ethnic state with good 
intergroup relations and recognition of the language and culture of all groups resident 
in the republic.  
 
6.9.2 Other Languages Taught 
When asked what other languages should be taught within the education system a 
wide variety of languages were suggested. However, English was by far the most 
popular choice with almost every participant who responded to this question stating 
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that English should be taught in Kazakhstan’s schools (71 of 73 respondents). Other 
frequently named languages were French (37 participants) and German (26 
participants) whilst Chinese, Spanish and Turkish were also mentioned by a number 
of interviewees (15, 14 and 10 respectively). Only 2 participants expressed the view 
that the minority languages of Kazakhstan should be routinely taught as second 
languages.  
 






































































The reasons given by participants for the need to teach English, French and German 
in Kazakhstan generally related to their importance as world languages spoken in 
economically developed countries seen as investors (and employers) in Kazakhstan. 
 
6:249 “English and maybe French, they are used for communication between 
countries.” 
 
6:250 “…we understand the climate, the nature, and globalisation that the future is in 
the English language so for us English is preferable… We know that most of all 
books are in English, most of all the sciences, most of all, books are now appearing 
about economics, about politics. This is riches for us, this is wealth and we mustn’t 
ignore it, we must receive the riches.” 
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This quote demonstrates the interviewee’s understanding of the instrumental 
importance of English in particular and, in Bourdieu’s terms, of the link between 
linguistic and economic capital. 
 
Chinese was chosen by some because of the size of China, which borders 
Kazakhstan in the east, and because of its growing economic influence. 
 
6:251 “In future I think Chinese because 1 of 5 people in the world is Chinese and 
then Chinese economy… grows every day, they will affect in future to world, not to 
Kazakhstan, to world and then we are now neighbours, it’s important.” 
 
Those who said that Turkish should be learnt mentioned the cultural and linguistic 
links between Kazakhstan and Turkey. 
 
6:252 “…because we are connected to Asia… and the language is quite similar to 
Kazakh so it’s easy.” 
 
The reasons given for the foreign languages suggested as appropriate for study in 
Kazakhstan can therefore be seen to be largely instrumental in nature with the 
importance of particular languages in economics and employment and as a means of 
communication in a wider sphere being the most popular reasons given for choosing 
a language or languages. 
 
6.10 Official Language(s) in Kazakhstan  
Having discussed language use in education participants were also asked which 
language or languages they thought should be granted official status in Kazakhstan. 
The most frequently given response to this question was that both Kazakh and 
Russian should have official status, with 33 of the 72 responses to the question 
indicating this viewpoint. However, only slightly fewer participants expressed a 
belief that Kazakh alone should be granted official status (29 respondents). In 
addition to these two viewpoints a small number thought that Kazakh, Russian and 
English or that Kazakh and English should be official languages in the republic (7 
and 3 interviewees respectively). As well as the fact that a similar number of all 
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participants favoured Russian and Kazakh as both being official languages as those 
who advocated recognition of just the Kazakh language, it is interesting to note that 
similar numbers of ethnic Kazakhs supported each of these options with 19 Kazakhs 
proposing both languages be recognised and 21 just Kazakh. Also, minority group 
representatives’ responses were fairly evenly split between these two options. In 
contrast, more than twice as many ethnic Russians supported the idea of both 
languages being officially recognised as advocated just Kazakh.  
 
Figure 6.14: Responses to the Question ‘What should be the official language(s) of 






























































Kazakhs 3 19 3 0 21 0 0 
Russians 2 9 0 0 4 0 0 
Others 2 5 0 0 4 0 0 
Total 7 33 3 0 29 0 0 
 
That so many participants expressed the opinion that Kazakh alone should be granted 
official status in Kazakhstan reflects the perceived importance of a state’s official 
language or languages as an identity marking function (see Søvik 2007: 115 for a 
discussion of this issue in Ukraine). That supporting this option does not necessarily 
entail a wish to eradicate Russian from use within the republic is made clear by the 
responses discussed above concerning the importance and acceptance of Russian in 
various communicative spheres and in education. Similarly, although all the ethnic 
Kazakhs who said that only Kazakh should be an official language speak that 
language none of the Russians who expressed this view claimed fluency in it and 
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only 2 of the 4 minority group members advocating this option said that they spoke 
Kazakh. Nor is it the case that those ethnic Kazakhs who argued that both languages 
should be granted official status did so because of a lack of knowledge of the Kazakh 
language, as only 1 of the 19 Kazakhs expressing this view claimed not to speak 
Kazakh.  
 
The differing viewpoints expressed in response to this question are then, not purely 
or primarily motivated by individual language competencies or practices but by 
beliefs about the importance of a state’s official language or languages as an 
indication of its identity. Many of those advocating that just Kazakh should be 
granted official status did so on the basis that it is the language of the eponymous 
ethnic group of the republic and as such deserves recognition and protection. As part 
of this some also express a nationalising view that independent Kazakhstan should 
promote the Kazakh people and its language and culture above other ethnic groups 
and their respective languages and cultures.  
 
6:253 “Kazakh. In the country of Kazakhstan, Kazakhs are the root population.” 
 
6:254 “I think… if our state wants to reach a real government, a real independent 
government, I think only Kazakh.” 
 
6:255 “Kazakh. It’s the Kazakh state, you must know it, study it.”† 
 
These arguments are reminiscent of those relating to the belief that Kazakhstan’s 
laws should be in Kazakh. Once again the use of Kazakh is seen as being a mark of 
independence as distinct from the country’s past under the aegis of Imperial Russia 
or the Soviet Union.  
 
In contrast to the ‘Kazakh only’ view, many of those who argued that both Kazakh 
and Russian should be given official status stated that this was an important 
recognition of the multi-ethnic nature of Kazakhstan and of the fact that Russian is 
the first language of a large proportion of the republic’s citizens. A more 
instrumentally motivated stance, that Russian is important to Kazakhstan due to its 
status as an international language, was also voiced by some. This highlights the 
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recurring tension between ideologically motivated beliefs in Kazakhification and 
pragmatic recognition of the instrumental importance of Russian in so many spheres.  
 
6:257 “Kazakh and Russian, because our population is half Kazakh and there are 
another group of nations, I think we must take into consideration their rights.” 
 
6:258 “Kazakh and Russian. Because um, um, when you work with other people, … 
with Russian people, Korean people, I think you must know this [Russian] 
language.” 
 
6:259 “I think Kazakh language, of course Russian, Russian has its position, the 
language of international communication.” 
 
6.11 Language Beliefs 
In order to further explore participants’ thoughts about the three languages being 
considered they were asked what was good or what they liked about each of them. 
Although there was a wide variety of responses for each of the languages, certain 
aspects were mentioned by a relatively high number of participants.  
 
6.11.1 Kazakh  


















































































































The most frequently given response regarding Kazakh was that it is a rich and 
versatile language with 17 of the 69 participants who answered this question making 
reference to this positive aspect of the language. The next most frequently given 
response was that it is beautiful and sounds good (10 mentions). Both of these 
answers reflect an aesthetic judgement of the language. 
 
6:260 “I am proud for the language of Kazakh people, literary language is very 
beautiful. When I um, listen to Kazakh um, sayings or proverbs or literary Kazakh 
language, speech it um, I like it, because it’s very beautiful and deep language.” 
 
6:261 “Kazakh is rich and beautiful and it is the future.” 
 
6:262 “A lot of words, it has a lot of words, Kazakh language, and uh, phrases, a lot 
of proverbs, sayings… songs, a lot of songs, folk songs and many things.”† 
 
Responses such as these reveal the fact that many participants associate the Kazakh 
language principally with a cultural or creative setting. They appreciate it for its 
aesthetic value in songs and proverbs and focus on its richness and versatility for 
such purposes rather than on its value in everyday communication or in high status 
domains. However, the next most frequently given response regarding the Kazakh 
language, which is exemplified in the quote above stating that Kazakh is ‘the future’, 
is that Kazakh is the state language and as such is important within Kazakhstan. In 
contrast to those oriented to the creative value of Kazakh, these responses are 
oriented more to an ideological, status based appraisal of the language.  
 
6:264 “This is, is the language of Kazakh people, this is the state language.” 
 
6:265 “People live in Kazakhstan they should know Kazakh language. If I were the 
president I would, I would make people to know Kazakh language very well.” 
 
6:266 “Because we live in Kazakhstan and so we should know the Kazakh 
language.”† 
 
In fact the participants quoted above do not actually answer the question put to them, 
‘What is good about the Kazakh language?” so much as defend its right to being the 
most prominent language in the republic and the consequent necessity of knowing it. 
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Thus at the moment Kazakh is valued for aesthetic and for ideological reasons far 
more than for its instrumental value. However, if the ideology of Kazakhification 
becomes dominant then the instrumental value of the language will consequently 
grow and it is on this basis that many interviewees are making current choices in 
favour of learning and using Kazakh. 
 
6.11.2 Russian  
As with Kazakh, when asked what was good about the Russian language the most 
frequently given response (mentioned by 25 out of 67 participants) was that it was a 
rich language. Many made reference to the large vocabulary available in Russian. 
However, almost as many interviewees (22) referred to the value of Russian as an 
international language which is in widespread use and knowledge of which gives 
access to many resources. 
 


















































































































6:268 “Russian language… the majority of science books and literature in our 
country were in Russian and it, it just opens us the great gates of science.” 
 
6:269 “Russian language I can speak in fifteen republics, everybody knows Russian.” 
 
6:270 “Russian language and literature are very rich and sounds very beautiful and it 
is an international language.”† 
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These responses show that whilst many participants appreciate Russian for 
expressive and aesthetic reasons a similar number of interviewees focus on the 
instrumental value of the language as a means of wider communication and of access 
to cultural and educational resources in particular.  
 
6.11.3 English  
English is also valued for primarily instrumental reasons. By far the most frequent 
responses from participants when asked about this language were that it was good to 
know an international language and that knowledge of English was helpful in gaining 
employment and facilitated travel abroad. Nearly half of the 62 participants who 
responded to the question expressed the value of English in these terms. 
 































































































6:273 “If you go to another country, to abroad, for example, if you go to China, you 
don’t speak Chinese, you can speak English language, they will understand.” 
 
6:274 “Because um, now there is this many offices which need an interpreter, 
English interpreter.” 
 
6:275 “First it’s important for your career promotion, then… it’s international… all 
people in the world can speak English, rather than Russian or something like that.”† 
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As well as the belief exemplified by the quotes above in the importance of English as 
a global language and language of business and employment a relatively high 
number of participants (16 out of 62 answering this question) do also state that they 
appreciate English as a beautiful language. One participant, a teacher at the Kazakh 
Turkish University, also explains that English is popular with young people because 
of its association with American popular culture and music and as such some use of 
English has come to reference familiarity with such music and being fashionable. 
 
6:277 “…especially our young generation uses English. They mix English sometimes 
with Russian… maybe it’s they want to be more modern, more fashionable. They 
like to use, for example, English idioms, clichés.”  
“Why do you think it’s fashionable?” 
“Um, because they listen to the music and all music especially in America. They 
listen to American music, pop songs. They like American singers.” 
 
From the above discussion of what is good about the Kazakh, Russian and English 
languages it has emerged that participants value Kazakh for its association with the 
literature and culture of that ethnic group and many wish to see its status 
consolidated and value its current importance as the official state language. English 
and Russian are primarily valued as means of communication in a wider sphere and 
for the access they provide to information and employment opportunities. From the 
comments of the participant quoted above it may also be that English is associated 
with a younger generation and with Western cultural values.  
 
6.12 Speakers of Kazakh, Russian and English  
In order to further explore the associations pertaining to each of the languages being 
discussed interviewees were also asked what sort of person was most likely to speak 
Kazakh, Russian and English respectively.  
 
6.12.1 ‘What sort of person is most likely to speak Kazakh?’ 
By far the most frequently given response when asked about the Kazakh language 
was that the most likely person to speak that language is someone from a village or 
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rural area. Of the 69 interviewees who answered this question 43 gave such a 
response. The next most commonly given answer was that Kazakh was most likely to 
be spoken by an older person, with 17 interviewees giving this response. It is clear 
from such replies that despite the growing status of Kazakh many participants still 
strongly associate the language with rural life and the older generation rather than 
with speakers and domains accorded high status in contemporary Kazakhstan.  
 






People in villages 43 
Older people 17 
Nationalists/ patriots  7 
Kazakhs 5 
Young people 5 
Traditionalists 4 
Those who study in Kazakh 3 
People in the South 2 
Educated people 2 
Those who don’t want Russians to understand  1 
Those who speak Kazakh at home 1 
People in the bazaar 1 
Business people 1 
Total number of respondents 69 
NB: Some respondents offered more than one response 
 
6:278 “Old people speak Kazakh more. [People] from the village.” 
 
6:279 “Old people speak Kazakh and people who live in villages.” 
 
Many participants directly contrast this with Russian which they associate with 
residents of the city and with younger people. 
 
6:281 “Of course villagers, um elder people [speak Kazakh]... But mostly in towns 
people speak Russian.” 
 
6:282 “On the whole, elderly people [speak Kazakh].”  
“Contemporary people, young people [speak Russian].” 
 
6:283 “Old people, for example [speak Kazakh], young people, they speak Russian 
often, old people, they speak their native language.” 
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Other answers given by a number of participants describing who is most likely to 
speak Kazakh include people who are ‘nationalists’ or ‘patriots’ (7 participants), 
ethnic Kazakhs (5 participants), young people (5 mentions) and those wanting to 
maintain their traditions and who respect their native language (4 mentions).  
 
The fact that some participants associate speaking Kazakh with younger speakers 
may indicate that whilst Kazakh is currently primarily associated with older speakers 
this situation is changing. The strong association between Kazakh and village 
inhabitants may also be less stable than in the past as rural Kazakhs increasingly able 
to take advantage of the improved and protected status of the language move into 
urban areas. This situation is described by one of the teachers at the Language 
Academy. This participant describes how such Kazakhs promote greater 
distinctiveness between ethnic groups and support ethnic nationalising measures 
perceived to favour their own linguistic and ethnic group at the expense of others. 
 
6:284 “Kazakhs coming from remote areas are now filling up the city, the elite 
Kazakhs are moving to Almaty, to Astana, that is closer to the centre, now… people 
are coming here to the city from the countryside. Here we have for example those 
foreign people who lived, we say Germans have gone to Germany… Jews have gone 
to Israel, etcetera. Yes, Greeks to Greece and in their place Kazakhs have come from 
the country, from the villages, bought a flat here, bought acc, accommodation here, 
now they practically all speak in Kazakh and it is precisely their upcoming 
generation which speaks only in Kazakh and even, you know it isn’t very pleasant 
somehow, even little children go out to play in the courtyard - they also distinguish 
Kazakhs by ethnic signs- only with Kazakhs and Russians only with Russians; 
children, these little, little ones. Moreover, these children as a rule, well and also the 
adults, are not very well brought up people… but they boast ‘I’m Kazakh’ because 
our politics is like that now. And they start to put you down, ‘You’re Russian, that 
means you’re of the second order already’, you understand… but as a rule that’s 
little-educated people who behave like that but those like all the teachers who work 
here, that’s a different contingent.” 
 
This quote clearly reveals that the interviewee feels that a positive ingroup identity as 
an ethnic Russian in Kazakhstan is under threat both from the policies pursued by the 
government and from those Kazakhs whom she sees as discriminating against her 
ethnic group. However, it is also apparent that she makes a distinction between those 
Kazakhs who have moved into the city from rural areas and are poorly educated and 
 234
the established urban population amongst whom are her colleagues who are better 
educated and whom she does not see as threatening. Interestingly the use of the word 
‘foreign’ to describe minority group members such as Germans and Jews in 
Kazakhstan suggests that the discourse of integration and assimilation is not entirely 
dominant and that such peoples are viewed in some sense as being ‘other’ and 
belonging elsewhere. The suggestion that some Kazakh people now focus on ethnic 
identity and discriminate against other groups is in obvious conflict with the 
discourse expressed elsewhere that no such discrimination takes place (see for 
example quotes 4:80 and 7:14). 
 
A similar distinction is made by some of the participants who describe Kazakh 
nationalists or those wishing to preserve tradition as those most likely to speak 
Kazakh. One participant describes how he believes that some Kazakhs use their 
language as a deliberate measure to exclude outgroup members, thus clearly 
highlighting the boundary marking function of language. 
 
6:285 “Only those root nationalists here who… want to show that they are very 
proud that they are Kazakhs.” 
 
6:286 “Two types [of people speak Kazakh], those who are just observing tradition 
and those who don’t want Russians to understand them.” 
 
6.12.2 ‘Is there anyone who only knows Kazakh?’ 
In order to further explore ideas relating to speakers of Kazakh, participants were 
also asked whether they believed there was anyone who only knew Kazakh and also 
whether there was anyone who knew Russian but refused to use it and would only 
use Kazakh. In response to the first of these questions the majority responded as 
would be expected from responses to the earlier question about Kazakh speakers that 
there were people living in the villages who were only able to speak Kazakh; 53 of 
the 70 participants who answered this question gave this response while 9 said that 
some old people were only able to speak Kazakh. Just 7 respondents stated that they 
didn’t think there was anyone unable to speak Russian.  
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People in villages 53 
Older people 9 
Kazakhs 4 
Yes 2 
Young people 1 
Those who study in Kazakh 1 
Lazy people 1 
People who don’t want to learn another language 1 
Some town people 1 
Total number of respondents  70 
NB: Some respondents offered more than one response 
 
6.12.3 ‘Is there anyone who only uses Kazakh?’ 
Of the 70 participants who responded to the question asking whether there was 
anyone who refused to use Russian despite knowing it, 26 stated that they didn’t 
think there was anyone like that or that they were unaware of anyone who behaved in 
that way. Of the 41 participants who did think there were such people 13 were 
unwilling or unable to specify further what type of person acted in this way. Others 
stated that some ‘nationalists’ or ‘patriots’ choose only to speak Kazakh (14 
mentions) or that those who want to ‘maintain their language, culture and traditions’ 
do so (9 mentions). 
 





Nationalists/ patriots 14 
Yes 13 
Traditionalists 9 
Old people 4 
People in the villages 3 
People who don’t want to speak Russian 3 
Men 1 
No/ don’t know anyone like that 26 
Total number of respondents 67 
NB: Some respondents offered more than one response 
 
6:287 “Yes, those who love their language and don’t want to change it or lose it.” 
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6:288 “There are people in the cities too who know Russian and Kazakh but speak 
Kazakh on principle. Those who want people living in Kazakhstan to know Kazakh – 
patriots of their country.” 
 
6:289 “Yes there is. Usually men act like that. They are more nation, nationalist. For 
example my father recently said, he knows Russian very well, he finished a Russian 
school but sometimes… he just refuses to speak Russian with Kazakhs.” 
 
6:290 “Those who want Kazakhs who speak Russian to go over to Kazakh.”† 
 
The latter two quotes in particular reveal more of the tension between those Kazakhs 
who advocate a nationalising agenda that gives priority to the Kazakh people and 
language in Kazakhstan and those Kazakhs who are happy with high levels of 
Russification and the ongoing influence of that language and culture.  
 
6.12.4 ‘What sort of person is most likely to speak Russian?’ 
As described above, in contrast to the ongoing association of Kazakh with those from 
a rural background, Russian is commonly associated with city dwellers. This was the 
most frequently occurring answer to the question ‘What sort of person is most likely 
to speak Russian?’ with 24 of the 69 respondents mentioning it. Also, as described 
above, whereas Kazakh is often associated with older people, the next most 
frequently given category in this context is that of young people, mentioned by 14 
participants. The next most commonly given answer is that ‘everyone’ speaks 
Russian (10 mentions), adding to the impression already emerging that Russian 
remains in widespread use in contemporary Kazakhstan despite the increase in status 
and support given to Kazakh.  
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People in the city 24 
Young people 14 
Everyone 10 
Non-Kazakhs 9 
Those who study in Russian 8 
Bosses and businessmen 4 
People born in Russia 3 
Old people 3 
Well educated people 2 
Government  1 
People who work 1 
Those who don’t respect Kazakhs 1 
Russified Kazakhs 1 
People in the North 1 
Total number of respondents 69 
NB: Some respondents offered more than one response 
 
6:292 “Usually the young, students, pupils and all city dwellers [speak Russian].” 
 
6:293 “Our population speaks Russian.” 
 
6:294 “Everyone speaks it.” 
 
Other responses given by a number of participants regarding those most likely to 
speak Russian include non-Kazakhs (9 mentions), people who were educated through 
the medium of Russian (8 mentions) and bosses or businessmen (4 mentions).  
 
6:295 “On the whole people of different nationalities who live in Kazakhstan except 
for Kazakhs and the city Kazakh population on the whole also speaks Russian.” 
 
6:296 “On the whole it’s people of European nationality.” 
 
6:297 “Businessmen [speak Russian].” 
 
6:298 “Usually people who… studied at school and university in Russian.” 
 
6:299 “Er, usually they are well educated people well, and usually people who 
finished Russian school.”† 
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6.12.5  ‘Is there anyone who only uses Russian?’ 
Participants were also asked if they thought there was anyone who was able to speak 
Kazakh but refused to do so and used only Russian. Of the 60 participants who 
answered this question 16 said that they didn’t think there was anyone like this. Of 
the remaining 44, 9 simply said that yes there were people who acted in this way 
without specifying who or why while 8 respondents said that people who were 
ashamed of their poor command of Kazakh did so and the same number also 
believed that Russified Kazakhs or those who had been educated in Russian did so. 
In keeping with the association of Russian with the younger generation, 7 
participants stated that some young people refused to speak Kazakh whilst 5 said that 
Kazakhs who didn’t like their own language did so. Other answers given included 
that it was ‘city dwellers’ (4 participants), those ‘from the north’ (3 participants), or 
‘those who look down on the Kazakh language’ (3 participants) who act this way. 
 






Those ashamed of their poor Kazakh 8 
Russified Kazakhs 8 
Young people 7 
Kazakhs who don’t like their language 5 
People in cities 4 
Those who look down on the Kazakh language 3 
People in the North 3 
Women 2 
Educated people 1 
Old people 1 
No 16 
Total number of respondents 60 
NB: Some respondents offered more than one response 
 
6:301 “People who are ashamed that they don’t speak Kazakh very well.” 
 
6:302 “Many students yes, who know Kazakh well and all the same mostly 
communicate in Russian, you can say that they’re the city population and that’s 
why.” 
 
6:303 “For example, I refuse to speak Kazakh because I am afraid… I think that it’s 
grammatically awful and wrong and that’s why I don’t speak!” 
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6:304 “Yes, Russified Kazakhs.” 
 
6:305 “Not refuses but maybe it’s their way of living maybe, they used to speak 
Russian from, from school, from childhood and they continue to speak Russian… I 
have friend and her family speaks Russian and her neighbours wonder why, why 
why they speak Russian, why not Kazakh, why not? Like they studied in Russian 
school and they understand Kazakh but it’s like maybe habit yeah.” 
 
6:306 “There are those who don’t like their own Kazakh language or something… I 
don’t know [why].”† 
 
The association established above between speaking Russian and being from the city 
is perhaps one reason why some people, wishing to emphasise their urban status, 
might choose to use only Russian despite knowledge of Kazakh. As mentioned 
above, during fieldwork for this study acquaintances described a similar motivation 
as being shown by friends who deliberately spoke Kazakh with a Russian accent 
(despite the ability to speak Kazakh without such an accent) when they moved from 
the village to the city, in order to index their identity as ‘urban’. The fact that through 
its link with city life the Russian language is thus associated with modernity and 
progress means that this language carries a high degree of prestige in contradiction to 
the dominant ideology which seeks to promote Kazakh as the highest status language 
in the republic. 
 
Certain of the quotes above also further illustrate the ongoing tension between 
Kazakhs happy with the continued use of Russian in the republic and those who wish 
to see the Kazakh language dominant in all spheres. The fear felt in particular, by 
those Kazakhs whose first language is Russian, of being ridiculed because of their 
poor command of Kazakh reveals the division between these two groups of Kazakhs 
and the perception on the part of Russified Kazakhs that they are judged negatively 
by their co-ethnics. This is clearly echoed in one of the articles analysed in chapter 7. 
In the article, published in Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, entitled ‘ 	
 

’ (Kazakhstanskaya Pravda,14/05/04), the author describes his refusal to 
speak Kazakh on television because he fears that his poor (or ‘impure’, see above for 
a discussion of ideals of language purity) accent and lack of fluency will be 
commented on negatively. Later in the article he describes the negative attitude of 
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those who know the language as the biggest obstacle facing those who might 
otherwise start using the language. 
 
6:309 “Actually I did refuse and continue to refuse to appear on television in Kazakh 
since I am not fluent in that language and do not want that someone would comment 
negatively on my impure pronunciation… 
 
I… want to show that the posing of the question about how there are Kazakhs who 
don’t know their native language and don’t want to know it, is absolutely unfounded. 
It is precisely the negative attitude towards this process by those who know the 
language that constitutes the main hindrance.”2 
 
6.12.6 ‘What sort of person is most likely to speak English?’ 
As well as questions relating to Kazakh and Russian, participants were also asked 
about the use of English. When asked who was most likely to speak this language the 
most frequently given response was ‘students’ (24 mentions from 63 participants 
answering this question). The next most common responses were ‘young people’ (10 
mentions), ‘educated people’ (8 mentions), ‘those working with foreign firms or 
foreign people’ (9 mentions), ‘those who want a good job or promotion’ (5 mentions) 
and ‘businessmen’ (4 mentions). These responses reveal a strong association between 
English and employment prospects. The picture created is that young people are 
studying English in order to secure good jobs, particularly with foreign firms.  
 
                                                 
2 See Appendix E for original Russian  
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Young people 10 
Those working with foreign firms/ in contact with foreigners 9 
Educated people 8 
Those who want a good job 5 
Businessmen 4 
Teachers 3 
People in cities 3 
People who want to live abroad 2 
Scientists 1 
Those working with computers 1 
People who travel 1 
Those with relatives abroad 1 
Government 1 
People who want to be cool 1 
Total number of respondents 63 
NB: Some respondents offered more than one response 
 
6:310 “Those aiming for an education, who want to know more.” 
 
6:311 “Progressive people, young people.” 
 
6:312 “English, it’s those who work in business.” 
 
6:313 “English is popular, very popular nowadays and our school children they… go 
to the universities, to continue their education in English… they think that if they 
know English they will get good job maybe in an international organisation, maybe 
they will go abroad and will travel. Many young people want to work for example in 
America, Great Britain, Canada, Australia.” 
 
6:314 “Those who want to have a career promotion.” 
 
6: 315 “People like me, who really want to work for a major firm.” 
 
6:316 “…nowadays it’s become like very fashionable, like fashionable language, 
everybody who wants to be employed or to have a good work [speaks English].”† 
 
6.13 Language Roles: Summary 
The above discussion of the roles played by English, Russian and Kazakh in 
contemporary Kazakhstan reveals an ongoing situation of competition between 
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speakers and advocates of each of these languages for their use and status within 
various domains. Group identities are marked and group boundaries contested 
through language use and through attitudes expressed towards others and their 
language use. In this way the role and status of English, Russian and Kazakh will go 
on being negotiated through both the use and avoidance of use of each of these 
languages. 
 
Whilst many participants acknowledged the right of individuals to choose what 
language to be educated in there was also a belief in learning through the ethnic 
group language being a matter of group loyalty and respect. The opinion that 
language of instruction affected a student’s character was also frequently voiced as 
many participants believed that learning through Kazakh provided inculcation in the 
cultural values and norms associated with that ethnic group and that the same was 
true for Russian. There was also a belief in the importance of speaking a language 
‘purely’ in order to preserve the respect and status due to the language and the group 
with which it is associated. For many of the participants the identity marking 
function of Kazakh as the state language is of great importance. Speaking Kazakh 
purely was thus presented as important in relation to the status and well-being of 
Kazakhstan as a respected independent republic on the world stage. 
 
A tension emerged between those participants who focussed on a Kazakhstani 
identity centred primarily on the Kazakh language and culture and those who 
focussed more on a multi-ethnic and linguistically and culturally inclusive identity 
for the state. Thus, when asked what the state language should be and which 
language or languages should be used for instruction in schools as well as about the 
most suitable language for various domains of use, some of the interviewees stated 
that Kazakh alone should be used in all contexts in order to present a state identity 
for Kazakhstan built around the Kazakh people and also distinct from other post-
Soviet states and from its own Soviet past. Other participants though, believed that 
the Kazakhstani group norms of inter-ethnic harmony and inclusiveness should be 
expressed through the use of both Kazakh and Russian in all domains.  
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There was however, widespread agreement regarding the instrumental value of 
Russian as an internationally significant language, knowledge of which provides 
access to a wide range of resources. The fact that Russian has a developed technical 
vocabulary for a much wider range of domains than Kazakh does was also 
recognized, although it was pointed out that Kazakh is being developed in this area. 
English was also highly valued for its status as a world language and for the 
investment and employment opportunities with which it is associated. 
 
Kazakh, in contrast, was more valued for the ideological reasons described above. It 
is regarded as being the language of independence whose use and status is increasing 
and which will be the main language with which the republic is associated in the 
future. Similarly, although Russian is described as still being in everyday use in the 
workplace, participants describe an increasing instrumental value for Kazakh in that 
employers now require Kazakh speakers in order to fulfil government requirements 
concerning documentation in the state language.  
 
Despite these developments though, there is still a general association of the Kazakh 
language with rural domains and older speakers. Russian, in contrast, is seen to index 
an urban identity and has a closer association with popular culture and modernity. 
Similar associations pertain with respect to English which is also regarded as the 
language of international opportunities and economic success. 
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7 National Identity: Media Context 
7.1 Introduction 
Whilst the interview material discussed in the present study reveals the behaviour 
and attitudes of a number of individuals seeking to find their place in present day 
Kazakhstan and to position themselves according to their beliefs about their various 
identities, it is helpful to review aspects of the wider social context in which this 
occurs. The issues of identity important to individuals both affect and are affected by 
discussions of those issues within the national media. An extensive review of 
Kazakhstan’s mass media is outwith the scope of this work; however, a look at a 
portion of the contemporary press provides an instructive indication of at least some 
of the relevant discourses ongoing in the country in relation to issues of language and 
the nature and boundaries of a state identity. 
 
As was outlined previously, Wodak and her colleagues identified five areas which 
they judged to be of thematic importance in the discursive construction of national 
identity. Having used these themes - the linguistic construction of a homo nationalis, 
the linguistic construction of a common political past, of a common culture, of a 
common political present and future and of a ‘national body’ to investigate the 
interview data collected in Shymkent - they are employed again below in the analysis 
of extracts from the Kazakhstani media. 
 
Freedom of the press is guaranteed in the constitution of Kazakhstan but according to 
monitors of media freedom, private and opposition media are increasingly subject to 
intimidation, censorship and legal harassment through libel suits. Moreover, the 
health, private life and financial affairs of the president are designated as state secrets 
and the country’s criminal code prohibits insulting the honour and dignity of the 
president. In light of these factors, private and opposition media increasingly operate 
self-censorship to avoid prosecution by the state. Recent legislation passed following 
the revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan prohibits advocating or 
glorifying ‘extremism’. However, human rights activists have complained that the 
definition of ‘extremism’ is too vague and could be used against nearly any 
potentially critical group. The president and his family and close associates control 
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most printing presses and radio and television broadcasting facilities. The 
government runs the national radio and television networks and is increasingly 
moving to block access to websites deemed critical of the president or the 
government1.  
 
In order to investigate the themes of language and identity as they are presented by 
the Kazakhstani press three publications were reviewed by means of their web sites. 
These are Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, a government-backed Russian language 
publication, Ekspress-K, and Liter, both daily, private Russian language publications.  
Each of these have archives available on line and these were searched for articles 
relating to ‘Kazakh language’, ‘Russian language’, ‘English language’ and 
‘education’. The archives were searched for articles dating from January 2003 to 
December 2005. This period was chosen because it covers approximately two years 
before and one year after the recording of the interviews in Shymkent and thus 
reflects the media context relevant at the time of that fieldwork.  These searches all 
produced a very high number of articles from the archive containing the words 
searched for.  From these, a total of fifteen which seemed most relevant were 
selected from each paper. As well as containing the key words searched for, the 
chosen articles were judged to involve topics clearly relevant to the construction of a 
national identity or identities, such as the use of language in official administration, 
access to and resources for education in various languages, linguistic and cultural 
events deemed worth reporting and attitudes towards the various languages spoken in 
Kazakhstan and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The search 
revealed a large number of articles dealing with the ‘problem’ of expanding the range 
of use of Kazakh and with the need for better educational resources, as well as many 
reports covering the speeches and activities of the president. These preoccupations 
are reflected accordingly in the relatively high proportion of articles selected which 
deal with these topics.  
 
                                                 
1 Source: Freedom of the Press Kazakhstan profile compiled by Freedom House, 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=251&country=6990&year=2006  
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7.2 The Discursive Construction of a Homo Nationalis 
In the examination of interviewees’ responses pertaining to the linguistic 
construction of a national character and description of the nature of national 
belonging the fact that numerous participants made reference to an emotional 
attachment and involvement in the nation was discussed. Such references are much 
less common in the newspaper material, being less personal in nature. However, 
where quotes or descriptions of public speeches are given there are some expressions 
revealing an emotional element to national belonging.  
 
This is most evident in the transcript (published as a Russian translation of the 
Kazakh original) in Kazakhstanskaya Pravda of a speech given by Nazarbaev at the 
opening of an architectural-memorial complex constructed in honour of Makhambet 
Utemisov (1803-1846), a Kazakh poet and political activist who helped lead a 
rebellion against the rule of the Khan of the Inner Horde and against Russian 
colonialism. That Nazarbaev chose to make this speech in Kazakh is, in itself, an 
endorsement of an ideology of Kazakhification and of the status of Kazakh as the 
official state language. However, the president would also be fully aware that any 
such speech would be translated to appear in the Russian language press for the 
benefit of the large Russian-speaking population in the country. For many citizens 
the Russian version of such a speech is the only one accessible and as such it 
contributes to and helps to constitute the discursive environment in which a large part 
of the population live and operate. Nazarbaev celebrates Makhambet along with his 
military partner Isatay Taymanuly, describing them as “two heroes” (“ ”) 
who “roused the people against the yoke of colonialism”2 and who are “an example 
of genuine love for their native land, for the people and for the mother country. Both 
of them are true patriots”3 (Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, 	
  
 
 , 16/09/2003). 
 
                                                 
2 “      ” 
3 “   
     
,    .   — 
 .” 
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In this extract Nazarbaev uses emotive language to commend the ‘two heroes’ and 
their passion for their homeland. Throughout the speech Nazarbaev eulogises 
Makhambet in particular for his poetic and military achievements.  Moreover, 
Nazarbaev makes Makhambet a more ‘appropriate’ figure of national admiration by 
stating that he believes the assertion that Makhambet and Isatay fought against 
Zhangir-Kerey Khan of the Inner Horde is a “mistaken opinion”, (“ 

”), and that the movement was actually a “national uprising directed against 
colonialism”4. In this way Nazarbaev appropriates Makhambet as a national figure 
suitable to represent and inspire the citizens of a modern day newly independent 
political state5.  
 
Further to this Nazarbaev blends the character of Makhambet as a symbol of ethnic 
Kazakh heroism with a wider conception of him as a hero for a contemporary, multi-
ethnic Kazakhstani state. In this way the qualities associated with a specifically 
Kazakh figure are given pre-eminence in the president’s call to patriotism and 
national pride. Thus Makhambet is described as being a “son of the Steppe for whom 
Freedom was a ‘religion’ and way of being”6 and “the last Steppe philosopher”7. 
Nazarbaev describes his “uniqueness” as being predetermined by his “roots in the 
heart of the ancient culture of the Steppe”8. Later it is said that he was searching for 
“the good and the unity of his people”9 and that he didn’t “give in to difficulties” but 
continuously “defended the common interest”10. Nazarbaev declares that such 
principles can become “golden rules to be followed by every citizen and patriot”11. 
 
                                                 
4 “   








5 Nazarbaev thus uses this speech to describe his conception of a Kazakhstani national identity and it is therefore 
highly relevant to the theme of the present chapter and is quoted extensively.  
6 “ ",   "  “”  
 ” 
7 “  ##” 
8 “    
     "”   
9 “      ” 
10 “   
, 
 #
   ” 
11 “





Similarly, Nazarbaev focuses on the “multifaceted”, (“
”) history and 
culture of the Kazakhs and lists the virtues of “knights of the steppe”, (“ 
$”) such as Makhambet who combined many talents in themselves.12 This 
focus on appropriate heroes is in marked contrast to the absence of references to 
national heroes in the discourses of individuals discussed in chapter 5 and is thus 
evidence of the way in which individuals are not merely passive recipients of official 
discourse but may reinterpret and reject aspects of it. 
 
The elevated tone of this speech is one of emotions excited by and connected to 
national belonging. Nazarbaev’s description of the hero’s focus on “unity” 
(“”) and the defence of the “common interest” (“ ”) as 
something to be copied reveals his desire that such activities be ongoing today in 
favour of the new Kazakhstani identity currently being defined. Nazarbaev thus 
seeks to selectively present and interpret history and this historical figure in 
particular in order to promote the identity and group values he desires to see 
established. Nazarbaev talks of the ‘national spirit’ and again uses Makhambet as an 
ideal example such that the national spirit of Kazakhstan is naturally embodied by a 
Kazakh national hero whilst at the same time the impression of ethnic inclusiveness 
is given in order to be relevant and acceptable today. Nazarbaev talks very definitely 
of ethnic Kazakh values and aspects of identity as inspiration for a wider, more 
inclusive citizenship, claiming Kazakh virtues as of universal worth and value such 
that a Kazakh identity and Kazakh spirit are seen to be central to a Kazakhstani 
identity and spirit. In particular he describes the work of various Kazakh heroes as 
being “an inexhaustible mine of folk wisdom, an inextinguishable life-giving spring 
for the national spirit”.13† 
 
Highlighting typically Kazakh characteristics as central to a Kazakhstani identity is 
an approach that is in some measure reflected in the responses of some of the 
                                                 













interviewees in the Shymkent study. Many respondents spoke of the traditions of 
friendliness and hospitality which are seen to have originated in Kazakh culture but 
to have been assimilated by all the peoples together in Kazakhstan. The language 
used by Nazarbaev in his speech is spiritual in vocabulary when he speaks of the 
“religion” of freedom and of the state’s prerequisites for true patriotism as quoted 
above and is also quite abstract when he speaks of the “national spirit”. However, the 
corresponding ideas as reflected in the discourse of the interviewees tend to be far 
more prosaic and concrete. Participants simply describe themselves as “proud” that 
Kazakhstan is independent and economically relatively prosperous and orient to the 
more definite traits of hospitality, acceptance and friendliness when discussing 
national traits.  
 
Amongst the newspaper articles collected the only other references to a discourse of 
national uniqueness are also found in accounts of speeches given by Nazarbaev. One 
reference to the “uniqueness of our state”14 comes in a call by Nazarbaev for the 
production of a good quality history of modern Kazakhstan for school use in which 
he states that such a book is necessary to demonstrate the uniqueness of the state and 
the value of “international and inter-confessional accord”15 (Kazakhstanskaya 
Pravda,   —  , 13/10/2004).† 
 
In this context, it may be argued that what is most valued is distinctiveness from the 
voice of the Soviet past or of contemporary Russia such that Nazarbaev is able to 
establish a suitable historical identity for Kazakhstan and ensure that such an identity 
is positively distinct from relevant others such as Russia or the other states of Central 
Asia.  
 
The other article dealing with national distinctiveness also relates to education, as the 
president explains that whilst currently there is a drive to fund scholarships for 
Kazakhstani students to study abroad, in time he hopes that an internationally 
respected quality education will be available in Kazakhstan because “receiving 
                                                 





knowledge abroad won’t always do as we have slightly different conditions and 
mentality”16 (Ekspress-K, %
  
$, 31/10/2003).   
 
Thus it would seem that a sense of national uniqueness is an important theme for the 
president as he seeks to shape an emerging state identity. In contrast, the other 
articles selected do not focus on a sense of a national mentality in the terms used by 
Nazarbaev. Many of them do, however, focus on the importance of the Kazakh 
language as a vital part of the life of the new state and its people. In writing about 
this topic the authors of many of the articles insist on the centrality and pre-eminence 
of the Kazakh language in the linguistic practice and identity of independent 
Kazakhstan, much as Nazarbaev insists on the centrality of Kazakhs in determining a 
Kazakhstani national identity.  
 
In the first paragraph of one of the articles from Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, written by 
a representative of the Kazakh language society Kazak Tili (Kazak Tili means 
‘Kazakh language’), the view is expressed that 
 
7:5 “Through all the centuries our native language has been for Kazakhs a lifting, 
mobilising force. ‘The language of our fathers is a holy legacy’ wrote our great 
compatriot Magzhan Zhumbaev. I am sure that all the more so in our new, sovereign 
state such an understanding of the significance of the Kazakh language, fills the 
hearts not only of poets but of all citizens of Kazakhstan.”  
(Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, & $ —  , 27/09/05)17. 
 
Thus, here too, a Kazakh poet and the Kazakh language are pointed out as being at 
the heart of understanding independent Kazakhstan’s identity. As in Nazarbaev’s 
speech at the opening of the architectural-memorial complex discussed above, the 
language used elevates something everyday – the Kazakh language – to a semi-
religious status, “a holy legacy” whose significance “fills the hearts… of all citizens 
of Kazakhstan”.  
 
                                                 
16 “
   
    ,   
    

” 
17 See Appendix E for Russian original of quotes 
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Similar dramatic and ennobling language is used in another of the articles taken from 
Kazakhstanskaya Pravda. Writing about the Kazakh language, the author states that 
 
7:6 “Its status is very high. It is the most important of the state symbols. Where there 
is a language there is a people. Where there are no speakers of a language – then 
there is no people.”   
(Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, ' ,  ? 13/12/2003).  
 
The idea expressed above, that the language is spiritually vital to the people, is 
echoed in later articles from the same paper. In the first of these a representative of 
the committee for languages is interviewed about efforts to raise the status of 
Kazakh. The representative interviewed praises the work of the Kazakh language 
organisation Kazak Tili, saying that the society’s publication Ana Tili had reported on 
“the spiritual resurrection of the nation”18 (Kazakhstanskaya Pravda,  
 
 , 20/03/05). A second article makes comments of a similar nature. 
 
7:7 “Language – is a cultural treasure, the spirit of the people, therefore every 
Kazakhstani is obliged to know the state language.”  
(Kazakhstanskaya Pravda,   , 02/07/05). 
 
Here once more the particular language of the Kazakhs, associated with their culture, 
is declared to be of spiritual import for all citizens. An article from the same paper 
the following month (Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, " 
 
, 
02/08/2005) cites the constitution and links knowledge of the state language with the 
development of Kazakhstan as an independent state.† 
 
However, despite the fact that many articles, especially those from Kazakhstanskaya 
Pravda, do focus on the development of Kazakh language and culture above those of 
other ethnic groups represented in Kazakhstan, there are also references to the 
protection given by the constitution to other languages and to the freedom in 
independent Kazakhstan for a variety of languages and cultures to co-exist. In an 
interview with Kobeem Khusa(yn, the director of a language institute, reported in 
Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, the academic being questioned states his belief that 
                                                 
18 “ 
  $.” 
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7:9 “In recent years many changes have occurred in relation to the state language and 
its introduction, but the main thing is that the psychology of the citizens of 
Kazakhstan has changed regardless of their national [i.e. ethnic] belonging. The 
overwhelming majority understand that the independence of the state determines 
independent development not only economically and politically but also the 
successful development of the culture both of Kazakhs and of representatives of 
other ethnic groups living in the republic.” (Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, ) 
 – , 
, , 16/12/2003). 
 
In this quote the fact that ‘Kazakhs’ are listed before and separately from ‘other 
ethnic groups’ implicitly marks the Kazakhs out as the primary culture setters and 
reference group within the state compared to all the ‘others’. However, this is held in 
tension with the explicitly expressed view that all cultures are to be given room to 
develop, a perspective reminiscent of comments made by the Shymkent interviewees 
in relation to a national character. As stated above, many of the interview participants 
cited hospitality and friendliness as typical Kazakhstani characteristics, resulting in 
an identity for Kazakhstan as a place of tolerance and inter-ethnic harmony with all 
ethnic groups being allowed to develop and express their culture. This is a source of 
positive ingroup identity and pride for a number of the interviewees, something also 
expressed quite clearly in certain of the newspaper extracts. In an article for 
Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, one author writes that 
 
7:10 “Our multi-ethnic country is rightly proud of the fact that in the most difficult 
years of the formation of statehood, Kazakhstan was able to preserve inter-ethnic 
accord, showing a world torn apart by ethnic wars a stunning example. We should 
have enough wisdom to get even further without mistakes, escaping the national self-
love of one or another ethnic group, which, together with the others, composes the 
unified whole under the name ‘people of Kazakhstan’.”  
(Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, *   , 25/03/2004).  
 
The newspaper article from which this is drawn consists of a collection of reports 
from the various administrative regions on the progress of plans to raise the status of 
Kazakh throughout the country, principally through its introduction in the sphere of 
regional administration. In his report about the Kyzylorda region, one contributor 
admits that the introduction of Kazakh to new spheres of use may be a source of 
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“discomfort” (“
#”) for Russian speakers but asserts that Russian speakers 
in Kyzylorda live well and that there are 
 
7:11 “absolutely no inter-ethnic or linguistic barriers to inter-relationships, the 
traditions of neighbourly relations and inter-ethnic accord are alive and well.” 
(Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, *   , 25/03/2004).  
 
It is clear then that the discourse of pride in inter-ethnic harmony as a distinguishing 
feature of Kazakhstani society evident in the responses of the interview participants 
in Shymkent is also present in the articles of Kazakhstanskaya Pravda. The 
following extract of an article from that paper reveals the author uniting the ideas 
discussed above of linking language with spiritual values and of inter-ethnic 
harmony as part of a strong and independent state identity. 
 
7:12 “The linguistic variety in the republic is destined to become the bond fastening 
together the spiritual unity and brotherhood of the peoples inhabiting Kazakhstan. In 
the course of language policy we must ensure that a person of any tribe or clan can 
say to the speaker of another language, to paraphrase the famous saying, ‘your 
language is my friend’. And our Constitution is able to become the guarantor of this”  




A large number of the articles selected from Kazakhstanskaya Pravda cover themes 
of language development and in particular the ‘problem’ of how to increase the use 
and status of Kazakh (a view in tension with the affirmation of “linguistic variety” 
given above). However, far fewer of the articles selected from the other two 
newspapers focus on this topic. A few do, though, relate to the concept of inter-
ethnic harmony as part of a positive Kazakhstani identity.  
 
One of these, from Ekspress-K, is in an account of a gathering of the Turkish 
diaspora in Kazakhstan. The author writes of how the Turkish exiles have been able 
to preserve their language and culture to a significant degree and how they were 
helped and accepted by the Kazakh people.  
 
7:13 “[They managed] to survive because the Kazakhs received the settlers very 
warmly. In the hard post-war years they helped them all they could. They shared 
with them their homes, their food”  
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(Ekspress-K, +
 , 05/05/2004).  
 
The same article goes on to quote a member of parliament who, in his childhood, 
lived with some Turkish exiles.  
 
7:14 “When I was a child, a family of Turks lived in the same house with our 
family…we shared a piece of bread with them, clothes… Even as children we never 
divided up by nationality. Both in the Soviet Union and even more so in independent 
Kazakhstan we live as one brotherly family.”  
(Ekspress-K, +
 , 05/05/2004). 
 
An article from the newspaper Liter describes a gathering of ethnic Kazakhs and 
quotes one of the participants as saying that  
 
7:15 “The main thing in Kazakhstan is that peace is preserved, and everyone feels 
equal and worthy as citizens of the country”.  
(Liter, ,   , 30/09/2005). 
 
From the foregoing, then, it is clear that pride in inter-ethnic harmony in Kazakhstani 
society is a prominent part of the discourse of national identity in both the individual 
interviews carried out in Shymkent and the newspaper articles selected. However, the 
newspaper articles, particularly those taken from Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, use far 
more emotive and elevating language, particularly in reference to the Kazakh 
language than is evident in the interview participants’ speech.  
 
In relation to the linguistic construction of a national character the idea of national 
identity and feelings of belonging being ‘activated’ was prevalent in the 
interviewees’ responses. Many of the participants talked of how they came to 
describe themselves as Kazakhstani when travelling abroad or in some other 
international context and some spoke of suddenly becoming aware of a strong 
emotional attachment to Kazakhstan in such situations. These ideas are not reflected 
in any of the newspaper articles selected. The emotive tone of many of the 
Kazakhstanskaya Pravda articles in particular suggests the assumption that a national 
identity of such importance would always be salient and emotionally involving and 
this may be why no reference to the activation of such an identity is made.  
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Similarly, whilst a number of the interview participants refer to the importance of a 
Kazakhstani identity because Kazakhstan was their place of birth or of socialisation 
these themes are not overtly apparent in the newspaper articles.  
 
There are, then, similar themes apparent in the discourse surrounding the linguistic 
creation of a homo nationalis for Kazakhstan in both the interviews conducted in 
Shymkent and the national media extracts reviewed. However, the treatment of those 
themes which are covered in both sets of data is different with the media discourse 
using more elevated and emotive language, sometimes using religious vocabulary, 
particularly in relation to the Kazakh language as a central symbol of Kazakhstani 
identity whereas there is no clear tendency to do so in the interviewees’ 
contributions. Moreover, certain themes relevant in the Shymkent participants’ 
discourse are not noticeable in that of the newspaper articles.  
 
7.3 The Discursive Construction of a Common Political Past 
The second thematic content area explored in relation to the Shymkent interview data 
was that of a common political past. In their treatment of this theme Wodak and her 
colleagues discuss the role of important historical events, be they times of success 
and prosperity for the country or times of crisis, in the construction of a national 
identity (1999: 31). As discussed in the previous chapter many of the interviewees 
showed pride in the independence of Kazakhstan and relate to the beginning of 
independence for the republic as an important and positive national event. Similarly, 
many of the newspaper articles refer to this event and to the introduction of the 
republic’s constitution as a significant point of orientation, reporting on what has 
been achieved or on how many years have passed since that date and on which are 
the most important problems still facing the country a decade or more on.  
 
Another common theme amongst the Shymkent participants was that of 
independence being achieved as the result of a long struggle, carried on from 
generation to generation by the autochthonous population.  This perspective is also a 
theme referred to repeatedly in the speech given by Nazarbaev at the opening of the 
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architectural-memorial complex. Nazarbaev draws attention to the ancient origin of 
the Kazakh people and of their durability and persistent character through use of 
hyperbole and emphatic vocabulary and phrases such as “ancestry of the ancient 
Turks”, “indomitable”, “ineradicable” and “endless resistance”19.† 
 
As described previously, Nazarbaev uses a Kazakh hero and the Kazakh people as 
his starting point for talking about independent Kazakhstan and then widens this out 
to include all ethnic groups living in the republic.  
 
The only other article of those selected that focuses on the heroism of former 
generations and on how that should inspire the present-day population is another of 
the articles taken from Kazakhstanskaya Pravda.  In this article too, the historic 
population of Kazakhstan is glorified and praised such that “every steppe-dweller” 
should be “filled with love for his ancestors and his roots”20 (Kazakhstanskaya 
Pravda, )    
? 28/10/2005).† 
 
The author writes about the importance of historic heroes to inspire the present 
generation and goes on to express the view that the young people of contemporary 
Kazakhstan have little respect for the Kazakh language as a result of their lack of 
respect for their ancestors and past heroes who fought for the language and culture. 
In the same way as Nazarbaev used elevating, religious language, so too does this 
author in describing the importance of every language and culture as something 
spiritual and elemental and how such an understanding enables present generations to 
live correctly. 
 
7:18 “It hasn’t been explained to them, [the young people] that every language is 
unique and beautiful, like every flower is beautiful and every creature living on the 
earth. Experienced linguists haven’t told them about how the culture of any people 
and its language is the trade of the Almighty, a building block of the universe which 
forms the impressive mosaic of the whole world. They don’t have understanding of 
the fact that the salt of the earth are not those who steal and are puffed up, proud of 
                                                 










their mansions, and not those who have read two books in their whole life but then 
fill stadiums as a result of good P.R. companies… but those who found immortality 
with a sword in their hand, protecting their people, their native language, their 
culture.”   
(Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, )    
? 28/10/2005). 
 
The idea that a people’s historical heroes are important for determining the nature 
and character of their national identity is also present in Nazarbaev’s speech at the 
architectural-memorial complex. He describes the movement under Makhambet as 
having “immense historical significance and great political importance”21 and states 
that it is not right to examine the history of a people and of its heroes separately22. He 
asserts that Kazakhstan’s heroes have left an “indelible” mark on the homeland’s 
history23 and become the “conscience of the nation”24 and that remembering them is 
a ‘holy duty’ (“ ”) in order to preserve the “moral-aesthetic health of the 
nation”25.† 
  
Both Nazarbaev in the extracts of his speech quoted above and the author of the other 
Kazakhstanskaya Pravda article cited see the historic heroes of the Kazakh people as 
playing an important role in the contemporary republic’s national identity. Kazakh 
history and the history of its heroes are, for them, key to understanding the nature 
and values of Kazakhstan today. They repeatedly use religious, spiritual and 
mythologizing language to elevate the people, events, culture and language of the 
Kazakhs to inspiring mythological proportions. In this way Nazarbaev in particular 
seems to wish to create a suitable collective memory for the new republic that fits his 
vision for its identity. The fact that he is at least partially successful is revealed by 
the Shymkent participants’ discourse of independence being the culmination of a 
long and continuous struggle fought by generations of Kazakhs for their own land, 
identity and culture. However, there are virtually no references to mythical or heroic 
                                                 
21 “      ” 
22 “      
     
  
   ” 
23 “
    ” 
24 “  $” 
25 “  --  $” 
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figures from the past as part of this discourse. It is also clear that this ideology is not 
all-pervasive as none of the other articles selected romanticise the past or its heroes 
in the way described above.  
 
What is more widespread, though, is the discourse of the oppression of the Kazakh 
language and culture during the Soviet Union. This is something present in the 
comments of the interview participants and in several of the newspaper articles 
reviewed. Despite the fact that he himself was a leader during the late Soviet period, 
Nazarbaev is critical of Communist rule, presenting it as being destructive of the 
Kazakh culture. In the speech already extensively quoted Nazarbaev says that 
 
7:20 “National history and worldview, national culture and art, national customs and 
the traditional order, religion, language and mentality, in a word everything that 
comprises the honour and worth of the nation was brought as a sacrifice to the lying 
banner of just reconstruction of the world and became small change in the dirty 
games of the communist party elite. 
It is impossible to measure the loss which, at the time of the thoughtless anti-national 
policy was brought to our blessed land… And how many documents and how much 
material evidence of ancient times, how many monuments, relics and rarities of the 
past, how many priceless sources of knowledge and faith are lost from sight, gone 
missing, and so disappeared without a trace from the face of the earth.?”  
(Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, 	
  
  , 16/09/2003). 
 
A similar viewpoint concerning the loss of language as a result of the dominance of 
Russian in the Soviet Union is expressed far less emotively in another of the 
Kazakhstanskaya Pravda articles. Talking of the Kazakh intelligentsia, the author, 
Mekhis Sule(menov, states that 
 
7:21 “Having moved to the big city, they discovered the exceptional importance of 
the Russian language for their careers and gave their whole remaining lives to 
perfecting it. All these years the typical representative of this layer of Kazakh 
intelligentsia read, wrote and spoke at work only in Russian because the whole of 
their success in the institute and then in their practical work depended on the quality 
of their knowledge of the Russian language.”  (Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, ) 
 , 14/05/04). 
 
Similarly, in another of the Kazakhstanskaya Pravda articles ()  – 
, 
, , 16/12/2003), the view is put forward that the poor status of Kazakh 
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as a result of the Soviet past is a problem. However, the article consists of an 
interview with the director of a language institute who also asserts that emotional 
appeals about the poor status of Kazakh are not necessarily helpful, a view clearly 
contrasting with that of the president.† 
  
The discourse of suppression of culture and language during the Soviet Union is not 
so apparent in the articles selected from the other two newspapers. The article 
referred to above, however, reveals that discourses concerning past language policy 
are not all so emotive as the first two Kazakhstanskaya Pravda articles quoted might 
suggest and that those dealing with the Soviet past are not all entirely negative. The 
competing discourses of cultural oppression versus cultural exchange, enrichment 
and assimilation as a result of the Soviet Union were described in the context of the 
interview data and are also present in certain of the newspaper articles reviewed. 
 
One article (Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, )  , 14/05/04), written by 
the ethnic Kazakh academic quoted above (7:21), questions the discourse of 
language suppression by suggesting that schools with Kazakh as the medium of 
instruction were closed, not so much by force during the Soviet Union, as because 
people no longer wanted to send their children there, although it is acknowledged 
that this is because of the need for competence in Russian for career prospects.† 
 
Moreover, an article from Liter reports on an address given by president Nazarbaev 
to teachers and students in which he argues that there is good to be derived from the 
educational experiences of the Soviet years. This illustrates the important influence 
of context and audience on the content of a speech. Whilst Nazarbaev’s speech 
quoted above focussed on the entirely negative effects of colonialism in Kazakhstan, 
here he highlights some positive aspects of that time. 
 
7:24 “The head of state noted that even the baggage of the old Soviet schools gives 
an advantage to those states and it is therefore worthwhile not to refuse that 
accumulation of experience in the matter of education of the young.”  
(Liter, * , 08/09/05).  
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Moreover, a Kazakhstanskaya Pravda article discusses the use of the Russian 
language in the CIS and highlights the positive role it plays for the countries 
concerned for which it gives access to a wider sphere of information and provides a 
high status common language. Russian is described as being the “friend and ally”26 
of other languages and as having exerted a “beneficial influence on the spiritual 
development of the peoples of the states of the post-Soviet space”27 and the assertion 
is also made that Russian has itself been influenced by the other languages of the CIS 
and Soviet Union over the years (Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, . , 
15/09/2004).† 
 
Also challenging the idea that Kazakh culture has always been in opposition to and 
threatened by Russian influences are comments in an article from Ekspress-K (& 
     …, 27/05/2004). The piece describes an evening’s 
events dedicated to the ‘Day of Slavonic writing and culture’ organised by the 
Russian community in the city of Taraz to mark the ‘Year of Russia in Kazakhstan’ 
and celebrates pieces about “the friendship and brotherhood of the peoples”28 and the 
works of Kazakh poets “declaring their love for the Russian language”29.† 
 
Similarly, another article from Ekspress-K (/   
“$…” 01/10/2004) reports the publication of a collection of Kazakh oral 
literature. The author describes how such literature was originally collected and 
recorded by Russian and other European travellers and researchers visiting the 
region. The views expressed directly challenge the discourse of colonial oppression 
and widespread disregard for culture by describing these early ethnographers’ love 
and respect for Kazakh culture and the “beneficial role” (“ ”) of 
these scholars in recording aspects of Kazakh culture.† 
  
                                                 
26 “  ” 
27 “             
 ” 
28 “   ” 
29 “"  -,     
 ” 
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This article introduces the idea of a Russian role in preserving and protecting the 
Kazakh language and culture, a discourse clearly contradictory to the parallel one 
described above of Russian oppression and destruction of culture. Both form part of 
Kazakhstan’s past relations with Russia and the Russian language and part of the 
collective memory of these relations. The two discourses, one of Russification as a 
wholly negative thing resulting in the threat of loss of Kazakh language and culture, 
and the other of cultural enrichment and mutual appreciation of the two languages 
and cultures exist alongside one another and both inform contemporary attitudes 
towards language and identity today as evidenced by the comments quoted above as 
to the place of Russian in the CIS and by the existence of both discourses in the 
interview participants’ responses.  
 
One facet of the interviewees’ discourse of a more positive view of history was that 
peoples who had settled in Kazakhstan had been welcomed and accepted and that the 
good relations between the ethnic groups in Kazakhstan over the years reveals the 
hospitable, tolerant nature of the Kazakhs. This is echoed in part of an article from 
Liter discussing the importance of the country’s cultural heritage.  
 
7:28 “The leading archaeologist of the country, Karl Baipakov spoke about the 
unique discoveries in the fortified settlement of Koilik, where the ruins of temples of 
various confessions (Muslim, Christian, Buddhist) were discovered on the territory 
of ancient Kazakhstan of the XI-XII centuries, which witnesses to the humane, 




! 28/01/05).  
 
Also evident in this quote is the ideology, expressed by a number of the Shymkent 
participants, that there is a direct and continuous link between the territory of what is 
now Kazakhstan and the present-day state and its people. 
 
It is therefore clear that in relation to themes pertaining to the linguistic construction 
of a common past there are similarities in certain of the attitudes and beliefs 
expressed in the newspaper articles under review and those revealed in the 
contributions of the interviewees in Shymkent to these discourses. This suggests that 
the historical identity presented in the media, itself to a significant degree a reflection 
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of Nazarbaev’s ideology of a suitable collective memory for the republic, is being 
taken up and co-constructed by Kazakhstani individuals such as those interviewed.  
 
7.4 The Discursive Construction of a Common Culture 
Beliefs about languages play an important part in the linguistic construction of 
culture. As discussed in the previous section, the competing views of the role of 
Russian in the past influence attitudes towards it today. Amongst the interview 
participants, competing discourses were evident with regard to the status of the 
Kazakh language in relation to Russian in particular. For some, Kazakhstan’s 
independent identity should be expressed in and through Kazakh to the exclusion of 
other languages whilst others believe that a bi- or multilingual identity better 
expresses the harmonious multi-ethnic society of Kazakhstan. These competing 
views are also expressed in various ways in many of the newspaper articles 
reviewed. 
 
Many of the articles describe the current status of Kazakh as a ‘problem’ to be 
addressed, believing that the state language should be more highly used and regarded 
and in fact, many of the interviewees agree that as a symbol of independent statehood 
Kazakh should be promoted. However, in both the interviews and the newspaper 
articles there are differences of opinion as to whether Kazakhstan should essentially 
become a monolingual state or whether there is still an important role for Russian 
and other languages, in particular English.  
 
One of the articles which puts forward the view that Kazakh should be promoted but 
that the continuing value of Russian should also be recognised and the increasing use 
of English accepted was written by the Kazakh academic already quoted (7:21) and 
published in Kazakhstanskaya Pravda ()  , 14/05/04) .† 
 
Another article which supports the ongoing use of Russian appeared in 
Kazakhstanskaya Pravda later in the same year and was written by the president of 
the A. S. Pushkin State Institute of the Russian Language. In this article it is argued 
that the knowledge of Russian as a shared language throughout the countries of the 
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CIS presents opportunities for those countries in the spheres of education, mass 
information and business relations (.  15/09/2004).† 
 
President Nazarbaev is also often quoted as supporting the continued use of Russian 
and the development of the use of English in Kazakhstan. One of the articles from 
Liter (‘   ’, 13/10/2004) reports on an address by 
Nazarbaev to a gathering of education and science workers. Having first stressed the 
importance of Kazakh and stated that children themselves understand the importance 
of studying with Kazakh as the medium of education, the president went on to talk 
about the place of other languages, stating that the government would promote the 
teaching of Russian and English in schools.† 
 
Kazakhstanskaya Pravda published a more extensive report about this event and 
gave a fuller account of the president’s views.  
 
7:32 “The need for English is a world tendency, it’s an obvious need. And excellent 
proficiency in Russian – this is our wealth, to lose which would be extremely foolish. 
We speak and carry out documentation in Russian because today all Kazakhstanis 
know that language. Therefore it is the Russian language that unites our nation, all 
citizens of our country. That’s how it’s turned out historically, and no one is to blame 
in this. Time is needed for the Kazakh language to begin to fulfil such a unifying 
role, but it is not worth rushing such an event, said the President… 
For us it will be of great advantage if we will be fully fluent in Kazakh, Russian and 
English.”  
(Kazakhstanskaya Pravda,   –  , 
13/10/2004). 
 
It is interesting that in this context Nazarbaev explicitly states that no-one is to blame 
for the predominance of Russian in Kazakhstan, whereas in the speech given at the 
opening of the architectural-memorial complex he clearly blamed Russian 
domination for the low status of Kazakh and the suppression of Kazakh culture (see 
for example extract 7:20). This once again shows how multiple competing discourses 
can co-exist and the same speaker can engage in them all with different audiences 




Despite Nazarbaev’s assertions that the replacement of Russian with Kazakh cannot 
be forced, in the same year as the conference speech quoted above was made, 
Kazakhstanskaya Pravda also reported on the progress made by the regional 
governments throughout the country on starting to use Kazakh instead of Russian for 
their administration and documentation. However, the continued importance of 
knowing Russian is stressed by the author reporting on the progress of introducing 
Kazakh in Kyzylorda oblast. Having discussed how the region was the first to start 
using Kazakh for all its administration and described the problems of lack of 
adequate knowledge of that language, he goes on to state that in some rural areas 
lack of knowledge of Russian is an increasing problem. The author asserts that in the 
view of the region’s akim, the senior official 
 
7:33 “It is very bad… not knowing the language of international communication 
closes off the young people’s access to world culture.  Besides which, 
monolingualism restricts their competitiveness in the labour market. In our 
multinational country not knowing the Russian language is as bad as not knowing 
Kazakh.”  
(Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, *   … 25/03/2004).  
 
However, the article from which this is drawn contains reports from seven other 
oblasts, all of which focus entirely on the need to raise the status of Kazakh by 
various means and none of which mention the continued validity of Russian or 
importance of English or other languages. These reports form part of a discourse 
which approaches the language situation as being essentially problematic, with 
intervention necessary to promote the use of Kazakh in a wider range of 
environments to the exclusion of Russian in particular and to forcibly increase its 
status in relation to other languages including Russian. 
 
For example, reporting on the situation in Aktobinskaya oblast, one author (whose 
opinion is echoed in accounts from other oblasts as well as in other articles) states 
that whilst the letter of the law is fulfilled, in that documents are being transferred 
from Russian into Kazakh, the law’s intended aim of increasing the status of Kazakh 
in official spheres is not achieved as this is the result of translation from a Russian 
original. The authors of these articles imply that the Kazakh edition of a document 
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should be primary and take precedence over the Russian edition, as a translation 
from a Russian original does not reflect the high status the Kazakh version should 
have (Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, *   … 25/03/2004).† 
 
In a Kazakhstanskaya Pravda article published the previous year (' ,  
? 13/12/2003), the vice-president for the society promoting the Kazakh 
language, Kazakh Tili, sets out his views on the continuing problems of language use 
in Kazakhstan 15 years after the first law about languages. He sees the ongoing 
predominance of Russian in many spheres as problematic and also considers Kazakh 
to be threatened by the rise of the use of English.† 
 
He gives a long list of situations in which Russian is used, minimizes those in which 
Kazakh is used, and uses a metaphor of domination in describing the Russian 
language as “ruling absolutely” (“ ”), all of which reveal 
the author’s negative attitude towards this practice and his perception of the Russian 
language as forcibly suppressing the use of Kazakh. The discourse here is one of the 
Kazakh land and language once more under threat from hostile colonial powers. The 
theme of invasion is further invoked in the description of English as becoming 
dominant on the “sovereign territory of Kazakhstan”30, creating an impression of that 
language as an invading force pushing Kazakh out from its rightful place.  
 
Another, later article from the same paper is also very clear that the current language 
situation is a problem that needs active intervention to remedy. The author introduces 
the article with the following statements. 
 
7:36 “The problem of expanding the sphere of use of the state language increasingly 
worries the community of our country. Moreover, not only inhabitants of the root 
nationality, but representatives of other peoples living alongside Kazakhs step out in 
defence of the Kazakh language.”   
(Kazakhstanskaya Pravda,  
  , 20/03/2005). 
 
                                                 
30 “   )” 
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Again the impression is created that the Kazakh language needs to be “defended” 
against the invasive presence of other languages in spheres where Kazakh rightfully 
belongs.  
 
The article contains an interview with a representative of a government Committee 
for Languages. The committee representative outlines what has already been 
achieved towards the promotion of Kazakh as well as talking about the problems and 
challenges to be faced, particularly in the spheres of education and administration. 
The final question implies that maybe Kazakhstan should follow the example of 
countries such as France in establishing extensive state protection for and promotion 
of the ‘root’ language (“‘’ ”), the adjective often employed to 
designate the eponymous ethnic group or their language. The reply given indicates a 
favourable response to such a suggestion. The interviewee believes that Kazakhstan 
will only truly achieve the status of being a “civilised” independent country when the 
Kazakh language dominates in at least all official spheres31. However, he offers no 
further indication as to what he believes constitutes being “civilised”, nor whether he 
considers Kazakhstan currently to be “uncivilised”. The implication of his words is 
that for a country to be civilised its designated state language must be the most 
prestigious language in common use in that country and be employed in the state 
apparatus. For Kazakhstan it appears then that to be “civilised” means to forge a new 
linguistic identity clearly different from that which prevailed during past eras of 
colonial and Soviet domination, and from Russia, arguably Kazakhstan’s most 
significant outgroup with which comparisons are made and from which 
distinctiveness must be maintained.  To be civilised is to be positively distinct from 
relevant others.† 
 
However, even in some of these articles advocating strong measures to ensure the 
absolute predominance of Kazakh over Russian there are also elements of the 
discourse clearly evident amongst the interview participants of the importance of 
preserving inter-ethnic harmony in Kazakhstan as this is felt to be one of the 
country’s most positive defining characteristics.  
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As referred to in relation to a national character, in terms of language policy several 
of the articles confirm the constitutional protection afforded to languages other than 
Kazakh for the benefit of the many other people groups resident in Kazakhstan 
(although such protection does not match that afforded to the Kazakh language 
itself). In an article discussing the development of the use of Kazakh the introductory 
paragraph states that 
 
7:38 “The President of the country has more than once emphasised that 
representatives of other peoples always retain the right to speak in their native 
language and to be understood.” 
(Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, )  – , 
, , 16/12/2003). 
 
Similarly, a later article by the head of the Atirau oblast office for the development 
of languages discusses the support afforded to the minority ethnic groups in 
Kazakhstan and their languages (although once again Kazakhs are the first point of 
reference and all other peoples and languages, including Russian, are secondary and 
‘other’) and describes how every year festivals of the languages of the peoples of 
Kazakhstan are held in the oblast, in which the celebrations relevant to each of these 





The idea suggested above of learning about the cultures, languages and celebrations 
of the various ethnic minorities of Kazakhstan is one which featured in several of the 
Shymkent participants’ responses. Whilst there might not be many obvious cultural 
features (and by implication no single language) seen as genuinely uniting all 
Kazakhstanis, the culture of tolerance itself and of being interested in other ethnic 
groups and willing to learn about them and from them is argued to be a unifying 
feature of contemporary Kazakhstani society and something to be proud of and 
celebrated. 
 
                                                                                                                                          
31 “*  $    
  ” 
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The report in Ekspress-K discussed previously (see section 7.3), which describes a 
concert held in Taraz to celebrate Slavonic writing and culture is an example of this. 
The author notes that participants came from both Russian and Kazakh schools and 
united to celebrate the Russian literature and language by reciting poems and 
performing songs and dances (Ekspress-K, &      …, 
27/05/2004).  
 
Similarly, an article in Liter celebrates the achievements of an ethnically Russian 
school girl who speaks Kazakh fluently and is also highly competent at playing the 
dombra, the Kazakh national instrument (Liter, 	 )
  $, 
30/04/2005). 
 
One of the articles published in Ekspress-K describes how students of the South 
Kazakhstan State University (S.K.S.U.) have set up their own mini-assembly of the 
peoples involving representatives of 32 different nationalities. The vice principal of 
the university, Nurzhan Altaev, stated that as one of the largest and most 
multinational universities in the region it is extremely important that, 
“representatives of every nation feel comfortable”32. The article continues by 
describing the assembly’s purpose. 
 
7:40 “The foundational aim which members of the Small Assembly of Nations of the 
S.K.S.U. have put before themselves is the all-round development of the national 
cultures, languages and traditions of the representatives of the nations studying at the 
university. 
The preservation of stability and inter-national agreement in the country is one of the 
important tasks facing the country’, says Nurzhan Altaev. Kazakhstani students must 
also promote this.” 
(Ekspress-K, 	$ – , 23/07/03).  
 
The rhetoric here is of individual responsibility in response to the country’s needs. 
The country needs stability and inter-national agreement and therefore individuals 
should promote these qualities. This culture of respect and mutual understanding is 
                                                 
32  




also promoted by the president.  After hearing an ethnically Russian language teacher 
(of Kazakh and French) address a conference in Kazakh, Nazarbaev is reported to 
have said that 
 
7:41 “[P]eople who honour the language and culture of another people deserve great 
respect and the same attitude towards their language and towards themselves” 
(Kazakhstanskaya Pravda,   –  , 
13/10/2004). 
 
From the foregoing it is clear that beliefs about language play a central role in 
competing conceptions of Kazakhstani culture. However, whilst the relative 
importance of various languages is contested there does seem to be agreement about 
the importance of maintaining peace and stability in the country and this theme is 
prominent in both the interview responses and numerous newspaper articles.  
 
Also apparent in the interview responses was the unifying effect of sport as 
Kazakhstanis of all ethnic backgrounds united in support of teams or individuals 
representing the country at sporting events. This theme was not evident in the 
newspaper articles reviewed although it is likely that this is primarily a result of the 
topics searched for in selecting the articles; these being ‘Kazakh language’, ‘Russian 
language’, ‘English language’ and ‘education’, as described in the introduction to the 
present chapter. Interestingly articles retrieved as a result of a search for 
‘Kazakhstani’ in the archives of each of the three papers being reviewed are 
predominantly reports of sporting occasions or achievements. This in itself is a 
strong indication that sport is the primary sphere in which a united Kazakhstani 
identity is a reality. Although the more formal, politically oriented phrase, ‘citizen of 
Kazakhstan’ is also employed as a term inclusive of all ethnic groups, the fact that 
relatively few reports other than those pertaining to sport contain the descriptor 
‘Kazakhstani’ may indicate that in many areas of life ethnic labels are still deemed to 
be relevant and that a genuine, culturally unified identity has yet to be established.  
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7.5 The Discursive Construction of a Common Political Present and Future 
Participants in the interviews in Shymkent oriented to a number of topics relating to 
the linguistic construction of a common political present and future. These included 
discussions of the importance of citizenship and of political achievements and virtues 
as well as hopes for the future and ongoing problems and challenges faced by the 
country.  
 
Some of the Shymkent interviewees focussed primarily on civil aspects of a 
Kazakhstani identity stating that each ethnic group was culturally different but united 
by citizenship in Kazakhstan and also by the public holidays celebrated there. This 
discourse, of the unifying nature of holidays and celebrations is echoed in some of 
the newspaper articles reviewed. For example, the report in Ekspress-K about the 
celebration of Slavonic writing and culture in Taraz (Ekspress-K, &   
   …, 27/05/2004) highlights the fact that Russians and Kazakhs 
were united in appreciation of the examples of Russian language and culture on 
display. Similarly, the article discussing the Turkish diaspora in Kazakhstan 
(Ekspress-K, +
 , 5/05/2004, also quoted above in extracts 7:13 and 
7:14) was written when a group of these Turks gathered together to mark the day of 
unity of the peoples of Kazakhstan and focuses on the sense of accord between 
ethnic groups in the country. 
 
Moreover, one of the political virtues that featured in the interviewees’ discourse and 
which has also been discussed above in relation to other themes, is that of the inter-
ethnic harmony believed to characterise Kazakhstan and be a significant achievement 
of the republic and its government since it acquired independence. The ongoing 
preservation of inter-ethnic peace in Kazakhstan provides a positive distinction from 
other post-Soviet countries and the former Yugoslavia where this has not been the 
case, which are referred to (in both individual discourse and government rhetoric) as 
relevant for comparison. 
 
The protection granted to minority languages in the constitution was highlighted in 
the preceding section. An article published in Ekspress-K, reporting primarily on a 
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Kazakh language contest, goes on to describe how this theoretical support for other 
languages is to be out-worked in practice. 
 
7:42 “[C]onditions are being created in Kazakhstan for the harmonious ethno-
cultural development of all the peoples living there… [O]ut of 7989 comprehensive 
schools, in 2062 schools teaching is carried out in different languages, out of which 
number 15 are studied as native languages. Besides this, more than 170 Sunday 
schools operate at the national cultural centres, at which representatives of the ethnic 
communities have the opportunity to study 23 native languages.”  
(Ekspress-K, ) $, 24/09/2003)  
 
This openness to such a large number of languages and cultures is presented as being 
one of the chief political virtues of the government of the independent republic. In an 
article discussing the progress of the president’s 2030 campaign for the development 
of Kazakhstan the author, who is the director of the Kazakhstani Institute for 
Strategic Research for the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, affirms the value 
of the priority given in the campaign to preserving inter-ethnic accord (Liter, 	 


 –  
, 12/10/2005).† 
 
Moreover, at a conference for education and science workers the leader of the 
president’s administration addressed the delegates and said that in the recent 
elections, won by the president’s party 
 
7:44 “The people voted, not just for the presidential party, but also for stability, for 
international accord, for economic prosperity.” 
(Liter, “”   , 13/10/2004). 
 
Similarly, in an article reporting on a gathering for ethnic Kazakhs from around the 
world in the new capital, one of the delegates, visiting from Russia, is reported as 
saying that 
 
7:45 “The main thing is that peace has been preserved in Kazakhstan, and everyone 
feels equal and worthy as citizens of the country. The homeland of the Kazakhs has 
not just been preserved but is developing and becoming a power in the Eurasian 
continent.”  
(Liter, ,   , 30/09/2005).  
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The above quote reveals a vision of Kazakhstan as a peaceful multi-ethnic state in 
which all citizens are equal but which is none the less recognised as first and 
foremost the homeland of the Kazakhs, a discourse discussed in preceding sections. 
The latter two excerpts also illustrate the fact that Kazakhstan’s economic progress 
since independence is another political achievement referred to with pride. This was 
also a prominent theme in the Shymkent participants’ contributions. Interviewees 
often mentioned that they were proud that Kazakhstan had come through the 
economic crisis in the years immediately after the break up of the Soviet Union and 
is now more economically prosperous than the other Central Asian states. This is 
echoed in part of Nazarbaev’s speech at the opening of the architectural-memorial 
complex. He claims that Kazakhstan is a leader amongst the countries of the CIS and 
links the political and economic development of the country with a strengthened 
sense of self-awareness on the part of its citizens. This may be an acknowledgement 
of the fact that the republic’s citizens are better able to feel a positive sense of 
ingroup worth and hence more likely to identify strongly with the Kazakhstani 
ingroup when the country is perceived to have a high status in comparison with 
relevant outgroups and a secure future as a group.† 
 
That economic development remains a high priority for Nazarbaev’s government for 
the foreseeable future is made clear in the article discussing the progress of the 2030 
development strategy. The report states that 
 
7:47 “There is one more important priority – economic growth, based on the 
development of the economy with a high level of investment. This priority will not 
change before 2030, although from year to year the direction of investment will be 
adjusted. Today Kazakhstan needs investment not in mining, as a few years ago, but 
in processing.”  
(Liter, 	 

 –  
, 12/10/2005).  
 
This statement shows not only that economic development is a priority for the 
coming years but also draws attention to progress already made, in that areas once in 
need of investment are now established and new opportunities are opening up for 
further investment and development. By this means and also by mentioning the 
 274
adjustments to be made each year the author stresses the government’s ongoing role 
in creating and facilitating the country’s economic success.  
 
The continued involvement of the president in pushing for economic progress is also 
highlighted in an article from Liter (Welcome, $! 15/06/2005) describing 
an international business conference in Almaty entitled: ‘Kazakhstan is attracting a 
new wave of investment: strategies for diversification and stable growth”33. The 
article quotes the president’s address to the conference in which he outlines his aim 
of Kazakhstan gaining entry to the World Trade Organisation. † 
 
The same article goes on to quote the president of the ‘Asian Society’ who also 
addressed the conference. 
 
7:49 “Kazakhstan has achieved significant success on the way to integration in the 
international economy… In the course of this conference the possibilities for the 
diversification of the economy of Kazakhstan, which is based primarily on natural 
resources based industry, will be discussed.”  
(Liter, Welcome, $! 15/06/2005). 
 
As well as economic prosperity for its own sake, integration and recognition on the 
world stage also seems to be a high priority and this is once again reminiscent of the 
interviewees’ pride in Kazakhstan’s status relative to that of other Central Asian 
states. Such high status helps promote a secure and positive ingroup identity for 
group members. Developing an identity as a modern state of international 
significance is thus a priority for both Nazarbaev and many of his citizens. The 
article discussed above reporting on the economic conference begins by describing 
how Nazarbaev addressed delegates in English and comments on the significance of 
this. 
 
7:50 “At the evening reception at the Almaty residence he addressed the guests freely 
in the language of international communication, which, in itself is symbolic 
confirmation of Kazakhstan’s striving towards integration in the world sphere.”  
(Liter, Welcome, $! 15/06/2005). 
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There are further indications of the importance Nazarbaev places on presenting 
Kazakhstan as a country of significance on the world stage in other articles. A 
Kazakhstanskaya Pravda report on an educational conference describes the 
president’s description of the country’s ongoing development and electoral reforms 
in which he states his desire that the country become a “natural part of the global 
world”34 (  –  , 13/10/2004).† 
 
Several of the articles report on Nazarbaev’s comments about education in 
Kazakhstan and the need to improve all levels of the educational system for the 
country to be economically prosperous and become competitive at an international 
level. The article described above about the economic conference is one of these. In 
it, the president’s belief that economic success depends on educational excellence 
rather than just monetary investment is outlined 35(Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, 
  –  , 13/10/2004).† 
 
Similarly, an article describing the president’s meeting with the principals of higher 
education institutions in Almaty describes the importance to Nazarbaev of reforming 
the education system.  
 
7:54 “The leadership of Kazakhstan has set itself a priority task – to raise education 
to a maximally high level of quality. Integration into the world education system is 
necessary and cannot be effectively realised without appropriate reorganisation of the 
existing structures, levels and qualifications of universities.” 
(Liter, * , 08/09/2005). 
 
Moreover, in an article reporting on various gifted students meeting with the 
president, one of the students, a maths champion, also links educational success with 
the country’s status on the world stage. 
 
                                                                                                                                          
33 )    $:   #$  
  
34 “    
” 
35 “-
     

 ,  
” 
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7:55 “- My gold medal is an acknowledgement of the ability of our country to 





The article goes on to describe the president’s interest in a maths project which had 
achieved recognition at an international exhibition and his response to this success. 
 
7:56 “‘We need to develop science, it is precisely the natural and exact sciences 
which are necessary for the advance of our state’, such is the opinion of Nursultan 
Nazarbaev. ‘Up to 2015 the economy of our country will grow three and a half times, 





The themes of economic prosperity and recognition at an international level are thus 
widespread in the news articles selected. There is a focus on the achievements of 
Nazarbaev and his government and the way in which the president confidently and 
specifically states that the economy will grow in extract 7:56 above portrays a sense 
of personal control and direction for the country on the part of Nazarbaev. However, 
in general crediting the country’s prosperity to Nazarbaev individually is more 
apparent in the interviewees’ responses than in the articles reviewed. Furthermore, 
whilst the interview participants’ responses included references to the benefits of the 
freedoms associated with independence as a state and the end of the Communist era, 
there is little evidence of such a discourse in the newspaper articles reviewed.  
 
As well as pride in what has already been accomplished, there is also a strong sense 
of confidence in the ongoing development of the state in both the interviews and the 
news articles and hence an assurance for its citizens of a positive and secure national 
identity, particularly in relation to the relevant outgroups of the other newly 
independent Central Asian states. Similarly, both data sets include aspirations for 
future improvements in the sphere of education in particular.  
 
Several of the articles include details of Nazarbaev addressing the issue of 
educational development and stating that it is a priority for him and his government. 
In an article published in Pravda covering a conference about education a great deal 
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of space is given to recounting the details of the president’s address to the delegates 
(Kazakhstanskaya Pravda,   –  , 
13/10/2004).† 
 
In this speech Nazarbaev emphasises the central importance of education for the 
government and the country as a whole and creates the impression that he is aware of 
what his citizens throughout the country are discussing and is already putting in place 
measures to develop education as people wish. Similarly, by stressing the increased 
budget he is able to highlight Kazakhstan’s continued and secure economic growth to 
enable such a project to be carried out. 
 
Later in the article Nazarbaev’s modernizing and liberalising credentials are again 
highlighted as changes to the education system since independence are listed, 
although there is also an acknowledgement that these changes alone have not enabled 
education to reach the high standard desired.† 
 
Once again reference is made to reaching an “international standard,” although no 
indication is given how such a standard can be objectively measured. The repeated 
references to reaching such a standard indicate though, that for Nazarbaev, status 
comparisons with other countries are an important and relevant measure of 
Kazakhstan’s success as a state (by maintaining positive distinctiveness from 
relevant outgroups), and having a world-class education system is part of the identity 
Nazarbaev would like for the state. The article ends by describing the president’s 
assurance to the delegates that improving education is a high priority for his 
government.† 
 
A number of other articles also focus on problems within the education system, with 
a particular emphasis on the need for better textbooks, and on government efforts to 
improve matters. There are articles from each of the three papers reviewed dealing 
with these themes indicating that the discourse of the need to improve education is 
prevalent in the media as well as being mentioned by a number of the Shymkent 
interviewees as a present problem and hope for future development.  
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One of the articles from Ekspress-K reports on a press conference given by the vice-
minister for education at the start of the 2004-2005 academic year. He describes the 
number of new schools about to open and how many others have undergone repairs 
and improvements. He also asserts that there is an increasing demand for Kazakh 
medium of instruction schools and describes the improvement in the level of 
technology available to many schools whilst stressing that there is still a long way to 
go in this respect to bring the schools up to the desired level of technological 
provision (1 , 26/08/2004).† 
 
This article reveals the vice-minister’s desire to highlight the fact that independent 
Kazakhstan is increasingly identified by the Kazakh language as citizens freely 
choose to send their children to Kazakh language schools whilst also once again 
stressing the fact that other languages are still given room (if not parity with Kazakh) 
in Kazakhstan. The wish to show that the government is making progress towards the 
aim of bringing the education system up to international standards is also brought to 
the fore by the focus on technological improvements. However it is accepted that this 
is an ongoing process and continued improvement remains a priority for the years 
ahead.  
 
One of the main areas about which concern is expressed is the perceived lack of a 
sufficient quantity and quality of textbooks. A number of articles focus on this theme 
as one of the main problems within the education system. An article published in 
Liter reporting on a congress for education and science workers quotes the president 
as he comments on this issue, giving examples of errors he has seen in school books 
and describing the consequences of such poor materials when he states that “such 
falsifications won’t make school pupils into patriots of the country who will be proud 
of their history”36 (“”   , 13/10/2004).† 
 
                                                 
36 “[]
 ##$
    
 ,    
 ” 
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This article reveals not only a discourse of dissatisfaction with present educational 
materials but also an ideological reason behind some of this dissatisfaction. 
Nazarbaev wants educational material that will foster an appropriate national identity 
and pride and is therefore concerned that the mistakes in the history book will not 
engender a suitable pride and respect for the territory’s past but will instead provoke 
ridicule, thus not giving the status he desires to the Kazakh background of the 
republic’s history. 
 
Another article from Liter also begins with a focus on the ideological importance and 
aims of textbooks. The article describes the many mistakes and problems associated 
with a newly published textbook for studying the Russian language for year 8 pupils 
and argues that such a book will do very little either to help academically or to 
promote respect for the Russian language or for Kazakhstan. 
 
The author of this article orients at the start of the discussion to the fact that a 
country’s language textbooks are about more than knowledge of the language in 
question, they are about the “ethics and philosophy” of that language and about 
discovering which historical figures are approved to represent the language and 
culture of that people. 
 
7:62 “In all times and among all peoples the study of the foundations of the 
grammar, rhetoric and poetry begins with an introduction to the ethics and 
philosophy of the national language and the creative legacy of those who have 
historical merit in the study, development and propaganda of the given language.” 
(Liter,  “
” ! 25/01/2005).† 
 
In this way the identity forming nature of textbooks is focussed on as they are 
acknowledged to be a valued means of communicating group norms and values and 
ensuring that they are adhered to by the next generation of group members.  
 
The author goes on to quote the introductory poem in praise of the Russian language 
and ridicule its poor literary quality before revealing that after much effort he 
discovered the author to be not one of the accepted cultural representatives like those 
described, but a contemporary academic in the field of physics with no literary 
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background, and thus (in his opinion) no suitable credentials for communicating the 
“ethics and philosophy” associated with the Russian language community. By 
beginning the article in this way the author implies that the failure of the textbook in 
these terms is as serious as the factual and stylistic errors which he goes on to 
enumerate. 
 
Other articles too describe the lack of quality textbooks as one of the main problems 
facing the education system. Also cited as problems to be addressed are the lack of 
well qualified teachers and poor quality teaching, particularly of the Kazakh 
language. As indicated above, the lack of computers and access to the internet and of 
teachers trained to use such technology are also described in some of the articles. 
These educational challenges all threaten the desired identity of Kazakhstan as a 
modern state able to compete academically and economically at an international 
level, which emerges in the discourse of both the interviews and the newspaper 
articles.  
 
In discussions of threats to a positive state identity a number of the interview 
participants cited corruption as an ongoing problem. However, this discourse is not a 
prominent feature of the newspaper articles selected, although it does appear in one 
article published in Liter. This article outlines the policies of the presidential 
candidates standing against Nazarbaev in the 2005 elections. Each of the four 
candidates has some policies to deal with corruption (0  $
 
« »? 18/11/2005).† 
 
The fact that this is the only context in which fighting corruption is found indicates 
that it is a minority and oppositional discourse and that the dominant discourse 
focuses on the achievements and successes of government without mention of this 
problem. Acknowledging corruption is a challenge to the positive identity of an 
internationally acceptable, competitive state attractive to foreign investors and 




It is clear then that there are a number of discourses prominent in the newspaper 
articles selected which relate to the linguistic construction of a common political 
present and future and which overlap with those present in the interview participants’ 
responses relating to these themes.  
 
7.6 The Discursive Construction of a ‘National Body’ 
The final area of thematic content being utilised for this research is that of the 
linguistic construction of a ‘national body’. This encompasses discourses relating to 
the landscape and its use and development and to the national territory.  
 
Amongst the Shymkent interviewees there were many who made reference to the 
landscape of Kazakhstan and there was a discourse of the people and their 
characteristics being shaped by the land in which they dwell, both in terms of the 
physical characteristics of the landscape and in terms of Kazakhstan’s location 
between Europe and Asia with the different cultures and world-views associated with 
each of these. In the media articles reviewed, the steppe landscape is mentioned 
prominently in Nazarbaev’s speech in praise of the historical hero Makhambet as 
having shaped that leader’s character.  
 
7:64 “…there is in Makhambet much which is unique, special characteristics and 
traits, such that the poet cannot be confused with any other at any time who has lived 
or will live on the earth. It is his uniqueness, predestined and coming from his roots 
in the heart of the ancient culture of the Steppe, the original nature of his talent, 
which is given to a man only with the sun of the father region, only with the hard 
native earth, only with the waters of the maternal rivers.” 
(Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, 	
  
  , 16/09/2003). 
 
Kazakhstan’s landscape is largely characterised by the great expanse of the steppe, 
and in this excerpt Nazarbaev personifies the land giving it powers of predestination 
and nurture, with Makhambet portrayed as a plant with roots in the culture, and 
needing the sun, earth and waters of Kazakhstan to thrive. The other imagery 
employed is that of Kazakhstan holding both paternal and maternal relationships with 
Makhambet such that he is portrayed as being literally a son of Kazakhstan, 
produced and shaped by his country. This theme is repeated later in the speech when 
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Nazarbaev describes Makhambet as being a “son of the Steppe”37. By making this 
explicit link with the land itself as the source of Makhambet and his talents, 
Nazarbaev is able to suggest that there is a direct link between the hero and 
Kazakhstan’s present-day inhabitants who can still be moulded by the same 
landscape and trace their roots back to the same ancient steppe culture.  
 
The link between the land and Makhambet’s talents is further emphasised when 
Nazarbaev describes him as being “the last steppe philosopher,”38 thus implying that 
the wisdom and philosophy of the steppe is somehow different from other 
philosophy, thereby emphasising both Makhambet’s origins and his uniqueness.  
 
Another text which strongly identifies the people and their culture with the landscape 
is that describing the publication of a book of Kazakh folk sayings. The title of the 
article, “Gold of the Steppe”, highlights the importance of the landscape, 
metonymically suggesting that it is the steppe itself (rather than the people) which is 
the origin of the rich selection of sayings collected. The report states that 
 
7:65 “In the pages of this collection, you won’t tire of being surprised by the folk 
wisdom and steppe perceptiveness.”  
(Ekspress-K, , , 30/11/2004). 
 
This echoes the ideas expressed by a number of the interview participants that the 
landscape has shaped the character of the people. Here, the words steppe 
“perceptiveness” or “farsightedness” (“ ”) create the 
impression that the open expanses of the steppe result in these characteristics of 
perception and farsightedness being shown by the people moulded by that landscape. 
Similarly, the Shymkent participants make connections between the land and the 
character of the people. One of the teachers quoted in chapter 5 (5:114) in relation to 
the interview participants’ linguistic construction of a national body links the open 
landscape of the steppe with the characteristic of hospitality. Her words are repeated 
below. 
                                                 
37 “!
    "” 
38 “  ##” 
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7:66 “In general our Kazakhs, you can say, if you look at the steppe, it’s so vast and 
boundless and the Kazakh spirit is also like that, hospitable, open.  
 
For the participants who expressed views such as this, the landscape of Kazakhstan 
has shaped the character of its people and the identity traits with which the historical 
people of Kazakhstan were imbued are still evident in the contemporary population, 
thus emphasising the continuity of relationship between land and people. 
 
The ideology of the people of the steppe and their culture being something to be 
admired and emulated and to which today’s Kazakhstanis are connected is also 
expressed in another article dealing with a people’s need for heroes and for links 
with their past. This article was discussed above in relation to the theme of a 
common political past. The author uses the phrase “steppe-dweller” twice within this 
section of text, which draws attention to the link between the people he describes and 
their physical setting; the people are primarily identified by the landscape in which 
they live.  
 
7:67 “Numerous epic historians, Kazakh poet singers, musicians, story-tellers and 
simple steppe-dwellers from century to century extolled the exploits of their 
ancestors. All this couldn’t but settle in the memory of generations… the simple 
people made their own heroes from the people. Thus, the previous epoch 
accomplished a great work in order that every steppe-dweller would be filled with 
love for his ancestors and his roots.” 
(Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, )    
? 28/10/2005). 
 
The idea that the steppe-dwellers remembered their predecessor’s achievements 
“from age to age”, or “from century to century”39 engenders a sense of seamless 
continuity and of a timeless bond between the land and the people which in turn has 
entered the consciousness of many generations as a collective memory identifying 
the people with their past in that place. Later in the article the author suggests that the 
problem with many contemporary young people is that they have lost this collective 
memory and don’t ask the questions “who are we?”, “where have we come from?”, 
or appreciate the sacrifices of past generations to give them the status they enjoy 
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today. This suggests a paradox in that the link with past generations and with the 
land is portrayed as being inherited and yet also as being something which must be 
sought after and discovered through questioning. The author describes meeting a 
group of young (ethnically Kazakh) people with little respect for the Kazakh 
language and expresses the opinion that if they were to read Kazakhstanskaya 
Pravda and become familiar with an article published there about the military 
exploits of past heroes then 
 
7:68 “probably they would ask themselves the simple questions: ‘who are we?’, 
‘where have we come from?’ They would think about whether they had become so 
relaxed, well dressed and good-looking themselves or whether such a life had been 
prepared for them by the previous generations of heroic warriors who, in the years of 
the ‘Aktaban-shybirindi’ (Great disaster) scattered the whole of Semirech with their 
bones.” 
(Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, ) ,   
? 28/10/2005). 
 
In this article, despite the fact that the main text is in Russian, the author uses the 
Kazakh label for the “Great disaster” (“2 ”) first and gives the 
Russian in parenthesis afterwards. This serves to highlight that it was a Kazakh 
disaster experienced by the Kazakh people and named by them as such. It presents 
Kazakh as the medium through which ‘Kazakhness’ is experienced and reveals the 
irony that, without knowledge of the Kazakh language, the young people in question 
would not know this name for an important part of their own past and hence are, in a 
way, cut off from it. 
 
There is a strong theme of continuity expressed in a number of the newspaper articles 
in which the land and continuous habitation on the territory of what is now 
Kazakhstan is used to construct a discourse of timelessness and legitimacy for the 
state and its eponymous population and culture.  
 
The article quoted above creates the impression that for Kazakhs to be cut off from 
their language is simultaneously to be cut off from their people’s past and hence 
from their identity; they can no longer answer the fundamental questions of identity, 
                                                                                                                                          
39 “   ” 
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“who are we?”, “where have we come from?” and they have lost the group memory 
of the steppe people passed through the generations from “age to age” which 
provides answers to these questions.  
 
A discourse constructing Kazakhstan as a land whose unproblematic existence 
reaches back into the ancient past such that the present-day republic has a coherent 
history stretching from then until the present is also evident in an article from 
Ekspress-K quoted earlier (/   “$…”, 01/10/2004). 
The piece reports on the publication of a collection of Kazakh oral literature 
originally collected by Russian and European travellers in the region.† 
 
In this text the author describes the examples of Kazakh oral literature as “immortal” 
(“
”), creating an impression of a timeless culture which had always 
been there and would never end, something to be treated with due respect, “carefully 
and tremulously”40. The ideology of a timeless land and culture existing in the distant 
past but directly connected to the present is also expressed in the use of the pronoun 
“-” in reference to the Kazakh land, “this Kazakh land”41. The land that those 
travellers visited is emphasised as being this land, the same land that is still 
Kazakhstan today, furthermore it is Kazakh land, it belonged to that people then as it 
does today. In this way the land is established as standing for the timelessness and 
permanence of Kazakhstan and the Kazakh people.  
 
This discourse of continuity, of a Kazakhstan that has always existed, is also evident 
in an article from Liter describing a conference discussing the needs of the Kazakh 
diaspora. It is reported that one family living in Britain wishes to be able to return to 
Kazakhstan so that their children can get to know their “historical homeland” 
(“ ”). It states that 
 
7:70 “Beyshir Zhanaltai, a Kazakh from England, is ready to leave prosperous 
Europe and move to the homeland of his ancestors”. 
                                                 
40 “  ” 
41 “-  
” 
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(Liter, ,   , 30/09/2005). 
 
It is this unproblematical correlation between the “homeland of his ancestors” and 
the present-day Republic of Kazakhstan which constitutes part of the discourse of 
permanence and legitimacy for Kazakhstan under discussion. It is even more readily 
apparent in another Liter article (0 

 – 
! 28/01/05) reporting a 
meeting between president Nazarbaev and members of the council charged with 
realising the government’s programme for preserving and promoting the country’s 
cultural heritage. This article was quoted above in the discussion of a common 
political past (7:28). 
 
This article also describes a direct link between the territory of what is now 
Kazakhstan in ancient times and the republic today as well as between the inhabitants 
of that land both then and now and asserts a continuity of cultural values associated 
with the territory. In this way the gradual emergence of Kazakhstan as a recognisable 
geographic, cultural or political unit distinct from others in the region is forgotten. 
Instead a rhetorical strategy of continuity is constructed in which Kazakhstan and its 
people are presented as timeless and ever-present.  
 
A similar strategy is used in Nazarbaev’s speech commemorating Makhambet and 
Isatay. Discussing the Soviet era, the president states that 
 
7:71 “It is impossible to measure the loss which, at the time of the thoughtless anti-
national policy was brought to our blessed land, to our cities and settlements which, 
long ago served as the cradle of the original steppe civilisation.”  
(Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, 	
  
  , 16/09/2003). 
 
Thus, by describing Kazakhstan as “serving as the cradle of the original steppe 
civilisation”42, Nazarbaev not only claims a cultural status for Kazakhstan over the 
other states of Central Asia as being the origin of steppe culture but also constructs a 
direct and continuous link between that ancient civilisation and the towns and 
settlements of contemporary Kazakhstan.  
                                                 
42 “
  
  $$” 
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The theme of continuity is expressed very prominently in this speech. Nazarbaev 
describes this sense of continuity and the importance of history for today’s citizens as 
being very much rooted in the land itself, which provides reminders of what and who 
have gone before. This section of the text of Nazarbaev’s speech was also discussed 
above in relation to the construction of a common political past (see also quote 7:19 
in Appendix C). 
 
Nazarbaev links the physical reminders of history in the surrounding landscape such 
as burial mounds on the steppe with the deeds of specific individuals chosen to 
represent the “ancient Kazakh people”. Again the Kazakh people is presented as 
having been in recognisable existence since ancient times and a direct connection is 
made between that ancient people and the present day state.  
 
The theme of continuity is repeatedly reinforced by Nazarbaev’s numerous 
references to the fact that the independence Kazakhstan enjoys today was something 
which today’s Kazakhs’ ancestors, Isatay and Makhambet among them, fought for 
and dreamt of.  
 
7:72 “Nursultan Nazarbaev emphasised that a people which has fought for freedom, 
is worthy of respect, and the Kazakh people has always defended its freedom in 
battle.”  
 
“The head of state emphasised that the greatest property of our people is its 
independence, and our ancestors knew this well, it was in the name of it that they 
fought and died. Therefore today monuments are being erected in all corners of our 
republic – this is a low bow from our generation to the spirit and memory of those 
who fell in the name of and on the path to independence. Especially now, when we 
live in a free country, about which our great ancestors long dreamt, we must not 
forget that our most noble and treasured aim is the national spirit” 
(Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, 	
  
  , 16/09/2003). 
 
Here the president uses the imagery of the “path to independence”43, which is again a 
way of constructing a discourse of continuity, suggesting that the country has been 
following a purposeful direction throughout its history and has now in some sense 
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‘arrived’ as an independent state. Today’s Kazakhstan is the fulfilment of the dream 
of the people’s ancestors whose tangible presence is still felt in the shape of 
monuments now appearing ‘in all corners of the republic’ providing a sense of 
continuity between their time and the present, between their struggle and today’s 
independence.  
 
The same theme of continuity between past, present and future generations is also 
emphasised later in the speech. Nazarbaev again describes independence as a dream 
for past heroes which has now been fulfilled.  
 
7:73 “Isatay and Makhambet  dreamt about the freedom and independence of their 
country, about unity and solidarity and today we, their descendents, admire the spirit 
of the great freedom fighters and our duty before our ancestors and before our 
children – is to always hold high the banner of freedom…”  
 
“Now, we can say with confidence: yes, today the great dream, for which our great 
ancestor Makhambet lived and fought has come true. His people has got rid of the 
fetters of slavery and become the fully empowered master of its own fate.” 
(Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, 	
  
  , 16/09/2003). 
 
In the above texts Nazarbaev presents Kazakhstan and the Kazakh people as being 
eternal, having existed together since ancient times. Elsewhere in his speech the 
president presents certain aspects of the Kazakh character as being similarly 
immortal, rooted in pre-history and still evident today. 
 
Nazarbaev constructs a discourse of ancient provenance for the Kazakh people and 
describes that people’s characteristic love for freedom as being something permanent 
and unchangeable; an “indomitable, ineradicable love for freedom”44 and their 
character as being “stoical” (“
 ”). These character traits are 
described as being the reason for the people’s continued existence and even 
prosperity despite the struggles they are described as having had over the centuries. 
                                                                                                                                          




   ” 
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The Kazakh people is thus constructed as being immortal and victorious due to its 
own inherent virtues and despite great hardships.  
 
The president further highlights these characteristics by stressing the continuity of 
the struggle for freedom, describing it as ongoing through the era of Makhambet and 
beyond into the years of the Soviet Union.† 
 
By stressing the continuity of the struggle for independence, Nazarbaev adds 
legitimacy to the claim that the independent Republic of Kazakhstan today is the 
fulfilment of a dream and achievement of an aim that the Kazakh people have fought 
for since their origins in the ancient past. It is part of the theme of immortality, 
continuity and consistency constructed around Kazakhstan and the Kazakh people.  
 
A similar immortality of character is claimed for the Kazakhs and their culture by 
Nazarbaev in this speech when he describes how cultural heroes, “giants of the spirit 
of the people”,45 have left an “indelible mark on the homeland’s history”46 and will 
“remain forever in the people’s memory”47. Similarly, he describes the military-
philosophical reflections of another hero, Dosmanbet, as an “inexhaustible mine of 
folk wisdom, an inextinguishable life-giving spring for the national spirit”48. By 
choosing words such as “indelible”, “forever”, “inexhaustible” and 
“inextinguishable”, Nazarbaev constructs an ideology of permanence and continuity 
for the Kazakh people.  
 
However, there is a discourse running counter to this which is expressed even within 
the same speech by Nazarbaev. This is the discourse of cultural loss and destruction 
of the colonial and Soviet eras. This theme was discussed above in relation to the 
linguistic construction of a common political past. As discussed above, Nazarbaev 
states that it is impossible to measure the cultural loss to Kazakhstan brought about 
                                                 
45 “  ” 
46 “
    ” 
47 “    
” 
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during the Soviet era (he himself takes no responsibility for that loss despite his 
connection to Soviet rule). The two competing discourses are evident both in this 
speech and in other newspaper articles. Within this particular text Nazarbaev makes 
some attempt to resolve the contradiction by asserting that the people themselves are 
the true culture-carriers and that as long as the Kazakh people as an ethnic group 
survive then the continuity and permanence associated with them are also preserved. 
 
7:75 “Somebody will lift their hand to burn ancient books and manuscripts. Someone 
will take on their soul the sin of destroying the store of libraries. But if the people 
live healthy and unharmed, the creator, the careful guardian, the legal possessor and 
worthy inheritor, taking from generations of ancestors the centuries-old luggage of 
the cultural-historical accumulation of the nation, then nobody can ever be capable of 
either destroying or taking away from it these, its riches.” 
(Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, 	
  
  , 16/09/2003). 
 
In this way Nazarbaev is, to a certain extent, able to reconcile the competing 
discourses of cultural destruction and continuity by asserting that the people 
themselves are the unbroken link with the cultural riches of the past such that the 
culture can still be regarded as immortal despite the physical destruction of the 
products of that culture. This sense of continuity, carried in the character of the 
people themselves, is further reinforced later in the speech. Here the president again 
emphasises the unceasing nature of the Kazakhs’ fight for independence and the 
continuity of values he says has been preserved through time. 
 
7:76 “Freedom and Equality, Sovereignty and Independence… To judge by the 
position of these four pillars of our national life, then the voice of Makhambet is to 
be heard, not just from him himself, but on behalf of the whole nation, not just from 
his time, but on behalf of centuries of Kazakh history. The dream about freedom and 
independence of the Kazakhs was not killed along with Makhambet, but like a 
phoenix from the ashes, rose up and called to the fight also in the year 1916 and in 
the year 1986.”  
(Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, 	
  
  , 16/09/2003). 
 
Following this Nazarbaev links the ancient past, recorded history and the present 
day. He adds further to the sense of timelessness by describing Makhambet as “our 













”), claiming that he has not disappeared but is 
effectively still present because of the relevancy of his now-realised aims of freedom 
and independence. Nazarbaev also links Makhambet strongly to the land itself saying 
that he came to defend his native land’s “desecrated honour”49.† 
 
From the foregoing it is clear that the landscape and territory of Kazakhstan play a 
prominent role in the legitimising discourses of permanence and continuity 
constructed in relation to the republic. The speech given by Nazarbaev at the opening 
of the architectural-memorial complex in honour of Makhambet and Isatay has been 
analysed in some detail as it is a particularly clear example of the linguistic 
construction of this discourse and also shows how Nazarbaev negotiates the potential 
problem of the concurrent counter discourse of cultural loss. The discourse of 
continuity of residence on the territory of Kazakhstan and of today’s independence 
being the fulfilment of present-day Kazakhs’ ancestors’ hopes and struggles is also 
apparent in the contributions of the Shymkent interviewees and thus constitutes an 
important identity discourse for today’s Kazakhstanis, particularly those who are 
ethnically Kazakh.  
 
7.7 Media Context: Summary 
The review of a selection of articles from the on-line Kazakhstani press presented in 
this chapter reveals a significant degree of correlation between the discourses 
concerning language and national identity presented there and those present in the 
interview participants’ responses. The state-sponsored ideology of the centrality of 
the Kazakh language and culture to the identity of present day Kazakhstan has been 
highlighted in many of the articles. So too has the potentially conflicting ideology of 
multi-ethnic harmony and acceptance. The importance of a suitable interpretation of 
the territory’s history which highlights the ancient provenance of the Kazakh people 
in that place and presents Kazakhstan’s independence as being the result of 
generations of continuous struggle towards that aim has also been shown to recur in 
numerous articles. The presence of these same themes in the individual interview 
                                                 
49  “   
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contributions provides evidence of the success of Nazarbaev in shaping key aspects 
of state ideology and identity. However, the individual participants are not merely 
passive recipients of state ideology but respond to and reinterpret these themes as 
they themselves participate in the linguistic construction of a national identity. The 
construction of a Kazakhstani state identity, including the establishment and 
maintenance of group norms and boundaries and identification of groups relevant for 
comparison is thus an ongoing process in which media, state and individual linguistic 
output are mutually influential and collaborative. 
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8 State Policy 
8.1 Introduction 
In order to better understand the context in which the discourses explored in the 
media extracts and interviewees’ contributions are situated, it is necessary briefly to 
examine specific aspects of the constitution and government policy towards 
languages and language use within Kazakhstan. Accordingly, this chapter 
investigates some state legislation and the responses of the Senators and MPs who 
were interviewed in relation to the construction and presentation of a state identity 
for independent Kazakhstan. A fuller discussion of government language policy was 
given in section 2.13. 
 
8.2 The Constitution 
The constitution currently in effect in Kazakhstan was ratified in January 1995 and 
replaced the first constitution of 1993 which had been drawn up following 
Kazakhstan becoming an independent state.  
 
The introduction to the constitution states 
 
8:1 “We the people of Kazakhstan, united by a common historic fate, creating a state 
on the indigenous Kazakh land, considering ourselves a peace loving and civil 
society, dedicated to the ideals of freedom, equality and concord, wishing to take a 
worthy place in the world community, realizing our high responsibility before the 
present and future generations, proceeding from our sovereign right, accept this 
Constitution.”1 
 
There are clear parallels here with some of the discourses highlighted in the 
discussions of both the media extracts and the individual interviews. The ideology of 
present day Kazakhstan being situated on the historical territory of the Kazakh 
people with a concomitant emphasis on continuity and a strong identification 
between the history and culture of this ethnic group and the present day republic is 
one which was frequently encountered in the discourses of both the newspaper 
                                                 
1 See Appendix E for Russian original of quotes 
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extracts and the interview participants. The statement here that the present day 
Republic of Kazakhstan has been created on “indigenous Kazakh land” indicates a 
prior claim on the part of the Kazakhs to the state and hence a leading role for them 
as an ethnic group in forging the nature and identity of the modern state. It also 
manages to imply the presence of another frequently encountered discourse, that of 
the Kazakhs’ hospitality – now extended such that by asserting that the state exists 
on what is the Kazakh’s land they are presented as ‘hosting’ an entire multi-ethnic 
state on ‘their’ land.  
 
Similarly, and linked to the idea of Kazakh hospitality, the dedication to the ideals of 
“freedom, equality and concord” is echoed in the strong discourse of inter-ethnic 
harmony expressed by many of the interviewees and frequently idealised as a 
positive aspect of Kazakhstani ingroup identity in the media extracts. 
 
That Kazakhstan wishes to “take a worthy place in the world” is a phrase evocative 
of the discourses discussed in previous chapters relating to the desire on the part of 
both individuals and the state for Kazakhstan to maintain and increase its current 
economic success and become a more prominent member of the world community. 
The less overtly expressed aspect of this ambition (in the context of the constitution 
if not by the interviewees) is for Kazakhstan to become more successful and achieve 
a higher status than particular outgroups relevant for comparison, notably Russia and 
the other former Soviet republics of Central Asia.  
 
Thus the opening paragraph of the constitution lays out a desired ideology of a state 
identity for Kazakhstan which has successfully become a prominent and pervasive 
part of discourses encountered in other contexts including those of the media and of 
individual interaction. This ideology is also apparent in the comments about the 
emerging national identity made by the MPs and Senators interviewed. When asked 
about the development and main characteristics of a Kazakhstani identity these 
participants frequently engaged in the discourses of the centrality of the Kazakhs as a 
group and of the importance of openness and unity between ethnic groups and 
increasing the status of Kazakhstan discussed above. The theme of independence 
 295 
being the result of a long historical struggle and the relevance of other post Soviet 
states for comparison which are seen in the media and interview material are also 
evident here. 
 
8:2 “I think that generally all the republics of the former USSR are characterised by a 
feeling of national identity because they all fought for their statehood over many 
centuries… there’s a wish that this state would last forever. But at the same time I 
think it’s also openness to others… a striving for unity… the language of course first 
and foremost. I would say probably traditions, history, culture uh, and probably the 
traditions of our ancestors, traditions of our ancestors first of all because when we 
talk of independence we immediately talk of those who stood so much for 
independence… we talk about Kenessaret, all those who fought for independence, of 
Benbaret Jungari and others.”  
 
8:3 “First of all it’s love for this state, secondly love for its culture, language, 
traditions and thirdly it’s a benevolent relationship with other nationalities and 
peoples and people of different faiths, and thirdly taking part in the development of 
Kazakhstan in its economic and other aspects.”† 
 
The consistency with which these themes are discussed highlights their role as core 
aspects of the state ideology of a Kazakhstani national identity. As we have seen, the 
same themes are repeated and re-interpreted at different levels within Kazakhstani 
society and in this way are becoming established aspects of an understanding of 
group belonging in Kazakhstan.  
 
8.3 Articles on Language in the Constitution 
The constitution also lays out the legal foundation of the state position with regard to 
language and language use within the republic. Article 7 of Section I (General 
Provisions) of the constitution states that 
 
8:7 “1. The state language of the Republic of Kazakhstan shall be the Kazak 
language. 
 2. In state institutions and local self-administrative bodies the Russian language 
shall be officially used on equal grounds along with the Kazak language. 
3. The state shall promote conditions for the study and development of the 
languages of the people of Kazakhstan.” 
 
This position is in accord with the ideology outlined above such that the language of 
the ethnic Kazakhs is granted the highest status as the sole state language of the 
 296
republic. The government is committed to a top-down, status planning approach 
favouring Kazakh above other languages in use in the republic. 
 
This stance is consolidated by a later article of the constitution (Article 41 point 2) 
which stipulates that only a citizen with “a perfect command of the state language2” 
is eligible for the office of president. In this way the ideology of the primacy of the 
Kazakh ethnic group is upheld.  
 
However, in constant tension with this is the ideology of Kazakhstan as hospitable 
and welcoming and of inter-ethnic accord and peace which requires an 
acknowledgement of the role and rights of other ethnic groups’ languages within the 
republic. Thus point three of article seven cited above stipulates that the state will 
promote the study and development of these other languages despite their lack of 
official status. Such an ill-defined commitment to support other group languages 
whilst not granting them equality with Kazakh is a reflection of the inherent tension 
between the ideology of the primacy of the Kazakh people and that of the multi-
ethnic and harmonious nature of Kazakhstani society and the building of a national 
identity defined on a civic rather than an ethnic basis.  
 
Similarly, in point two of article seven cited above, the recognition granted to the 
ongoing role of the Russian language is a reflection of the tension between the 
ideology of the primacy of Kazakh and the pragmatic need to recognise the fact that 
many of the personnel currently in governmental positions at least, are most 
comfortable and competent operating through Russian rather than Kazakh. That 
Russian should be “officially used on equal grounds” with the Kazakh language and 
yet not have equal status with that language is once again a direct result of the 
conflict between ideologies of Kazakh nationalisation of the state and ideologies 
valuing multi-ethnicity and openness to other groups. It is also an acknowledgement 
of the fact that in order to achieve the stated aim of Kazakhstan taking a “worthy 
place in the world community” (8:1) and hence growing in international status and 
competitiveness, maintaining use of and competence in a language of international 
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status such as Russian by a large proportion of the population and in particular its 
elite, can only be beneficial.  
 
Subsequent articles in the constitution consolidate the ideology of openness and 
recognition of cultural and ethnic diversity within the republic. Article 14 point 2 in 
Section II (The Individual and Citizen) states that 
 
8:8 “No one shall be subject to any discrimination for reasons of origin, social, 
property status, occupation, sex, race, nationality, language, attitude towards religion, 
convictions, place of residence or any other circumstances.” 
 
Further, Article 19 point 2 states that 
 
8:9 “Everyone shall have the right to use his native language and culture, to freely 
choose the language of communication, education, instruction and creative 
activities.” 
 
Similarly, Article 39 point 2 stipulates that 
 
8:10 “Any actions capable of upsetting inter-ethnic concord shall be deemed 
unconstitutional.” 
 
As with the provision for the “development” of languages in article 7 above, further 
definition of what actions will be construed as upsetting inter-ethnic concord or of 
what it means in practice for a citizen to have the right to choose the language of 
instruction, for example, is absent from the constitution.  
 
8.4 Languages in the Republic of Kazakhstan 
Such clarification is left to subsequent legislation such as the law ‘On Languages in 
the Republic of Kazakhstan’ which was passed in July 1997. The introduction to this 
law states that  
 
                                                                                                                                          




8:11 “The present law establishes the legal basis of the functioning of languages in 
the Republic of Kazakhstan, and the responsibilities of the state in founding 
conditions for their study and development, providing for the simultaneous respect 
for all languages used in Kazakhstan without exception.”  
 
Article 4 of this law decrees that the state language of the republic is Kazakh. It 
further establishes that 
 
8:12 “The state language is the language of state administration, legislation, legal 
proceedings and clerical work operating in all spheres of societal relations in the 
whole territory of the state.  
It is the duty of every citizen of the Republic of Kazakhstan to be fluent in the state 
language which is an important factor in the consolidation of the people of 
Kazakhstan. 
The government of any state, local representative and executive organs are obliged 
to:  
do all possible to develop the state language in the Republic of Kazakhstan and 
strengthen its international authority;  
to create all necessary organisations and material and technical conditions for all 
citizens of the Republic of Kazakhstan to be able to freely master the state language 
without charge;  
to provide help to the Kazakh diaspora to preserve and develop their native 
language.” 
 
Thus, the government’s essentialising ideology is again apparent as this document 
firmly establishes the Kazakh language as an integral part of the identity envisaged 
for the republic. It is a language which all citizens have a duty to know as a mark of 
group unity and belonging and the international authority of which must be 
increased. As noted above though, this identity function of the Kazakh language is 
balanced by competing markers of group belonging; multi-ethnic harmony and 
openness to diversity. Therefore the next provision of the legislation, article 5, is for 
the official use of Russian in equality with Kazakh in state organisations and the 
executives of local self-administration3. Subsequently, article 6, entitled ‘Care of the 
state for languages’, gives details of the state policy towards other ethnic groups’ 
languages in Kazakhstan.   
 
                                                 
3 “* 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8:13 “Every citizen of the Republic of Kazakhstan has the right to use his native 
language, to the free choice of language of interaction, upbringing, instruction and 
creativity. 
The state cares about creating the conditions for the study and development of the 
languages of the people of Kazakhstan. 
In areas of compact habitation of national groups measures can be implemented for 
their languages to be used.” 
 
Whilst the guarantee of the right of all citizens to use his or her native language in 
personal interaction, upbringing and creativity as provided by this article is fairly 
straightforward, the provision of instruction in the native language is less so. This 
appears to be possible only in “areas of compact habitation of national groups”. 
Some further detail regarding this aspect of language policy is given in article 16 of 
the act which covers language in the area of education.† 
 
This article makes it clear that in terms of status planning in education, the principal 
provision for linguistic development and study is reserved for the Kazakh language 
and provision is made to a lesser extent for Russian and still less for other languages 
in use in the republic. A similar situation obtains in relation to the areas of science 
and culture and of the mass media. With regard to the latter sphere article 18 states 
that the volume of programmes in Kazakh must not be less in time than the sum of 
the volume of programmes in other languages.† 
 
This article once again reveals the state ideology of promoting Kazakh as the main 
language with which the republic is to be identified. The fact that Kazakh might not 
necessarily play such a role without intervention is demonstrated by the fact that the 
“necessary linguistic environment” is something which the government must use 
legislation to ‘create’. That there is some resistance to this intervention is revealed in 
comments made by some of the senators and MPs who were interviewed in Astana.  
 
8:16 “…but again what does the mass media do? Watchable times are given over to 
the Russian language, unwatchable times, during the night for instance, or, are given 
to the Kazakh language and the airwaves are filled up. The law isn’t actually 
broken… Our people is a Russified population therefore they do it according to the 
population, although it’s also not right, they need to fulfil the law. They fulfil it but 
you see how it is carried out. After twelve at night for instance they put on all the 
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Kazakh language programmes. Who watches them? Or they put on music in Kazakh 
until six in the morning. Who listens to that or watches it?” 
 
Whilst the MP quoted above acknowledges that television companies make decisions 
based on the nature of the ‘Russified’ population of Kazakhstan, others interviewed 
attribute the actions of the media companies simply to resistance to government 
policy such that they make a fuss about (8:17) “freedom of speech”† and (8:18) 
“make things difficult” †. This reveals the way in which the inherent tension between 
an ideology of the centrality of Kazakh and an acceptance of Russian (and to a lesser 
extent other group languages) results in the place of these languages being contested 
and negotiated by those in a position to influence the linguistic environment of the 
republic.  
 
8.5 The State Programme on the Functioning and Development of 
Languages for 2001-2010 
In February 2001 a decree of the president entitled ‘The state programme on the 
functioning and development of languages for 2001-2010’ was issued. This 
document, which was produced to comply with and further develop the provisions on 
language in the constitution and the law on languages, deals with both status and 
corpus aspects of language planning. It declares that there are three foundational 
aims associated with language function and development within the republic.  
 
8:19 “The strategy for the development of the languages of the peoples of 
Kazakhstan defines three foundational aims: the broadening and strengthening of the 
social and communicative functions of the state language; the preservation of the 
cultural functions of the Russian language; the development of the languages of 
ethnic groups” 
 
These aims correlate closely with the dual emphasis established in the other 
legislative documents discussed on a Kazakh nationalising programme balanced by 
measures designed to promote the state’s hospitable and peacefully multi-ethnic 
character. The majority of the text of the document is concerned with the first of 
these aims, that of extending the scope of the Kazakh language within society and 
describes various key areas in which this is a particular priority.  
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The principal of these is the functioning of Kazakh as the main language of state 
administration and clerical work at all levels of government service. The document 
cites the lack of knowledge of Kazakh on the part of many civil servants as being one 
of the main problems to be addressed. The importance of a planned and gradual 
transition to operation in Kazakh is highlighted. Moreover, plans are outlined for the 
provision of teaching of the Kazakh language for staff and the establishment of 
incentives to learn this language and clear sanctions for infringement of relevant 
language requirements - Cooper’s acquisition planning (1989: 45). The same is true 
for staff in public services with the spheres of healthcare, trade, transport and 
communications highlighted in this context. It is planned for knowledge of Kazakh to 
become compulsory for all employees in these areas of work. 
 
Another area in which the document focuses on the lack of satisfactory levels of 
knowledge and use of Kazakh is that of the country’s armed forces. Emphasising the 
importance of this sphere it is written that the use of Kazakh in the armed forces 
(8:20) “is a question of the strengthening of national security4”. It is noted that due to 
“historical circumstances” the use of Russian tends to predominate amongst staff but 
stipulates that officers and sergeants should be required to learn Kazakh and that 
provision should be made to facilitate this. 
 
A similar emphasis on the importance of Kazakh as an integral part of the desired 
identity of the state is found in relation to the sphere of international affairs. In this 
context the state language is described as being an (8:21) “important attribute of state 
sovereignty5” and that therefore Kazakh must be used in international meetings.  
 
The education system is focussed on in some detail in the document. It is stated that 
although the share of Kazakh as a medium of instruction in education is increasing it 
still has not reached a satisfactory level in all stages of the education process. The 
need for more Kazakh language pre-schools is mentioned in particular. It is also 
noted that the quality of teaching in Kazakh language and minority language schools 
                                                 
4  8:20 “ 
  $ ” 
5 8:21 “ 
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is often not as high as that in Russian language schools. These themes are also 
encountered in the media extracts discussed and in the individual interviews as is the 
theme, also covered in the present document, of the need for new and better quality 
textbooks to serve the educational needs of the republic as an independent and 
modernising state.  
 
These themes are also evident in the interviews with senators and MPs. Many of 
them see the transformation of the education system to suit the ideological needs of 
the independent republic as an important part of state-building and one which 
inevitably takes time to enact. Several senators contrast the Russo-centric ideology of 
the Soviet education system with the drive to increase the number of Kazakh schools 
and present school subjects in a manner more suited to the present linguistic and 
cultural priority of promoting Kazakh group markers. Also, several of the 
government interviewees highlight the importance of teaching history in a manner in 
keeping with the ideology of Kazakhstan being the historical territory of the Kazakhs 
and of a long struggle for independence; themes also apparent in the media 
discourses examined in chapter 7. 
 
8:22 “During the Union we had schools and teaching and instruction and textbooks 
which were all in Russian, now it is being translated into the state language. Schools 
are being opened with state language medium of instruction, in this direction there is 
progress.”  
 
8:23 “At the present time they are reconsidering and have already reconsidered most 
courses of study, they are reviewing textbooks and it’s not a secret that during Soviet 
times we were only able to study the history of the Soviet Union but mainly the 
history of the Soviet Union was the history of Russia. A state, a state like Kazakhstan 
only began to study its history in sufficient detail from the moment it acquired 
independence. Therefore it is very important here to raise up this state identity on 
those historical examples which have been, on the experiences which Kazakhstan has 
gone through, on those successes which we have already achieved”† 
 
The fact that these themes are so prominent in the Senators’ and MPs’ discourse as 
well as in that of the Shymkent interviewees and the media extracts shows that they 
are both pervasive and important in the current atmosphere of state-building and 
identity negotiation in Kazakhstan. 
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The need for an increase in both the quantity and quality of Kazakh language output 
is also discussed in the document in relation to the mass media as it is acknowledged 
that this is one of the areas in which Russian still tends to predominate. It is stated 
that the amount and standard of current output in the state language (8:29) “cannot 
satisfy the requirements of sovereign Kazakhstan6”, thus reinforcing the ideology of 
Kazakh as the right and necessary language for independent Kazakhstan.  
 
In relation to promoting greater knowledge and use of the Kazakh language amongst 
the population as a whole (in accordance with articles 7 and 93 of the constitution) 
the document outlines plans to provide access for all citizens to a system of free 
Kazakh language courses of a suitably high quality.  
 
The document states the need, in relation to many of the areas of society outlined 
above, for ongoing corpus planning through the development of a modern and 
standardised terminology in the state language. A state terminological commission is 
responsible for research and publication in this area for the (8:30) “broadening of the 
possibilities of the Kazakh language in representing new socio-cultural realities7”. 
The commission has published a series of terminological dictionaries dealing with 
various branches of knowledge. Similarly, the legislation states the need for the 
(8:31) “regulation and restoration of historical names8” of regions, places and 
organisations within the republic. This provision in particular exemplifies the 
ideology of Kazakhification of the republic and of the justification of this programme 
through a discourse of historical legitimacy. That regions, cities, villages and 
organisations are to have their Kazakh names ‘restored’ in accordance with history 
creates a sense that the ‘true’ identity of the state as a physical and social entity is 
best and most legitimately expressed in the Kazakh language. 
 
                                                 
6 8:29 “ 
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   )” 
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The document further details the need for the provision of a unified system of norms 
for contemporary literary Kazakh and regulation of the process and principles of 
word formation for the modern language - Haugen’s selection of a norm and 
codification of form (1966: 17) - as another of the tasks to be addressed. In order to 
achieve this aim the creation of an orthographical council is proposed, the remit of 
which would also include improving the alphabet and orthography of the language as 
necessary. The legislation also highlights the role of the country’s Institute of 
Linguistics in addressing these and similar tasks.  
 
It is clear from this summary of the main provisions of the legislation concerning the 
‘functioning and development of languages’ that the promotion of the Kazakh 
language in all areas of society is a high priority for the state. However, as in the 
other pieces of legislation discussed this priority is balanced to a certain extent by the 
ideologies expressed concurrently of acknowledging and providing for the multi-
ethnic nature of Kazakhstan by protecting both the Russian language and the 
languages of minority ethnic groups resident in the republic.  
 
To this end the legislation under discussion does also confirm the state’s 
commitment to protecting the use of languages other than Kazakh. It is stated that 
language policy is (8:32) “one of the most socially meaningful aspects of the life of 
the state in as much as it enables the strengthening of civic accord in society and its 
further consolidation9”. The ideology of such civic accord and of the peaceful 
cohabitation in the republic of representatives of many languages and cultures is one 
frequently encountered in the media (see, for example, section 7.2 quote 7:10 and 
following) and individual discourses (sections 4.2.1; 4.2.4; 4.3.1) discussed above 
(and see also quote 8:34 below). There is, in the document, a guarantee for Russian 
in its function as a language of official use alongside Kazakh in organs of state and 
local administration. The legislation also pledges provision for the continued use of 
Russian in areas of science, education, culture and the mass media – all areas in 
                                                 
9 8:32 “
 $    
   $ 
 
   ,         
  $” 
 305 
which it is stated that use of Russian currently tends to predominate. However, in the 
case of the present legislation, as with the constitution and law on languages, the 
provisions made for the protection and promulgation of Russian and other languages 
are considerably less than those made for the promotion of Kazakh.  
 
It is written that (8:33) “the state gives help to the languages of all the diasporas 
living in the territory of Kazakhstan10”. The legislation confirms the need to honour 
the guarantee given in the constitution that citizens are to be free in their choice of 
language of communication, upbringing, study and creativity. The main provision 
planned for minority languages discussed within the document is support for the 
system of Sunday schools which provide linguistic and cultural instruction for 
representatives of minority ethnic groups. There is mention of a fund to provide for 
such schools materially and of supporting the training of specialists to teach minority 
group languages in educational institutions. It is also asserted that the state will 
support the creation of conditions for the functioning of minority languages in the 
spheres of culture and the mass media.  
 
The multi-ethnic yet peaceful nature of Kazakhstani society is also highlighted by the 
senators and MPs who were interviewed. For example, when asked to describe the 
people of Kazakhstan several focussed on the stability and accord in society and the 
efforts made by the state to support all ethnic groups in the country. 
 
8:34 “Kazakhstan is a very multinational state… Here in Astana they are starting to 
publish a newspaper which will highlight the activities of the national cultural 
centres and concern itself with questions of inter-ethnic agreement, the development 
of culture, of languages et cetera… it’s one of the features which demonstrates that 
the state pays a great deal of attention to… our strength in ethnic society… it is very 
important to preserve stability, to preserve the culture, to preserve the assurance that 
all the ethnic groups which live here in Kazakhstan have a future.”  
 
8:35 “I would describe them as a very close-knit family, 130 peoples, nationalities 
live in Kazakhstan, co-exist peacefully… we live very closely, therefore we live 
wonderfully.”† 








The discourse of inter-ethnic harmony is manifestly an important one to these 
senators and MPs and accords with that expressed through the state legislation. It is 
clearly therefore a central part of the identity building ideology of the state. The 
government wishes to influence the country’s social and linguistic culture through its 
language policy by promoting the themes of harmony despite diversity and of state 
support for all ethnic groups as positive markers of Kazakhstani ingroup belonging in 
order to engender loyalty to and identification with the state and by extension to the 
personnel that constitute its current governing bodies.  
 
8.6 Introduction of a Supplement to the Decree of the President of the 
Republic of Kazakhstan of 7th February 2001 
A piece of legislation passed in May 2006 was written to supplement the decree of 
2001 discussed above. This document reiterates the key aspects of that decree and 
provides information on its progress as well as details of plans for further 
development and implementation. One such area emphasised is the need to 
implement new technologies in the teaching of Kazakh, utilising audio and visual 
materials as well as computer based courses in the language. Additionally, the 
necessity of a process of standardisation through the development of a universal 
system of testing and evaluation as part of the language teaching programme is 
acknowledged. The focus on the importance of the Kazakh language in the life and 
identity of the state is further underlined by the link made between the “spiritual and 
moral development” of the upcoming generation and the “cultivation of an interest in 
the state language” amongst that generation thereby implying that knowledge of the 
Kazakh language is integral to the spiritual and moral character of a citizen of the 
country. To this end the need for quality provision of literary and artistic materials in 
Kazakh for pre-school and school age children is emphasised. 
 
8:38 “For the purpose of the spiritual-moral development of the upcoming generation 
and the cultivation of its interest in the state language of the country it is necessary to 
pay special attention to the full and qualitative guarantee for children of pre-school 
and school age of artistic and educational literature, methodological materials and 
periodical publications in the Kazakh language.” 
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This document also outlines a timetable for the transition of state administration in 
the country’s various regions to Kazakh with details of those areas to make the 
change during each of the years from 2006 to 2009. 
 
8.7 Measures for the Realisation of the Mission of the President of the 
Republic of Kazakhstan for the Further Improvement of State Language 
Policy 
A further piece of legislation from October 2006 is entitled, ‘Measures for the 
realisation of the mission of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan for the 
further improvement of state language policy’. The principal aim of this document is 
to provide for the formation of a commission for the ‘further development of the 
state language policy’ and, as well as establishing the status and composition of this 
commission, to outline a plan of measures to fulfil the president’s mission regarding 
language policy in the republic. The document itself consists of extracts from a 
speech given by the president to the Assembly of peoples of Kazakhstan detailing his 
vision for state language policy alongside suggested measures for the fulfilment of 
this mission as articulated by Nazarbaev and a stipulated timeframe and ministry or 
agency to be responsible for achieving these goals.  
 
The first three points of the document deal with the promotion of the state language, 
highlighting once again the high priority attached by Nazarbaev to establishing this 
language as the principal linguistic identity marker of the state and all its citizens. 
The areas of state administration and education are again focussed on as priorities for 
improvement in terms of extent of Kazakh use and language teaching provision. A 
subsequent point made by the president calls for Russian and minority language 
organisations and Sunday schools to be sites of Kazakh language teaching and 
promotion. There is a recommendation for the commission to look at questions of 
funding and staffing for such a programme.  
 
The central place of Kazakh in the state identity and in the identity envisaged by 
Nazarbaev for its citizens is further emphasised by later extracts from his speech 




8:39 “We must make every effort for the further development of the state language 




8:40 “The question of state importance is closely connected with patriotism – the 
question of the state language. The state language is a symbol, like the flag, the coat 
of arms and the national anthem, with which the homeland begins. And it is called to 
unite all citizens of the country” 
 
In response to this it is proposed that measures be taken in order to promote (8:41) 
“the formation in the young of a feeling of respect in relation to the state language as 
one of the state symbols11”. This stipulation thus acknowledges the fact that without 
such intervention it is feared that young people will not feel the level of respect 
towards the state language that the government requires and that the growing use of 
Kazakh is not perhaps as natural and driven from below as the state might wish. 
 
When discussing the principal symbols or markers of a Kazakhstani identity a 
number of the government interviewees also mentioned the importance of the state 
language. They highlight the need to promote Kazakh and the knowledge of Kazakh 
so that it can genuinely become a marker of ingroup identity for Kazakhstanis as 
Nazarbaev wishes and, in describing this need they must also address the tension 
thereby created between such policies of Kazakhification and the constitutional 
guarantee of protection and provision for all languages and favoured ideology of 
ethnic diversity and freedom in Kazakhstan.  
 
8:42 “Language must play a uniting role. At the present time on the whole Russian 
fulfils this role. But in as much as in our constitution the state language is Kazakh it 
means we must take measures towards, and we are doing so, in order to raise the 
level and studying of the state language and the application of the state language and 
its dissemination.” 
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8:43 “Of course it’s language, without a doubt, of course it’s the traditions and 
customs which live in our country which develop and continue to have a place… I 
think it’s very important and…those decades when Kazakh didn’t occupy its due 
place in the life of Kazakhstan’s society , it’s probably now over that hurdle and 
going forward now and now the Kazakh language as an expression of the culture of 
the foundational, root nationality living here is now already occupying its place 
more.”  
 
8:44 “In society in the last years the understanding has begun to mature that this state 
is definitely here that it’s the state of Kazakhstan with a state language that must be 
accepted, especially by the young who let’s say join in themselves, they are living 
here and aiming to have a career here, they take hold of the language.”  
 
8:45 “Well language is probably at the foundation of what the state identity is, 
because every nation in the first place identifies itself by language. By language, by 
culture, by certain traditions and all the same language stands in the first place.” † 
 
The use of words such as “mature” and “develop” and of phrases such as “going 
forward” form part of a discourse of consolidation and progress suggesting that 
having achieved independence the state is now undergoing change and restructuring 
and is close to achieving its true linguistic and cultural identity which had hitherto 
been repressed. The idea of Kazakhstan engaging in an ongoing process of identity 
formation is discussed further in relation to the Kazakhstan 2030 document (see 
quote 8:67 and following). The idea of the state having a true identity defined by its 
language is suggested particularly in quote 8:45 which invokes the ideologies of 
essentialism and of universality to legitimise the Kazakhification of the state.   
 
Having established the priority given to the Kazakh language in the identity and 
functioning of the state, the October 2006 document goes on to deal with points 
relating to the Russian language. In order to pursue the aim of continued economic 
growth within the republic and to facilitate citizens’ access to a wider educational 
and informational resource base the president expresses his continued support for the 
use of Russian in Kazakhstan. He states that knowledge of an international language 
such as Russian (8:48) “broadens informational horizons in the modern world12”. 
Nazarbaev envisages that (8:49) “in the foreseeable future, Russian will remain a 
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factor in our competitiveness” and thus “the level of knowledge of the Russian 
language in Kazakhstan must remain high13”. In fact Nazarbaev foresees the 
combination of Kazakh, Russian and English as being part of the country’s future 
development and success.  
 
8:50 “The new generation of Kazakhstanis must be at least trilingual, fluent in the 
Kazakh, Russian and English languages.”  
 
Following this the president goes on to propose the introduction of programmes for 
the intensive study of English within the general education system.  
 
The final point drawn from the president’s speech is his desire for a re-examination 
of the question of a transition for Kazakh from the Cyrillic to the Latin alphabet. The 
document proposes that research into this question be conducted and the experiences 
of other countries to have made a similar change such as Turkey and Uzbekistan (see 
Schlyter 2007 for an account of Uzbekistan’s orthographical reforms) be taken into 
account. The motivation for this possible change is likely to be similar to that behind 
the drive to rename large numbers of places and features according to historic 
Kazakh tradition as discussed above; the change in orthography would further 
enhance the country’s break from its Soviet past and would help establish a new 
identity characterised by a visibly different linguistic environment.  
 
8.8 Plan for the years 2007-2008 for Measures for the Realisation of the State 
Programme for the Functioning and Development of Languages for 2001-
2010 
The ideology of creating a changed language environment for the state as an 
independent republic is also evident in the legislation passed in February 2007 which 
acts as a ‘Plan for 2007-2008 for the realisation of the state programme for the 
functioning and development of languages for 2001-2010’. As well as measures 
similar to those described above in the context of other legislation dealing with the 
ongoing need to extend the use of Kazakh and monitor its introduction in various 
                                                 
13 8:49 “* 

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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 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
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spheres of state and social life, a number of the measures proposed in this document 
deal with the need to continue to develop and publicise a standardised modernisation 
of Kazakh language terminology. Point 27 of the document highlights the need for  
 
8:51 “The creation and regulation of the branches of the terminological sections of 
humanitarian, educational, economic-financial, technical and other spheres by the 
State Terminological Commission.” 
 
Similarly, another area of language planning prioritised in the document is that of the 
ongoing translation of proper names of regions within Kazakhstan into Kazakh and 
of the need to publish these translations as well as the work of the terminological 
commission in a bulletin. The necessity of developing and publishing textbooks, 
methodological materials and dictionaries of various types, including terminological 
dictionaries and those of proper names is also highlighted and budgeted for at a state 
level. Provision is also made for the production of topographical maps in the state 
language. 
 
As in other legislation though, mention is also made of support for Russian and for 
minority languages. Provision is made for television and radio broadcasts (8:52) “in 
the languages of the peoples of Kazakhstan14” and a proposal is made to organise a 
competition to find the best Sunday school in the national cultural centres. There is 
also a proposal to introduce an annual republic festival of the languages of the 
peoples of Kazakhstan and a day of Slavonic literature. Another competition to be 
introduced is for the recital of work by the Kazakh poet Abai by peoples of other 
nationalities and the proposal to teach Kazakh in the Sunday schools of national 
cultural centres is given further backing.  These latter measures again highlight the 
state’s desire to emphasise the cultural importance of Kazakh for all sections of the 
population.  
 
State policy thus consists of a combination of prioritising a change in the visible 
linguistic landscape such that Kazakh is the language of state and of the physical and 
geographical landmarks of the state whilst other languages are protected within 
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Sunday schools and celebrated in festivals promoting harmony and diversity (thus 
predominantly limiting them to relatively safe and unobtrusive spheres of use). In 
this way the government continues to engage in the discourses of Kazakhification of 
the republic alongside conflicting ideologies of celebrating and protecting ethnic, 
linguistic and cultural diversity within the republic.  
 
8.9 Education  
A piece of legislation passed in June 2007 ‘On education’ lays out the basic 
principles of the state policy for education. It is stipulated in this document that all 
educational organisations must teach knowledge of Kazakh as the state language, as 
well as teaching Russian and one foreign language. The right, outlined in the 
constitution, to education in other native languages is, according to this document, 
provided for where possible by educational organisations, classes and groups 
operating in the relevant languages.  
 
8:53 “The right to receive education in the native language is provided for by the 
creation of appropriate educational organisations, classes, and groups where they and 
the conditions for their functioning are possible.”  
 
In this way the emphasis and ideology of the educational system is consistent with 
those observed in other legislation dealing with language although the proviso that 
education is available in minority languages “where possible” is a distinct step away 
from the rhetoric of linguistic equality in the constitution. 
 
8.10 Kazakhstan 2030 
With the approach of the year 2000 Nazarbaev prepared a programme of 
development to be presented to the country laying out his vision for Kazakhstan up 
until the year 2030. The main aim expressed for the Kazakhstan 2030 programme is 
that of the (8:54) “prosperity, security and ever growing welfare of all 
Kazakhstanis15”. 
                                                                                                                                          
14 8:52 “   )” 
15 8:54 “$,      $” 
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Before outlining the programme Nazarbaev summarises the country’s existing 
advantages as he sees them. Nazarbaev lists eight advantages which characterise 
Kazakhstan and there is significant similarity between this discourse and that of 
many of the Shymkent interviewees discussing the positive aspects of a Kazakhstani 
identity which give them pride. First of all the president lists independence itself, 
followed by the new and emerging political and economic system, a change in social 
systems leading to greater prosperity and individual freedom, the educational and 
scientific achievements of the population, the rich natural resources within 
Kazakhstan’s territory, the vast areas of arable land in the country, the political 
stability and unity of society and the tolerance and patience which characterise the 
population and culture of Kazakhstan. Here is further evidence that the discourse of 
the state is reflected at other levels of society such that many of the aspects 
Nazarbaev presents as positive attributes of Kazakhstani group identity were also 
invoked by individuals interviewed when they were discussing national identity.  
 
These themes were echoed very closely by one of the Senators and also by one of the 
MPs when asked what they considered to be the most important aspects of 
Kazakhstan’s independence. 
 
8:55 “Well usually the foundational aspects of independence are territory, language, 
probably the original culture, people’s patriotism, probably we’d say economics, the 
basis there is first and foremost mineral resources and probably also people who can 
work.”  
 
8:56 “The foundational aspects of independence are the territory, it’s the people, it’s 
the political institutions, it’s the economic base, it’s the spiritual harmony and unity 
of the country.”  
 
These members of the government are thus clearly echoing Nazarbaev’s own 
discourse on independence and the positive attributes of the state’s identity. Whilst 
the other senators and MPs do not so closely match the president’s words in answer 
to this question, tending to focus more on the resurgence of the Kazakh language and 
culture as key aspects of independent Kazakhstan, the themes articulated above are 
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partly present in answer to this question and are also apparent in other answers given 
during the course of the interviews.  
 
Following this Nazarbaev makes clear that the less favourable aspects of Kazakhstani 
society are the result of the negative Soviet legacy (although, as previously observed, 
he takes no responsibility for this legacy despite his involvement in the regime 
during the late Soviet period) and are challenges to be overcome in time by 
Kazakhstan as an independent state. The president then goes on to articulate the 
mission for Kazakhstan for the new millennium. Nazarbaev sums up this mission as 
 
8:57 “to build an independent, prosperous and politically stable Kazakhstan with its 
inherent national unity, social justice and the economic well-being of the entire 
population.” 
 
Here again Nazarbaev highlights the importance of economic prosperity and civil 
harmony as identity markers, themes which occur frequently in the state, media and 
individual discourses as well as being a focus of the senators’ and MPs’ discourses as 
cited above. A vision is articulated which encompasses these and other common 
themes present in media and individual discourses as previously discussed. 
Nazarbaev describes the citizens of Kazakhstan as he envisions they would be by 
2030. 
 
8:58 “They would be… well educated and healthy. They would be prepared to work 
in the conditions of a modern market economy, sticking though to the traditions of 
their forefathers. They would have an equally good command of the Kazakh, Russian 
and English languages. They would be patriots of their peaceful, prosperous, rapidly 
growing country which would be well-known and respected all over the world. 
…In the year of 2030 our descendents would live in a country which would no 
longer stay in the background of world developments. Their Kazakhstan, being the 
centre of Eurasia, would be a connecting link between the three rapidly growing 
regions of China, Russia and the Muslim world. It would be inhabited by 
representatives of numerous nationalities sure of equal opportunities enjoyed by all 
the nations but deeming themselves to be citizens of Kazakhstan first and foremost.”  
 
The reference to Kazakhstan as a country which would be “no longer in the 
background of world developments” is one which occurs frequently in the media 
extracts. In several of Nazarbaev’s speeches quoted in chapter 7 reference is made to 
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the importance he places on Kazakhstan’s standing in the world community (see for 
example quote 7:50 and following). This quote reveals Nazarbaev’s vision of 
Kazakhstan as being both geographically and strategically central to political and 
economic developments in the region. That he is successful in promoting this 
discourse is illustrated by the fact that it was referred to by an individual interview 
participant (see quote 4:70).  
 
The theme of being a citizen of Kazakhstan “first and foremost” and of Kazakhstan 
being the primary point of social belonging and identification is echoed in the words 
of one of the senators when asked what it means to be Russian in Kazakhstan today. 
 
8:59 “Russians in Kazakhstan, first of all I’m a citizen of Kazakhstan, I don’t feel 
any kind of situations of limitation in relation to the fact that I’m Russian… First of 
all to feel Russian is to feel yourself to be a citizen, a part of what happens in this 
country.”  
 
Another of the senators gives a similar response when asked what it means to be a 
Kazakh in Kazakhstan today. 
 
8:60 “Well, to be Kazakh, I wouldn’t want to differentiate, you know, we have 
equality. It means any citizen of Kazakhstan, here citizens are not subdivided by the 
constitution so that, it means we have equal rights, we can speak the state language 
and other languages, it’s the same for people not of Kazakh nationality they have the 
same rights here, therefore I wouldn’t draw a great distinction, here we haven’t made 
such distinctions.”  
 
This ideology of ethnic equality and integration is also echoed by other government 
interviewees including one of the MPs. 
 
8:61 “Here, in principle it’s probably just the same to be Kazakh, Russian, Korean, 
Uighur, in my opinion everyone is proud of Kazakhstan.”  
 
However, others of these interviewees acknowledge that for many there is a degree 
of tension and difficulty in understanding their ethnic identity in independent 
Kazakhstan. One of the senators, an ethnic German, describes the way his ethnic and 
linguistic culture affects the ways he can be viewed by various relevant others. 
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8:62 “If I go to Germany yes, in Germany I will be Russian. If I go to Russia, I will 
be Kazakh, and here I’m German. You understand me yes? They consider me 
German here, but there in Germany they’d consider me as a Russian because I 
represent the Russian Germans.”  
 
The same senator goes on to talk about the choice that ethnic Russians faced in the 
light of Kazakhstan’s independence. 
 
8:63 “For the Russians I think it’s somewhat more complicated than for the others 
because it was the Soviet state and the Russians represented the titular nation and 
were in the majority and unexpectedly they experience psychological discomfort 
from the Kazakhs calling them a national minority… but then there was a choice, to 
stay here and accept everything as it is, as nobody expelled anybody and nobody is 
expelling anyone… you can move to your historical homeland in Russia…there is a 
choice here each person has to make, has to understand that history has turned out 
this way.”  
 
Also, a number of the senators and MPs interviewed do describe the ethnic Kazakhs 
as having a status distinct in some ways from other groups despite the fact that the 
same participants also engage in the discourse of equality and non-discrimination. 
For example, the senator for Karaganda oblast, himself an ethnic Ukrainian, first 
describes the ethnic diversity apparent in the government as proof of the lack of 
ethnic discrimination but then goes on to describe the Kazakhs in terms which set 
them apart from other groups in the country. Similarly, one of his colleagues engages 
in the discourse current in both the media extracts and individual interviews of 
Kazakhs as the “foundational nation”, whose claim to a special status in the republic 
is historically legitimated.  
 
8:64 “I’m just such a person as everyone else… I’m not limited. If any nation were 
limited in Kazakhstan then I think that it wouldn’t have representatives in the higher 
legislative organs. We have Belorussians, Russians, I’m Ukrainian, there are 
Germans, Kazakhs, Tatars and many other nationalities which are represented both in 
the government and in the parliament of the republic”  
 
8:65 “Well, how should I put it, what it means [to be Kazakh in Kazakhstan]? It’s the 
foundational nation which - the nation which historically lived on this territory, has 
its own traditions, its own rituals, its own like foundations, which like during the 
course of many years preserved their territory.”  
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One of the MPs particularly emphasises the need for Kazakhs to preserve and 
promote their ethnic identity in light of the loss of language and culture during the 
Soviet period (a theme discussed in relation to the media extracts in chapter 7).  
 
8:66 “To be Kazakh, well you need to protect your ethnic membership, you need to 
speak in the language, you need to think in the language, you need to love your land, 
your people. You can be Kazakh by your passport but Russian by mentality, we have 
quite a lot of people like that, you understand?... I have to say that the overwhelming 
majority have a Russian mentality to some extent because of the culture, the 
education, the majority of specialists received their education in the Soviet times, on 
the whole in Russian.” 
 
The discourse apparent in these last quotes, of cultural survival throughout a long 
and difficult history, was also evident in some of the media extracts analysed and 
discussed in chapter 7. The concept of distinguishing between ethnicity as a label as 
it might appear in a passport and as something experienced and lived out is also 
made by some of the Shymkent interviewees (see quote 4:106 and following). 
 
The ideologies of economic growth and increasing world status, especially in regard 
to relevant outgroups which are apparent in the excerpt from the 2030 programme 
quoted above also appear in the introduction to the constitution. Similarly, the ideals 
of inter-ethnic harmony and civic identity encountered in much of the legislation and 
state discourse already discussed are again balanced by references to the “traditions 
of their forefathers” implying the importance of ethnic Kazakh culture and history as 
the foundation and legitimisation for the state and for much state policy, a discourse 
encountered in the quotes from the interviews with senators and MPs given above. 
 
These themes are further apparent in the more detailed programme of development 
laid out as part of the 2030 mission statement. The need to foster a positive ingroup 
identity rooted in the state and the common interests of the state and the individual 
are stressed. As part of the first long-term priority articulated in the programme, 




8:67 “We must develop a sense of patriotism and love for their country in all of 
Kazakhstan’s citizens. Old, once stable connections between the people and the state 
have been weakened and new ones, between individual and national interests have 
yet to be formed. Fortunately, an awareness is already developing in the majority of 
an understanding of the commonality of interests of the people and the state. I have 
no doubt that in accordance with the improvements in the well-being of the people, 
this will be strengthened. This will hasten an understanding of the seemingly simple 
truth that the welfare of every citizen depends on the sovereignty and security of the 
state in which he lives.”  
 
In this way Nazarbaev constructs a common fate and common goals for the state and 
the individual both of which are foundational to the formation of a strong sense of 
ingroup identification on the part of group members. He alludes to the strengthening 
of the economy and links this with an increased sense of group loyalty such that 
group members are encouraged to see themselves as having a stake in the economic 
status of the state and to view their own improving standard of living as being 
integrally linked to the state and to the policies of the government which in turn will 
engender a sense of loyalty to and positive identification with that state level identity. 
 
The senators and MPs who were interviewed were asked their views on the degree of 
development of a Kazakhstani state level identity. Several of those interviewed 
describe this as being a work in progress and something which the government is 
actively promoting.  
 
8:68 “I think we have work in store now so that the state identity would be greater 
and so that it would be within the family… it must be inside a person.”  
 
8:69 “I think that it’s maybe not all that developed but with every year it is moving 
further and further on in its development.”†  
 
However, one of the senators, as well as focussing on the positive ingroup identity of 
Kazakhstanis in comparison with relevant outgroups (for him Russia and other CIS 
countries) and on the role of economic stability in facilitating this, argues that in 
Kazakhstan a state identity is developing from the bottom up, emerging primarily 
from the people itself rather than from state ideology. 
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8:72 “I think that the state identity of our independence hasn’t had much time yet and 
nonetheless we need to value the fact that the state identity is growing and precisely 
being part of such a state and pride that Kazakhstan has achieved certain successes in 
the time since we’ve been independent, all these are probably present in every 
Kazakhstani. All the more as our country is quite open, we know the state of affairs 
of our neighbours, we know the state of affairs in Russia, in other countries. In that 
respect I must say that our country appears quite successful. In this scheme in that in 
the first place economic success facilitates the growth of a state identity… I have to 
say that probably it is at quite a high level even in comparison with the other 
countries of the CIS, the level of state identity. Because it happened that I worked in 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for quite a long time, therefore it happened that I was 
in a lot of countries and could see the pride that every Kazakhstani has in his state 
and it seems to me that this differentiates us favourably from our neighbours. 
Moreover, if the ideology emerging in certain countries is maybe rather by force, we 
won’t go far. For example, there is Turkmenistan and other similar countries, then 
for us it comes more not from the state line but most of all the state identity comes 
from the people itself.”  
 
There is thus a clear discourse amongst the government interviewees that as the state 
preserves inter-ethnic equality, builds social and economic stability and continues to 
be guided by the vision of the president for the continually improving welfare of all 
Kazakhstanis then there will be a concomitant increase in identification with and 
loyalty to both the president and the state on the part of citizens and that pride in the 
state’s achievements and favourable status in comparison with relevant outgroups 
will result in a secure and positive ingroup identity at the level of state membership.  
 
Accordingly, another long-term priority to be discussed in the 2030 programme is 
that of (8:73) “domestic stability and the consolidation of society16”. In this context 
individuals are once again urged to view their best interests as lying in maintaining 
the stability and prosperity of the state level group and in viewing this group identity 
as of greater importance than religious, ethnic or other possible group identifications.  
 
8:74 “If various groups, irrespective of what unites them – political ideology, 
religious, ethnic or class interests – are in a state of confrontation, it will lead to a 
dangerous situation, in which the people would be distracted from the aim of 
achieving the common good and the realisation of national interests.” 
 
                                                 
16 8:73 “   $ ” 
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Thus Nazarbaev constructs a discourse of the state as the primary group identity for 
its citizens. In order to highlight the importance of this he cites Northern Ireland, the 
former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and others as examples of the disastrous consequences 
which can follow if other group identities are given priority over a unified state 
identity and sense of belonging. The president states that Kazakhstan must engage in 
a strategy of building a society in which all ethnic groups have equal rights and in 
which a civic identity based on equal opportunities for all citizens is fostered.  
 
Nazarbaev acknowledges that a Kazakhstani identity is in a state of negotiation and 
ongoing formation, arguing as did the senators quoted above, that this inevitably 
takes time but he goes on to list a number of factors characteristic of such an identity. 
 
8:75 “Not everyone can today answer the seemingly simple question, ‘Who are we, - 
the Kazakhstanis?’ Deciding the problem of self-identification takes time and a 
certain degree of historical development… Yet even today there are a number of 
factors which unite us. Our land and its borders, our parents who cultivated it, our 
common history in which we suffered the grief of failures together and shared the joy 
of our achievements. Our children who live and work together on this land. And each 
of us is united in understanding our duty towards our parents and our striving to 
make the lives of our children better.”  
 
Many of the key themes identified in the framework I have adopted for 
understanding national identity through discourse in chapters 5 and 7 are apparent 
here in this ideology of a Kazakhstani identity based on the land and on a shared 
history and future. Once again the themes highlighted as being important in 
discourses of national identity articulated through state legislation coincide with 
those observed in the media and individual interviews.  
 
These themes of a common past and of a sense of common struggle and achievement 
and striving towards a prosperous future are also evident in the discourses of a 
number of the government interviewees when discussing the characteristics of a 
Kazakhstani identity. Again the importance of a positive comparison with relevant 
outgroups emerges in these discourses.  
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8:76 “I would probably say that the main trait is pride in your state, pride in what we 
have managed despite the difficult times in our history and from the standpoint of 
acquiring independence we have managed to determine everything, to successfully 
complete all the reforms which were begun in the economic and political spheres and 
to stand on the road to development which other countries have not been able to 
reach yet. That pride and awareness that we have successfully done this, that’s 
probably the main thing.”†  
 
The ideology of inter-ethnic harmony and unity so integral to the construction of a 
Kazakhstani identity is also emphasised by Nazarbaev in the section dealing with 
domestic stability. 
 
8:79 “Chauvinism and nationalism however, are not yet completely forgotten. Efforts 
to raise up these processes though do not arouse any interest whatsoever in the 
majority of the population, more the reverse, they only irritate them. Russophobia is 
in steep decline as the process of the regeneration of the Kazakh traditions and 
language is naturally understood. Unlike in previous years, society is much calmer 
and discusses ethnic problems constructively and openly.”  
 
This section is a further example of the discourse of national unity and ethnic 
harmony in tension with the priority given to Kazakh language and culture. 
Nazarbaev asserts that the population is increasingly uninterested in chauvinism and 
nationalism and in denigrating ethnic outgroups yet, having earlier asserted that all 
ethnic groups are understood to be equal, here maintains that the prioritisation of an 
ethnic Kazakh identity within the state is understood as natural. This echoes 
Nazarbaev’s statement quoted earlier (8:57) in which he referred to Kazakhstan’s 
national unity as being “inherent”. Thus the conflicting ideologies of ethnic equality 
and of the prioritisation of the Kazakh ethnic group are both constructed as being 
natural and foundational parts of a Kazakhstani identity. Similarly national unity and 
the national identity are also presented as being both natural and as emerging as part 






This dissertation has explored the processes of identity negotiation ongoing in the 
Republic of Kazakhstan. Chapter 1 identified some of the main themes relevant to 
the discussion and laid out the theoretical framework for the study. The social 
identity perspective was introduced and described. Within this context an 
understanding of identity was outlined that focuses on the availability to an 
individual of multiple possible identities of differing levels of inclusiveness. The 
saliency of a particular identity is held to vary according both to context and to the 
history, beliefs and goals of the individual concerned. Where a group level identity 
becomes salient then the individual’s response to the situation will reflect that, and 
he or she may seek to enact or defend linguistic and behavioural norms associated 
with group belonging and to create or maintain a sense of positive distinctness from 
outgroups perceived to be relevant. The importance of discourse to processes of 
identity formation and maintenance was also described and the interaction between 
discourse and social context was highlighted. The aim of this study was to 
investigate these processes in the context of ethnic and state level identities in 
Kazakhstan.  
 
In order to provide a broad context for the work as a whole chapter 2 provided a brief 
historical overview of Kazakhstan in which social and political events which have 
influenced the region were outlined. Chapter 3 also served to set the rest of the work 
in context by describing the methodological approach adopted for the fieldwork in 
Kazakhstan. The fieldwork in question consisted of interviews with students and 
staff at educational establishments in the southern city of Shymkent and with some 
MPs and Senators in the capital city, Astana.  
 
Chapter 4 began to address the research questions dealing with the saliency of 
identities at varying levels of inclusiveness to the interview participants and with the 
interviewees’ ideas about the content and boundaries of those identities. There was 
also discussion of which outgroups were perceived as being relevant for comparison 
and on what main dimensions. 
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Chapters 5 and 7 both explored the thematic contents of a state level Kazakhstani 
identity as it was constructed discursively by individuals (chapter 5) and in samples 
drawn from the media (chapter 7). Again the value and saliency of the identity, 
competing ideas of its content and boundaries and contrasts and comparisons with 
other groups were described.  
 
Chapter 6 investigated the interview participants’ beliefs about the roles which 
various languages should be ascribed in contemporary Kazakhstan and about which 
languages were associated with which spheres of use or type of speaker.  
 
Chapter 8 described aspects of the constitution and other legislation dealing with 
language use in the republic. The laws themselves were briefly described and the 
themes and ideologies pertaining to ethnic and state level identities highlighted. 
Extracts from the interviews with Senators and MPs were included here to illustrate 
areas of agreement and divergence between the legislation and the government 
employees’ discourse.  
 
9.2 Conclusions 
The present research has contributed to the field of post-Soviet studies of language 
and identification through the approach taken in not prioritising one particular ethnic 
group but rather investigating understandings of Kazakh, Russian and minority 
ethnic group membership in Kazakhstan and, moreover, by not assuming the 
relevance and salience of ethnic or national identities to all individuals in all 
circumstances but demonstrating the ways in which such identities are actually 
understood and negotiated by individuals on an everyday basis. Similarly, the 
defining attributes of group identities and the outgroups deemed relevant for 
comparison were not assumed but have been investigated and explored as they 
emerge in the discourses of individuals and of elites. 
 
Chapter 4 in particular provided evidence of the context dependent nature of identity 
salience. Each question brought different levels of identity to the fore for different 
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individual participants. However, that personal, ethnic and state level identities were 
all relevant and valued by the participants was made manifest.  
 
The development and negotiation of a state level Kazakhstani identity is clearly an 
ongoing process within the republic. Some of the interviewees denied that such an 
identity was yet valid and some contended that ethnic differences were most 
significant or that if a Kazakhstani identity were deemed relevant then it would be 
defined in purely civic terms. However, the state and media are both investing 
significantly in discourses of national identity and many of the interviewees express 
a similar focus in their responses. Numerous themes relating to the content of a 
Kazakhstani identity were evident in all three sources – the individual interviews, the 
media extracts (many of which directly reported government discourse) and the 
legislation reviewed.  
 
One of the most widespread beliefs relating to the positive aspects of a Kazakhstani 
identity was that Kazakhstan is a multi-ethnic yet highly inclusive, harmonious and 
peaceful country. Many of the interviewees made reference to this aspect of state 
belonging and described how ethnic groups in Kazakhstan live peacefully together 
and can learn from and enrich one another. Similar themes emerge in both the media 
and government discourses and Kazakhstan is shown to compare favourably with 
numerous other multi-ethnic and post-Soviet states. This belief provides a secure 
sense of group belonging and constitutes a highly valued group norm. That 
Kazakhstan is multi-ethnic is demonstrably true and a focus on the times and 
instances of inter-ethnic harmony and co-operation is evidence of the way in which 
discourse both affects and is affected by social context. By describing inter-ethnic 
accord as a group norm the government hopes to establish it as such.  
 
Related to the idea of inter-ethnic harmony are the valued group norms of 
friendliness and hospitality. In the individual interviews in particular these are 
described as being attributes of Kazakh culture which have been assimilated by all 
groups living in Kazakhstan such that they have become identifying features of 
Kazakhstani group belonging and dimensions on which Kazakhstan compares 
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favourably with Russia and with the other Central Asian republics. These themes are 
also expressed in the media and government output discussed and it is Russia and the 
states of Central Asia that most consistently emerge as the groups deemed relevant 
for comparison throughout the study.  
 
However, in tension with these themes are those, also present in all three sets of data, 
of Kazakhstan as belonging first and foremost to the Kazakhs as an ethnic group who 
are consequently accorded principal status as culture-definers in the state and whose 
group language is the legitimate expression of independent statehood. The idea of 
ethnic Kazakh attributes and language serving as a model for a wider Kazakhstani 
identity is prevalent in both the media and government data examined in particular. 
This stance is frequently legitimated by an appeal to history in which the Kazakhs’ 
long residency in the land is highlighted as is their suffering during both Imperial and 
Soviet times. The theme of independence being achieved as the result of a long 
historical struggle is also evident in the discourse of individuals and of media and 
government representatives. Related to this are discourses of the importance of the 
land (the idea of the location and landscape of Kazakhstan having shaped the 
character of the people forms part of this) and of a sense of continuity attained 
through the passing on of Kazakh culture and traditions from one generation to 
another.  
 
Despite the inherent conflict between the themes of inter-ethnic harmony and 
inclusion and those of the Kazakhs’ priority status in Kazakhstan they nonetheless 
appear together and a single individual may invoke both of these themes in different 
contexts without any apparent sense of inconsistency.  
 
Also in tension are the concurrent themes of cultural oppression of the Kazakhs and 
of mutual cultural enrichment and exchange between peoples and between Kazakhs 
and Russians in particular. Thus at different times Russian language and culture are 
constructed as oppressing those of the Kazakhs and as enriching them. The 
instrumental value associated with the knowledge of the Russian language due 
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principally to its status as a language of wider communication and the access it 
provides to spheres of culture and learning is also a common theme. 
 
The themes of Kazakhstan’s economic development and relative prosperity and of 
the ongoing reforms overseen by president Nazarbaev frequently emerge as valued 
aspects of a Kazakhstani identity. The historical and cultural similarities between 
Kazakhstan and the other post-Soviet states of Central Asia present a challenge to the 
creation and maintenance of ingroup norms positively distinct from these outgroups. 
The economic success of Kazakhstan in comparison with its neighbours is therefore 
particularly valued as a means of maintaining a secure sense of positive 
distinctiveness. Similarly the president himself and the legal changes he has overseen 
since Kazakhstan became independent are also clear distinguishing features invoked 
as part of a state identity. Related to Kazakhstan’s economic progress is the theme of 
Kazakhstan as growing in status on the world stage. An identity as a state of global 
significance and influence emerges as an aspiration in both the media and 
government discourses. 
 
The principal threats to a positive sense of Kazakhstani identity are those which 
challenge particularly valued group norms. Thus discrimination or tension between 
ethnic groups emerges as a threat to the values of inter-ethnic harmony and inclusion 
whilst corruption and lack of development in spheres such as health and education 
challenge the valued group markers of reform, development and prosperity.  
 
The media and government data tend to present a Kazakhstani identity as naturally 
salient, positive and secure. However, many of the interview responses suggested 
that whilst an ethnic level identity was often salient, a state level, Kazakhstani 
identity was only made salient in certain contexts. Such ‘activation’ of the national 
identity was discussed in particular in chapter 5 and it was evident that a number of 
the participants only responded in terms of such an identity when travelling abroad, 




Also, as suggested above, analysis of the interviewees’ responses revealed that for a 
number of participants a Kazakhstani identity is either invalid or not valued. Such 
participants orient instead to other possible identities and may reveal a focus on the 
maintenance of a positive sense of ethnic group belonging. Chapter 4 discussed the 
fact that the changes in Kazakhstan since the disintegration of the Soviet Union 
present challenges in relation to both ethnic and state level identities for Russians in 
particular. These participants seemed to experience greater difficulty in relating 
positively to markers of group identity and maintaining a positive sense of group 
distinctiveness.  
 
In the case of ethnic identity the problems experienced by some Russians (and also 
some minority group members) in maintaining a positive sense of group belonging 
were illustrated in particular by those participants who stated that nothing made them 
proud to be a member of their ethnic group, whilst conversely, no Kazakhs gave this 
response in relation to their ethnic belonging.  
 
That ethnic identity is perceived as being multi-dimensional was highlighted in 
chapter 4. The wide variety of responses given by participants when asked to define 
the boundaries of ethnic group membership was described there. Definitive aspects 
of group membership mentioned by the interviewees included biological descent, 
language and following customs and culture appropriate to the group. Some 
respondents made a distinction between ethnic group membership as a label that 
might appear in a passport and group belonging which is genuinely experienced and 
results in ingroup appropriate behaviour and values. This relates to the distinction, 
made by some, between those who were members of the group because of biological 
descent only, and those who were ‘real’ members of the group displaying and 
valuing appropriate group norms.  
 
One such group norm, held by some to be diagnostic of true group membership, is 
ability to speak the ethnic group language. The importance of language as a mark of 
belonging emerged quite clearly in the analysis of the interview material. Participants 
described the group language as being important or integral to their ethnicity with 
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some asserting that without knowledge of the language an individual could not claim 
group membership or was not a ‘true’ group member. The pressure felt by 
individuals to show their adherence to the group by means of their language choices 
was clearly illustrated in the discussion of medium of instruction in education. 
Learning through the group language was described by some as being a matter of 
group loyalty such that learning in another language could be perceived as 
abandonment of the group. There was also a belief in the impact of language of 
instruction on the character of an individual. Numerous participants asserted that 
learning through a particular language entailed enculturation into the social and 
behavioural norms of the group associated with that language. However, a belief that 
Russian medium education was still of a higher standard than that in Kazakh was 
also articulated by some interviewees which constituted a possible cause of conflict 
for some when choosing the language of instruction.  
 
The tension sometimes existing between favouring one language for ideological 
reasons and another for instrumental reasons emerged in the discussions of the 
appropriateness of particular languages to specific spheres of use. Although there 
was a strong belief in Kazakh as the language of independent Kazakhstan whose use 
and status should be enhanced there was also a widespread belief in the instrumental 
value of Russian. Russian is appreciated for its role as a language of wider 
communication understood by a high percentage of the population of Kazakhstan and 
of other states of the former Soviet Union and for its established and developed 
vocabulary in technical spheres. 
 
Moreover, despite the pervasive discourse constructing Kazakh as the language of 
modern, independent statehood in Kazakhstan there is still a strong association 
between that language and older speakers and rural environments whilst Russian is 
associated with modern, urban spheres of use and with younger speakers. 
 
These findings show that the social identity perspective employed for the present 
study has proved to be an appropriate and rewarding framework within the research 
context. The fact that the social identity approach focuses on the multiple identities 
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available to an individual and on the context dependent nature of the saliency of 
particular group memberships was particularly relevant. Similarly, the understanding 
of discourses as both affecting and being affected by their social setting has been 
helpful in prompting an investigation into the similarities and differences between 
individual, media and state discourses relating to national identity. The thematic 
headings drawn from the work of Wodak (1999) also proved to be both relevant and 
valuable in this context. However, as certain thematic elements found to be relevant 
in the Austrian context proved to be less so in relation to Kazakhstan it may be that a 
more selective approach, following that of Wodak less closely and more open to 
other themes relevant to the particular setting in question would have been 
appropriate. Overall, however, the theoretical framework employed in this study has 
proved to be both relevant and helpful in answering the research questions laid out in 
chapter 1. 
 
9.3 Agenda for Further Research 
This dissertation has demonstrated that the boundaries and norms associated with 
ethnic and state level identities are under ongoing negotiation in Kazakhstan. A 
number of discourses are emerging as central to the understanding of a Kazakhstani 
identity and these are evident by their pervasiveness in the material drawn from all 
three data sources in the study. However, the values and norms presented by some as 
essential to group belonging are contested by others and the very legitimacy and 
value of these identities are sometimes questioned. The place of the Russian and 
Kazakh languages is contested on a daily basis in the language choices and talk about 
talk of individuals, the media and of the state itself. However, the data for this study 
were necessarily drawn over one relatively short period of time and the interview 
material drawn from a limited number of demographically similar individuals in one 
location. In order to further substantiate the conclusions drawn above and establish 
their legitimacy in other areas it would be necessary to conduct similar research in 
other areas of the country and amongst other portions of the population. It would also 
be instructive to observe the possible evolution of existing discourses or emergence 
of new ones in relation to ethnic and state belonging as time passes. Ultimately it 
would be of great interest to observe what changes may develop in relation to these 
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identities as and when a change of regime occurs and Nazarbaev is no longer head of 
state. 
 
It would also be of great interest and value to carry out comparative studies in other 
Central Asian states. The work of Flynn (2007b) with Russians in Uzbekistan, 
described in section 1.2 and that of Dave (2004) comparing language policy and its 
implementation in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan outlined in section 2.13 both provide 
evidence of interesting similarities and differences between Kazakhstan and these 
other Central Asian states. The fact that the participants in the present study were 
shown to orient to inhabitants of Russia and of the other Central Asian states, as 
relevant for comparison when discussing both ethnic and state level identities means 
that such comparative studies would be appropriate and helpful in order to expand 
and consolidate the contributions made by the present study.   
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Appendix A: Fieldwork Questions 
Questions for Students and Teachers 
How would you describe the people of Kazakhstan? 
Are you glad that Kazakhstan is now independent? 
What is the most important aspect of this? 
 
How would you describe yourself? 
What makes you Kazakh/Russian…? 
Would you ever describe yourself as Kazakhstani? 
Why/ why not? 
 
How are the different ethnic groups in Kazakhstan different from each other? 
Are people from Kazakhstan different than people from other countries? 
Are all Kazakhs the same as each other? 
Are all Russians the same as each other? 
What about members of other ethnic groups? 
 
How important is the Kazakh language to being Kazakh? 
How important is the Russian language to being Russian? 
(If respondent is from other ethnic group, ask about importance of group language) 
Can you still be Kazakh if you don’t speak the language?  Why/ why not? 
Can you still be Russian if you don’t speak the language? Why/ why not? 
(If respondent is from other ethnic group, ask about group language) 
 
Do all people speak Kazakh the same way? 
Do all people speak Russian the same way? 
What is good Kazakh? 
What is good Russian? 
 
What makes you proud to be Kazakh/ Russian…? 
What makes you ashamed? 
What makes you proud to be a Kazakhstani? 
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What makes you ashamed? 
Do you ever compare Kazakhstan with other countries?  
Which ones? How? 
 
What languages can you speak? 
What language/s do you study/teach in? 
When do you use Russian? 
When do you use Kazakh? 
Do you ever mix Russian and Kazakh together? 
What sort of people do this? 
Do you/does your teacher ever mix languages in a lesson? 
What language/s do you most like to speak? Why? 
Is there any language you wish you knew better? Why? 
Does what language you study in affect what other people think of you? 
Does it affect your character? 
Why did you choose to teach/study in Kazakh/Russian? 
 
How do you think schools and universities will change in the next 10 years? 
(If at school) Will you go to university? 
What language will you study in?  
If you want to get a good job, what language/s do you need? 
Do you think this will change at all in the future? 
Is any one language most important now? Why? 
What do you want to do when you leave university? 
Are any particular languages important for this? 
What is good about the Kazakh language? 
What is good about the Russian language? 
(If respondent is from other ethnic group ask about group language) 
What is good about the English language? 
 
Is any one language better than others: 
• for business? 
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• for literature? 
• for law? 
• for poetry? 
• for philosophy? 
• for jokes? 
• for science? 
 
Do you think English will become more, or less important in the future? 
What about Kazakh? 
What about Russian? 
 
What laws are there about language use in education? 
Do you agree with them? 
Is there anything you would like to change? 
 
(To teachers) Does the government check that schools/universities fulfil their 
requirements? 
How? 
Do you think it should do this? 
How do language laws affect your job? 
What do you think is the most important part of being a teacher? 
What language did you study in? 
 
What language/s do you think schools should use to teach? Why? 
What other languages should be studied? Why? 
Is it better to study in one language or in more than one? 
What should be the official language/s of Kazakhstan? Why? 
 





Is there anyone who only knows Kazakh? 
Is there anyone who only uses Kazakh? 
Is there anyone who only knows Russian? 
Is there anyone who only uses Russian? 
Is there anyone who doesn’t know Kazakh? 
Is there anyone who doesn’t know Russian? 
 
What can you tell about a person by how they speak? 
Do you think you speak differently than your parents? How? Why? 
Do you think your children (will) speak differently than you? How? Why? 
 
Why did you choose to teach/study at this school/university? 
What do you like about this school/university? 
What do you dislike? 
How does this school/university compare with others? 
Do you enjoy being a teacher/student? 
What do you like about it? 
What do you dislike? 
How does going to university change you? 
 
Questions for MPs and Senators 
How would you describe the people of Kazakhstan? 
What are the most important aspects of independence?  
How are the various ethnic groups in Kazakhstan different from one another? 
Are all Kazakhs the same as each other? 
Are all Russians the same as each other? 
What does it mean to be Russian in Kazakhstan? 
What does it mean to be, for example, Korean? 
What does it mean to be Kazakh? 
 
Are people from Kazakhstan different than people from other countries? 
How developed is a Kazakhstani national identity? 
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How does the development of a Kazakhstani national identity compare with that of 
other countries? 
What are the main characteristics of a Kazakhstani national identity? 
What are the symbols/ markers of that identity? (e.g. language, food, clothes) 
What is the relationship between ethnic and national identity for the people of 
Kazakhstan? 
How would you like to see this develop in the future? 
What role does language play in the national identity? 
How does this compare with the role that language played before independence? 
 
What main changes have been made to language legislation since independence? 
What is the rationale/ ideology behind these changes? 
How do these changes aid the development of Kazakhstan as a nation? 
What language or languages are used to record and distribute legislation? 
 
How is the national identity reflected in the education system? 
What part do the laws on languages play in this? 
Are school curricula decided at the level of national government, local government, 
or by individual schools? 
What man changes have been made in educational curricula since independence? 
What are the reasons for these changes? 
Overall which decisions concerning education are taken at national level, which at 
local level and which by individual schools and universities? 
 
What are the best aspects of education in Shymkent/Kazakhstan now? 
How would you like to see education here develop? 
 
What proportion of school pupils are in Kazakh as opposed the Russian medium 
schooling now? 
What about at university level? 
How does this compare with the situation in 1991? 
Will this change in the future? 
 338
What proportion of school time is reserved for Russian language study in Kazakh 
medium education? 
What proportion of school time is reserved for Kazakh language study in Russian 
medium education?  
What legislation is there concerning the study of both Kazakh and Russian literature? 
Are these measures (proportion of time for other language study and literature study) 
different than those in place before independence? 
Is there any governmental involvement in the provision of educational recourses such 
as textbooks and dictionaries? (language) 
 
How else will schools and universities change in the next 10 years? 
What role does English play in education here? 
Is there any provision for minority language medium education?  
Is there any provision for minority language tuition? (as a subject) 
Are all levels of education available in both Russian and Kazakh? 
What provision is there for adults to learn new languages, especially Kazakh? 
 
What legislation is there concerning language in the media? 
Are there quotas for Russian and Kazakh language newspaper production and radio 
and television broadcasts? 
What language legislation is there concerning advertisements and public 
announcements or signs in public places? 
Does the government have any involvement in the production of educational 
programmes? (language) 
 
Do you think the medium of education affects a person’s character? 
Does language use reveal a person’s character and attitudes? 




Appendix B: Key to Interview Quotes 
A Note on Style 
Quotes which were originally made in Russian I have translated into English, those 
given in Kazakh have been transcribed from the interpreter’s translation and 
similarly those given in English have been transcribed verbatim. I chose to do this to 
retain the voice of the individual as far as possible although this means that errors of 
grammar and vocabulary remain. Where questions or comments made by me are 
quoted they are given in italics. I have used the Library of Congress system of 
transliteration for individual Russian words used in interview quotes spoken 
primarily in English. 
 
Referencing of Quotes 
Quotes are referenced to identify the individual by their institution, whether they are 
a student or a teacher, an individual number for that institution, their ethnicity and 
their sex. The reference also indicates the disk, track and approximate location in that 
track of the quote given and finally shows the language in which the interviewee 
made that particular quote. For ease of reference quotes are also numbered within 
each chapter.  
 
Institutions: 
S – Salem school 
S37 – School number 37 
KT – Kazakh Turkish University 
SK – South Kazakhstan State University 
M – Miras University 
LA – Language Academy 
 
Student or Teacher: 
s – student 




Identifies individual student or teacher 
 
Ethnicity: 
K – Kazakh 
R – Russian 
U – Uzbek 
Uk – Ukrainian 
Ko – Korean 
Ky – Kyrgyz 
Uy – Uygur 
T – Tatar 
 
Sex: 
m – Male 
f – Female 
 
e.g. St2Rf = Salem school, teacher 2, Russian, female 
 
Disk reference: 
e.g. [01, 02: 3.00-3.30] 
Disk 1 
Track 02 
Location 3.00 minutes to 3.30 minutes 
 
Language of quote: 
K – Kazakh 
R – Russian 







Number                  Reference 
4:1 (St2Rf, [03, 08: 00-0.30], R) 
4:2 (LAt3Rf, [25, 01: 0.30-1.00],R) 
4:3 (KTt2Kf, [07, 04: 00-0.30], E) 
4:4 (Ss10Rf, [02, 09:00-0.30], R) 
4:5 (Ms5Rf, [19, 01:00-0.30], R) 
4:6 (LAt2Tm, [21, 06:1.00-2.00], R) 
4:7 (St1Kf, [03, 05:00-1.00], R) 
4:8 (KTs1Kf, [05, 06:2.00-2.30], K) 
4:9 (LAs5Kf, [22, 11: 0.30-1.00], E) 
4:10 (SKs13Km, [10, 16:1.00-1.30], K) 
4:11 (Ss1Kf, [01, 01: 0.30-1.00], R) 
4:12 (KTs8Km, [09, 10:1.30-2.00], E) 
4:13 (Ss9Rm, [02, 06:0.30-1.00], R) 
4:14 (St3Kf, [03, 11: 00-1.00], E) 
4:15 (Ss8Kof, [02, 03: 00-1.00], R) 
4:16 (Ms14Kf, [20, 16: 00-1.00], E) 
4:17 (Ms3Rm, [17, 10: 00-1.30], E) 
4:18 (KTs2Kym, [07, 13: 1.30-2.00], K) 
4:19 (Ms3Rm, [17, 10: 2.30-3.30], E) 
4:20 (LAt1Rf, [21, 01: 2.00-2.30], E) 
4:21 (Ms11Kf, [20, 02: 2.00-2.30], E) 
4:22 (Sks10Km, [10, 04: 3.30- 4.00], E) 
4:23 (Ms6Rf, [19, 04: 2.00-2.45], R) 
4:24 (Ms9Rf, [19, 16: 2.00-2.30], E) 
4:25 (SKs2Uyf, [05, 12: 2.45-3.00], E) 
4:26 (KTt1Kf, [07, 01: 2.00-2.15], E) 
4:27 (KTs5Km, [08, 12: 2.00-2.15],R) 
4:28 (SKs6Kf, [07, 09: 3.00-3.30], R) 
4:29 (KTs11Kf, [22, 15: 3.00-3.30], K) 
4:30 (KTs7Km, [09, 06: 6.00-6.45], E) 
4:31 (Ss11Kf, [02, 12: 2.30-3.00],R) 
4:32 (Ms6Rf, [19, 04: 0.45-1.45], R) 
4:33 (Ss2Rf, [01, 04: 0.30-1.45], R) 
4:34 (KTs1Kf, [05, 06: 3.30-4.00],K) 
4:35 (SKs9Kf, [10, 01: 1.15-1.45], E) 
4:36 (LAs11Kf, [24, 09: 1.30-2.30], E)  
4:37 (KTs6Kf, [09, 01: 1.00-2.00], R) 
4:38 (Mt2Kf, [16, 10:3.00-4.00],E) 
4:39 (LAs4Rf, [22, 08: 1.00-1.15], R) 
4:40 (St3Kf, [03, 11: 0.45-1.30], E) 
4:41 (LAs2Uf, [21, 17: 0.45-1.00], E) 
4:42 (LAs8Kf, [23, 16: 1.30-2.00], R) 
4:43 (Ms9Rf, [19, 16: 2.30-3.30], E) 
4:44 (Mt1Rf, [16, 01: 8.00-9.00], E) 
4:45 (Mt1Rf, [16, 01: 9.00-9.45], E) 
4:46 (Ms3Rm, [17, 10: 5.00-5.30], E) 
4:47 (Ms2Kf, [17, 02: 2.15-2.30], E) 
4:48 (Mt2Kf, [16, 11: 0.45-2.30], E) 
4:49 (LAt1Rf, [21, 01: 6.00-6.45], E)  
4:50 (LAt2Tm, [21, 07: 7.15-9.15], R) 
4:51 (LAs12Km, [24, 14: 3.00-4.00], E) 
4:52 (LAs6Rf, [23, 01: 3.30-3.45], E) 
4:53 (Ss8Kof, [02, 03: 2.00-2.30], R) 
4:54 (KTs1Kf, [05, 06: 9.00-9.30], K) 
4:55 (SKs11Km, [10, 08: 3.00-3.30], E) 
4:56 (Ss9Rm, [02, 06: 2.45-3.00], R) 
4:57 (LAs11Kf, [24, 09: 3.45-4.45], E) 
4:58 (Ms5Rf, [19, 01: 2.30-3.15], R) 
4:59 (LAs9Tm, [24, 03: 3.00-3.15], R) 
4:60 (Ss7Kf, [01, 21: 2.00-2.15], R) 
Quote 
Number                  Reference 
4:61 (SKs2Uyf, [05, 12: 6.00-6.45], E) 
4:62 (Mt5Km, [18, 01: 5.00-5.45], E) 
4:63 (LAs9Tm, [24, 03: 4.15-4.45], R) 
4:64 (St2Rf, [03, 08: 4.00-5.00], R) 
4:65 (Ss2Rf, [01, 04: 4.30-5.00], R) 
4:66 (LAs5Kf, [22, 11: 5.15-6.00], E)  
4:67 (SKs12Km, [10, 11: 6.00-7.15], E)  
4:68 (SKs9Kf, [10, 01: 5.00-6.30], E) 
4:69 (LAs4Rf, [22, 08: 3.00-3.30], R) 
4:70 (St3Kf, [03, 11: 5.30-6.45], E) 
4:71 (Mt2Kf, [16, 11: 5.00-6.15], E) 
4:72 (KTt2Kf, [07, 04: 6.15-6.45], E) 
4:73 (LAt2Tm, [21, 08: 2.00-7.30], R) 
4:74 (Ms11Kf, [20, 02: 1.00-1.15], E) 
4:75 (Ms6Rf, [19, 04: 0.15-1.00], R) 
4:76 (Ms12Kf, [20, 06: 8.00-9.15], E) 
4:77 (Mt5Km, [18, 01: 5.15-5.30], E) 
4:78 (LAs2Uf, [21, 17: 4.45-5.15], E) 
4:79 (LAt3Rf, [25, 01: 4.00-4.45], R) 
4:80 (SKt1, [06, 11: 8.30-9.15], E) 
4:81 (KTs7Km, [09, 06: 9.30-07: 0.30], R) 
4:82 (LAt1Rf, [21, 01: 6.45-7.30], E) 
4:83 (SKs13Km, [10, 16: 4.00-4.45], K) 
4:84 (Mt6Kf, [23, 04: 9.00-10.00], E) 
4:85 (Ms9Rf, [19, 16: 5.15-5.45], E) 
4:86 (SKs6Kf, [07, 09: 5.30-6.00], R) 
4:87 (Ms7Rm, [19, 07: 5.45-6.15], R) 
4:88 (SKs5Km, [06, 07: 6.00-7.00], K) 
4:89 (KTs1Kf, [05, 08: 8.00-8.30], K) 
4:90 (SKs1Kf, [05, 02: 4.00-4.30], E) 
4:91 (LAs10Km, [24, 07: 1.45-2.00], E) 
4:92 (KTt2Kf, [07, 05: 4.15-5.00], E) 
4:93 (SKs3Km, [05, 17: 3.45-4.15], E) 
4:94 (Ms9Rf, [19, 16: 9.15-9.30], E) 
4:95 (Ms10Ukf, [19, 19: 8.15-8.30], E) 
4:96 (LAs8Kf, [23, 17: 7.30-9.15], E,K) 
4:97 (Ss12Km, [03, 03: 4.45-5.00], R) 
4:98 (KTs7Km, [09, 06: 7.15-8.00], E,K) 
4:99 (Ss4Rm, [01, 12: 1.45-2.00], R) 
4:100 (Ms10Ukf, [19, 19: 3.00-3.30], E)  
4:101 (SKs3Km, [05, 16: 5.00-5.30], E,K)  
4:102 (Ss1Kf, [01, 01: 2.45-3.00], R) 
4:103 (Ms6Rf, [19, 04: 2.45-3.00], R) 
4:104 (Ss2Rf, [01, 04: 2.00-2.15], R) 
4:105 (KTt1Kf, [07, 01: 2.15-2.45], K) 
4:106 (SKs2Uyf, [05, 12: 3.15-3.45], E) 
4:107 (LAs7Kf, [23, 10: 3.30-5.15], E) 
4:108 (LAs2Uf, [21, 17: 1.15-2.00], E) 
4:109 (KTt2Kf, [07, 04: 1.30-1.45], E) 
4:110 (Ms12Kf, [20, 06: 4.45-5.00], E) 
4:111 (SKs5Km, [06, 06: 3.30-3.45], K) 
4:112 (St1Kf, [03, 05: 2.00-3.45], R) 
4:113 (Ms9Rf, [19, 16: 4.15-4.45], E) 
4:114 (Mt4Rf, [17, 15: 4.00-4.30], R) 
4:115 (Ms2Kf, [17, 01: 3.30-4.00], E)  
4:116 (LAs11Kf, [24, 09: 3.15-3.45], E) 
4:117 (St2Rf, [03, 08: 1.45-2.00], R) 
4:118 (SKs7Um, [08, 07: 4.30-5.00], R) 
4:119 (LAs9Tm, [24, 03: 2.15-2.45], R) 
4:120 (LAs1Rf, [21, 14: 2.15-2.30], E) 
 342
Quote 
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4:121 (KTs1Kf, [05, 06: 8.00-8.15], K) 
4:122 (LAs5Kf, [22, 11: 2.45-3.30], E) 
4:123 (St3Kf, [03, 11: 1.30-2.15], E) 
4:124 (Mt1Rf, [16, 01: 6.15-7.00], E) 
4:125 (KTs3Km, [07, 17: 6.00-7.15], K)  
4:126 (LAt3Rf, [25, 01: 2.45-3.00], R) 
4:127 (Mt2Kf, [16, 10: 4.00-6.45], E) 
4:128 (Ss7Kf, [01, 21: 2.00-2.15], R) 
4:129 (Ms14Kf, [20, 16: 8.30-9.00], E) 
4:130 (LAs7Kf, [23, 11: 3.45-5.00], E) 
4:131 (KTs11Kf, [22, 15: 8.00-8.30], K) 
4:132 (LAs8Kf, [23, 17: 6.50-7.15], K)  
4:133 (SKs1Kf, [05, 02: 3.00-4.00], E)  
4:134 (SKs14, [11, 02: 4.30-5.00], R) 
4:135 (Mt6Kf, [23, 05: 8.15-9.30], E) 
4:136 (Ss3Km, [01, 07: 9.00-9.45], R) 
4:137 (SKs5Km, [06, 07: 4.00-4.30], K) 
4:138 (Ms2Kf, [17, 03: 0.30-0.45], E) 
4:139 (SKs9Kf, [10, 01: 9.00-9.15], E) 
4:140 (Ms5Rf, [19, 01: 7.30-7.45], R) 
4:141 (Ms3Rm, [17, 11: 4.45-5.15], E)  
4:142 (LAs4Rf, [22, 08: 5.45-6.15], R) 
4:143 (Ms9Rf, [19, 16: 8.15-8.30], E) 
4:144 (LAs1Rf, [21, 14: 7.00-7.30], E) 
4:145 (Ms7Rm, [19, 07: 5.15-5.45], R)  
4:146 (Ss5Kom, [01, 15: 5.30-5.45], E) 
4:147 (SKs2Uyf, [05, 13: 0.00-0.30], E) 
4:148 (LAs9Tm, [24, 03: 8.00-8.15], R)  
4:149 (KTt1Kf, [07, 01: 5.30-6.00], E) 
4:150 (SKs1Kf, [05, 01: 8.15-9.00], E) 
4:151 (LAs11Kf, [24, 0.30-1.15], E) 
4:152 (LAs10Km, [24, 06: 8.45-9.15], E)  
4:153 (LAs5Kf, [22, 11: 7.30-8.00], E) 
4:154 (KTs7Km, [09, 07: 3.30-4.00], E) 
4:155 (SKs12Km, [10, 12: 0.00-0.45], E)  
4:156 (LAs3Kf, [22, 02: 2.45-3.15], E) 
4:157 (LAs12Km, [24, 14: 6.45-7.30], E) 
4:158 (Ss1Kf, [01, 01: 5.15-5.30], R) 
4:159 (KTs8Km, [09, 10: 5.30-6.45], E) 
4:160 (Mt2Kf, [16, 11: 9.00- 12: 0.15], E) 
4:161 (SKt1Kf, [06, 12: 1.45-2.45], E) 
4:162 (LAt3Rf, [25, 01: 6.30-6.45], R) 
4:163 (Ms7Rm, [19, 07: 3.45-4.00], R)  
4:164 (Ms3Rm, [17, 10: 8.45-9.15], E)  
4:165 (Ms5Rf, [19, 01: 5.30-5.45], R) 
4:166 (Mt1Rf, [16, 02: 7.30-8.00], E)  
4:167 (SS1Kf, [01, 01: 5.15-6.00], R) 
4:168 (LAs11Kf, [24, 10: 1.30-2.30], E) 
4:169 (KTs1Kf, [05, 08: 2.00-2.30], K)  
4:170 (KTt1Kf, [07, 01: 6.00-6.30], E) 
4:171 (SKs8Km, [08, 17: 1.30-2.00], E) 
4:172 (KTt2Kf, [07, 04: 8.30-8.45], E)  
4:173 (Mt5Km, [18, 01: 8.00-9.45], E) 
4:174 (Ms13Kf, [20, 13: 4.45-6.00], E) 
4:175 (SKs1Kf, [05, 01: 9.00-10.00], E) 
4:176 (SKs14Km, [11, 02: 2.15-3.00], R) 
4:177 (Mt2Kf, [16, 12: 1.00-1.15], E)  
4:178 (KTs3Km, [07, 01: 0.00-1.00], K) 
4:179 (SKs4Km, [06, 03: 0.00-0.45], K) 
4:180 (KTs5Km, [08, 12: 2.30-3.00], R) 
4:181 (Ms5Rf, [19, 01: 6.00-6.15], R) 
4:182 (St2Rf, [03, 08: 2.30-3.00], R) 
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4:183 (Ms3Rm, [17, 10: 9.30- 11: 0.30], E)  
4:184 (LAt3Rf, [25, 01: 6.45-7.30], R) 
4:185 (Ms6Rf, [19, 04: 6.00-6.45], R) 
  
5:1 (KTs7km, [09, 06: 1.15-2.00], E) 
5:2 (SKs9kf, [10, 01: 1.15-1.45], E) 
5:3 (Ss2Rf, [01, 04: 1.30-1.45], R) 
5:4 (Ms9Rf, [19, 16: 9.15-9.45], E) 
5:5 (SKs2Uyf, [05, 12: 1.30-2.45], E) 
5:6 (Ms9Rf, [19, 16: 1.15-2.00], E)  
5:7 (Ss10Rf, [02, 09: 2.00-2.15], R) 
5:8 (KTs8Km, [09, 10: 2.30-2.40], E) 
5:9 (SKs9Kf, [10, 01: 1.45-2.15], E) 
5:10 (Lat1Rf, [21, 01: 6.00-6.45], E) 
5:11 (SKs7Um, [08, 07: 5.15-6.00], R) 
5:12 (KTs7Km, [09, 06: 4.00-4.50], R) 
5:13 (SKs9Kf, [10, 01: 9.30-9.45], E) 
5:14 (Ss8Kof, [02, 03: 1.00-1.20], R) 
5:15 (SKs10Km, [10, 04: 3.30-3.40], E) 
5:16 (Ms10Ukf, [19, 20: 1.30-2.20], E) 
5:17 (KTs2Kym, [07, 13: 5.00-5.30], K)  
5:18 (KTs11Kf, [22, 15: 3.00-3.30], K) 
5:19 (Ss7Kf, [01, 21: 0.30-1.00], R) 
5:20 (Ms3Rm, [17, 11: 5.30-6.00], E) 
5:21 (KTs7Km, [09, 06: 8.30-10.00], E)  
5:22 (Las3Kf, [22, 01: 6.30-7.00], E) 
5:23 (Ss8Kof, [02, 03: 0.00-0.45], R) 
5:24 (Mt2Kf, [16, 11: 5.00-5.45], E) 
5:25 (Ms3Rm, [17, 01: 0.00-1.20], E)  
5:26 (Las11Kf, [24, 09: 3.45-4.45], E) 
5:27 (KTs10, [09, 15: 3.30-4.00], R) 
5:28 (SKs11Km, [10, 08: 3.00-3.20], E) 
5:29 (Ss7Kf, [01, 21: 2.00-2.20], R) 
5:30 (KTs1Kf, [05, 06: 9.00-10.00], K) 
5:31 (Mt2Kf, [16, 11: 1.45-2.30], E)  
5:32 (Las8Kf, [23, 16: 6.00-7.00], R,K) 
5:33 (Ms6Rf, [19, 04: 3.00-4.00], R) 
5:34 (Ss8Kof, [02, 03: 0.00-0.45], R) 
5:35 (Ms12Kf, [20, 06: 8.00-8.30], E) 
5:36 (Ss9Rm, [02, 06: 3.30-3.45], R)  
5:37 (St3Kf, [03, 11: 0.00-0.45], E) 
5:38 (LAs7Kf, [23, 11: 6.10-6.40], E) 
5:39 (LAs3Kf, [22, 03: 5.00-6.15], E) 
5:40 (Mt2Kf, [16, 11: 8.10-9.00], E) 
5:41 (Ms10Ukf, [19, 19: 5.30-5.45, 6.30-7.10], E) 
5:42 (KTs5Km, [08, 12: 5.4-6.20], R) 
5:43 (KTs1Kf, [05, 07: 7.30-8.10], K) 
5:44 (Ms9Rf, [19, 16: 5.10-6.00], E)  
5:45 (Mt2Kf, [16, 11: 1.00-1.50], E) 
5:46 (Ms9Rf, [19, 16: 0.30-1.15], E) 
5:47 (Ms2Kf, [17, 02: 1.2-2.00], E)  
5:48 (Ss2Rf, [01, 04: 1.30-1.45], R) 
5:49 (St3Kf, [03, 11: 0.45-1.30], E) 
5:50 (KTs5Km, [08, 12: 1.30-2.00], R) 
5:51 (Ss11Kf, [02, 12: 2.00-2.30], R) 
5:52 (Mt3Rm, [17, 05: 4.15-4.45], R) 
5:53 (Kts3Km, [07, 17: 2.30-4.00], K) 
5:54 (SKs12Km, [10, 13: 1.00-2.00], E,R) 
5:55 (KTs1Kf, [05, 06: 2.00-2.30], K) 
5:56 (SKs3Km, [05, 16: 2.00-3.15], E) 
5:57 (Sks5Km, [06, 06: 2.30-2.50], R) 
 343 
Quote 
Number                  Reference 
5:58 (St3Kf, [03, 11: 9.30-10.15, 12: 0.00-0.50], E) 
5:59 (Mt2Kf, [16, 10: 4.00-5.15], E) 
5:60 (Mt4Rf, [17, 15: 5.00-6.00], R) 
5:61 (Ss7Kf, [02, 01: 2.00-2.30], R) 
5:62 (Ss10Rf, [02, 09: 0.00-0.30], R) 
5:63 (Ss9Rm, [02, 06: 0.15-0.45], R)  
5:64 (SKs10Km, [10, 05: 3.30], E,R,) 
5:65 (KTt2Kf, [07, 04: 6.05-6.40], E) 
5:66 (Lat2Tm, [21, 07: 0.00-1.00], R) 
5:67 (SKt1Kf [06, 11: 8.40-9.15], E) 
5:68 (KTs7Km, [09, 06: 9.30- 07: 0.15], R) 
5:69 (LAs9Tm, [24, 03: 4.15-4.45], R) 
5:70 (SKs14Km, [11, 01: 0.30-1.00], R) 
5:71 (Ms9Rf, [19, 16: 0.30-1.00], E) 
5:72 (KTs10,Kf, [09, 15: 5.00-6.00], E,R)  
5:73 (LAs4Rf, [22, 08: 1.00-1.20], R) 
5:74 (LAs4Rf, [22, 08: 6.30-6.50], R) 
5:75 (Ss1Kf, [01, 02: 7.15-7.30], R) 
5:76 (Ms9Rf, [19, 18: 2.40-3.00], E)  
5:77 (Ms6Rf, [19, 05: 8.45-9.00], R) 
5:78 (Mt5Km[18, 05: 1.40-2.10], E) 
5:79 (LAs1Rf, [21, 16: 4.00-4.30], E) 
5:80 (St2Rf, [03, 08: 3.00-3.30], R) 
5:81 (KTs2Kym, [07, 13: 5.00-5.40], K) 
5:82 (LAs6Rf, [23, 01:8.00-8.25], E)  
5:83 (KTs10Kf, [09, 16: 4.15-4.45], R)  
5:84 (Ss5Kom, [01, 15: 5.50-6.10], E) 
5:85 (KTs2Kym, [07, 14: 4.30-4.40], K) 
5:86 (SKs14Km, [11, 01: 0.30-1.10], R) 
5:87 (Ss11Kf, [03, 01: 4.00-4.20], R) 
5:88 (LAs11Kf, [24, 10: 5.00-6.00], E) 
5:89 (37t1Km, [14, 01: 0.10-0.30, 0.45-1.15], R) 
5:90 (SKs2Uyf, [05, 12: 1.30-2.00], E) 
5:91 (SKs3Km, [05, 17: 3.30-4.10], E)  
5:92 (KTs3Km, [07, 01: 6.00-6.30], K) 
5:93 (Ms6Rf, [19, 04: 0.50-1.50], R) 
5:94 (LAs5Kf, [22, 12: 3.50-4.20], E) 
5:95 (SKs5Km, [06, 07: 6.00-7.00], K)  
5:96 (Ss11Kf, [02, 13: 3.30-4.15], R) 
5:97 (St1Kf, [03, 05: 1.00-1.45], R)  
5:98 (Ms9Rf, [19, 16: 9.40-17: 0.05], E)  
5:99 (SKs5Km, [06, 07: 8.00-8.30], K) 
5:100 (Mt1Rf, [16, 03: 4.30-8.10], E) 
5:101 (LAs2Uf, [21, 17: 9.05-9.20], E) 
5:102 (Ss11Kf, [02, 13: 4.45-5.15], R) 
5:103 (SKs14Km, [11, 02: 5.30-6.30], R)  
5:104 (Ms5Rf, [19, 01: 8.30-8.50], R)  
5:105 (KTs11Kf, [22, 15: 9.00-9.30], K) 
5:106 (KTs8Km, [09, 10: 8.15-8.30], E) 
5:107 (SKs12Km, [10, 11: 2.00-2.50], E) 
5:108 (KTs10Kf, [09, 16: 3.00-3.30], E) 
5:109 (Mt5Km, [18, 02: 9.25-03: 0.30], E) 
5:110 (SKs14Km, [11, 01: 1.00-1.15], R) 
5:111 (KTs7Km, [09, 06: 4.00-5.10], R)  
5:112 (Ss12Km, [03, 03: 4.45-5.00], R) 
5:113 (Ms9Rf, [19, 16: 9.15-9.30], E) 
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5:114 (St1Kf, [03, 05: 0.00-1.00], R) 
5:115 (St3Kf, [03, 11: 5.50-6.50], E) 
5:116 (Mt5Km, [18, 01: 6.10-7.15], E) 
5:117 (Lat2Tm, [21, 09: 0.00-1.30], R) 
5:118 (SKt1Kf, [06, 11: 1.05-1.30], E) 
5:119 (Ms9Rf, [19, 16: 6.30-7.20], E) 
5:120 (Lat1Rf, [21, 01: 0.35-1.00], E) 
  
6:1 (KTs1Kf, [05, 10: 1.00], K) 
6:2 (KTs4Km, [08, 05: 2.20], K) 
6:3 (SKs14Km, [11, 02: 9.50-03: 0.15], E) 
6:4 (LAs10Km, [24, 07: 3.00-3.25], E) 
6:5 (LAs7Kf, [23, 12: 1.30-2.00], E) 
6:6 (SKs12Km, [10, 12: 8.55-9.05], E) 
6:7 (LAs11Kf, [24, 10: 8.10-8.20], E) 
6:8 (St3Kf, [03, 13: 1.20-1.50], E) 
6:9 (LAs9Tm, [24, 04: 0.00-0.20], R) 
6:10 (Ms9Rf, [19, 17: 3.35-3.45], E) 
6:11 (KTt2Kf, [07, 05: 10.00- 06: 0.55], E) 
6:12 (SKs11Km, [10, 09: 1.00-1.10], E) 
6:13 (Ms2Kf, [17, 03: 4.25-4.30], E) 
6:14 (KTs5Km, [08, 13: 5.05-5.30], R) 
6:15 (Ss11Kf, [02, 14: 1.00-1.30], R) 
6:16 (LAs4Rf, [22, 08: 8.05-8.25], R) 
6:17 (SKs9Kf, [10, 02: 1.00-1.55], E) 
6:18 (SKs1Kf, [05, 03: 1.00-1.15] E)  
6:19 (LAs4Rf, [22, 08: 8.20-8.35], R) 
6:20 (Ms14Kf, [20, 1.50-2.10], E) 
6:21 (Mt6Kf, [23, 06: 4.15-5.35], E) 
6:22 (KTs10Kf, [09, 16: 6.30-7.15], R) 
6:23 (KTs9Km, [09, 13: 7.00-7.30], E) 
6:24 (Ss3Km, [01, 08: 1.55-2.05], R) 
6:25 (Ss7Kf, [02, 01: 4.05-4.10], R) 
6:26 (KTs6Kf, [09, 01: 8.05], R,K) 
6:27 (LAs11Kf, [24, 10: 8.30-8.40], E) 
6:28 (SKs9Kf, [10, 02: 2.00-2.15], E) 
6:29 (Ms2Kf, [17, 03: 5.05-5.45], E) 
6:30 (Ms4Kf, [19, 09: 1.00-1.20], R) 
6:31 (SKs1Kf, [05, 02: 5.50-6.00], E)  
6:32 (SKs11Km, [10, 09: 1.45-2.00], E)  
6:33 (LAs2Uf, [21, 18: 2.35-3.10], E)  
6:34 (SKs14Km, [11, 02: 9.10-10.00], E) 
6:35 (Mt6Kf, [23, 06: 6.40-7.00], E) 
6:36 (SKs10Km, [10, 04: 7.20-7.40], E) 
6:37 (LAs10Km, [24, 07: 3.30-4.00], E) 
6:38 (KTs6Kf, [09, 01: 8.00-8.15], R) 
6:39 (KTt1Kf, [07, 02: 1.10-2.15], E,R,) 
6:40 (SKs3Km, [05, 17: 6.00-6.30], E) 
6:41 (SKs4Km, [06, 03; 4.35-5.00], K) 
6:42 (Ss2Rf, [01, 05: 0.30-0.45], R) 
6:43 (Ss8Kof, [02, 08: 8.20-8.30], R) 
6:44 (Ms10Ukf, [19, 19: 9.40-10.00], E) 
6:45 (Ms7Rm, [19, 07: 6.30-6.45], R) 
6:46 (St1Kf, [03, 06: 2.30-3.30], R) 
6:47 (St1Kf, [03, 05: 2.05-3.00], R) 
6:48 (Lat1Rf, [21, 02: 5.40-6.30], E) 
6:49 (SKt1Kf, [06, 13: 6.15-6.45], E) 
6:50 (KTt2Kf, [07, 05: 6.40-7.20], E) 
6:51 (Mt5Km, [18, 04: 0.30-0.50], E)  
6:52 (Mt2Kf, [16, 12: 6.30-7.20], E) 
6:53 (KTs7Km, [09, 07: 9.10-9.30], E) 
6:54 (SKs2Uyf, [05, 13: 4.35-4.45], E) 
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6:55 (SKt1Kf, [06, 13: 6.40-6.50, 7.30-8.00], E)  
6:56 (Ss11Kf, [02, 13: 6.10-6.55], R) 
6:57 (Ss7Kf, [02, 01: 4.20-4.30], R) 
6:58 (Lat2Tm, [21, 09: 8.00-8.40], R) 
6:59 (Ss3Km, [01, 08: 2.20-2.30], R) 
6:60 (Ss12Km, [03, 03: 6.15-6.30], E) 
6:61 (KTt1Kf, [07, 02: 2.15-2.55], E) 
6:62 (37t1Km, [14,], R) 
6:63 (Ms4Kf, [19, 09: 1.20-2.00], R) 
6:64 (Mt2Kf, [16, 12: 8.00-8.45], E) 
6:65 (Ss1Kf, [01, 01: 9.35-02:00], R)  
6:66 (St3Kf, [03, 12: 5.10-5.30], E) 
6:67 (SKs4Km, [06, 03: 5.00-6.00], K) 
6:68 (SKs8Km, [08, 17: 8.40-9.00], E) 
6:69 (Mt6Kf, [23, 06: 7.00-7.45], E) 
6:70 (St2Rf, [03, 09: 2.30-3.00], R) 
6:71 (Ms7Rm, [19, 07: 6.45-7.00], R) 
6:72 (KTs4Km, [08, 05: 2.30-3.00], K)  
6:73 (KTs1Kf, [05, 09: 0.30-0.55], K) 
6:74 (LAs12Km, [24, 15: 2.20-2.35], E) 
6:75 (KTs2Kym, [07, 14: 6.30-7.00], K) 
6:76 (KTs3Km, [08, 01: 3.30-3.40], K) 
6:77 (Ms2Kf, [17, 03: 6.20-6.30], E) 
6:78 (Mt5Km, [18, 02: 2.05-2.20], E) 
6:79 (Ms14Kf, [20, 17: 4.05-4.15], E) 
6:80 (SKs7Um, [08, 08: 9.50-09: 0.10], R) 
6:81 (SKs7Um, [08: 09: 0.10-0.30], R) 
6:82 (SKs8Km, [08, 17: 9.30-10.00], E) 
6:83 (SKt1Kf, [06, 13: 7.20-7.30], E) 
6:84 (SKt1Kf, [06, 13: 6.50-7.25], E) 
6:85 (Ss5Kom, [01, 15: 7.20-7.40], E) 
6:86 (St3Kf, [03, 12: 4.50-5.20], E) 
6:87 (LAs12Km, [24, 15: 3.30-3.45], E) 
6:88 (KTs5Km [08, 13: 7.30-8.00], R) 
6:89 (KTs6Kf, [09, 01: 9.00-9.20], R) 
6:90 (St2Rf, [03, 09: 3.25-3.55], R)  
6:91 (37t2Km, [13, 03: 1.00-1.10], K)  
6:92 (SKs3Km, [05, 17: 8.00-8.20], E) 
6:93 (SKs14Km, [11, 03: 1.55-2.25], E) 
6:94 (KTs2Kym, [07, 14: 8.00-8.20], K) 
6:95 (37t1Km, [14], R) 
6:96 (KTs9Km, [09, 13: 8.10-8.25], E) 
6:97 (KTs1Kf, [05, 09: 2.30-3.30], K)  
6:98 (Mt2Kf, [16, 12: 9.30-13: 0.05], E) 
6:99 (LAt2Tm, [21, 09: 8.35-8.50], R) 
6:100 (SKs13Km, [10, 17: 1.30-1.55], K) 
6:101 (St1Kf, [03, 06: 4.10-4.30], R) 
6:102 (37t2Km, [13, 02: 1.00-1.40], K) 
6:103 (LAt2Tm, [21, 09: 8.05-8.25, 8.50-9.00], R) 
6:104 (LAs2Uf, [21, 18: 4.10-4.25], E) 
6:105 (Ms4Kf, [19, 09: 4.00-4.30], R) 
6:106 (Ms7Rm, [19, 07: 8.00-8.15], R)  
6:107 (Ms5Rf, [19, 02: 1.00-1.15], R) 
6:108 (Mt1Rf, [16, 05: 0.50-1.10, 06: 1.15-2.15, 3.00-3.20], E) 
6:109 (Mt2Kf, [16, 13: 0.30-2.00] E) 
6:110 (St2Rf, [03, 09: 4.00-5.50], R) 
6:111 (Kts3Km, [08, 02: 4.30-5.00], K) 
6:112 (SKs5Km, [06, 08: 6.30-8.00], K) 
6:113 (LAs11Kf, [24, 11: 1.35-2.05], E) 
6:114 (LAs7Kf, [23, 12: 6.20-6.45], E) 
6:115 (LAs2Uf, [21, 18: 0.30-1.40], E) 
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6:116 (St3Kf, [03, 12: 8.30-9.20], E) 
6:117 (LAt2Tm, [21, 10: 00.00-0.40, 1.10-1.30], R) 
6:118 (St1Kf, [03, 06: 6.50-7.55], R) 
6:119 (Ss7Kf, [02, 01: 6.00-6.15], R) 
6:120 (Ss5Kom, [01, 15: 8.00-8.25], E) 
6:121 (St1Kf, [03, 05: 9.40- 06: 0.30], R) 
6:122 (Mt5Km, [18, 03: 6.45-7.10], E) 
6:123 (SKs1Kf, [05, 03: 00.00-1.00], E) 
6:124 (LAs5Kf, [22, 12: 9.20- 13: 0.10], E) 
6:125 (LAs7Kf, [23, 12: 6.55-8.20], E,R) 
6:126 (LAs2Uf, [21, 18: 6.30-7.25], E)  
6:127 (St2Rf, [03, 09: 5.55-6.30], R) 
6:128 (St3Kf, [03, 13: 0.45-1.10], E) 
6:129 (LAt2Tm, [21, 10: 4.15-4.50], R) 
6:130 (KTs4Km, 08, 05: 4.40-5.00], K) 
6:131 (KTs5Km, [08, 13: 9.05-9.25], R) 
6:132 (Mt6Kf, [23, 07: 0.50-1.20], E) 
6:133 (37t2Km, [13, 03: 3.30-4.30], K)  
6:134 (SKs5Km, [06, 08: 8.00-8.50], K) 
6:135 (Ms14Kf, [20, 17: 5.50-6.15], E) 
6:136 (KTs1Kf, [05, 09: 9.00- 10: 0.45], K) 
6:137 (SKs3Km, [05, 18: 0.05-1.00], E) 
6:138 (KTs9Km, [09, 13: 9.30-9.40], E) 
6:139 (SKs7Um, [08, 09: 2.55-3.30], R) 
6:140 (SKs12Km, [10, 13: 3.50-5.00], E) 
6:141 (Ms11Kf, [20, 03: 6.30-7.50], E) 
6:142 (Ss7Kf, [02, 01: 7.45-8.20], R) 
6:143 (KTs7Km, [09, 08: 3.05-3.35], E) 
6:144 (Ms5Rf, [19, 02: 2.05-2.45], R) 
6:145 (Ms3Rm, [17, 12: 4.00-4.25], E)  
6:146 (LAs2Uf, [21, 18: 7.50-8.10], E) 
6:147 (Ms12Kf, [20, 09: 4.00-4.15], E) 
6:148 (Mt5Km, [18, 04: 6.35-7.10], E) 
6:149 (Ms2Kf, [17, 03: 9.30-9.50], E)  
6:150 (Ss5Kom, [01, 15: 9.15-9.45], E) 
6:151 (KTt1Kf, [07, 02: 7.00-7.30], E) 
6:152 (Ss8Kof, [02, 04: 1.40-1.55], R)  
6:153 (Ss9Rm, [02, 07: 2.05-2.20], R) 
6:154 (Ms6Rf, [19, 05: 4.10-4.30], R) 
6:155 (Ms6Rf, [19, 05: 5.20-5.25], R) 
6:156 (Ms7Rm, [19, 07: 8.50-9.30], R) 
6:157 (Ms12Kf, [20, 09: 4.00-4.55], E) 
6:158 (LAs11Kf, [24, 11: 4.05-4.40], E) 
6:159 (LAt2Tm, [21, 10: 7.30-8.25], R) 
6:160 (Ss8Kof, [02, 04: 2.40-3.00], R) 
6:161 (KTs11Kf, [22, 16: 9.00-9.15], K)  
6:162 (KTs9Km, [09, 14: 0.10-0.30], E) 
6:163 (Ss4Rm, [01, 13: 1.45-2.00], R) 
6:164 (SKs1Kf, [05, 03: 3.05-3.55], E) 
6:165 (Ms14Kf, [20, 17: 7.00-7.10], E) 
6:166 (Ss5Kom, [01, 15: 9.45-10.00], E)  
6:167 (Ms3Rm, [17, 12: 4.20-5.15], E) 
6:168 (KTt2Kf, [07, 06: 2.30-3.05], E)  
6:169 (SKs7Um, [08, 09: 1.05-1.30], R) 
6:170 (Ss3Km, [01, 08: 3.30-4.00], R) 
6:171 (LAs4Rf, [22, 08: 9.35-10.00], R)  
6:172 (Ss5Kom, [01, 15: 7.40-7.55], E) 
6:173 (Ss2Rf, [01, 05: 2.05-2.35], R) 
6:174 (St3Kf, [03, 12: 5.55-6.40, 7.50-8.00], E) 
6:175 (LAs9Tm, [24, 04: 4.30-4.45], R) 
6:176 (Ms6Rf, [19, 05: 6.30-7.00], R) 
6:177 (LAs10Km, [24, 08: 0.25-0.45], E) 
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6:178 (LAs1Rf, [21, 15: 6.00-6.40], E)  
6:179 (KTt2Kf, [07, 06: 5.30-6.10], E) 
6:180 (LAs4Rf, [22, 09: 3.00-3.25], R) 
6:181 (SKs4Km, [06, 04: 4.30-5.20], K) 
6:182 (KTs3Km, [08, 02: 7.45-8.15], K)  
6:183 (KTs9Km, [09, 14: 1.30-1.40], E) 
6:184 (LAs5Kf, [22, 13: 6.35-7.20], E) 
6:185 (KTs8Km, [09, 11: 7.20-7.30], E) 
6:186 (KTs1Kf, [05, 11: 1.00-1.25], K) 
6:187 (SKs5Km, [06, 09: 8.35-9.00], K) 
6:188 (Ss12Km, [03, 04: 2.30- 2.55], R) 
6:189 (SKs2Uyf, [05, 14: 3.25-3.45], E) 
6:190 (KTs6Kf, [09, 02: 2.35-2.55], R) 
6:191 (KTs5Km, [08, 14: 3.00-3.20], R) 
6:192 (Ms14Kf, [20, 18: 0.30-0.45], E) 
6:193 (KTs1Kf, [05, 10: 8.55-9.10], K)  
6:194 (Ss6Ukf, [01, 19: 1.30-1.40], R) 
6:195 (Ss7Kf, [02, 01: 9.30-9.50], R) 
6:196 (SKs7Um, [08, 09: 9.00-9.20], R) 
6:197 (SKs4Km, [06, 04: 5.30-5.45], K) 
6:198 (KTs10Kf, [09, 17: 8.50-9.00], K)  
6:199 (Ss12Km, [03, 04: 2.05-2.25], R) 
6:200 (LAs7Kf, [23, 13: 3.30-3.55], R) 
6:201 (KTs3Km, [08, 02: 8.25-8.40], K)  
6:202 (KTs1Kf, [05, 10: 8.20-8.30], K) 
6:203 (Ms5Rf, [19, 02: 4.35-4.45], R) 
6:204 (Ms7Rm, [19, 08: 1.00-1.15], R)  
6:205 (Ms1Uf, [16, 18: 4.25-4.40], R)  
6:206 (Ss8Kof, [02, 04: 3.55-4.15], R) 
6:207 (Ss2Rf, [01, 05: 7.30-8.15], R) 
6:208 (Ms4Kf, [19, 10: 0.00-0.15], R)  
6:209 (KTs2Kym, [07, 15: 7.00-7.20], K) 
6:210 (KTs11Kf, [22, 17: 8.30-9.25], K) 
6:211 (Ss11Kf, [02, 14: 5.55-6.10], R)  
6:212 (Ss10Kf, [02, 10: 9.00-9.10], R) 
6:213 (Ss12Km, [03, 04: 3.00-3.10], R) 
6:214 (Ss2Rf, [01, 05: 8.50-9.10], R) 
6:215 (Ms4Kf, [19, 10: 1.00-1.50], R) 
6:216 (LAs10Km, [24, 08: 1.35-1.55], E) 
6:217 (LAs9Tm, [24, 04: 5.15-5.35], R) 
6:218 (SKs6Kf, [07, 11: 7.00-7.25], R)  
6:219 (Ms8Uf, [19, 14: 8.30-8.50], E) 
6:220 (Ss4Rm, [01, 13: 4.20-4.35], R) 
6:221 (SKs8Km, [08, 18: 5.55-6.10], E) 
6:222 (Ss2Rf, [01, 05: 9.20-9.35], R) 
6:223 (SKs5Km, [06, 09: 7.25-7.55], K) 
6:224 (KTs4Km, [08, 05: 9.30-9.40], K) 
6:225 (KTs3Km, [08, 02: 9.35-9.55], K)  
6:226 (LAs6Rf, [23, 02: 8.30-855], E) 
6:227 (Ss11Kf, [02, 14: 7.00-7.25], R) 
6:228 (Ss6Ukf, [01, 19: 2.25-2.55], R) 
6:229 (KTs2Kym, [07, 15: 9.00-9.20], K) 
6:230 (KTs4Km, [08, 05: 9.40-10.00], K) 
6:231 (KTs7Km, [09, 08: 8.50-9.10], E) 
6:232 (LAs3Kf, [22, 05: 6.55-7.10], E)  
6:233 (Ms8Uf, [19, 14: 9.55-15: 0.25], E) 
6:234 (LAs10Km, [24, 08: 2.25-2.40], E) 
6:235 (Ms1Uf, [16, 18: 5.15-5.30], R) 
6:236 (Ms14Kf, [20, 18: 1.50-2.25], E) 
6:237 (KTs9km, [09, 14: 2.10-2.20], E) 
6:238 (Ms1Uf, [16, 18: 6.00-6.25], R) 
6:239 (Ms2Kf, [17, 04: 2.00-2.30], E) 
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6:240 (SKs2Uyf, [05, 14: 5.00-5.55], E) 
6:241 (KTt1Kf, [07, 03: 3.00-3.25], E) 
6:242 (KTs2Kym, [07, 16: 0.00-1.55], K) 
6:243 (SKs7Um, [08, 10: 2.00-2.55], R) 
6:244 (SKs14Km, [11, 05: 6.25-7.50], E) 
6:245 (KTs9Km, [09, 14: 2.35-2.55], E) 
6:246 (KTs3Km, [08, 03: 1.00-1.55], K) 
6:247 (Ms4Kf, [19, 10: 3.00-3.55], R) 
6:248 (Ss7Kf, [02, 02: 2.00-2.20], R) 
6:249 (Ms7Rm, [19, 08: 2.45-3.00], R) 
6:250 (LAt2Tm, [21, 12: 6.05-6.30, 8.00-8.25], R) 
6:251 (SKs3Km, [05, 19: 5.30-6.15], E) 
6:252 (St3Kf, [03, 14:10.00- 15: 0.15], E) 
6:253 (Ss1Kf, [01, 02: 7.15-7.30], R) 
6:254 (KTt2Kf, [07, 07: 5.30-5.50], E)  
6:255 (Ss4Rm, [01, 13: 7.25-7.40], R) 
6:256 (Ss2Rf, [01, 05: 2.00-2.25], R) 
6:257 (KTt1Kf, [07, 02: 4.15-4.55], R,E,) 
6:258 (Ms12Kf, [20, 10: 6.50-7.50], E) 
6:259 (LAs12Km, [24, 16: 2.20-2.35], E) 
6:260 (Mt2Kf, [16, 10: 6.35-7.05], E) 
6:261 (SKs13Km, [10, 17: 7.00-7.10], K) 
6:262 (LAs12Rm, [24, 15:8.00-8,20], E) 
6:263 (Ms9Rf, [19, 17: 7.30-7.45], E)  
6:264 (Ms10Ukf, [19, 20: 3.45-3.55], E) 
6:265 (Ms13Kf, [20, 14: 3.15-3.35], E) 
6:266 (LAs8Kf, [23, 19: 4.30-4.35, 24, 01: 0.00-0.05], E)  
6:267 (Ms14Kf, [20, 17: 8.50-9.05], E) 
6:268 (LAs5Kf, [22, 13: 2.45-3.10], E) 
6:269 (SKs3Km, [05, 18: 8.00-8.10], E) 
6:270 (SKs6Kf, [07, 09: 4.00-4.30], K) 
6:271 (SKs7Um, [08, 09: 7.55-8.05], R) 
6:272 (KTt2Kf, [07, 06: 3.50-4.05], E)  
6:273 (SKs9Kf, [10, 03: 0.40-0.55], E) 
6:274 (LAs3Kf, [22, [05: 1.25-1.40], E) 
6:275 (SKt1Kf, [06, 15: 5.30-6.10], E) 
6:276 (SKs12Km, [10, 14: 0.00-0.20], E)  
6:277 (KTt2Kf, [07, 06: 4.15-5.10], E) 
6:278 (Ms7Rm, [19, 08: 4.05-4.25], R) 
6:279 (Ms13Kf, [20, 15: 0.30-0.50], E) 
6:280 (KTt2Kf, [07, 07: 6.05-6.30], E)  
6:281 (Ms2Kf, [17, 04: 4.00-4.40], E) 
6:282 (SKs6Kf, [07, 11: 4.30-4.50], R) 
6:283 (SKs9Kf, [10, 03: 6.00-6.20], E) 
6:284 (LAt3Rf, [25, 04: 4.30-6.20], R) 
6:285 (Ss2Rf, [01, 06: 2.30-2.55], R) 
6:286 (Ss9Rm, [02, 07: 8.30-8.50], R) 
6:287 (Ss10Rf, [02, 11: 4.30-4.55], R) 
6:288 (KTs5Km, [08, 14: 8.30-9.00], R) 
6:289 (Ms4Kf, [19, 10: 7.00-7.50], R)  
6:290 (SKs7Um, [08, 10: 8.05-8.30], R) 
6:291 (Ms9Rf, [19, 18: 3.55-4.25], E)  
6:292 (Ms4Kf, [19, 10: 6.10-6.25], R) 
6:293 (Ms6Rf, [19, 05: 9.40-9.50], R) 
6:294 (LAs4Rf, [22, 09: 8.45-8.50], R) 
6:295 (LAs9Tm, [24, 04: 9.30-9.45], R) 
6:296 (LAs10Km, [24, 08: 7.05-7.15], E) 
6:297 (SKs13Km, [10, 18: 1.30-1.35], K)  
6:298 (SKs3Km, [06, 01: 1.10-1.30], E,K) 
6:299 (Mt1Rf, [16, 08: 3.40-3.55], E) 
6:300 (Ms10Ukf, [20, 01: 1.35-1.40], E) 
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6:301 (KTs4Km, [08, 06: 4.00-4.25], K) 
6:302 (LAs9Tm, [24, 05: 0.40-1.00], R)  
6:303 (SKt1Kf, [06, 17: 2.35-3.00], E) 
6:304 (KTs1Kf, [05, 11: 7.00-7.25], K) 
6:305 (Ms9Rf, [19, 18: 4.30-5.25], E) 
6:306 (LAs4Rf, [22, 09: 9.35-10.05], R)  
6:307 (KTs2Kym, [07, 16: 7.00-7.55], K) 
6:308 (SKs6Kf, [07, 11: 10.00-12: 0.25], R) 
6:309  
6:310 (Ss8Kof, [02, 04: 8.45-9.00], R) 
6:311 (SKs3Km, [06, 01; 1.55-2.05], E,K) 
6:312 (Ms6Rf, [19, 05: 9.50-10.05], R) 
6:313 (Mt1Rf, [16, 08: 4.10-4.30, 4.50-5.50], E)  
6:314 (SKt1Kf, [06, 17: 1.30-1.50], E) 
6:315 (Ms5Rf, [19, 02: 8.15-8.25], R)  
6:316 (Ms2Kf, [17, 04: 5.00-5.15], E) 
6:317 (Ms1Uf, [16, 18: 9.15-9.30], R) 
6:318 (SKs10Km, [10, 06: 9.30-9.35], E,K) 
  
7:66 (St1Kf, [03, 05: 0.00-1.00], R) 
  
8:2 (Sen1 [26, 02: 7.00- 03: 1.40], R) 
8:3 (Sen4, [26: 16: 0.10-0.45], R) 
8:4 (Sen3, [26, 13: 0.40-1.25], R) 
8:5 (Sen2 [26, 08: 2.15-2.50, 3.40-3.55, 7.45-8.00], R)  
8:6 (MP1, [27: 08: 7.00-7.30], R) 
  
8:16 (MP2, [27, 13: 0.05-1.20], R) 
8:17 (MP1, [27, 09: 6.00-7.00], R)  
8:18 (Sen3, [26, 14: 2.05-2.25], R) 
  
8:22 (Sen6, [27, 03: 5.05-5.50], R) 
8:23 (Sen5, [26, 20: 3.20-4.15], R) 
8:24 (MP2, [27, 12: 4.45-6.45], R) 
8:25 (Sen4, [26, 17: 6.05-6.15], R) 
8:26 (MP1, [27, 09: 5.05-5.35], R)  
8:27 (Sen1, [26, 05: 4.10-5.05], R) 
8:28 (Sen2, [26, 09: 0.40-1.15], R) 
  
8:34 (Sen2, [26, 07: 0.00-1.15], R) 
8:35 (MP2, [27, 11: 0.00-0.50], R)  
8:36 (Sen7, [27, 06: 0.30-0.45, 1.15-1.45], R) 
8:37 (Sen6, [27, 01: 2.00-3.00], R) 
  
8:42 (MP1, [27, 08: 9.00-10.00], R) 
8:43 (Sen3, [26, 13: 2.50-3.05, 4.30-5.05], R) 
8:44 (Sen2, [26, 08: 3.45-4.05], R) 
8:45 (Sen5, [26, 19: 9.25-10.00], R) 
8:46 (Sen4, [26, 15: 2.30-3.45], R)  
8:47 (Sen1, [26, 03: 1.05-1.25], R)  
  
8:55 (Sen1, [26, 02: 1.00-1.30], R) 
8:56 (MP1, [27, 08: 1.50-2.20], R) 
  
8:59 (Sen5, [26, 18: 2.30-3.10], R) 
8:60 (Sen7, [27, 06: 3.10-3.50], R) 
8:61 (MP2, [27, 11: 2.40-3.00], R) 
8:62 (Sen2, [26, 07: 8.05-8.25], R) 
8:63 (Sen2, [26, 08: 0.10-1.20], R) 
8:64 (Sen6, [27, 01: 6.35-7.30], R) 
8:65 (Sen6, [27, 01: 7.35-8.05], R) 
Quote 
Number                  Reference 
8:66 (MP1, [27, 08: 4.00-4.45], R) 
  
8:68 (Sen1, [26, 04: 3.20-3.50], R) 
8:69 (Sen3, [26, 13: 0.00-0.15], R) 
8:70 (Sen2, [26, 08: 1.25-2.00], R)  
8:71 (Sen6, [27, 02: 0.35-2.05], R) 
8:72 (Sen5, [26, 18: 4.55-7.00], R) 
  
8:76 (Sen5, [26, 18: 7.00-750], R) 
8:77 (Sen6, [27, 02: 4.25-5.20], R) 







Appendix C: Supplementary Quotes 
 
Chapter 4 
4:2 “Kind, hospitable, inquisitive, but of course not all, each person has their own 
character.” 
 
4:9 “Our people um are, they say that Kazakh people very um, er, friendly…”  
 
4:17 “Uh, different people, Russian, Kazakh and um, it seems to me, um people of 
Kazakhstan live in big unity. This country um, how to say…unites yes, unites them - 
Uzbek, Kazakh, Ukraines, different nationalities. Um, they live uh, together for a 
long time on this land uh, so um, they have friendship…”  
 
4:27 “Citizen of Kazakhstan.”  
 
4:28 “…I’m a student, a citizen of Kazakhstan.”  
 
4:29 “I work and study. I am glad that I am Kazakhstani and that I was born here.”  
 
4:37 “That after independence Kazakhstan returned to… its language because before 
independence they only spoke Russian and were proud to speak Russian, to know 
Russian but now, on the whole everything is in Kazakh.”  
 
4:41 “The first probably that we are free of way of thinking. Then, then we are free 
of choosing the religion and yeah we can study whenever or whatever we want.”  
 
4:42 “Every person can himself work and build something for himself 
independently.”  
 
4:50 “Yes, I’m Kazakhstani, I’m Kazakhstani. I know the Kazakh language better 
than Tatar, I can write and read in Kazakh, study, I give lectures in Kazakh, I give 
lectures in Russian and in Kazakh so therefore I feel Kazakhstani… And to feel 
Kazakhstani is very easy because half the population of the Kazakh, Kazakh 
republic, the Republic of Kazakhstan belong to another culture, Russian culture, 
Tatar culture, Uyghur, Uzbek, half the population. Therefore, we feel Kazakhstani 
and are proud of it even… A mono-national state is a somewhat poor nation.” 
 
4:54 “When out of Kazakhstan, when visiting other countries.”  
 
4:55 “Yes, for example, when I met some foreign students.”  
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4:56 “Yes, when I communicate on the internet.”  
 
4:64 “Yes, for example, when I myself was in Russia, in Moscow, in the centre, and 
other people immediately said to me, ‘You’ve no doubt come from Kazakhstan, 
you’re not a Russian like ours,’ Muscovites, living in the capital, ‘you’re completely 
different.’ First of all they said, ‘You probably speak their language, speak Kazakh, 
you have an accent, it shows,’ and I said, ‘Yes, I speak it.’ And then that my 
hospitality, it was noticeable among them and the sociability, that they, for example, 
I compared, myself, in literature, when you compare traditions and how we relate to 
them… for some reason they relate to it all differently.” 
 
4:65 “I think so yes, in Kazakhstan people are more kind and hospitable, they don’t 
look at whether you’re rich or poor, they relate to everyone equally.”  
 
4:66 “Yes, er, they are very er, friendly and they, they are ready to help always and I 
think I will recognise a um, citizen of Kazakhstan everywhere…people of different 
nations of our country are close to me.”  
 
4:68 “Yes, because they, because they are part of definite country, for example our 
Kazakhstan and others, they have their own traditions and they um, in they differ 
from us by um, for example, these things.” 
“Holidays such as New Year, they are common to every ethnic of our country.”  
 
4:71 “…I think people may differ… in their culture, mentality because of the 
conditions in where they live. So the surrounding, the condition er, influence on the 
mentality. The economic state influence on the mentality of the people so for this 
reason there will be difference, because of different condition, different surrounding 
yeah, different economic, there will be dif, difference between different nation I 
think.”  
 
4:75 “I’ve been to different countries, for example, I’ve been to Russia, to 
Kyrgyzstan, to Uzbekistan and I think that people from Kazakhstan are more open, 
more friendly, you can easily find out how to get around they answer readily, even 
sitting on the bus you can easily talk…”  
 
4:78 “As I tried to compare for example, when I was in Uzbekistan, in Tashkent, 
yeah I, I found some differences between the people itself like themself. For 
example, I would say that Kazakhstan people they are more polite probably yes and 
they are open-heart, hearted people.” 
 
4:81 “Every Kazakhstani, Kazakhstani, whether he’s Russian or Kazakh or Tatar or 
Uzbek, they have their own traditions, and each one has their own traditions, the 
Uzbeks, the Tatars, the Russians and all of them are united as one, in one Kazakhstan 
and they respect Kazakhstan’s traditions”  
 
 349 
4:82 “There are several ethnic group, groups here but they are also, they are very 
friendly from each other and, and in my opinion in our country all groups very 
friendly than in other countries, it’s my opinion, and so I, I like this country from this 
position because all people can speak with each other without any fears.”  
 
4:84 “I think it, maybe our, maybe our president is so hospitable and er, all our these 
laws in constitution is equal for every nation, maybe, maybe this is, I think that all 
this, every nation has their own ideas, their own um, this way of life and I think 
maybe it’s our law [that unites all the nationalities in Kazakhstan].” 
 
4:89 “If you compare Kazakhstan with other countries you can see that the economic 
level is higher than the neighbouring countries, for example, Uzbekistan.” 
 
4:90 “because our Kazakhstan is young country and we develop very fast and so I’m 
proud of it, how people good workers.”  
 
4:101 “First of all my mother and father is Kazakh…and then in myself Kazakh 
blood flows.”  
 
4:105 “I know my language, speaking Kazakh, my birth, my origin, my motherland, 
my eyes, my appearance.”  
 
4:110 “The first language and I like my language very much…”  
 
4:111 “My parents are Kazakh and I speak in Kazakh.”  
 
4:117 “First of all language, then what? Behaviour, manner of relating.” 
 
4:122 “My habits, my family traditions, uh, and my understanding and I love my 
country, I speak Kazakh, I know all the traditions and I try to follow them.”  
 
4:126 “Most likely my mode of thought…”  
 
4:133 “I’m proud with my people, with our language, our musical instrument and 
character of our people.”  
 
4:137 “[I am] proud of the achievements from ancestors and independence and 
culture and traditions and language.”  
 
4:138 “Because finally we became independent I’m proud of it…and nevertheless 
uh, we have lots of problem but nevertheless we kept our religion, and our like our 
culture, many customs that we still have.”  
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4:139 “I am proud of my country, proud of my Kazakhstan…”  
 
4:141 “I think yes, everyone should be proud of nationality um, which he has or she 
has. Yes, I’m proud…”  
 
4:145 “In Kazakhstan in principle I can’t be proud of anything. If I was in Russia 
then, that the country is big, that I have such a history…” 
 
4:148 “Probably my origins and traditional celebrations…” 
 
4:152 “It’s like if you don’t know the language or the traditions you don’t know 
anything of the people, every Kazakh must know his language.”  
 
4:153 “It’s very important because all the traditions of history of Kazakhstan and 
majority of literature are written in this language and it’s important to each Kazakh 
to speak to develop this language.”  
 
4:155 “It’s important for us because if we live in Kazakhstan we must know Kazakh 
language and in short we must know our native tongue.”  
 
4:157 “I think that the role of Kazakh language in Kazakhstan is important first of all 
because as for every country for example in English it’s important I think to know, to 
know English and but nowadays the Kazakh language it takes its deserved role, it 
takes its own yes. Before it wasn’t but now it has taken its own role.” 
 
4:164 “Russian language is um, the main language for me. It’s important because I 
talk on this language. I speak, write, read more in Russian…” 
 
4:166 “…It’s just the language we speak. I think it’s important because we speak 
only Russian.” 
 
4:169 “Yes. Because of your Kazakh blood that flows through your veins.”  
 
4:172 “I can say if I can’t speak, I will say that I am Kazakh because I am proud of 
my nation.”  
 
4:176 “I don’t think so. I think that if he is Kazakh he must know his language, his 
customs, his traditions, but if he doesn’t know his language, his traditions I think that 
he’s not a Kazakh.” 
- “Who is he then?” 
- “A Kazakh but not a pure-blooded one.”  
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4:177 “I think it will be um, difficult to understand the Kazakh inside world not 
knowing the language…so I think any people will not feel as their nation if they do 
not know their language.”  
 
4:180 “I don’t think you’re worth calling Kazakh if you don’t know your native 
language.”  
 
4:183 “Maybe yes, because my father is Russian, therefore would I be in a foreign 
country being Russian person I uh, called myself Russian.” 
 
4:185 “If he doesn’t speak Russian it means he was born in some other country and 
lives there. It seems to me, I, these Russians are losing themselves, in these specific 
situations. Those who go abroad become like that population. Maybe they retain 
some customs in food there …but they become more like the population.”  
 
Chapter 5 
5:3 “More pride in Kazakhstan, because now it’s an independent country.” 
 
5:6 “It is always, um, pleasant to hear that my country is independent, we are young 
and we have like independence only during 14 years maybe, so we have a lot of 
problems with this but like it’s just the beginning. I like more Kazakhstan than Soviet 
Union.”  
 
5:13 “Everything makes me proud that I am Kazakh and Kazakhstani, I am proud of 
me, that I am part of this country.”  
 
5:15 “We can say our Kazakhstan is independent.”  
 
5:16 “We don’t depend on other countries, um, we have our, we have our law, we 
have our, we have our constitution, so, we have our own system of education.” 
 
5:19 “it’s my people, I was born here.”  
 
5:20 “Yes I am proud of being a citizen of Kazakhstan because I have lived here 
from my birth.” 
 
5:23 “People who live in Kazakhstan, I’ve just been in Russia and can compare, all 
the same in the relationship between them, their hospitality, they are a lot warmer 
towards people and more sociable.”  
 
 352
5:24 “I think people may differ only in their culture, mentality because of the 
conditions in where they live. So the surrounding, the condition er, influence on the 
mentality.”  
 
5:25 “Uh, different people, Russian, Kazak, and um it seems to me, um people of 
Kazakhstan live like in big unity. This country um, how to say…unites, yes unites 
them – Uzbek, Kazakh, Ukraines, different nationalities. Um, they live uh, together 
for a long time on this land uh, so um, they have friendship.” 
 
5:32 “I really love sport and if, I dream it’s of competitions, if I were to win there, to 
take part, been involved, when I see on television when Kazakhstan wins, wins, I 
don’t know, I even cry for joy.  
 
5:38 “in general people, Kazakhstani people, they are all friendly, not like in other 
countries” 
 
5:44 “Russian here are different from Russian in, in Russia. Yes, we are very 
different… In behaviour, in the way of speaking yes. Here we are, we are, I think we 
are more polite we are like Kazakh but in Russia they people I think are rude are very 
maybe… not friendly, aggressive maybe, yes I think so.”  
 
5:47 “Maybe we are more friendly than if you take even Russia, if you are there, 
sometimes you can have big problems, especially with the skin as I have um, with 
the same eyes… Yeah, they have racism and maybe if you know skinheads, this like 
small sects… but here like now we don’t have it.”  
 
5:54 “we were in Russian power and they made us to speak in Russian and closed 
our Kazakh schools.”  
 
5:55 “…in the time of the Soviet Union we lost our culture, traditions and language.” 
 
5:63 “they’re a kind people, good, people here don’t throw anyone out, [they’re] 
hospitable.” 
 
5:70 “I think that in our country, it’s a multinational country, in our country I think 
that all people are happy, we have a democratic republic.” 
 
5:71 “There are a lot of nationalities but they are all I think common, like very polite 
um, very friendly I think so, they don, they don’t show any um, discrimination like, 
discrimination towards other nationalities. So we are very friendly” 
 
5:72 “In our country lives many nationalities and they teach each other, they keep 
relationships very good.” 
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5:77 “Kazakh must be the national language and Russian the international language.” 
 
5:84 “I live in Kazakhstan, I should be proud of it. We don’t have wars here.” 
 
5:85 “[I am proud] that Kazakhstan respects all peoples and other countries” 
 
5:90 “I am proud because our country that’s up developed very quickly ‘cos in 
comparison with other, like Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, we really higher 
and our president, I really like him because he’s very different.” 
 
5:91 “We have a very good and very clever president, we are waiting from future 
very good things.” 
 
5:95 “In the period of the Soviet Union Kazakhstan was at a very low level among 
the Soviet countries but at the present time, yes, naturally it’s a developing country, 
but the economic level is higher than the other post-Soviet countries.”  
 
5:96 “at the moment, our country, our republic, in recent years we’ve been 
improving quickly, the economy of our country is developing. I’m proud of this, that 
it is blessed… we have freedom of speech, freedom of everything, a person can live 
as he likes.” 
 
5:97 “Kazakhstan has begun to take more care over how to be economically 
independent, how to be, it plays a big role in the improvement of the economy and 
culture in these directions.” 
 
5:99 “[I am ashamed] because of cases of injustice in the courts and other structures 
of our government.” 
 
5:100 “As for education, I think that education in Kazakhstan um, is not so good as 
in Russia… the way of living in Kazakhstan some years ago was difficult for people 
and a lot of teachers they had to go to the markets to sell different things, and to earn 
money dif, different ways, er, so uh, they, teachers I mean, they didn’t think about 
education and how to teach and they just thought about how to live, how to survive 
in difficult situations and um, that’s why we have, um, some people, young people 
who are not so educated… and some of those uh, pupils from school they entered 
universities so… their knowledge was not so good. They were not so good students. 
That’s why it’s difficult to teach them because the same situation was um, with the 
teachers of university…and we have now um, bad students and every year we have 
students which, whose knowledge, is weaker and weaker.” 
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5:101 “[What makes me ashamed is] bribes, yeah, and also medical system. Yeah, 
it’s not in an advanced level I mean.” 
 
5:105 “The land is very rich and big. The government, the land itself, everything is 
very good.” 
 
5:106 “Yes [I am proud], we have big territory, we have our independence.” 
 
5:107 “We don’t depend on other countries and er, and er, we have own laws and um 
we can sell our oil and other, um, precious things.” 
 
5:108 “First [I am proud] I live in independent country and we have large territories.” 
 
5:112 “[I am proud] that I live in this country, it’s my native land.” 
 
5:113 “I live here, I should like, it’s my native country and, I can’t live here without 
being proud of it.” 
 
Chapter 6 
6:6 “the Kazakh language is our native tongue, we must know it.” 
 
6:17 “because in future I want to speak…the Russian language because I am from 
village and… there are no qualified teachers, they are lower than city’s teachers” 
 “The quality of education is lower in the village?”  
“Yes, of course.” 
 
6:18 “because all books and so on for English are in Russian.” 
 
6:21 “They promised us when I um fill in application, they promised that there will 
be Kazakh group and I um trust them and when I came for the first day for our class 
there not, there were not Kazakh groups… I asked them why we have this, we had 
Russian teacher they… can’t found Kazakh teachers… so the first year was difficult 
for me because I studied 10 years Kazakh, in Kazakh school and so studying Russian 
for example, this philosophy, this everything was so my, so difficult for me, but by 
time, yes, got used.” 
 
6:30 “We usually use Kazakh at home, we communicate in Kazakh and in the street, 
with friends, at university, in Russian.” 
 




6:32 “I use Russian when I speak with my friends and I speak in Kazakh when I 
home with my parents.” 
 
6:35 “I use Kazakh at home, among my friends and when I saw Russian I speak in 
Russian. For example when I enter this shop, when I see shop assistant Russian 
person, I speak with him Russian.” 
 
6:36 “When I talk with Kazakh I speak in Kazakh, when I with Russian I speak in 
Russian.” 
 
6:39 “It depends on my surrounding people, when I speak with my relatives, my 
family, my mum, dad, I speak Kazakh, when I speak with my husband, I speak 
Russian. I’m trying to teach him Russian chtoby on ne zabyl, ne znaiu [so that he 
doesn’t forget it, I don’t know], we use both languages.” 
 
6:40 “I speak in Kazakh in my life more than in Russian. If my partner is or can’t 
understand in Kazakh I speak to him in Russian.” 
 
6:41 “If people understand the Kazakh language I speak Kazakh, if they understand 
Russian, then in Russian.” 
 
6:52 “I feel even um, sometimes I am stopping and thinking in what language I am 
thinking and in what language I am speaking. Because I do not even feel in what 
language I am speaking or thinking. When I stop and think about it um, I feel that 
sometimes I think in Russian, mostly, mostly and sometimes in Russian, in Kazakh 
language yes. And so speaking as well.” 
 
6:57 “Yes, almost all the time.” 
 
6:66 “Yes… I do it when I can’t find the proper word in Kazakh so I put Russian 
one. It just because of the lack of vocabulary.” 
 
6:67 “Sometimes. When I am speaking to Russian people, sometimes I mix the 
Kazakh language.” 
 
6:68 “Yes, sometimes. When can’t remember or don’t know word in Kazakh.” 
 
6:69 “Some words. For example such as, ‘koroche’  [‘in short’] and such words… 
Sometimes when I speak, for example, even when I teach… this Kazakh group I 
sometimes use such words, but I try uh, to translate it in Kazakh.” 
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6:74 “Sometimes yes. When I don’t know for example language the proper, an 
appropriate word.” 
 
6:78 “For me it doesn’t really matter. Yeah, ‘cos we just used, I am used to use 
bilingualism.” 
 
6:90 “…it’s not strict to say if you’re Russian you should speak pure Russian and 
that’s all, and not other things here and there. You need to speak this language or that 
language.” 
 
6:94 “It is bad. It spoils the language.” 
 
6:100 “[It is] bad. Because I am Kazakh I must speak Kazakh.” 
 
6:107 “No, it’s his own personal business, which, whichever language is simpler for 
him, he’ll study in.” 
 
6:126 “For example, if I speak about myself, when I uh, um, entered to, enter Uzbek 
class, I became more shy. Yeah and we, I changed some even traditions in my home. 
For example, before, we got to use, Ok we got to say to with my parents saying like 
‘you’, which means ‘ty’, but when I enter Uzbek class, I started speaking with my 
parents like ‘you’, formal, like ‘vy.’” 
 
6:131 “You become similar to the society you’re a part of.” 
 
6:132 “Yes, of course. Yes, because I have many friends, they are Kazakh but they 
studied at the Russian schools and they… have a different character compare with 
me. Sometimes I notice that mm, they also have some characters as Russian people.” 
 
6:133 “Yes. Because of the society that’s around him, the society can affect and 
influence him or her and make him… like more Russianised… and the character of 
that child can be turned to another direction because of the society and the friends 
that are around him and what he sees everyday.” 
 
6:135 “Yes. Every nationality have their own character… and when…you will be 
among this people the character will affect for each other.” 
 
6:141 “It has changed my character in some spheres – studying in Russian, in 
Russian group I now, I am able to say what I think… not as in Kazakh group, I can 
behaviour myself what I ca, I want, freely.” 
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6:145 “Of course Russian, Kazakh, and it is preferable to know uh, English language 
because of relations with foreign partners in dif, dif, different spheres.” 
 
6:146 “The more he knows, the better it. Russian, I think because Russian and 
Kazakh and English they are equal because nowadays I mean the requirements of job 
is to know three languages.” 
 
6:149 “Kazakh and English in many cases because nowadays it’s like in 
advertisements… and of course uh, like computer skills.” 
 
6:152 “Kazakh because it’s where I live and English because they are also 
demanding more that you know a foreign language.” 
 
6:162 “Russian… Most people accept that south Kazakhstan speaks in Russian.” 
 
6:166 “Kazakh… It’s the national language.” 
 
6:167 “The most important is uh, Kazakh… it is the Republic of Kazakhstan it 
demands uh, people to know Kazakh.” 
 
6:168 “Kazakh…our law is written in Kazakh language and… documents, state 
documents, not only in the sphere of policy and economy but also in the sphere of 
education.” 
 
6:172 “Everywhere in the world English is used, so I need to know it.” 
 
6:179 “I think Kazakh language is better for business. Maybe Kazakh and foreign 
languages… Because in future everything, every business, documents in Kazakh.” 
 
6:183 “Russian, because everyone speaks in Russian and most documents are in 
Russian.” 
 
6:185 “Russian or English, because of the terminology.” 
 
6:192 “For law, it’s the main Kazakh. Because it’s the law, our Kazakhstan’s law and 
the main must be Kazakh language for law.” 
 
6:193 “Kazakh, because the official language is Kazakh.” 
 




6:198 “It depends on the person.” 
 
6:201 “Kazakh. Because it’s Kazakhstan.” 
 
6:205 “Russian, because maybe it’s only my opinion, I’ve read a lot of Russian 
classics, but I really like how you can describe things in Russian.” 
 
6:208 “Russian. Because we still have many books in Russian.” 
 
6:212 “Kazakh, it’s Kazakhstan.” 
  
6:221 “Russian. Phrases good in Russian.” 
 
6:225 “Russian is more suitable because it’s easily understandable.” 
 
6:233 “Russian… in circle of friends we just speak Russian to tell anecdotes. I don’t 
know why but we only use Russian to tell anecdotes, maybe we don’t know them in 
Uzbek or in Kazakh.” 
 
6:234 “I think Russian… Russian is funnier.” 
 
6:237 “Kazakh. Kazakh jokes are very good.” 
 
6:240 “There must be choice. Because we live in free country, independent country 
so we are free in our opinions.” 
 
6:256 “Kazakh. Because it’s Kazakhstan and it should take pride in it.” 
 
6:263 “I like the Kazakh language in songs, it’s more, it’s more softly maybe, softer 
than in speech.” 
 
6:267 “I am living in Kazakhstan and I am Kazakh and so it’s the main, most 
important, it’s necessary.” 
 
6:271 “All books are in Russian. It gives us more knowledge.” 
 
6:272 “It’s good because all people… of our country use Russian language and some 
documents also, books, they are in Russian.” 
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6:276 “If we know English language we can go to foreign countries, buy a car, do 
business.” 
 
6:280 “People who are from villages, from countryside, they use Kazakh.” 
 
6:291 “Yes… Old people who try to, to protect maybe their, their native language, 
their culture and refuse to speak Russian, like, ‘You should understand me, I will 
speak to you in Kazakh.’” 
 
6:300 “Russian people.” 
  
6:307 “A lot. The people who don’t like their language, some Kazakhs, if they’re 
Russians they’d speak it, some Kazakhs don’t like their native language.” 
 
6:308 “Yes. For example, I have an acquaintance. She’s a Kazakh but she speaks 
with an accent in Kazakh so she’s just shy and doesn’t speak it.” 
 
6: 317 “Active people from age 18 to 30 because it’s when they start to work and 
need English.” 
 
6:318 “Educated people.” 
 
Chapter 7 
7:1 “steppe knights, as a rule, combined in themselves many military, political, 
diplomatic and by no means least of all, artistic talents and, with equal success could 
debate important social-political problems and, with heartfelt lyricism express their 
observations about nature and society and give eloquent speeches in forums both 
large and small and, with a spear in hand, lead warfare.”1 
(Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, 	
  
  , 16/09/2003). 
 
7:2 “Today, when we have made it as a state and on the path to the establishment of 
our independence, put into practice a Strategy for the development of the country up 
to 2030 – a strategy for the founding of the nation, for patriotic ideas… the 
mobilizing call of the poetry of Makhambet is topical for us as never before…In 
thinking about the fate of our native land and the future of the country we will turn 
our gaze again and again to the great poetic flights of Makhambet in order to quench 
our spiritual thirst [and] check our path.”   
(Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, 	
  
  , 16/09/2003). 
 
                                                 
1 See Appendix E for quotes in original Russian 
 360
7:3 “Today for every citizen, be he a poet or an administrator, there is no task higher 
or more noble than to live with the problems of a simple people and to care about the 
security and prosperity of the country. Therefore now, when we have in our hands 
the Freedom about which thousands of patriots dreamed for centuries, we cannot for 
a moment forget that our greatest treasure and final aim is healthy and indefatigable 
self-improvement aspiring to the very best moral spirit of the nation. Only a highly 
moral person with a clear conscience and a responsive heart can be a true patriot of 
the homeland. In this vein, the work of Makhambet infused with the magical force of 
the poetry of Kultegin, the untiring devotion of the lyrical chronicles of Kaztugan 
and the profound military-philosophical reflections of Dosmanbet will remain for all 
time for us as an inexhaustible mine of folk wisdom, an inextinguishable life-giving 
spring for the national spirit.” 
 
“To see the phenomenon of Makhambet through the prism of universal ideals and 
values – is an excellent opportunity to get to know Kazakhstan better, to study more 
determinedly the complex history of our people, to understand more deeply the 
mysteries of the Kazakh soul” 
(Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, 	
  
  , 16/09/2003). 
 
7:4 “Up to now there is not a single acceptable textbook of the recent history of 
Kazakhstan. The dramatic events of our independence and our struggle to strengthen 
it have not become a subject of study. And we need to bring children up in this, to 
show the value of the experience of friendship, and of international and inter-
confessional accord and to show the uniqueness of our state, emphasised the 
President.” 
(Kazakhstanskaya Pravda,   —  , 
13/10/2004). 
 
7:8 “Soon the whole community of Kazakhstan will mark 10 years since the day 
when the constitution of the independent republic was accepted. The main law of the 
country has, for all these years, been a reliable guarantor of the progress of the state. 
A significant place in it is devoted to the development of languages. As is written in 
the law, ‘it is the duty of every citizen of the Republic of Kazakhstan to know the 
state language which is an important factor in the consolidation of the peoples of 
Kazakhstan’.”  




7:16 “Isatay and Makhambet dreamt about the freedom and independence of their 
country, about unity and solidarity and today we, their descendents, admire the spirit 
of the great freedom fighters and our duty before our ancestors and before our 
children – is to always hold high the banner of freedom”  
 
“In actual fact, it is precisely thanks to the indomitable, ineradicable love for freedom 
and the stoical character of the Kazakh people coming from the ancestry of the 
ancient Turks, that it was able to stand up to the catastrophes of history, not to 
disappear from the face of the earth, to preserve its territorial and national wealth 
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and, most importantly its national face and dignity. This character was tempered in 
the fire of numerous uprisings and endless resistance. This was a love soaked in the 
blood of staunch fighters bringing themselves as a sacrifice in the name of the 
Fatherland.” 
 
“Now, we can say with confidence: yes, today the great dream, for which our great 
ancestor Makhambet lived and fought has come true. His people has got rid of the 
fetters of slavery and become the fully empowered master of its own fate and has 
started to live a free and creative life without war or confrontation…their territory 
and natural riches are open for people and serve the well-being of all who live and 
labour on this land.”  
(Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, 	
  
  , 16/09/2003). 
  
7:17 “Numerous epic historians, Kazakh poet singers, musicians, story-tellers and 
simple steppe-dwellers from century to century extolled the exploits of their 
ancestors. All this couldn’t but settle in the memory of generations… the simple 
people made their own heroes from the people. Thus, the previous epoch 
accomplished a great work in order that every steppe-dweller would be filled with 
love for his ancestors and his roots.”   
(Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, )    
? 28/10/2005).  
 
7:19 “In whatever corner of the boundless Kazakh steppe you saw a barrow or 
imperceptible hillock, from all around you would be revealed evidence of the past. 
The people is an impartial judge and just this people in its time, having appreciated 
the worth of Makhambet gave the movement under the leadership of Isatay and 
Makhambet a meaning of immense historical significance and great political 
importance. For this reason it is not right to present and examine the history of a 
people and the history of its great heroic individuals in separation from each other. 
And this means that, having conferred high international status on the anniversary of 
Makhambet there stands as a fact the worldwide recognition and deep respect which 
the world association gives to the ancient Kazakh people and to our young but none-
the-less real state – a spirit of trust, of genuine interest and bright hope which 
mankind links with our country.”  
 
“It is far from an accident that I have focussed attention on the great significance and 
deep meaning we have invested in taking to a world level the anniversaries of such 
giants of the spirit of the people as Abai, Zhambul, Mukhtar Ayezob and other 
famous citizens... Having left an indelible mark on the homeland’s history they are 
dear to us, first of all because each one of them, having gathered the resolve to go 
against the flow of the age and raised their heads to meet the destructive wind of the 
times, was able to become the conscience of the nation, an expression of the hopes 
and expectations of the people and to the end remain a defender of the national 
interests. Such as these remain forever in the people’s memory. We are obligated to 
imprint the images of such as these in the consciousness of the young and future 
generations… None of us has the right to forget them. In the name of which, in order 
to preserve an unclouded historical memory, and in order to preserve the moral-
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  , 16/09/2003). 
 
7:22 “Many articles, programmes, meetings and conferences have been and will in 
future be devoted to the problem of the introduction of the state language. This 
question has been discussed for more than ten years at a great many levels. True, 
judgements and suggestions with regard to the state language at the moment wear a 
very emotional character. And you won’t get far on emotion. Frequently slogans 
predominate here… But all of us, not just scientists, journalists and officials, but 
society as a whole, have realised that national policy and as part of that, language 
policy, has its own particularities in each state. Kazakhstan has its own historical 
traditions. Within that Kazakhstan was part of the Soviet Union for a relatively long 
period where a historically motivated language policy was conducted, and to 
overcome the resulting tendencies in a short period of time is a very complicated 
proposal. This is shown in the experience of many other states.”   
(Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, )  – , 
, , 16/12/2003). 
 
7:23 “They say now that after the war there was a policy of Russification when they 
began to shut Kazakh schools. This is true, but it isn’t all. In my view, the biggest 
part of the blame for the present position of the Kazakh language lies with the 
Kazakhs themselves who didn’t see any prospects in their native language and 
wanted their children to study in the Russian language. I, at least, have formed the 
impression that Kazakh schools were closed not because such was the order from 
Moscow, but because Kazakh parents removed their children to Russian schools.”  
(Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, )  , 14/05/04). 
 
7:25 “The Russian language is not the enemy of the other national languages of the 
peoples of the countries of the Commonwealth, but a friend and ally. The national 
languages of the peoples of the states of the CIS are great languages. There is 
outstanding classical and contemporary literature in them. Each of them has enriched 
the lexicon of the contemporary Russian language. Their potential opportunities are 
inexhaustible. However, artificial attempts to oppose the national languages and the 
Russian language, ousting the latter from various spheres of public life, are futile. 
The fact remains that the Russian language has exerted and continues to exert a 
beneficial influence on the spiritual development of the peoples of the states of the 
post-Soviet space. The Russian language remains the language of high culture, an 
information channel between the countries of the CIS and also between them and the 
international community.”  
(Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, . , 15/09/2004). 
 
7:26 “It is not by accident then that … so many songs and poems about Russia, about 
friendship and brotherhood of the peoples, about the strength and attractiveness of 
the Russian word were heard. And it is not by accident that so many school pupils 
took part in the concert. Moreover, they weren’t just from Russian schools but from 
Kazakh ones too. 
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…Verses of Kazakh poets declaring their love for the Russian language in the 
heartfelt delivery of…the older classes couldn’t leave the public unmoved.”  
(Ekspress-K, &      …, 27/05/2004). 
 
7:27 “The book shows, with what great love the foremost Russian and European 
scholars related to the Kazakh people, its rituals, customs and language and how 
carefully and tremulously they preserved the immortal examples of Kazakh oral 
literature for descendents… Most interesting of all is the view of the Russian on 
nomadic culture. The first recordings in the Russian language at that time of the 
Kazakh folk tales, omens, beliefs, good-wishes, curses, lyrical songs and poetry 
contests cannot fail to provoke readers’ interest as they are now placed in this 
book… The year of Russia in Kazakhstan is marked by the invisible presence of the 
beneficial role of the first scholars and travellers who, having trodden this Kazakh 
land in the distant past, fell in love with it.”  
(Ekspress-K, /   “$…”, 01/10/2004).  
 
7:29 “I will say at once that I don’t see Russian as any kind of barrier to fully 
mastering Kazakh. The fact is that today out of the peoples of Central Asia Kazakhs 
know Russian the best of all but are the worst of all at knowing their own language. 
In other countries they can be proud of the better knowledge of their language but the 
level of knowledge of Russian has fallen, and fallen substantially. I am sure that this 
is not the best route to progress. In Kazakhstan we need to draw from this the 
conclusion that we should attain a good knowledge of our native language whilst 
preserving an excellent knowledge of Russian as a recognized world language and 
add to this English as the most important world language.”  
(Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, )  , 14/05/04). 
 
7:30 “The striving of the countries which are members of the CIS to widen their 
connections with the international community also promotes an acknowledgement of 
the advantage of knowing Russian as a language of international cooperation. 
…The existence of the Russian language in the territories of the countries of the CIS 
presents a particular opportunity for national-Russian and Russian-national bi- and 
multilingualism and a balanced use of the state and Russian languages in the spheres 
of education, mass information and official-business relations. To preserve and 
support the Russian language and culture in the territories of the CIS is our common 
task, the beneficial consequences of which are hard to over-estimate.”  
(Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, .  15/09/2004). 
 
7:31 “N. Nazarbaev noted that the state would undertake serious efforts for the 
development of other languages, especially Russian and English: It is possible it is 
even necessary to increase the number of hours of teaching of these languages. There 
is nothing bad in our children growing up multilingual, he concluded.”  
(Liter, ‘   ’, 13/10/2004). 
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7:34 “It is necessary to widen the sphere of use of the state language, implementing it 
in the post service, on public transport and in the spheres of communications, trade 
and healthcare. 
Unfortunately, many measures for the development of the state language become a 
formality. In the majority of organisations and businesses documents are drawn up in 
the Kazakh and Russian languages. There are translators on the staff, and here and 
there, even whole departments of translators. On paper all is carried out smoothly 
and the examining body, as a rule, don’t find fault with anything. In practice, the 
Kazakh language documents arise as a result of translation from the Russian text. 
Orders and instructions in businesses and organisations are not developed, not used 
in practice and exist at the level of translations, they are filed in folders and, after a 
lapse of time, surrendered to the archives.”  
(Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, *   … 25/03/2004).  
 
7:35 “It is a sufficient period of time that every intelligent person should be 
penetrated by a feeling of responsibility for the fate of the state language…” 
 
“In the past Kazakh occupied second place after Russian, today it has slipped to third 
place, in that English has become one of the dominant languages on the sovereign 
territory of Kazakhstan…” 
 
“If the airwaves and the screens create a monolingual atmosphere then the 
bureaucratic forces quietly rejoice that for the present nobody is disturbing them on 
the subject of knowledge of the state language. Brief meetings, office chats, planning 
sessions, gatherings, meetings, briefings, press-conferences, ‘round tables’, meetings 
of the Parliament and Senate, negotiations and cultural get-togethers all happen in 
Russian. Only the occasional anniversary celebration reminds us that all the same we 
are Kazakhs and the better half of our compatriots live, not just anywhere, but in 
Kazakhstan… In a word, in the information space and in all spheres of activity the 
Russian language rules absolutely.”  
(Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, ' ,  ? 13/12/2003) 
 
7:37 “This question [of the protection and promotion of the language] can’t leave 
anyone unaffected. In all civilised countries the state language has the required 
status. As concerns our citizens, a serious demand for the study of the Kazakh 
language needs to emerge. For example, for acceptance into the civil service it would 
not be unnecessary to demand knowledge of Kazakh. In the course of promotion up 
the service ladder it is necessary to pay attention to the ability of a given worker to 
communicate and conduct documentation in the state language.” 
(Kazakhstanskaya Pravda,  
  , 20/03/2005). 
 
7:39 “That is one more particular about our constitution: it provides ‘favourable 
conditions for the development not just of the state language, but also of the 
languages of the peoples of Kazakhstan as a whole’. Representatives of more than 
forty nationalities live in Atirau oblast… Answers to citizens’ applications are given 
in the language of address. The local executive bodies assist the national diasporas 
with the study of their national language, culture, customs and traditions. Every year 
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festivals of the languages of the peoples of Kazakhstan are held, where every 
national-cultural centre marks the celebrations of its peoples and where you can hear 
Bashkiri, German, Ukrainian, Korean, Chechen and Georgian spoken by native 
speakers.” 




7:43 “Let me say that national security and internal stability in a multi-national and 
multi-confessional state remain important priorities as long as such a state exists. In 
the management of the republic there must always be a platform for the association 
of all peoples.”  
(Liter, 	 

 –  
, 12/10/2005). 
 
7:46 “We are filled with optimism for stability, peace, accord and creativity: the size 
of pensions are growing, the size of salaries is increasing. In the speed, volume and 
quality of socio-economic reform, improvements to the political system and the 
democratisation of the state and society, Kazakhstan is one of the leaders in the 
C.I.S. The republic is widely recognised in the world and its international authority 
grows from day to day. A solid foundation for our independent statehood has been 




  , 16/09/2003). 
 
7:48 “One of the tasks which is a priority for Kazakhstan for the strengthening of an 
open economy and its modernisation, is entry into the World Trade Organisation. 
The negotiation process for entry into the W.T.O. is going at full speed…” 
(Liter, Welcome, $! 15/06/2005).  
 
7:51 “First of all, [the electoral reforms] have occurred against a background of 
general liberalisation of the political system. They are being conducted 
systematically, on the basis of the integrated resolution of the task of social 
development. For this every new stage of political reform is closely tied to the level 
of development of the economy, of civil society, of the political and legal culture of 
the population. Only in this way can the country get through this difficult period 
successfully, build a modern society and become a natural part of the global world, 
said the Head of state.”  
(Kazakhstanskaya Pravda,   –  , 
13/10/2004). 
 
7:52 “Characterising the development of education in the country, the President 
noted that Kazakhstan has reached a new stage of development where many tasks in 
all areas of life are able to be addressed and among these are education and science. 
The growth of the country’s economy demands not just financial investment. To a 
large degree it is provided for by human factors, intellectual investment.” 




7:53 “Speaking about the tasks of science, it is necessary to comprehend clearly that 
Kazakhstan cannot preserve its scientific potential without a link to the national 
economy, and the economy cannot become competitive without the support of 
science. In the modern world there has been an acknowledgement that the economic 
success of states is determined by their systems of education and the degree of 
education of their citizens.” 
(Kazakhstanskaya Pravda,   –  , 
13/10/2004). 
 
7:57 “The development of education and the sciences is a political and national task. 
It is precisely for this reason that it cannot be fulfilled by being a departmental 
project. In connection with this the President has set the mission of developing a new 
state programme of education, the status of which is widely discussed in Kazakhstani 
society. 
The tasks set are serious, much must be done quickly, in an orderly way and, 
importantly, effectively. The preparatory stage for the realisation of the state-
programme has been carried out. In recent years the finance budgeted for education 
and the sciences has increased significantly. Thus, if in the present year it consists of 
one hundred and ninety-two billion, then next year it is planned to increase it to two 
hundred and fifty billion tenge”. 
(Kazakhstanskaya Pravda,   –  , 
13/10/2004). 
 
7:58 “…the domestic system of education has turned out to be incapable of adapting 
to contemporary economic conditions. In the sphere of education a bloc of problems 
with the system have appeared which the government has tried to solve for a period 
of ten years by carrying out modernisation of separate segments of the educational 
system. The independence of educational establishments of all levels has increased, 
their rights have expanded in the choice of a curriculum, of textbooks and methods of 
teaching… a new type of educational organisation has arisen, the non-state sector of 
education has been founded. 
But all this has yet to lead to the attainment of the foundational aim, noted the Head 
of state. 
Firstly, the measures taken have not provided for a rise in the quality of education. 
…the steps taken have not led to the adaptation of the domestic system of education 
to an international educational standard.” 
(Kazakhstanskaya Pravda,   –  , 
13/10/2004). 
 
7:59 “The gathering has ended. Of course it is not possible to discuss absolutely 
everything in a short time, and such an aim has not been pursued, the main thing is 
that teachers and academics feel that the state is placing the development of 
education and the sciences amongst its main priorities.” 
(Kazakhstanskaya Pravda,   –  , 
13/10/2004). 
 
7:60 “In five new schools teaching will be conducted in the state language. 
Incidentally, in the words of the vice-minister, there is a tendency towards an 
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increase in the number attending schools where the main language of instruction is 
Kazakh. Such that 58 percent of reception class pupils are going to Kazakh schools. 
As a whole in the republic linguistic parity is preserved: 1 million 600 thousand 
school pupils study in the state language and 1 million 200 thousand study in other 
national languages, in which number Russian is included. 
The mass introduction of technology to educational establishments is continuing: 65 
percent of schools (of which 57 percent are rural) today have a telephone line, 44 
percent of schools are already connected to the Internet. Thirty-one technical 
vocational schools and 25 colleges are computerised. Seven hundred and seventeen 
small schools in remote villages are connected to satellite channels and the Internet. 
Alas, despite the visible activity of educational workers it is impossible to consider 
the campaign for introducing technology as completed. At the acknowledgement of 
the vice-minister, ‘today there is one computer for every 54 pupils’.”  
(Ekspress-K, 1 , 26/08/2004). 
 
7:61 “-I have seen these pearls and pseudo-discoveries with my own eyes- said N. 
Nazarbaev, and quoted aloud several obvious blunders which provoked applause 
from the teachers: 
…A textbook of the history of ancient Kazakhstan considers that every year 6 pupil 
must know the construction of 29 burial mounds and remember their dimensions. 
Why?! Especially ‘admirable’ is the assertion that an arrow from a sak had deadly 
force at a distance of 800 metres. Not every modern weapon could reach such a 
distance. Reading the history textbooks you will be truly surprised at how the authors 
transform unfounded legends into historical facts. Such falsifications won’t make 
school pupils into patriots of the country who will be proud of their history… Don’t 
joke with history… It is difficult to learn from a textbook in which there is not only 
abnormal didactic material but also a mass of factual and stylistic mistakes. 
…[T]he head of state was distressed that to this time not one decent textbook of the 
recent history of Kazakhstan has been written.” 
(Liter, “”   , 13/10/2004). 
 
7:62 “In all times and among all peoples the study of the foundations of the 
grammar, rhetoric and poetry begins with an introduction to the ethics and 
philosophy of the national language and the creative legacy of those who have 
historical merit in the study, development and propaganda of the given language. 
Such came to be for the Russian language such indisputable authorities as 
Lomonosov, Pushkin, Gogol, Turgenev, Tolstoy, Chekhov, Bunin and a great 
number more of the first rank who shone.  
What was my surprise when I saw that it turned out that the honour of a creative 
‘presentation’ of the Russian language in the new academic year had been given to… 
no, not Pushkin and Bunin, and not even to Trediakovskom and Nekrasov, but to a 
certain A. Kypchishin, author of the new ode ‘to the great and mighty’ under the title 
‘Language of Accord’.” 
(Liter,  “
” ! 25/01/2005). 
 
7:63 “The question of the fight with corruption has not escaped the attention of the 
alternative candidates. In particular, Eleysizov considers this fight an important task 
of all branches and organs of power… 
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Abilkasimov names the main direction of his anticorruption activity as among the 
highest responsibilities of the faces of state, oblast and city akims, leaders of the 
judiciary and power structures and national companies… 
With regards to Baimenov and Tuyakbaya, they, without touching on the theme of 
the fight with corruption itself, at the same time suggest anti-corruption measures of 
a chiefly social-economic character within the framework of various of their 
programmed regulations.” 
(Liter, 0  $
 « »? 18/11/2005). 
 
7:69 “The book shows, with what great love the foremost Russian and European 
scholars related to the Kazakh people, its rituals, customs and language and how 
carefully and tremulously they preserved the immortal examples of Kazakh oral 
literature for descendents… The year of Russia in Kazakhstan is marked by the 
invisible presence of the beneficial role of the first scholars and travellers who, 
having trodden this Kazakh land in the distant past, fell in love with it.”  
(Ekspress-K, /   “$…”, 01/10/2004). 
 
7:74 “As we see, the epoch of Makhambet, the XIX century, was a century of great 
and small anti-colonial uprisings and fights for the national interests which every 
now and then burst into flame in different corners of the Kazakh steppe… 
It is known that in the epoch of colonialism there was open mass protest and the 
refusal to submit to the authorities did not disappear together with the fall of 
autocracy, but had a place too in the Soviet reality…” 
(Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, 	
  
  , 16/09/2003). 
 
7:77 “ ‘Take vengeance for us, having loudly demanded Equality!’ once exclaimed 
our fathers, who in the dark nights of history spent their lives in the fight and ended 
them in the bitterness of hopelessness, also did not live to until the dawn of freedom. 
As if having heard this call of his ancestors, Makhambet appeared in the world as a 
son of the people, able to raise his rebellious head and his bold voice to the 
executioners and tormentors of his people, and defending the desecrated honour of 
his native land enter a clearly unequal fight…the arrow of Makhambet hit the target 
and the day came when his dream was realised. And therefore Makhambet did not 
disappear… together with his epoch, Makhambet is our contemporary.” 
(Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, 	
  
  , 16/09/2003). 
 
Chapter 8 
8:4 “First of all Kazakhstanis very much want to find their place on this planet as a 
state and are doing everything possible towards this, in the economic sphere and in 
the political sphere alike… it’s now made the transition to deciding its own problems 
on a large scale and on the whole to building a very peaceful and to try to build a 
relationship, a peaceful relationship with all countries, with all elements of society.”  
 
8:5 “Today there are already things to be proud of. Many Kazakhstanis when they 
communicate, I do myself, and when we communicate with colleagues or just with 
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inhabitants of Kyrgyzia there or of Moldova or Belorussia, we see that understanding 
of the questions of the process itself of economic development, the founding of the 
state and development there of democratic institutions we are a little in front and we 
are proud of that and we can, we are surprised let’s say when Uzbek colleagues ask 
us questions which seem to us very naïve, we’ve already passed all that, already 
understand it all, because Kazakhstan is a little higher in development… 
…in society in the last years the understanding has begun to mature that this state is 
definitely here, that it’s the state of Kazakhstan with a state language which must be 
accepted… 
If the state is to respect the national peculiarities of each people, then that people will 
truly relate to the state with respect.”  
 
8:6 “The main characteristics of a state identity? Well I think it’s national power, it’s 
patriotism, it’s respect for your elders, that’s very developed in Kazakhstan, it’s 
hospitality, it’s the openness of the country for all, we are open to the whole world 
and we are proud of that. We very much, our people, and all those who live here we 
call our people, regardless of nationality or ethnic group.”  
 
8:14 “In the Republic of Kazakhstan there is provision for the founding of pre-school 
organisations functioning in the state language, and in areas of compact habitation of 
national groups – in their languages. 
The language of instruction and upbringing in children’s homes and equivalent 
organisations is decided by local executive organs with reference to the national 
composition of their contingent. 
The Republic of Kazakhstan provides for receiving primary, foundational secondary, 
general secondary, technical and professional, further, higher and postgraduate 
education in the state language, in Russian and where necessary and possible, in 
other languages. In educational organisations the state language and Russian 
language are compulsory subjects of study and are on the list of disciplines included 
in the document on education.”  
 
8:15 “The Republic of Kazakhstan provides for the functioning of the state language 
and other languages in printed output and the mass media. 
With the aim of creating the necessary linguistic environment and the proper 
functioning of the state language the volume of programmes on television channels 
in the state language, regardless of their individual form, must not be less in time 
than the sum of the volume of programmes in other languages.”  
 
8:17 “Unfortunately here the mass media often don’t fulfil that law. Well, we have a 
procurator who must oversee the fulfilment of the law, and there is a language 
committee which should control the fulfilment of the law on languages. I would like 
them to work more by principle but what the commercial structure is interested in is 
earning more money and sometimes they don’t observe the law on languages, we 
know that, we know that. But if the authorities start to punish them, they start to 
shout that we don’t have freedom of speech, that they are being forced et cetera, 
unfortunately that’s what happens.”  
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8:18 “…it doesn’t work as we would have liked because there are watchable times as 
you know and unwatchable times and our mass media in some ways uses this to 
make things difficult” 
  
8:24 “In Kazakhstan for instance, Kazakh schools… the programme of study was not 
equal with the Russian language ones, therefore… for instance my older daughter, 
when we received independence I sent her to a Kazakh school and it was very 
difficult, it was very difficult for her because the programme there wasn’t good 
enough, there were no textbooks… I had to move her, after class five I sent her to a 
Russian school… the time will come when all children for instance, all Kazakhs will 
probably try to send their children to a Kazakh school. But today there is this 
problem so many of my friends of the same age, their children study in Russian 
schools to this day and my children study in a Russian school even though I too am 
maybe a patriot like, but I’ve understood that for children today in comparison [they] 
are given a better education by Russian schools.”  
 
8:25 “We don’t yet have enough teachers who can teach subjects in Kazakh and we 
don’t yet have enough textbooks.”  
 
8:26 “I know that now there are more Russian schools still. Before there were very 
few Kazakh schools, now this process is being equalised, evened out, but all the 
same there are still more Russian schools”  
 
8:27 “We have, with the acquisition of independence, a special state programme for 
the production of textbooks, national textbooks. I spoke about how before our history 
was so to say, more oriented to the Communists and let’s say even in ancient history 
they hardly wrote at all about those who fought for independence, that’s the first 
thing. And secondly, for us everything was oriented towards Moscow we say, well 
Ru, it was about Russia so now we need to change the history, now there are changes 
in Kazakh literature, literature in general, many aspects are changing.”  
 
8:28 “Whereas before we studied the history of the USSR, history according to the 
USSR, now we’ve already tipped the other way, we pay a lot of attention to the 
history of Kazakhstan although we don’t have good textbooks, here there is a 
problem I know”  
 
8:36 “Well I can say that more than 100 nationalities live on the territory of our 
republic… I can answer you, they’re friendly, so many nationalities live in peace and 
harmony… the aim of the Kazakh people, the state, the government [is] to live in 
peace and harmony.”  
 
8:37 “The people of Kazakhstan are a multinational people, 131 nationalities live in 
our Karaganda oblast. They are a friendly people, you know in Kazakhstan we have 
the Assembly of the Peoples of Kazakhstan, the chairman of the Assembly is our 
president. Similar to this assembly we have small assemblies in every region, every 
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oblast and the Akim of the oblast heads up the small assembly of the oblast. The 
people living in the oblast, 131 nationalities, are friendly peaceable.”  
 
8:46 “Well we received our independence in ’91 and so at last Kazakh became the 
state language, our original culture began to develop… and if at first having the 
Kazakh language as the state language is a bit uncomfortable because many people 
don’t know Kazakh, now there is a great thrust as many of our children learn in 
kindergartens in Kazakh from an early age. That is, we are far from saying that 
Kazakhstan is for Kazakhs, we say that Kazakhstan is for Kazakhstanis, in light of 
this the people who will live here and work here must use the language of 
independence of the republic.”  
 
8:47 “[The most important markers are] the language first and foremost. I would say 
probably traditions, history, culture, uh and probably the traditions of our ancestors.”  
 
8:70 “That needs to be worked at. In general, how to put it? I understand that state 
identity is on the whole founded on some kind of state idea on an idea of state policy 
which united everyone, which sparked off and called up national pride and would 
cause an accompanying striving to identify oneself with this state.”  
 
8:71 “Since the acquisition of independence, of course it was ’91, the people of 
Kazakhstan with every year become more and more sure and feel that the state cares 
about the people. There are many state programmes directed towards the well-being 
of the peoples living in Kazakhstan and for example every year the head of our state, 
our president reads out before the people a message laying out a task for the 
following year for the government and the government works on these questions 
which are reflected by the president in his message. As a rule these questions are all 
social plans, social directions for the improvement of the well-being of our people.”  
 
8:77 “Well you know that society develops, it doesn’t stand still, that is foundational, 
from there, with the development of society, from there the state identity of the 
people living here also develops. With every year some kind of programmes are 
accepted and with every year problems are set and the people living in Kazakhstan 
solves these problems. It improves itself, enriches itself from year to year.”  
 
8:78 “The main characteristics of a state identity?… Many have suffered in this land, 
there are testing sites for everything possible, nuclear explosions, ecological 
disasters, therefore our people greatly love and value their land and are ready, as they 
say, to fight for it to protect it if that is necessary. But on the whole to emphasise that 




Appendix D: Change over Time 
 
The present study follows two earlier pieces of research carried out in Shymkent. 
The first of these involved questionnaires on language use and was carried out in 
1999-2000 as part of an undergraduate dissertation. The second was carried out as 
the data collection stage of an MSc. It also involved the use of questionnaires and 
was undertaken in 2003. The sample populations in these studies were similar to that 
of the present study as the vast majority of the questionnaires were completed by 
students attending local schools and universities and by those making use of facilities 
at an English language library and teaching centre. Both these studies also asked 
participants about their use of Kazakh and Russian. It is therefore possible to make a 
reasonable comparison over a period of five years of a sample student age 
population’s competency in Russian and Kazakh. Although this time scale is not as 
great as could be wished it is nonetheless valid as an indication of stability or change 
of language use within the community.  
 
As Figure 9.1 below shows the self reported use of Russian and Kazakh by Kazakh 
participants has remained very stable during the five years represented. Similarly all 
Russians and nearly all minority group members participating in the studies 
consistently report knowledge of Russian. However, both these groups, and 
particularly the ethnic Russians reported low levels of knowledge of Kazakh in the 
2000 study, with a higher proportion of each group claiming some use of Kazakh in 
2003 and higher proportions again doing so in 2005. It would seem from these 
figures that as time has passed since independence increasing numbers of Russians 
and ethnic minority groups are willing and, or able to learn Kazakh. Whether this is 
because a younger post-independence generation has less prejudice against Kazakh 
as a language, has more opportunities to learn it or because it is increasingly seen as 
necessary in the job market is not immediately clear but it is likely that all these 
factors play a part. What is clear is that the Kazakh language is now spoken by a 
much higher proportion of the population than was the case five years ago.  
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Kazakh 95% 99% 98% 14% 19% 63% 44% 42% 99%
Russian 100% 97% 98% 100% 100% 100% 100% 96% 100%
2000 2003 2005 2000 2003 2005 2000 2003 2005





Appendix E: Quotes in Original Russian 
 
Chapter 6 
6:309 “,       
 
  ,     
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